What could make morality objective?

[Atla]

Well,
if there is no objectivity, then objective morals are off the table.

My problem is that I can interpret this sentence in too many ways, and most of them are non-sequiturs, where "objective" was used in two different senses. So I don't know what you meant.

if it turns out that what we consider objective in other fields of study (like science, say) lacks qualities that are part of the criticism of objective morals, then those criticisms of the idea of objective morality are undermined.

Scientific objectivity admits that humans aren't omniscient, we simply try to come up with the best explanations that are avilable at the time. If we apply the same method to morality, I think we clearly get that morality is subjective, as far as we can tell right now. So I don't really see the problem.

if it is not easy to separate out mind from matter or 'external reality' then the demand for some kind of mind external independent existence for morals would be weakened (so idealists, some pragmatists, some antirealist could argue).

But there's no reason to think that the issue of subjective vs objective morals would be related to such a mind-externality vs mind-internality.

VA is a kind of moral realist and an ontological antirealist (idealist).
PH is a materialist realist who considers 'mind' a term without a reference.

Yes and I see both the ontological denial of a mind-external world, and considering 'mind' to be a term without a reference, to be untenable positions. I think the razor disagrees with them. Philosophy without the Occam's razor is just random guesswork, where there are infinitely many positions and all of them are equally wrong, so what's the point of that.

Now that I think about it, pure subjectivity seems to collapse into solipsism, where no morality makes sense at all. Because there are no others to be moral or immoral or amoral towards.

[Iwannaplato]

My problem is that I can interpret this in too many ways, and most of them are non-sequiturs, where "objective" was used in two different senses. So I don't know what you meant.

I think it's ok however you describe objectivity. If person A says there are no objective morals and we examine person A's ideas about objectivity and then show that things he or she takes as objective (in other areas of knowledge or life) then their objection is problematic.

if it turns out that what we consider objective in other fields of study (like science, say) lacks qualities that are part of the criticism of objective morals, then those criticisms of the idea of objective morality are undermined.

Scientific objectivity admits that humans aren't omniscient,

Sure.

we simply try to come up with the best explanations that are avilable at the time. If we apply the same method to morality, I think we clearly get that morality is subjective, as far as we can tell right now. So I don't really see the problem.

Well, you could look at the various arguments that have taken place in the thread'. And they are bound to come back, so there's no need to read 500 pages and I certainly haven't. I understand that you don't see a problem.

if it is not easy to separate out mind from matter or 'external reality' then the demand for some kind of mind external independent existence for morals would be weakened (so idealists, some pragmatists, some antirealist could argue).

But there's no reason to think that the issue of subjective vs objective morals would be related to such a mind-externality vs mind-internality.

Most moral anti-realisms argue in some way that any moral opinion or stance is based on subjective values. They contrast this with the study of atoms and their arguements generally have within them, either explicit or implicit, a realist view of reality (especially 'out there'). If that view doesn't hold, if reality is not simply 'out there' and is not separate from mind or what gets called mind, then their argument may fall apart or they may need to give up objectivity about other things. Again this gets taken up in the thread.

VA is a kind of moral realist and an ontological antirealist (idealist).
PH is a materialist realist who considers 'mind' a term without a reference.

Yes and I see both the ontological denial of a mind-external world, and considering 'mind' to be a term without a reference, to be untenable positions. I think the razor disagrees with them. Philosophy without the Occam's razor is just random guesswork, where there are infinitely many positions and all of them are equally wrong, so what's the point of that.

Why don't you pick either PH or VA and argue against their positions. Mainly what you are saying here is you are convinced. Also Occam's Razor is a methological suggestion, not an ontological assertion.

[Atla]

I think it's ok however you describe objectivity. If person A says there are no objective morals and we examine person A's ideas about objectivity and then show that things he or she takes as objective (in other areas of knowledge or life) then their objection is problematic.

Wouldn't the concept of objectivity be meaningless, if we could describe it in any way? In which case what are we talking about?

No, objective morals are things that are morally right of wrong, irregardless of what anyone thinks or knows about them, irregardless of how anyone feels about them. A person's ideas don't matter. There would be these universal moral laws period, usually but not necessarily proclaimed by omnipotent gods.

Most moral anti-realisms argue in some way that any moral opinion or stance is based on subjective values. They contrast this with the study of atoms and their arguements generally have within them, either explicit or implicit, a realist view of reality (especially 'out there'). If that view doesn't hold, if reality is not simply 'out there' and is not separate from mind or what gets called mind, then their argument may fall apart or they may need to give up objectivity about other things. Again this gets taken up in the thread.

