Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

People without conscience concluding that morality isn't real, is like people born blind concluding that sight isn't real, or like people born deaf concluding that hearing isn't real.

Indeed so.

And they never think to ask, how did we ever get the "ears" and "eyes" for this thing that was never real?

[FlashDangerpants]

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.

That's an argument for why you think there ought to be moral fact as you find the alternative undesirable.
You probably don't want to argue that there is moral fact because there ought to be.

[Harbal]

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.

But all these people have morality of some colour; just a different colour to yours and mine. That kind of strongly suggests that morality is a very relative thing.

[Immanuel Can]

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.

That's an argument for why you think there ought to be moral fact as you find the alternative undesirable.

A prudential argument? Yes, it is -- in part. But it's also a rational one, because the fact of incommensurable moral systems is undeniable. So whatever "morality" is, if it's a thing at all, it's not merely "socially relative." That neither works in practice nor makes sense in theory.

[Immanuel Can]

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.

But all these people have morality of some colour; just a different colour to yours and mine. That kind of strongly suggests that morality is a very relative thing.

That's mistaking two propositions for one another. One is that people have different views of what morality is, in particular. The other is that they have SOME view at all.

It is true that everybody has some view of what morality is. But the fact of their substantive disagreements proves that if "morality" is anything it all, it's not a relative thing.

But as you suggested before, it could be nothing at all. It could be just some inexplicable universal delusion. People think things can be right and wrong, but really, none can. However, that's neither what people empirically think, nor is it possible to run any society, even of two people, that way.

[Atla]

People without conscience concluding that morality isn't real, is like people born blind concluding that sight isn't real, or like people born deaf concluding that hearing isn't real.

Indeed so.

And they never think to ask, how did we ever get the "ears" and "eyes" for this thing that was never real?

I was referring to you. You can't understand that humans have a moral sense of rightness and wrongness, because you don't have one, and are also a bad observer of human nature so you don't notice it in others either. But having a real moral sense, doesn't automatically mean that there must also be an objective morality. Morality isn't inherently rational either

[Immanuel Can]

People without conscience concluding that morality isn't real, is like people born blind concluding that sight isn't real, or like people born deaf concluding that hearing isn't real.

Indeed so.

And they never think to ask, how did we ever get the "ears" and "eyes" for this thing that was never real?

I was referring to you.

That's bizarre. And it's erroneous, of course; and it's irrelevant to the question, as well. But okay...please yourself.

But having a real moral sense, doesn't automatically mean that there must also be an objective morality.

No, it only means it's an objective fact that everybody has some sense of morality. They could possibly all be deluded, it's true. But then, that raises an important secondary question: how do we explain the fact that everybody in the world has some sense of morality, if there is absolutely no objective property to which this phenomenon corresponds? How did we all get "eyes" and "ears" for a non-existent thing?

So that's an explanation I'd want to hear.

[Harbal]

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.

But all these people have morality of some colour; just a different colour to yours and mine. That kind of strongly suggests that morality is a very relative thing.

That's mistaking two propositions for one another. One is that people have different views of what morality is, in particular. The other is that they have SOME view at all.

It is true that everybody has some view of what morality is. But the fact of their substantive disagreements proves that if "morality" is anything it all, it's not a relative thing.

But as you suggested before, it could be nothing at all. It could be just some inexplicable universal delusion. People think things can be right and wrong, but really, none can. However, that's neither what people empirically think, nor is it possible to run any society, even of two people, that way.

So what's the alternative; adopt the morality prescribed by somebody's God? But then what if it isn't your God?

[Atla]

Indeed so.

And they never think to ask, how did we ever get the "ears" and "eyes" for this thing that was never real?

I was referring to you.

That's bizarre. And it's erroneous, of course; and it's irrelevant to the question, as well. But okay...please yourself.

But having a real moral sense, doesn't automatically mean that there must also be an objective morality.

No, it only means it's an objective fact that everybody has some sense of morality. They could possibly all be deluded, it's true. But then, that raises an important secondary question: how do we explain the fact that everybody in the world has some sense of morality, if there is absolutely no objective property to which this phenomenon corresponds? How did we all get "eyes" and "ears" for a non-existent thing?

So that's an explanation I'd want to hear.

Not everyone has an inherent sense of morality, for example you don't have one, but I'd say it's at least partially in our DNA, and I'd say over 90% of humans have it.
The obvious answer seems to be that morality evolved to increase the survival and well-being of the tribe. For example it's bad to kill other members of your tribe. Then humans even became self-aware, and could abstract away this sense of rightness and wrongness.

[FlashDangerpants]

I don't see morality as a matter of logic, or rationality, which leaves me unable to respond to your question in those terms, I'm afraid.

Well, the upshot of that would be we'd have to conclude that morality isn't anything at all...at least, not any REAL thing. So "killing" (or whatever) cannot be prohibited at all. It can't even in any extended sense, actually be "wrong."

And I think that's now how most people think it is. Some may say that morality is strong enough to be objective, and some may say it's something weaker and more subjective; but hardly anybody would be willing to say it's actually nothing.

