Is morality objective or subjective?

[FlashDangerpants]

The attraction of this theory for VA is obvious: the human brain is organised physiologically to deal with different aspects of human life; therefore, 'morality' is programmed, somehow, into the human brain.

Sort of fits into that fetish he has for meaningless sorting of things into folders in lieu of building a direct understanding of them. He slots things into hiearchies and calls that analysis, so he finds it comforting any time he meets a theory where other people have done the same.

That's why he has that other thread to find out what is the worst crime in the world, so he can assign it a score of 100 bads for that BuzzFeed listicle he calls a 'moral FSK'.

[Peter Holmes]

The attraction of this theory for VA is obvious: the human brain is organised physiologically to deal with different aspects of human life; therefore, 'morality' is programmed, somehow, into the human brain.

Sort of fits into that fetish he has for meaningless sorting of things into folders in lieu of building a direct understanding of them. He slots things into hiearchies and calls that analysis, so he finds it comforting any time he meets a theory where other people have done the same.

That's why he has that other thread to find out what is the worst crime in the world, so he can assign it a score of 100 bads for that BuzzFeed listicle he calls a 'moral FSK'.

Yep. Is anyone counting his OP score?

As I think you said, it boils down to the ability - and willingness - to assess the validity and soundness of an argument.

Just now he came up with this: We believe X; therefore, X is not independent from our belief.

But, no doubt, I'm straw manning him. Again.

[Skepdick]

As I think you said, it boils down to the ability - and willingness - to assess the validity and soundness of an argument.

Cunt, please.

You dodged addressing the validity/soundness of the argument (below) like you dodge rawdogging a crackwhore in Abuja.

P1. Murder is wrong.
P2. Murder is wrong.
C. Murder is wrong.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The attraction of this theory for VA is obvious: the human brain is organised physiologically to deal with different aspects of human life; therefore, 'morality' is programmed, somehow, into the human brain.

Sort of fits into that fetish he has for meaningless sorting of things into folders in lieu of building a direct understanding of them. He slots things into hiearchies and calls that analysis, so he finds it comforting any time he meets a theory where other people have done the same.

That's why he has that other thread to find out what is the worst crime in the world, so he can assign it a score of 100 bads for that BuzzFeed listicle he calls a 'moral FSK'.

Yep. Is anyone counting his OP score?

As I think you said, it boils down to the ability - and willingness - to assess the validity and soundness of an argument.

Just now he came up with this: We believe X; therefore, X is not independent from our belief.
But, no doubt, I'm straw manning him. Again.

You are grounding all your views based on philosophical realism's mind independence which is illusory, thus you will always be strawmaning when trying to counter my views.

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Prove your 'what is fact' is real and not illusory.

Just now he came up with this: We believe X; therefore, X is not independent from our belief.
But, no doubt, I'm straw manning him. Again.

Yes, strawmaning the "10th millionth" times.

It should be;
We believe X grounded on a specific human-based FSR-FSK;
Because it is human-based, it follows deductively X cannot be mind-independent;
therefore, X is not independent from our belief.

In dealing with complex philosophical issues, we must be more rigoristic, precise and detailed.
Why are you such a coward in not addressing the above and countering that.


I posted this in your other thread, but you failed to counter them:
viewtopic.php?p=651161#p651161

• 1 We believe the Big Bang occurred grounded on the human-based Science-Cosmological FSR-FSK.
  Because it is human-based, it follows deductively it cannot be mind-independent
  Therefore the Big Bang is not independent from our belief.
  
  2 We know that electromagnetic force exists grounded on the human-based Science-Physics FSR-FSK.
  Because it is human-based, it follows deductively it cannot be mind-independent. Therefore, electromagnetic force is not independent from our knowledge.
  
  3 We describe gravitational accretion in human ways grounded on the human-based Science-Physics FSR-FSK.
  Because it is human-based, it follows deductively it cannot be mind-independent. Therefore, gravitational accretion is not independent from our description.

