What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Context and convention - agreement on the use of a sign - provide the rule(s) for using it.

But having and following rules for using the words 'pink', 'unicorn' and 'moon' is not what makes the factual assertion 'there are pink unicorns on the moon' true or false. If it were, there'd be no way to decide if the assertion is true or false.

A factual assertion is classically true or false given the way we use the signs in context. The fact that, if we used those signs differently, the assertion would be false, is trivially true and inconsequential.

[Peter Holmes]

I say there are no moral facts, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective. And I ask moral objectivists: Please produce one example of a moral fact.

One response: It's a fact that murder is morally wrong.
Question: Why is it a fact that murder is morally wrong?
Response: Because murder is unlawful killing.
Question: Why is it a fact that unlawful killing is morally wrong?
Response: Because any unlawful act is morally wrong.
Question: Why is it a fact that any unlawful act is morally wrong?
Response: Because I/we/all of us think it is. Or: Because laws codify moral facts. Or: Because it just is.

There's a moral opinion at the start and the end. And at every step, a moral opinion is asserted. At the start or the bottom of every moral argument, there is a moral opinion, which is subjective and unfalsifiable, because it has no truth-value.

Objectivist counter argument: Agreement on the use of signs constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. So it's a fact that murder is morally wrong because that's how we use these words. Like any assertion, a moral assertion is falsifiable, because it has a truth-value.

Two responses:

1 Some say abortion is morally wrong. Others say abortion is not morally wrong. Both groups agree on the use of signs - both agree on what is meant by the expressions 'morally right' and 'morally wrong'. So the claim 'it's a fact that X is morally wrong because that's how we use these words' is false.

2 Any use of language is contextual and conventional. But agreement on the use of signs does not constitute the truth of the factual assertion 'water is H2O'. If it did, then such agreement would constitute the truth of its negation: 'water is not H2O'.

(VA's work-around: Morality has nothing to do with moral rightness and wrongness. which are matters of opinion and therefore subjective - but rather the avoidance of evil and the promotion of good - which are matters of fact and therefore objective. (Face palm.))

[Skepdick]

I say there are no moral facts, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective. And I ask moral objectivists: Please produce one example of a moral fact.

I say your framing and conception of objectivity and facts is confused.

If there can be facts about man-made logic; and facts about man-made arguments; and facts about man-made mathematics; and facts about man-made laws; and facts about man-made games; and facts about man-made rules; and factual assertions about the 'rightness' and 'wrongness' of chess moves then there are facts about morality.

And the fact that murder is wrong is one of those facts.

[Iwannaplato]

(VA's work-around: Morality has nothing to do with moral rightness and wrongness. which are matters of opinion and therefore subjective - but rather the avoidance of evil and the promotion of good - which are matters of fact and therefore objective. (Face palm.))

He may have said this at some point. But I read elsewhere that it's not objective vs subjective that steers him away from moral rules, it's the power dynamic and also, I think, that enhancing virtue (my word) is a better, more nuanced, less Abrahamic approach. I would say he is close to virtue ethics here.

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism).

He wants to enhance humans empathy for others. This will have the side effect of reducing murder, for example. So, it's not about increasing laws and rules, but rather finding ways to enhance the oughtness-not-to-kill-other-humans already present in us. I don't think that the way it is now this holds. (based on arguments of mine and others that I am sure you've read/made. On what objective grounds to we enhance that oughtness and not the aggressive oughtnesses? how does this oughtness in the neurons show itself? why don't we simply say we have tendencies towards both aggression and empathy? and so on)

But I think he will think you've misread him, even if he has said what you said here.

He's seeing mirror neurons ----> evidence of a universal oughtness in homo sapiens -----> none of this primitive (religionlike) rules and control of people's behavior as the application of his ideas but rather -----> enhance the mirror neurons so people are more empathetic. The fall out is less of the nasty interpersonal stuff.

So the objectivity is coming from enhancing something that we have already, universally (except for some psychotics), evolved to have. I am not sure how MORE is not changing what is objective. IOW it is the current degree of empathy/mirror neuron influence/strength that would be objective if anything. Making it more would be a subjective choice.