And, of course, that raises the next question: if morality is nothing, then how has it even appeared? And how has it appeared so universally, since it must then utterly fail to correspond to any feature of reality at all? Never mind the question of how society is to proceed in practice, since we have now completely debunked any legitimate ability to coordinate a public moral expectation.

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I agree, for reasons thusly so....

In Japan, table manners are such that it is rude not to slurp your food. In England, a gentleman never slurps. In some places it is rude to stare and in others not so much. Must we overrule the Japanese and fix their broken manners, or do we consider manners to be a social artifact in which certain rules of behaviour have been constructed locally? It seems you and I take the latter view, we are not manners-realists.

At least once a week I have a Teams meeting with American colleagues to discuss various plans. Every fucking time, they always talk about the weather for a while. This is of course an inversion of custom, probably brought about by their expectation that limeys always talk about clouds for 5 minutes before doing anything useful. They are in California though and it's always on fire, so I guess they have more weather concerns than we do right now. It seems to me that customs are the sort of cultural artifacts that we use, and need, but the exact contents of what is the usual package of customs can vary quite a lot. That would be because the value of customs lies mainly in making social situations somewhat predictable, much like with manners. I am therefore not a customs-realist, and I ask mister Harbal, do I have your agreement on this? I suspect I do.

I once did a big IT project for a billionaire from the general area of the mid east, who was decking out his London mansion and needed a massive wifi network so that his techy nerd household could operate wirelessly. Never met the guy once, but I did see how he was fitting out the pad and it was the most garish tasteless monstrosity ever, it made Donald trump's horrible golden palace look refined and tasteful. But it would have been completely fitting to him, the place he's from is one where all that shit is considered excellent taste. So I am not a taste-realist any more than I am a moral-realist or a customs-realist. Assuming you've been with me so far, can I assume you still are?

Taste, customs, fashions, manners, these are all social constructs that we use in our practices and our interractions. It's important to have them, it seems important to change them, sometimes to rebel and flout them. What is less important is the exact contents of them. They are all highly debatable, and we have ways of performing reason upon them, but the question of whether this or that is really actually truly rude is often moot.

I see no reason why morality, to the extent that it is actually a singular thing at all (doubtful to be honest) should be different from those other things. I think I am allowed to not like corduroy trousers without having to prove that they are bad in some universally indisputable way that makes no sense to me.

[Harbal]

Well, the upshot of that would be we'd have to conclude that morality isn't anything at all...at least, not any REAL thing. So "killing" (or whatever) cannot be prohibited at all. It can't even in any extended sense, actually be "wrong."

And I think that's now how most people think it is. Some may say that morality is strong enough to be objective, and some may say it's something weaker and more subjective; but hardly anybody would be willing to say it's actually nothing.

And, of course, that raises the next question: if morality is nothing, then how has it even appeared? And how has it appeared so universally, since it must then utterly fail to correspond to any feature of reality at all? Never mind the question of how society is to proceed in practice, since we have now completely debunked any legitimate ability to coordinate a public moral expectation.

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I agree, for reasons thusly so....

In Japan, table manners are such that it is rude not to slurp your food. In England, a gentleman never slurps. In some places it is rude to stare and in others not so much. Must we overrule the Japanese and fix their broken manners, or do we consider manners to be a social artifact in which certain rules of behaviour have been constructed locally? It seems you and I take the latter view, we are not manners-realists.

At least once a week I have a Teams meeting with American colleagues to discuss various plans. Every fucking time, they always talk about the weather for a while. This is of course an inversion of custom, probably brought about by their expectation that limeys always talk about clouds for 5 minutes before doing anything useful. They are in California though and it's always on fire, so I guess they have more weather concerns than we do right now. It seems to me that customs are the sort of cultural artifacts that we use, and need, but the exact contents of what is the usual package of customs can vary quite a lot. That would be because the value of customs lies mainly in making social situations somewhat predictable, much like with manners. I am therefore not a customs-realist, and I ask mister Harbal, do I have your agreement on this? I suspect I do.

I once did a big IT project for a billionaire from the general area of the mid east, who was decking out his London mansion and needed a massive wifi network so that his techy nerd household could operate wirelessly. Never met the guy once, but I did see how he was fitting out the pad and it was the most garish tasteless monstrosity ever, it made Donald trump's horrible golden palace look refined and tasteful. But it would have been completely fitting to him, the place he's from is one where all that shit is considered excellent taste. So I am not a taste-realist any more than I am a moral-realist or a customs-realist. Assuming you've been with me so far, can I assume you still are?

Taste, customs, fashions, manners, these are all social constructs that we use in our practices and our interractions. It's important to have them, it seems important to change them, sometimes to rebel and flout them. What is less important is the exact contents of them. They are all highly debatable, and we have ways of performing reason upon them, but the question of whether this or that is really actually truly rude is often moot.

I see no reason why morality, to the extent that it is actually a singular thing at all (doubtful to be honest) should be different from those other things. I think I am allowed to not like corduroy trousers without having to prove that they are bad in some universally indisputable way that makes no sense to me.