Yes and as far as we can tell, reality is just as much 'out there' as it is 'in here', so there's no reason to think that this is an issue.

Why don't you pick either PH or VA and argue against their positions.

I have, I think VA has me on ignore since years after he kept losing arguments back then.
PH seems to be simply ignoring all of psychology, phenomenology etc., and well, all of human subjectivity in general, in order to make a case for reality that is entirely made of abstraction and is de-realized. He seems to have effectively argued himself into non-existence, looks like some kind of escapism to me that, he is trying to subconsciouly justify on philosophy forums. It's all backwards, I told him these things and he seems to have no response.

Mainly what you are saying here is you are convinced. Also Occam's Razor is a methological suggestion, not an ontological assertion.

Of course it's a methological suggestion, but philosophy without it is just random fantasizing.
Are you not 'convinced' that the Earth is orbiting one Sun, instead of say two, or 34658? Why would you see these options as equally consideration worthy?

[Skepdick]

Of course it's a methological suggestion, but philosophy without it is just random fantasizing.

Are you not 'convinced' that the Earth is orbiting one Sun, instead of say two, or 34658? Why would you see these options as equally consideration worthy?

I am convinced that if I assume that the Sun orbits the earth I can do the calculations necessary to navigate Earth with a pen and paper; whereas the model where we assume Earth orbits the sun becomes more computationally complex.

Talk about Occam’s razor…

Which is why seamen still use the Ptolemaic models.

[Iwannaplato]

Wouldn't the concept of objectivity be meaningless, if we could describe it in any way? In which case what are we talking about?

You could argue that. I'm pretty sure it's been brought up.

Most moral anti-realisms argue in some way that any moral opinion or stance is based on subjective values. They contrast this with the study of atoms and their arguements generally have within them, either explicit or implicit, a realist view of reality (especially 'out there'). If that view doesn't hold, if reality is not simply 'out there' and is not separate from mind or what gets called mind, then their argument may fall apart or they may need to give up objectivity about other things. Again this gets taken up in the thread.

Yes and as far as we can tell, reality is just as much 'out there' as it is 'in here', so there's no reason to think that this is an issue.

Well, you could argue that.

I have, I think VA has me on ignore since years after he kept losing arguments back then.

He has me on ignore. Though I can reach him, so to speak, when other people respond to me.

PH seems to be simply ignoring all of psychology, phenomenology etc., and well, all of human subjectivity in general, in order to make a case for reality that is entirely made of abstraction and is de-realized. He seems to have effectively argued himself into non-existence, looks like some kind of escapism to me that, he is trying to subconsciouly justify on philosophy forums. It's all backwards, I told him these things and he seems to have no response.

I don't recognize that as PH's position, but hey, I want to get out of the middle. I thought you were new to them and the thread and I wanted to give my take on the overview.

Mainly what you are saying here is you are convinced. Also Occam's Razor is a methological suggestion, not an ontological assertion.

Of course it's a methological suggestion, but philosophy without it is just random fantasizing.

I don't agree. If you want to start a thread on the OR I'd probably join in.

Are you not 'convinced' that the Earth is orbiting one Sun, instead of say two, or 34658? Why would you see these options as equally consideration worthy?

1) my point was that some people seem to interpret the OR as meaning that the simpler explanation is the better one. It seemed possible that was implicit in what you said.

I think the razor disagrees with them.

I mean a materialist who sees mind as an illusion could be a more parsimonius stance. It depends how it's argued. And solipsism is extremely parsimonious and hard to prove false. Also I think it's an odd way to word it: Occam's Razor disagrees with them. If it is a methodological suggestion and not a ontological rule than it doesn't disagree...it's not a stance on someone's position.

I certainly have positions that have more entities than other people tend to work with. I'm on the pragmatist end, and I am happy to use words that work for me and others I communicate about something with, without feeling any rush to slice off what might be extras. I don't have any reason to believe there are two suns. Generally when someone has a model or belief that has more entities than someone else they disagree over the evidence for those extra entities or the definitions. I suppose there may be people who want to add entities even though they have no reason to in their own models and experiences, but I think that's pretty rare. This doesn't mean they are right obviously, but they usually have motivation and in their minds justification.
So, I think this....

Why would you see these options as equally

regarding two or thousands of our Sun
Is odd.
I could throw the opposite, odd, questions at you Why do you consider one planet as the number of planets equally valide to 8 or 9 - depending on Pluto's current status.