But I bring this up not to say he is right, but to perhaps get the disagreement on clearer ground.

[Veritas Aequitas]

(VA's work-around: Morality has nothing to do with moral rightness and wrongness. which are matters of opinion and therefore subjective - but rather the avoidance of evil and the promotion of good - which are matters of fact and therefore objective. (Face palm.))

You are so ignorant that you are slapping [using your palm] yourself.

What is objective is independent from individual's opinion, beliefs and judgment.
Whatever emerged from a human-based FSK is objective, i.e. based on collective consensus thus independent from individual's opinion, beliefs and judgment.

It is so evident, in essence the discussion of morality is about the elimination [avoidance] of evil to enable its related moral good [there are many types of goods].

One example of an evil impulse is the killing of humans by humans when the oughtness-to-kill turned malignant for some reasons.
This evil impulse is verifiable and justifiable via the human-based-science-biology FSK as a biology-fact.
This oughtness-to-kill when turned malignant is a threat to humanity, thus humans are evolved with an oughtness-not-to-kill-human inhibitor to modulate it.
This human-based-science-biology FSK fact is then imputed into the human-based-moral-FSK, thus becomes a human-based moral fact that is objective [as defined].
Therefore morality is objective.

That morality is objective [independent from individual's opinion, beliefs and judgment] relying on objective human-based moral facts is very critical to guide humanity to prevent the extermination of the human species.

When the oughtness-not-to-kill-human inhibitor is fully functional as a guide [not enforcement] and self-governing, then there is no possibility of the human species being exterminated at least via human evil actions. [the human species could be exterminated by many other non-human means].

[Peter Holmes]

I say there are no moral facts, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective. And I ask moral objectivists: Please produce one example of a moral fact.

I say your framing and conception of objectivity and facts is confused.

If there can be facts about man-made logic; and facts about man-made arguments; and facts about man-made mathematics; and facts about man-made laws; and facts about man-made games; and facts about man-made rules; and factual assertions about the 'rightness' and 'wrongness' of chess moves then there are facts about morality.

And the fact that murder is wrong is one of those facts.

Okay. I've explained why I think your argument is incorrect. But if I haven't persuaded you, so be it. And thank you for addressing me politely.

If you want to carry on our discussion, here are some questions.

1 Do you think it's a fact that abortion or capital punishment is morally wrong? If not, then why? In other words, what distinguishes what you call a moral fact - such as that murder is morally wrong - from moral issues that aren't matters of fact, but rather opinion?

2 There are 'facts about' aesthetics, such as that some people think X is beautiful, and others think X is ugly. Do you think that it 'can be a fact' that X is beautiful or ugly?

[Peter Holmes]

(VA's work-around: Morality has nothing to do with moral rightness and wrongness. which are matters of opinion and therefore subjective - but rather the avoidance of evil and the promotion of good - which are matters of fact and therefore objective. (Face palm.))

He may have said this at some point. But I read elsewhere that it's not objective vs subjective that steers him away from moral rules, it's the power dynamic and also, I think, that enhancing virtue (my word) is a better, more nuanced, less Abrahamic approach. I would say he is close to virtue ethics here.

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism).

He wants to enhance humans empathy for others. This will have the side effect of reducing murder, for example. So, it's not about increasing laws and rules, but rather finding ways to enhance the oughtness-not-to-kill-other-humans already present in us. I don't think that the way it is now this holds. (based on arguments of mine and others that I am sure you've read/made. On what objective grounds to we enhance that oughtness and not the aggressive oughtnesses? how does this oughtness in the neurons show itself? why don't we simply say we have tendencies towards both aggression and empathy? and so on)

But I think he will think you've misread him, even if he has said what you said here.

He's seeing mirror neurons ----> evidence of a universal oughtness in homo sapiens -----> none of this primitive (religionlike) rules and control of people's behavior as the application of his ideas but rather -----> enhance the mirror neurons so people are more empathetic. The fall out is less of the nasty interpersonal stuff.