Yes, Flash, I endorse this.

[Immanuel Can]

But all these people have morality of some colour; just a different colour to yours and mine. That kind of strongly suggests that morality is a very relative thing.

That's mistaking two propositions for one another. One is that people have different views of what morality is, in particular. The other is that they have SOME view at all.

It is true that everybody has some view of what morality is. But the fact of their substantive disagreements proves that if "morality" is anything it all, it's not a relative thing.

But as you suggested before, it could be nothing at all. It could be just some inexplicable universal delusion. People think things can be right and wrong, but really, none can. However, that's neither what people empirically think, nor is it possible to run any society, even of two people, that way.

So what's the alternative; adopt the morality prescribed by somebody's God? But then what if it isn't your God?

Men worship many gods, it's true. And even those who refuse the thought of any god end up offering their tributes to something less worthy...such as themselves. So the "worship" of something is inevitable, because we all find we have to choose some orientation point for our life projects. Around that, all our activities end up constellating. And perhaps the most foolish god is "myself," since I cannot possibly not know that I am a contingent and temporal being, doomed to die soon. So I'm worshipping a perishing ghost, then, organizing my whole life around a piece of dust.

But one can worship something that is objectively real, or one can worship things that are illusory. If morality is objective, it could only be grounded in the only Supreme Being there actually is. And if there were none, then morality would indeed be nothing but a popular delusion.

[Immanuel Can]

I was referring to you.

That's bizarre. And it's erroneous, of course; and it's irrelevant to the question, as well. But okay...please yourself.

But having a real moral sense, doesn't automatically mean that there must also be an objective morality.

No, it only means it's an objective fact that everybody has some sense of morality. They could possibly all be deluded, it's true. But then, that raises an important secondary question: how do we explain the fact that everybody in the world has some sense of morality, if there is absolutely no objective property to which this phenomenon corresponds? How did we all get "eyes" and "ears" for a non-existent thing?

So that's an explanation I'd want to hear.

Not everyone has an inherent sense of morality,

Actually, they do. Go mess with their husband or wife, or their children, and see what happens. They'll have an opinion about whether what you've done is right or wrong, for sure.

The obvious answer seems to be that morality evolved to increase the survival and well-being of the tribe. For example it's bad to kill other members of your tribe.

That's not at all obvious. Lions kill other dominant lions, so that they can take over the pride and the "lion's share" of the resources. They kill the cubs of the former lion, and put all the females in estrus that way. Why would humans operate any differently? Kill the dominant member of the tribe, become the tribal chief, and get all the babes...

Evolutionary explanations are always shady, at best, but they become really apocryphal when it comes to morality.

[Harbal]

That's mistaking two propositions for one another. One is that people have different views of what morality is, in particular. The other is that they have SOME view at all.

It is true that everybody has some view of what morality is. But the fact of their substantive disagreements proves that if "morality" is anything it all, it's not a relative thing.

But as you suggested before, it could be nothing at all. It could be just some inexplicable universal delusion. People think things can be right and wrong, but really, none can. However, that's neither what people empirically think, nor is it possible to run any society, even of two people, that way.

So what's the alternative; adopt the morality prescribed by somebody's God? But then what if it isn't your God?

Men worship many gods, it's true. And even those who refuse the thought of any god end up offering their tributes to something less worthy...such as themselves. So the "worship" of something is inevitable, because we all find we have to choose some orientation point for our life projects. Around that, all our activities end up constellating. And perhaps the most foolish god is "myself," since I cannot possibly not know that I am a contingent and temporal being, doomed to die soon. So I'm worshipping a perishing ghost, then, organizing my whole life around a piece of dust.

But one can worship something that is objectively real, or one can worship things that are illusory. If morality is objective, it could only be grounded in the only Supreme Being there actually is. And if there were none, then morality would indeed be nothing but a popular delusion.

That's all very well IC, but I simply couldn't bring myself to lower my moral standands just to comply with the demands of someone else's god.

[Immanuel Can]

So what's the alternative; adopt the morality prescribed by somebody's God? But then what if it isn't your God?

Men worship many gods, it's true. And even those who refuse the thought of any god end up offering their tributes to something less worthy...such as themselves. So the "worship" of something is inevitable, because we all find we have to choose some orientation point for our life projects. Around that, all our activities end up constellating. And perhaps the most foolish god is "myself," since I cannot possibly not know that I am a contingent and temporal being, doomed to die soon. So I'm worshipping a perishing ghost, then, organizing my whole life around a piece of dust.

But one can worship something that is objectively real, or one can worship things that are illusory. If morality is objective, it could only be grounded in the only Supreme Being there actually is. And if there were none, then morality would indeed be nothing but a popular delusion.

That's all very well IC, but I simply couldn't bring myself to lower my moral standands just to comply with the demands of someone else's god.

Don't, then. Raise them to correspond to what the Supreme Being, your Creator, expects of you. That's all anyone could ask.