Just in case, note this;
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145
You have not countered this.

[FlashDangerpants]

The attraction of this theory for VA is obvious: the human brain is organised physiologically to deal with different aspects of human life; therefore, 'morality' is programmed, somehow, into the human brain.

Sort of fits into that fetish he has for meaningless sorting of things into folders in lieu of building a direct understanding of them. He slots things into hiearchies and calls that analysis, so he finds it comforting any time he meets a theory where other people have done the same.

That's why he has that other thread to find out what is the worst crime in the world, so he can assign it a score of 100 bads for that BuzzFeed listicle he calls a 'moral FSK'.

Yep. Is anyone counting his OP score?

As I think you said, it boils down to the ability - and willingness - to assess the validity and soundness of an argument.

Just now he came up with this: We believe X; therefore, X is not independent from our belief.

But, no doubt, I'm straw manning him. Again.

I guess it all boils down to his inability to understand what makes an argument deductively valid. He thinks he can pull off a masterpiece of bait and switch by arguing that all the 'real' stuff like science and so on depends upon theory laden observation and that therefore he can manufacture a set of theory laden observations and make an equally 'true' 'reality' out of them (which his grand dream for this 'morality-proper-FSK'). But if he spends 50 years on the first part of that (which looks like his current plan) he's going to be a very old man before he finds out that the followup isn't even valid. The entire thing is a dead end.

[Immanuel Can]

Sorry - I constructed a response to this discussion - for which, thanks, btw - a few days ago, but it went awry. The best laid schemes o' mice and men gang aft agley. So here's another go. Some initial thoughts.

I dislike the 'cognitivist/non-cognitivist' label. Here's a dictionary definition of cognition: 'the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses:'

Leaving aside the mythicality of mentalist talk - 'mental action or process' - the implication that to be a moral non-cognitivist is to reject 'knowledge and understanding' of moral issues 'through thought, experience and the senses' is libellous nonsense. Labels and their baggage! What can you do?

Iow, to reject moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts, and, therefore, the claim that moral assertions have truth-value independent from opinion - is not to abandon 'knowledge and understanding through thought, experience and the senses' with regard to moral issues.

To be rational is to have or seek sound reasons for what we do and believe. What we count as a 'sound reason' is, of course, open to rational debate. But explanations come to an end. And, like the rest of us, moral objectivists have nothing 'at the end' except a moral opinion: this is morally right/wrong. (A theistic objectivist claim - this is morally right/wrong because my team's god says it is - is, obviously, ridiculous.)

More to be said, of course.

I'm not seeing a response to the Frege-Geach problem here, Peter, though I grant that perhaps one may be intended.

Basically the problem is how to word a moral claim, if objective moral values are not to be any part of it. So any subjectivist view of morals ends up issuing in something like:

P1: Boo to killing.
P2: If 'Boo to killing,' then getting your little brother to kill is boo.
C: Therefore, getting your little brother to kill is boo.

Now, that's obvious nonsense, right? But if we're going to render a claim that speaks against killing (or rape, or theft, or pedophilia, or whatever we want to substitute for the word "killing") we're going to need to have some language to do it. So what language would you advise we should use, Peter, to speak against such things? What would be the honest and factually-correct way to make such a statement?

Can you reword that syllogism to make it, as you put it, "rational" and appropriate to the view of morality you personally hold, whatever you would like it to be called?

[Harbal]

I would far more trust and respect a moral act that is done out of personal, moral sentiment, than one performed dispassionately out of duty to God.

[Immanuel Can]

I would far more trust and respect a moral act that is done out of personal, moral sentiment, than one performed dispassionately out of duty to God.

Okay, let's put that into the syllogism, then:

P1: Harbal's personal, moral sentiment is against killing.
P2: If personal, moral sentiment is against killing, then getting his little brother to kill is against personal, moral sentiment.
C: Therefore, getting his little brother to kill is against Harbal's personal, moral sentiment.