So the objectivity is coming from enhancing something that we have already, universally (except for some psychotics), evolved to have. I am not sure how MORE is not changing what is objective. IOW it is the current degree of empathy/mirror neuron influence/strength that would be objective if anything. Making it more would be a subjective choice.

But I bring this up not to say he is right, but to perhaps get the disagreement on clearer ground.

Thanks. I need more time to digest what you're saying here.

But one point straight off. You may be drawing out what you see as an instrumental or goal-consistency purpose in his argument: given that goal B is morally right/good/to be pursued, and given that action A is consistent with goal B - then action A is morally right/good/to be pursued.

Translated, this could mean the following: given that it's morally right/good/to be pursued that we should enhance human empathy, and given that humans have mirror neurons which 'programme' us to experience empathy - then enhancing the effect of those mirror neurons is morally right/good/to be pursued.

Does that make sense, or have I misread you? (Needless to say, goal-consistency or instrumentality doesn't confer objectivity on moral assertions. That a moral conclusion follows from a moral premise doesn't make the conclusion a matter of fact.)

[Iwannaplato]

Translated, this could mean the following: given that it's morally right/good/to be pursued that we should enhance human empathy, and given that humans have mirror neurons which 'programme' us to experience empathy - then enhancing the effect of those mirror neurons is morally right/good/to be pursued.

Yes. In a sense it will make us virtuous or have good characters. Having these will lead to less violence. No need for the crude tool of rules and control

Does that make sense, or have I misread you? (Needless to say, goal-consistency or instrumentality doesn't confer objectivity on moral assertions. That a moral conclusion follows from a moral premise doesn't make the conclusion a matter of fact.)

Yes. He does acknowledge that we also have violent oughtnesses in our brains. So on what grounds do we decide to enhance mirror neurons and not the others. If we develop objective moral facts on what is present in the brain, this would include everything and also in the precise ratios/strength of influence already there.

I have tried again and again to point out to him - mainly via proxies responding to me, since he never responds to my posts and may not read them - that he has some other source of moral value that he brings to what is found in brains. The decision to enhance X and not Y is based on values not objectively discovered in brains.

I think, but can't be sure, that he simply thinks it is obvious that we would enhance empthy and not aggression. I have sympathy for this. And I think you and I are likely pleased with the idea of people in general being more empathetic and less aggressive, especially at the level of violence.

But it is not the information about what is in brains that is creating the morality he is putting forward as objective. It is his values, however sympathetic you and I might be in relation to what he likes.

I am rather stunned he hasn't seen this problem yet. But I am assuming that given he approaches you and others now and then with 'would you torture and kill a child' and other challenges, he is basing his virtue ethics on his gut feelings and ones that most people share in general, given that he chooses, always, extreme abusive violence and not for example the abortion issue.

I think it's great in a way that he is a virtue ethicist (my label not his). It often gets left out of discussions where consequentialism and deontology are the only options considered. And even those who moral antirealists nevertheless see subjective values in C & D terms not in Virtue Ethics terms. We end up with rules, forbidden things, laws, with the two different types of justifications. Virtue ethics offers a different practical approach to making thing better according to values (whether these values are considered objective or subjective).

More from Stanford on this....

Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

None of this strengthens his moral objectivism, but I think if we can reduce the ways we are all talking past each other it might make the conversation better.

Of course, this is my interpretation of his position.

One problem with developing objective moral facts from brains as they are, is that to me this entails one should NOT try to improve things. The way brains are would be virtuous by definition. So, why enhance anything?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I say there are no moral facts, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective. And I ask moral objectivists: Please produce one example of a moral fact.

I say your framing and conception of objectivity and facts is confused.

If there can be facts about man-made logic; and facts about man-made arguments; and facts about man-made mathematics; and facts about man-made laws; and facts about man-made games; and facts about man-made rules; and factual assertions about the 'rightness' and 'wrongness' of chess moves then there are facts about morality.

And the fact that murder is wrong is one of those facts.

Okay. I've explained why I think your argument is incorrect. But if I haven't persuaded you, so be it. And thank you for addressing me politely.

