Philosophical Realism's Mind-Independence is Absurd

[Atla]

But ultimately, because it is grounded on a human-based FSR-FSK, it follows deductively, the external person cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

Which doesn't mean either that the person is internal or mind-dependent. Will you EVER tell us what the point of your philosophy is, or don't you know yourself?

[Atla]

I'll try to write a deduction, maybe he'll understand this one:

P1: Internal-ness and external-ness are two sides of the same mental faculty, they are connected, they are a feature of the human mind.

P2: Science-FSK is the most reliable FSK. It supports the dual-object noumenon view, where the appearance of the other person is internal to the perceiver's mind, and the noumenal other person is external to the perceiver's mind.

Conclusion: Therefore it is nonsensical to discard external-ness, but keep internal-ness, turning it into all-there-is.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Can anyone show evidence where Science per-se support the idea of the noumena, the thing-in-itself the exist independent of the human mind?

Note

• The Basic Assumption of Experimental Science
  
  IT is often supposed that experimental science inevitably must assume the existence of an external world

External world in the above refer to a mind-independent world, the noumena.

If it is an assumption by science, how can science prove it to be real, i.e. scientifically real?

[Atla]

Can anyone show evidence where Science per-se support the idea of the noumena, the thing-in-itself the exist independent of the human mind?

Note

• The Basic Assumption of Experimental Science
  
  IT is often supposed that experimental science inevitably must assume the existence of an external world

External world in the above refer to a mind-independent world, the noumena.

If it is an assumption by science, how can science proof it to be real, i.e. scientifically real?

You have to be kidding??

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3] Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science. While there is superficial overlap, the indirect model is unlike the standpoint of idealism, which holds that only ideas are real, but there are no mind-independent objects.

[Iwannaplato]

What sort of rational mind would attribute 'concepts' to bacteria or animals.

Well, that's what you've been doing.

There are various meanings to 'sense'.
When I refer to a 'sense of external-ness', it is with reference to;
-a way in which an expression or a situation can be interpreted; a meaning.
not referring to the human five senses.

I don't think this is an intelligible paragraph. And it now seems that bacteria are interpreting.

Instead of 'sense', I shall refer to 'a mode of externalness'

I don't think that's an intelligible phrase. In any case it needs an explanation.

[to facilitate basic survival] in all living organisms from 3 billion years to the present including humans.

Why would this 'mode' facilitate survival better than the lack of that mode or a mode that is really real.

This mode of external-ness can be classify as a spontaneous response, primal instincts, and the like.

Why would an organism need a false way of experiencing? As long as it does the right thing when encountering food or threatening conditiosn or whatever, why would it need an illusory mode?

And then also, how do you know what mode they have?

My point is p-realists [humans] are fixated on this 'mode of externalness' as a concept [only human actively conceptualize] and grab it as an ideology, i.e. philosophical realism.

And only humans can answer questoins about what mode of experiencing they have.

I have stated many times, e.g. the oncoming train on the track I am standing on is external to me, not in my head.

But it can't be external to you, according to antirealism. Yes, you state this, but you don't reconcile the contradiction.

As such, I will jump off the rails to avoid that external train.
When I see any man, say Mr. X, he is external person to me [not existing in my head] from the common and conventional human-based FSR-FSK.

But that common and conventional view is not real.

A covid19 virus with its covid19-based FSR-FSK would not realized Mr. X as an external person like all humans do.
It is likely a covid19 with its covid19-based FSR-FSK will cognize a denser bundle of molecules which it need to infect and multiply.

Mindreading.

A 100% sonar bat with its sonar-bat-based FSR-FSK will cognize a denser bundle of molecules and not an external person like all humans do.

Mindreading (and odd mindreading that bats cognize bundles of molecules)

So, there is no absolute mind-independent things such as an external person out there.

You'll need to make up your mind.

Whatever is real is conditioned to the specific FSR-FSK.