We wouldn't view them equally, in either direction. We'd view one as right and have our reasons. I can't just say the OR disagrees with you and it's a strange accusation that people are viewing positions other than their own as equally justified. Well, actually sometimes I do, but for some reason my not instantly agreeing with the way you were using Occam's Razor seemed to imply to you I would add entities for no reason at all. A very odd assumption, just as my opposite assumption about you would be odd.

Further I think it's the first time I've ever been strawmanned out of complete aether.

I'll leave it here. If you think the thread's a waste of time and/or can't find a way to get any use out of it, I'm sure you'll find a parsimonious solution to that.

[Atla]

Wouldn't the concept of objectivity be meaningless, if we could describe it in any way? In which case what are we talking about?

You could argue that. I'm pretty sure it's been brought up.

Most moral anti-realisms argue in some way that any moral opinion or stance is based on subjective values. They contrast this with the study of atoms and their arguements generally have within them, either explicit or implicit, a realist view of reality (especially 'out there'). If that view doesn't hold, if reality is not simply 'out there' and is not separate from mind or what gets called mind, then their argument may fall apart or they may need to give up objectivity about other things. Again this gets taken up in the thread.

Yes and as far as we can tell, reality is just as much 'out there' as it is 'in here', so there's no reason to think that this is an issue.

Well, you could argue that.

I have, I think VA has me on ignore since years after he kept losing arguments back then.

He has me on ignore. Though I can reach him, so to speak, when other people respond to me.

PH seems to be simply ignoring all of psychology, phenomenology etc., and well, all of human subjectivity in general, in order to make a case for reality that is entirely made of abstraction and is de-realized. He seems to have effectively argued himself into non-existence, looks like some kind of escapism to me that, he is trying to subconsciouly justify on philosophy forums. It's all backwards, I told him these things and he seems to have no response.

I don't recognize that as PH's position, but hey, I want to get out of the middle. I thought you were new to them and the thread and I wanted to give my take on the overview.

Mainly what you are saying here is you are convinced. Also Occam's Razor is a methological suggestion, not an ontological assertion.

Of course it's a methological suggestion, but philosophy without it is just random fantasizing.

I don't agree. If you want to start a thread on the OR I'd probably join in.

Are you not 'convinced' that the Earth is orbiting one Sun, instead of say two, or 34658? Why would you see these options as equally consideration worthy?

1) my point was that some people seem to interpret the OR as meaning that the simpler explanation is the better one. It seemed possible that was implicit in what you said.

I think the razor disagrees with them.

I mean a materialist who sees mind as an illusion could be a more parsimonius stance. It depends how it's argued. And solipsism is extremely parsimonious and hard to prove false. Also I think it's an odd way to word it: Occam's Razor disagrees with them. If it is a methodological suggestion and not a ontological rule than it doesn't disagree...it's not a stance on someone's position.

I certainly have positions that have more entities than other people tend to work with. I'm on the pragmatist end, and I am happy to use words that work for me and others I communicate about something with, without feeling any rush to slice off what might be extras. I don't have any reason to believe there are two suns. Generally when someone has a model or belief that has more entities than someone else they disagree over the evidence for those extra entities or the definitions. I suppose there may be people who want to add entities even though they have no reason to in their own models and experiences, but I think that's pretty rare. This doesn't mean they are right obviously, but they usually have motivation and in their minds justification.
So, I think this....

Why would you see these options as equally

regarding two or thousands of our Sun
Is odd.
I could throw the opposite, odd, questions at you Why do you consider one planet as the number of planets equally valide to 8 or 9 - depending on Pluto's current status.

We wouldn't view them equally, in either direction. We'd view one as right and have our reasons. I can't just say the OR disagrees with you and it's a strange accusation that people are viewing positions other than their own as equally justified. Well, actually sometimes I do, but for some reason my not instantly agreeing with the way you were using Occam's Razor seemed to imply to you I would add entities for no reason at all. A very odd assumption, just as my opposite assumption about you would be odd.

Further I think it's the first time I've ever been strawmanned out of complete aether.

I'll leave it here. If you think the thread's a waste of time and/or can't find a way to get any use out of it, I'm sure you'll find a parsimonious solution to that.

Yeah okay that's a different topic. That's not how to use the razor, for example upon closer inspection, eliminative materialism and solipsism fail the razor's test. They may be correct, but are unlikely to be correct. (That's why I said the example with the suns, the Earth may have 2 or more suns, it's just unlikely, as far as we can tell.)