If you want to carry on our discussion, here are some questions.

1 Do you think it's a fact that abortion or capital punishment is morally wrong? If not, then why? In other words, what distinguishes what you call a moral fact - such as that murder is morally wrong - from moral issues that aren't matters of fact, but rather opinion?

2 There are 'facts about' aesthetics, such as that some people think X is beautiful, and others think X is ugly. Do you think that it 'can be a fact' that X is beautiful or ugly?

I have linked this > a 'million' times which skepdick is alluding to, but there is more to consider;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

• Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means.
  For example,
  "This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, and
  "The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact.
  Further, "Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" and "Abraham Lincoln was assassinated" both accurately describe historical facts.
  Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.

As alluded by Skepdick, the above are all man-made facts [are objective] within their respective human-based FSKs.

But the question is how credible and reliable, i.e. objective are the above man-made facts?
As I had argued, the scientific FSK is the most reliable and credible human-based FSK at present, as a standard for which the other FSKs are to be compared and rated.

If one were to claim, "murder is morally wrong" as a moral fact within a specific FSK, e.g. a social FSK, a theistic moral FSK, an intuitive FSK, it is objective because it is claimed within a FSK [by definition is objective],
the imperative question need to be asked is how credible and reliable, and what's the degrees of objective of such a claim.

For example, a Christian moral FSK claim 'murder is morally wrong' but the reliability and credibility, thus its objectivity is questionable because the FSK is grounded on an illusory God. Relative to the human-based scientific FSK, the Christian moral FSK [re this specific moral element only] would be rated at 20/100 credibility and reliability with 0.001/100 objectivity.
It is 20/100 credibility and reliability because it is effective in preventing murders when Christians are threatened with hellfire if they commit murder.

In my case of morality-proper leveraging on a credible and reliable human-based FSK that leans on the human-based scientific fact of a biological fact of oughtness-not-to-kill-humans, that would be a credible and reliable human-based moral fact which is highly objective [as defined].

1 Do you think it's a fact that abortion or capital punishment is morally wrong? If not, then why? In other words, what distinguishes what you call a moral fact - such as that murder is morally wrong - from moral issues that aren't matters of fact, but rather opinion?

Re whether abortion is morally wrong, it should be deliberated as with 'murder is wrong' i.e. reviewing in respect of the reliability and credibility of the human-based-moral-FSK it is conditioned upon.
In the case of 'abortion is morally wrong' within the Christian theistic moral FSK, it is the same with its 'murder is wrong', i.e. its objectivity is 0.001/100 because it is grounded on an illusory God.

2 There are 'facts about' aesthetics, such as that some people think X is beautiful, and others think X is ugly. Do you think that it 'can be a fact' that X is beautiful or ugly?

You may think this is a possible 'checkmate' question from you. But this is based on your ignorance and philosophical immaturity.

Note there has a lot of research on the neuro-aesthetics which is verifiable, justifiable and testable.

Neuroaesthetics is a field of experimental science that aims to combine (neuro-)psychological research with aesthetics by investigating the "perception, production, and response to art, as well as interactions with objects and scenes that evoke an intense feeling, often of pleasure.".[5]
The recently developed field seeks among other things the neural correlates of aesthetic judgment and creativity. It is argued that visual aesthetics, namely the capacity of assigning different degrees of beauty to certain forms, colors, or movements, is a human trait acquired after the divergence of human and other ape lineages,[6] rendering the experience of beauty a defining characteristic of humankind.[7]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroesthetics#:

Just like the neural correlates of human-based moral facts, when identified and tested in the brain of humans, the neural correlates related to aesthetics in the brain are the human-based science-biology-neuroscience-facts of aesthetics.
When these are imputed into a human-based aesthetics FSK, they are then human-based- aesthetics-FSK facts.

I am sure, you have no basis [no references] to deny the above except blabbering your defiance.

[Peter Holmes]

Translated, this could mean the following: given that it's morally right/good/to be pursued that we should enhance human empathy, and given that humans have mirror neurons which 'programme' us to experience empathy - then enhancing the effect of those mirror neurons is morally right/good/to be pursued.

Yes. In a sense it will make us virtuous or have good characters. Having these will lead to less violence. No need for the crude tool of rules and control

Does that make sense, or have I misread you? (Needless to say, goal-consistency or instrumentality doesn't confer objectivity on moral assertions. That a moral conclusion follows from a moral premise doesn't make the conclusion a matter of fact.)

Yes. He does acknowledge that we also have violent oughtnesses in our brains. So on what grounds do we decide to enhance mirror neurons and not the others. If we develop objective moral facts on what is present in the brain, this would include everything and also in the precise ratios/strength of influence already there.

I have tried again and again to point out to him - mainly via proxies responding to me, since he never responds to my posts and may not read them - that he has some other source of moral value that he brings to what is found in brains. The decision to enhance X and not Y is based on values not objectively discovered in brains.

I think, but can't be sure, that he simply thinks it is obvious that we would enhance empthy and not aggression. I have sympathy for this. And I think you and I are likely pleased with the idea of people in general being more empathetic and less aggressive, especially at the level of violence.

But it is not the information about what is in brains that is creating the morality he is putting forward as objective. It is his values, however sympathetic you and I might be in relation to what he likes.

I am rather stunned he hasn't seen this problem yet. But I am assuming that given he approaches you and others now and then with 'would you torture and kill a child' and other challenges, he is basing his virtue ethics on his gut feelings and ones that most people share in general, given that he chooses, always, extreme abusive violence and not for example the abortion issue.

I think it's great in a way that he is a virtue ethicist (my label not his). It often gets left out of discussions where consequentialism and deontology are the only options considered. And even those who moral antirealists nevertheless see subjective values in C & D terms not in Virtue Ethics terms. We end up with rules, forbidden things, laws, with the two different types of justifications. Virtue ethics offers a different practical approach to making thing better according to values (whether these values are considered objective or subjective).

More from Stanford on this....

Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

None of this strengthens his moral objectivism, but I think if we can reduce the ways we are all talking past each other it might make the conversation better.

Of course, this is my interpretation of his position.

One problem with developing objective moral facts from brains as they are, is that to me this entails one should NOT try to improve things. The way brains are would be virtuous by definition. So, why enhance anything?

Thanks again. My doubt about the supposed difference that distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology is that the choice and nature of virtues is completely subjective. In other words, the supposed foundation of virtues is no foundation at all. After all, the ancient 'virtue' was strength and masculinity - from 'vir' - with the derivations 'virility' and 'virulence' (extreme severity and harmfulness).

So VA may be (if unwittingly) advocating a form of virtue ethics. But that can never establish the existence of moral facts and objectivity. It cannot be a fact that we should be empathetic. Many of us just think - for good reason - that it's a good idea.

But - totally agree with your patient critique. But sadly, it will make no difference. VA is impermeable to reason.

[Skepdick]

Okay. I've explained why I think your argument is incorrect.

If there are no objective rules for "incorrectness of arguments" why should I care?

1 Do you think it's a fact that abortion or capital punishment is morally wrong? If not, then why?

Do you think it's a fact that my argument is "incorrect"? If not, then why you say it?

In other words, what distinguishes what you call a moral fact - such as that murder is morally wrong - from moral issues that aren't matters of fact, but rather opinion?

Context and conventions distuiguishes them.

2 There are 'facts about' aesthetics, such as that some people think X is beautiful, and others think X is ugly. Do you think that it 'can be a fact' that X is beautiful or ugly?

Indeed they can be facts. If conventions are established in context.

[Iwannaplato]

Thanks again. My doubt about the supposed difference that distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism and deontology is that the choice and nature of virtues is completely subjective.

Sure, it's not different in that sense. All three are moral realisms. It's a different way of thinking about morals. And moral antirealists themselves have values, and they likely mirror these ways of thinking about what they value by thinking about consequences, things they don't like in and of themselves and then also in terms of character. And most people evaluate with a mixture.

My point was not 'Hey, he's not being objectivist about values, he's a virtue ethicist.' No. He's being objectivist. But his reasons for being more of a virtue ethicist are not because it is more objective. His focusing on building character instead of developing rules is tno because the former is more objective, but rather because it is more effective, less crude, and I think less like the religion he left.

So VA may be (if unwittingly) advocating a form of virtue ethics.

Yes, and doesn't seem to have been interested in looking at VE which I think would help him be clearer actually.

But that can never establish the existence of moral facts and objectivity. It cannot be a fact that we should be empathetic. Many of us just think - for good reason - that it's a good idea.

I agree. I just noticed a kind of ping pong around his explaining his 'virtue ethics' and why and your sense of his why there. That they were not the same. I have not via this brought your positions closer. But it might reduce some of the repetition.

[Peter Holmes]

Okay. I've explained why I think your argument is incorrect.

If there are no objective rules for "incorrectness of arguments" why should I care?

Rules are just rules, so 'objective rules' is a redundancy. And yep, there's no compulsion to follow or care about rules - legal rules excepted, of course.

1 Do you think it's a fact that abortion or capital punishment is morally wrong? If not, then why?

Do you think it's a fact that my argument is "incorrect"? If not, then [do] why you say it?

Yes, I think it's incorrect. Now, what about my question?

In other words, what distinguishes what you call a moral fact - such as that murder is morally wrong - from moral issues that aren't matters of fact, but rather opinion?

Context and conventions distuiguishes [sic] them.

Please be explicit. What distinguishes the contexts and conventions used in a factual moral assertion from those used in a non-factual moral assertion?

2 There are 'facts about' aesthetics, such as that some people think X is beautiful, and others think X is ugly. Do you think that it 'can be a fact' that X is beautiful or ugly?

Indeed they can be facts. If conventions are established in context.

Okay. Fair enough - colours to the mast. You know why I think it can never be a fact that X is beautiful or ugly. And I'd point out the morally terrible consequences that can follow from that claim.

[Skepdick]

Okay. I've explained why I think your argument is incorrect.

If there are no objective rules for "incorrectness of arguments" why should I care?

Rules are just rules, so 'objective rules' is a redundancy. And yep, there's no compulsion to follow or care about rules - legal rules excepted, of course.

And morals are just morals. So objective morals is a redundancy. And yep, there's no compulsion to follow or care about morals - with or without exception.

Yes, I think it's incorrect.

Is that "incorrect" in the way that "objectively incorrect" is redundant; or some other kind of incorrect?

Now, what about my question?

We'll get to yours when you finish answering mine.

Please be explicit. What distinguishes the contexts and conventions used in a factual moral assertion from those used in a non-factual moral assertion?

Can you show me how? What distinguishes "correctness" from "incorrectness"?

Okay. Fair enough - colours to the mast. You know why I think it can never be a fact that X is beautiful or ugly. And I'd point out the morally terrible consequences that can follow from that claim.

But your morality is subjective. Morally terrible - morally non-terrible. What's the difference? It's all just opinions.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So VA may be (if unwittingly) advocating a form of virtue ethics. But that can never establish the existence of moral facts and objectivity. It cannot be a fact that we should be empathetic. Many of us just think - for good reason - that it's a good idea.

Nah, my morality-proper -eliminate evil to enable its related goods- has nothing to do with virtue per se albeit there are some overlap.

These example of virtues [good] are way off from my specific taxonomy of 'evil acts'.
What are examples of virtues?
Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.

Ben Franklin's '13 Virtues' path to personal perfection
Then he considered various virtues that, if mastered, would counteract his unwanted behavior. His list of 13: Temperance, Silence, Order, Resolution, Frugality, Industry, Sincerity, Justice, Moderation, Cleanliness, Tranquility, Chastity and Humility.

All facts are conditioned upon a human-based FSK [objective].
As such it is possible for human-based virtue FSK facts which are objective.
I have not deliberated on this and I am not interested in that at present.

But - totally agree with your patient critique. But sadly, it will make no difference. VA is impermeable to reason.

I have provided tons of philosophical reasonings to support my arguments and claims.

You? nothing, zilch!!