For those who do not understand the above, research on Kant's concept of empirical-realism vs transcendental idealism. Make sure one understand [not necessary agree with] the theme thoroughly.

Giving homework assignments as a way to ward off criticism is evasive.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3] Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science. While there is superficial overlap, the indirect model is unlike the standpoint of idealism, which holds that only ideas are real, but there are no mind-independent objects.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism#:

The above is about indirect realism not science per se.
Note Argument Against Indirect Realism

The most science can do is to assume the external world but no way science can prove a mind-independent external world exists as real.

Science itself is conditioned upon the human mind [collective minds], there is no way a mind-conditioned state can prove a state that is not conditioned upon the human mind.

[Atla]

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3] Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science. While there is superficial overlap, the indirect model is unlike the standpoint of idealism, which holds that only ideas are real, but there are no mind-independent objects.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism#:

The above is about indirect realism not science per se.
The most science can do is to assume the external world but no way science can prove the a mind-independent external world exists as real.

Science itself is conditioned upon the human mind, there is no way a mind-conditioned state can prove a state that is not conditioned upon the human mind.

In that sense, science can't "prove" the internal world either. In that sense, science can't "prove" anything. What on Earth are you talking about?

[Veritas Aequitas]

As stated,
What is real, factual, true, knowledge is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK; the scientific FSK being the most credible, reliable and objective at present.
What other FSKs [mathematics and logic tools aside] are better than the scientific FSK? theological FSK, historical FSK, etc.?

Science has proven loads of things [internal and external] [some later rejected] as FSK-ed real but it has to be qualified to the scientific FSR-FSK, i.e. it can only be scientifically real, not because your father or mother said so.

[Atla]

As stated,
What is real, factual, true, knowledge is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK; the scientific FSK being the most credible, reliable and objective at present.
What other FSKs [mathematics and logic tools aside] are better than the scientific FSK? theological FSK, historical FSK, etc.?

Science has proven loads of things [some later rejected] as real but it has to be qualified to the scientific FSR-FSK, i.e. it can only be scientifically real, not because your father or mother said so.

According to you, science can't even "prove" the existence of humans. So there is no human-based FSR-FSK according to you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The scientific-biology FSK had proven the realistic existence of humans and this is supported by other sub-scientific FSKs.

[Atla]

The scientific-biology FSK had proven the realistic existence of humans and this is supported by other sub-scientific FSKs.

No, the scientific-biology FSK claims that those other humans exist in the external world (to the perceiver). You just said the external world can't be proven as real.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The external world assumed by some [not all] scientists cannot be proven to be really-real because it is an assumption in the first place.
Whatever is real to science must be qualified upon the scientific FSK.

The mind-independent external world adopted as an ideology dogmatically by you, PH and other p-realists is grounded on an illusion. To deliberate such a claim as real is a non-starter.

[Atla]

The external world assumed by some [not all] scientists cannot be proven to be really-real because it is an assumption in the first place.

The mind-independent external world adopted as an ideology dogmatically by you, PH and other p-realists is grounded on an illusion. To deliberate such a claim as real is a non-starter.

Right, so the idea of other humans is a non-starter, according to you. Which also means that the idea of a humanS-based FSK is a non-starter.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It is only the idea of external humans in accordance to the p-realists' ideology like you, PH and others is absurd and a non-starter.
The p-realists' ideology is illusory, thus a non-starter.
The p-realists' ideology is a psychological issue, not an epistemological issue.

The concept of external humans in accordance to common, conventional sense and qualified to the science-biological FSK is realistic.

[Atla]

It is only the idea of external humans in accordance to the p-realists' ideology like you, PH and others is absurd and a non-starter.
The p-realists' ideology is illusory, thus a non-starter.
The p-realists' ideology is a psychological issue, not an epistemological issue.

The concept of external humans in accordance to common, conventional sense and qualified to the science-biological FSK is realistic.

You've been telling us the opposite for years. The common, conventional sense, and qualified to the science-biological FS, claims the externalness of other humans, so they are impossible to be real.