Is that the kind of condemnation of killing that we think is entailed by a moral claim? Do we have reason to think that if Harbal's "personal moral sentiment" is against a thing, it's obligatory on his brother and the rest of us to avoid that action? And is that how morality works? Is Harbal the touchstone of public morality?

I am pretty sure you're not going to say that you are that. But if you're not, then what does the fact that Harbal has "personal moral sentiment" about something mean to the rightness or wrongness of that thing?

[Harbal]

I would far more trust and respect a moral act that is done out of personal, moral sentiment, than one performed dispassionately out of duty to God.

Okay, let's put that into the syllogism, then:

P1: Harbal's personal, moral sentiment is against killing.
P2: If personal, moral sentiment is against killing, then getting his little brother to kill is against personal, moral sentiment.
C: Therefore, getting his little brother to kill is against Harbal's personal, moral sentiment.

Is that the kind of condemnation of killing that we think is entailed by a moral claim? Do we have reason to think that if Harbal's "personal moral sentiment" is against a thing, it's obligatory on his brother and the rest of us to avoid that action? And is that how morality works? Is Harbal the touchstone of public morality?

I am pretty sure you're not going to say that you are that. But if you're not, then what does the fact that Harbal has "personal moral sentiment" about something mean to the rightness or wrongness of that thing?

I don't see morality as a matter of logic, or rationality, which leaves me unable to respond to your question in those terms, I'm afraid.

[FlashDangerpants]

P1: Boo to killing.
P2: If 'Boo to killing,' then getting your little brother to kill is boo.
C: Therefore, getting your little brother to kill is boo.

Again, that article was short so it may have glossed over some stuff. The Frege-Geach problem makes use of Frege's substitution of intensional semantic content for extensional equivalents. His famous example of the morning star and the evening star being the physical object and thus "this evening I saw the morning star" and "this evening I saw the evening star" are the same expression. That would be in contrast to Mill who held that Tully and Cicero are interchangeable only if you know that Tully is Cicero. So you can absolutely take on the Frege-Geach problem by hitting Frege directly and not even bothering with Geach.

But you seem to have got yourself into a rut where you think Pete is an emotivist. Your clue that he isn't should be found in the fact that VA firmly believes he is, and VA gets very little right. For Ayer, there is a Fregean exchangeability between the phrase "You acted wrongly in stealing that money" and, in his own words: ‘you stole that money’, in a peculiar tone of horror, or written with the addition of some special exclamation marks. Ayer is a textbook example of an actual non-cog.

Neither Pete nor Harbal has actually given you any reason to believe that they hold this Ayerian boo/hurrah thesis that it directly means the same thing to be saying that stealing is bad, as it does to say "stealing" while frowning. If they don't hold this non-congitive view about the meaning of moral statements then the statements aren't Fregean substitutable, and the Frege-Geach issue is not a problem for them, at all.

[Immanuel Can]

I would far more trust and respect a moral act that is done out of personal, moral sentiment, than one performed dispassionately out of duty to God.

Okay, let's put that into the syllogism, then:

P1: Harbal's personal, moral sentiment is against killing.
P2: If personal, moral sentiment is against killing, then getting his little brother to kill is against personal, moral sentiment.
C: Therefore, getting his little brother to kill is against Harbal's personal, moral sentiment.

Is that the kind of condemnation of killing that we think is entailed by a moral claim? Do we have reason to think that if Harbal's "personal moral sentiment" is against a thing, it's obligatory on his brother and the rest of us to avoid that action? And is that how morality works? Is Harbal the touchstone of public morality?

I am pretty sure you're not going to say that you are that. But if you're not, then what does the fact that Harbal has "personal moral sentiment" about something mean to the rightness or wrongness of that thing?

I don't see morality as a matter of logic, or rationality, which leaves me unable to respond to your question in those terms, I'm afraid.

Well, the upshot of that would be we'd have to conclude that morality isn't anything at all...at least, not any REAL thing. So "killing" (or whatever) cannot be prohibited at all. It can't even in any extended sense, actually be "wrong."

And I think that's now how most people think it is. Some may say that morality is strong enough to be objective, and some may say it's something weaker and more subjective; but hardly anybody would be willing to say it's actually nothing.

And, of course, that raises the next question: if morality is nothing, then how has it even appeared? And how has it appeared so universally, since it must then utterly fail to correspond to any feature of reality at all? Never mind the question of how society is to proceed in practice, since we have now completely debunked any legitimate ability to coordinate a public moral expectation.

[Immanuel Can]

But you seem to have got yourself into a rut where you think Pete is an emotivist.

No, it really doesn't matter. The Frege-Geach summary is emotivist, it's true; but my question is what OTHER adjectives Peter might supply to fit the function of warranting a prohibition of some kind...like, against killing or inciting others to kill. I leave him free to make the substitutions he deems appropriate -- not merely emotivist ones, as in the original.

I only ask that he render some coherent syllogism, so we can see what it is he thinks justifies a moral prohibition. The floor is open.

[Harbal]

Okay, let's put that into the syllogism, then:

P1: Harbal's personal, moral sentiment is against killing.
P2: If personal, moral sentiment is against killing, then getting his little brother to kill is against personal, moral sentiment.
C: Therefore, getting his little brother to kill is against Harbal's personal, moral sentiment.

Is that the kind of condemnation of killing that we think is entailed by a moral claim? Do we have reason to think that if Harbal's "personal moral sentiment" is against a thing, it's obligatory on his brother and the rest of us to avoid that action? And is that how morality works? Is Harbal the touchstone of public morality?

I am pretty sure you're not going to say that you are that. But if you're not, then what does the fact that Harbal has "personal moral sentiment" about something mean to the rightness or wrongness of that thing?

I don't see morality as a matter of logic, or rationality, which leaves me unable to respond to your question in those terms, I'm afraid.

Well, the upshot of that would be we'd have to conclude that morality isn't anything at all...at least, not any REAL thing. So "killing" (or whatever) cannot be prohibited at all. It can't even in any extended sense, actually be "wrong."

And I think that's now how most people think it is. Some may say that morality is strong enough to be objective, and some may say it's something weaker and more subjective; but hardly anybody would be willing to say it's actually nothing.

And, of course, that raises the next question: if morality is nothing, then how has it even appeared? And how has it appeared so universally, since it must then utterly fail to correspond to any feature of reality at all? Never mind the question of how society is to proceed in practice, since we have now completely debunked any legitimate ability to coordinate a public moral expectation.

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

[Atla]

People without conscience concluding that morality isn't real, is like people born blind concluding that sight isn't real, or like people born deaf concluding that hearing isn't real.

[Immanuel Can]

All I can say is that I don't find subjective morality to be the problem you present it as. From what I see, people from the same social environment have very similar moral values, regardless of whether they believe those values to be subjective or objective.

I think, though, that I do have an important point there. I don't think it can be brushed off this way.

Two problems, at the least. One is that the fact that a "social environment" has "similar moral values" is socially local. It doesn't allow us to say that beating women and slavery are wrong for Arab countries, child rape is wrong for Pakistan or Sudan, or that killing Uighurs is wrong for the Chinese, or democracy is important in Russia. But even worse, we don't any longer live in homogenous cities and countries...Sudan, Pakistan, China...they're all here, now. So we don't any longer all have the same "social values." And that's a serious problem -- especially when your daughter bumps into a guy from some such place, or you are trying to do business with a businessman from a country where tribe comes before all. Don't expect him to conform to the same "social values" with which you raised your daughter, or with which you hope to do business; but what will you say, when your "social values" are different from his?

So yes, it's a problem. And social-relativism won't even begin to save us from it.