[Skepdick]

Yeah okay that's a different topic. That's not how to use the razor, for example upon closer inspection, eliminative materialism and solipsism fail the razor's test. They may be correct, but are unlikely to be correct. (That's why I said the example with the suns, the Earth may have 2 or more suns, it's just unlikely, as far as we can tell.)

Occams razor doesn't solve anything.

It merely instructs us not to multiply entities beyond necessity.

So what criterion determines whether it is; or it isn't necessary to multiplie entities any further?
What criterion determines that we have one too many entities than necessary?

That's why the medical proffession defaults to Hickam's dictum. It's far more likely that multiple causes explain multiple symptoms than to have a single root-cause account for everything that's wrong with the patient.

[Atla]

Occams razor doesn't solve anything.

In that sense nothing ever gets "solved", humans aren't omniscient, so that's hardly an argument. The only thing humans can do is use the razor and probabilities, to try to arrive at the best guesses about reality. Those who think otherwise (so like 95%+ of users on philosophy forums) are merely lying to themselves.

It merely instructs us not to multiply entities beyond necessity.

That too, but the big issue in philosophy is the number of made-up assumptions used. For example eliminative materialism uses 2-3 unnecessary made-up assumptions that are conveniently swept under the rug, and then simply forgotten.

So what criterion determines whether it is; or it isn't necessary to multiplie entities any further?
What criterion determines that we have one too many entities than necessary?

Once everything know to man is accounted for, explained in an internally consistent theory, no more made-up assumptions and made-up entities are needed.

[Skepdick]

Once everything know to man is accounted for, explained in a consistent theory, no more made-up assumptions and made-up entities are needed.

You mean other than the assumption that everything has to fit into a single, consistent theory?

It's strange because non-contradiction is a made-up entity. And a mighty strange assumption for a self-proclaimed "non-dualist" at that.

[Atla]

Once everything know to man is accounted for, explained in a consistent theory, no more made-up assumptions and made-up entities are needed.

You mean other than the assumption that everything has to fit into a single, consistent theory?

It's strange because non-contradiction is a made-up entity. And a mighty strange assumption for a self-proclaimed "non-dualist" at that.

Humans can't go outside the realm of non-contradiction, so that's also hardly an argument.

[Skepdick]

Humans can't go outside the realm of non-contradiction, so that's also hardly an argument.

If that were true I wouldn't be able to manufacture contradiction on-demand

[Atla]

Humans can't go outside the realm of non-contradiction, so that's also hardly an argument.

If that were true I wouldn't be able to manufacture contradiction on-demand

Writing contradictory things only works if you are, generally speaking, still within the realm of non-contradiction

[Skepdick]

Humans can't go outside the realm of non-contradiction, so that's also hardly an argument.

If that were true I wouldn't be able to manufacture contradiction on-demand

Writing contradictory things only works if you are, generally speaking, still within the realm of non-contradiction

Surely contradictions are only possible within the realm of contradiction?

The realm of non-contradiction wouldn't allow for contradictions.

[Atla]

If that were true I wouldn't be able to manufacture contradiction on-demand

Writing contradictory things only works if you are, generally speaking, still within the realm of non-contradiction

Surely contradictions are only possible within the realm of contradiction?

The realm of non-contradiction wouldn't allow for contradictions.

Or maybe that's just once again your inability to differentiate between abstract thinking and the concrete world.

A = 1
A = 2

I've written a contradiction here, an abstract A value can't be equal to 1 and 2 at the same time.
But as pixels appearing on a computer screen, what I've written are two different concrete spacetime events, and there's no contradiction in that sense.

Overall we haven't left the (concrete) realm of non-contradiction. If there is such a (concrete) reality, our human thinking is simply incapable of going there, arguably.

So that's not relevant to the Occam's razor thing.

[Skepdick]

Writing contradictory things only works if you are, generally speaking, still within the realm of non-contradiction

Surely contradictions are only possible within the realm of contradiction?

The realm of non-contradiction wouldn't allow for contradictions.

Or maybe that's just once again your inability to differentiate between abstract thinking and the concrete world.

A = 1
A = 2

I've written a contradiction here, an abstract A value can't be equal to 1 and 2 at the same time.

Sorry. I don't understand the problem. My Python interpreter doesn't understand the problem either.

Code: Select all

❯ ipython
Python 3.11.2 (main, Mar 25 2023, 22:52:57) [Clang 14.0.0 (clang-1400.0.29.202)]
Type 'copyright', 'credits' or 'license' for more information
IPython 8.13.2 -- An enhanced Interactive Python. Type '?' for help.

In [1]: A = 1

In [2]: A = 2

In [3]: