What could make morality objective?

[Age]

So we can agree that a factual assertion is not a factual assertion?




Whether there are; or aren't pink unicorns on the moon depends entirely on the contextual definition of "pink unicorn".

In any context where "pink unicorn" is ostensively defined to refer to existents resembling the one below, it is a fact that there are pink unicorn on the moon!

That is ONLY if at least one of 'those things' does ACTUALLY even exist on the moon.

Quite. A name is not the named, just as a description is not the described. We can name and describe the thing some of us happen to call the American flag any way we like. We could call it a pink unicorn. Signs are arbitrary. But whether there actually is a thing that we happen to call an American flag or a pink unicorn on what we happen to call the moon has nothing to do with names and descriptions.

Agreement on the use of signs - 'definitions' - does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

So, what then, EXACTLY, does ACTUALLY constitute 'facts' AND 'objectivity'?

I wonder if there's another way to explain this? I'll keep trying.

you can 'TRY' MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, BUT if you want to CLAIM 'facts' equals 'objectivity' AS WELL AS YOUR 'definitions' do NOT constitute what we call 'facts' AND 'objectivity', then NO matter WHAT WAY you explain 'things' here YOUR 'definitions' of the words that you USE, in YOUR explanations, will NEVER BE constituted as 'fact', NOR 'facts'.

That is, OF COURSE, if what you are 'TRYING TO' CLAIM here is ACTUALLY A 'fact'. But then if 'it' WERE, then you would ONLY BE CONTRADICTING "your" OWN 'self' here.

Now, IF, as you 'TRY TO' CLAIM here, YOUR OWN AGREEMENT on 'definitions' does NOT constitute what you call 'facts', then, AGAIN, what ELSE could POSSIBLY constitute for ACTUAL 'facts'.

AND BEFORE you USE your PREVIOUS examples that you have ALREADY USED, REMEMBER that 'they' ONLY EXIST BECAUSE of 'AGREEMENT' itself.

[Iwannaplato]

Don't forget that he has a massive hard on for science as the most "credible" FSK, but the credibility of any FSK derives from the number of people that accept it as the provider of answers to questions. The science FSK is only credible in those terms because most people believe it refers back to real natural facts about the existing world. So he only grants science all that credibility on the basis of a superstitious but mistaken belief that people have about it. So he's an FSK-Antirealist too.

Does he really make this case somewhere?

[FlashDangerpants]

Don't forget that he has a massive hard on for science as the most "credible" FSK, but the credibility of any FSK derives from the number of people that accept it as the provider of answers to questions. The science FSK is only credible in those terms because most people believe it refers back to real natural facts about the existing world. So he only grants science all that credibility on the basis of a superstitious but mistaken belief that people have about it. So he's an FSK-Antirealist too.

Does he really make this case somewhere?

He's not going to make that argument on purpose, but certainly he's done it by accident.

You can see him in action insisting that science is the most "credible" "FSK" here

His description of how credibility works is available here. The main issue is that it is not the proofs or the data or the results that confers plausibility (realist stuff), but rather the constructivist acceptance criteria of the men being persuaded by the data.

And that tallies with how his description of his morality-proper FSK works. Which is all about men with beards standing around coinstructing agreements about morality.

So yes, his case does depend uopn social post-truth constructivism for its description of how FSKs work, but the thing that makes science the "standard bearer" is the erronous belief the general population holds that science arrives at natural truths. Which his whole Moon-Doesn't-Exist argument explicitly denies.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA says this: 'What I agree with is Moral Empirical Realism which is conditioned upon a human-based-empirical-moral-FSK which is credible, reliable and high degree of objectivity.' [sic]
Here are some observations on VA's approach.
1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)
2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)
3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)
4 The claim that realism entails belief in the existence of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, because there is no separate and different 'mind' from which reality can - or needs to - be independent. So to make this claim is (usually) to straw man realists.

You have not responded to my post;
viewtopic.php?p=633765#p633765
Note my question below,
If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?
no answers to it? Here the post again.

Strawman!
I had stated it is only incoherent and delusional as in your case, where you claim the existence of mind-independent reality, facts [features of reality, just is] is absolute, i.e. no other way.

I agreed, the idea of mind-independence can be assumed within common sense and conventional sense. If one stand on railway track with an oncoming train, there is 'really' a mind independent train and any rational person would jump off the railway track.

But it is incoherent when you insist on applying what is common sense in the case of the deliberation of moral facts.

5 The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is a form of realism. By contrast, anti-realism sometimes amounts to the claim that there are no such things as features of reality - so that there are no things that can be entangled.

Nope!
The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is basically a form of anti-realism; see my 1 above.

6 But sometimes, anti-realism really amounts to a rejection of the idea that any one kind of description captures the 'essence' or 'fundamental nature' of reality - as though there could be such a thing.

Not sure of your point.
I claimed that anti-realism deny there are such thing as any 'essence' or 'fundament nature' of reality that exists independently in-itself from the human conditions.

I think the problem is how VA's 'moral empirical realism' is consistent with her/his professed ontological anti-realism - and, indeed what, anti-realism itself actually amounts to.

Anti-realism is my case is against your philosophical realism, i.e. that things in reality are independent of the human conditions. To you there are no such things as independent moral facts.

If you agree with the following;

1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)

2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)

3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)

If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?

Note mine is 'moral empirical realism', note the emphasis "empirical" but ultimately it is subsumed within antirealism ['moral empirical realism].

I had mentioned, your philosophical realism is subsumed within idealism, i.e.
idealism[philosophical_realism] which is illusory and delusional.

[Peter Holmes]

VA says this: 'What I agree with is Moral Empirical Realism which is conditioned upon a human-based-empirical-moral-FSK which is credible, reliable and high degree of objectivity.' [sic]
Here are some observations on VA's approach.
1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)
2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)
3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)
4 The claim that realism entails belief in the existence of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, because there is no separate and different 'mind' from which reality can - or needs to - be independent. So to make this claim is (usually) to straw man realists.

You have not responded to my post;
viewtopic.php?p=633765#p633765
Note my question below,
If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?
no answers to it?

Here's your argument. A human being and a rock are both real, physical things. Therefore, a human being and a rock are entangled with each other, and a rock can't be unentangled from a human being. My question is: in exactly what way is a rock entangled with human beings? Are you referring to a physical theory - perhaps a variation of quantum or string theory - which posits the physical connection between all things in the universe? Is that what you mean by 'entanglement'?

Here the post again.

Strawman!
I had stated it is only incoherent and delusional as in your case, where you claim the existence of mind-independent reality, facts [features of reality, just is] is absolute, i.e. no other way.

I agreed, the idea of mind-independence can be assumed within common sense and conventional sense. If one stand on railway track with an oncoming train, there is 'really' a mind independent train and any rational person would jump off the railway track.

But it is incoherent when you insist on applying what is common sense in the case of the deliberation of moral facts.

Try very very hard to follow what I'm saying, which is this: I don't claim there's a mind-independent reality. I'll say it again, just in case it isn't clear: I don't claim that there is a mind-independent reality.

'Ah', you exclaim, 'but when you say there are features of reality that exist independent from opinion, then you surely are claiming that there's a mind-independent reality!'

Well, what an intellectual tangle. Looks like PH has a bad case of cognitive dissonance. Let's see. PH, what do you have to say for yourself?

Okay, let's try again. I'll try a conditional premise, as follows.

If there is no such thing as 'mind', or 'the mind', then there is no such thing as 'mind-dependence' or 'mind-independence'. In other words, talk of 'mind-independence' is coherent only if there is such a thing as 'mind' or 'the mind'.

Calling VA: do you understand that conditional or hypothetical premise? Because, if you do, then you can understand how it's possible both to assert the existence of independent features of reality (facts) and deny the existence of mind-independent features of reality - because, if there is no 'mind', then talk of mind-independence is incoherent. Abolish one term of a dichotomy, and it's no longer a dichotomy.

5 The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is a form of realism. By contrast, anti-realism sometimes amounts to the claim that there are no such things as features of reality - so that there are no things that can be entangled.

Nope!
The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is basically a form of anti-realism; see my 1 above.

Nope. And this where your anti-realism is self-refuting. What exactly are the features of reality that are entangled? For example, are the aforementioned rock and human being real things - in which case, this is a realist claim. Or are they unreal products of an entanglement - in which case, what the hell are they? Your metaphor of 'entanglement' doesn't do any useful work. You've been hiding behind it.

6 But sometimes, anti-realism really amounts to a rejection of the idea that any one kind of description captures the 'essence' or 'fundamental nature' of reality - as though there could be such a thing.

Not sure of your point.
I claimed that anti-realism deny there are such thing as any 'essence' or 'fundament nature' of reality that exists independently in-itself from the human conditions.

Okay, let me explain my point again. Anti-realism could be a denial of the existence of what we call reality. But you don't deny its existence - and you promote the importance of empirical evidence for its existence - qualified by your 'framework and system of knowledge' invention.

So you accept the physical existence of what we call reality, but you deny that that reality has an 'essence' or 'fundamental nature'. And I agree with you. I reject any and every kind of ontological essentialism or 'fundamentalism'. It makes no sense to talk about what Kant called noumena, or things-in-themselves.

So all that's left us are things which we can describe in different ways, for different purposes. For example, the thing that, in one context, we call water and describe as H2O, we may call something else and describe differently in a different context. To say 'water is H2O' is not to say that the essence or fundamental nature of this thing we humans call water is H2O. To say that would be as stupid as to say that water is not H2O - which also implies that there is some mysterious thing that water really is.

I think the problem is how VA's 'moral empirical realism' is consistent with her/his professed ontological anti-realism - and, indeed what, anti-realism itself actually amounts to.

Anti-realism is my case is against your philosophical realism, i.e. that things in reality are independent of the human conditions. To you there are no such things as independent moral facts.

If you agree with the following;

1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)

2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)

3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)

If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?

Note mine is 'moral empirical realism', note the emphasis "empirical" but ultimately it is subsumed within antirealism ['moral empirical realism].

I had mentioned, your philosophical realism is subsumed within idealism, i.e.
idealism[philosophical_realism] which is illusory and delusional.

What does the label 'anti-realist empiricism' mean? What can an anti-realist do with empirical evidence?

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA says this: 'What I agree with is Moral Empirical Realism which is conditioned upon a human-based-empirical-moral-FSK which is credible, reliable and high degree of objectivity.' [sic]
Here are some observations on VA's approach.
1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)
2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)
3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)
4 The claim that realism entails belief in the existence of a mind-independent reality is incoherent, because there is no separate and different 'mind' from which reality can - or needs to - be independent. So to make this claim is (usually) to straw man realists.

You have not responded to my post;
viewtopic.php?p=633765#p633765
Note my question below,
If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?
no answers to it?

Here's your argument. A human being and a rock are both real, physical things. Therefore, a human being and a rock are entangled with each other, and a rock can't be unentangled from a human being. My question is: in exactly what way is a rock entangled with human beings? Are you referring to a physical theory - perhaps a variation of quantum or string theory - which posits the physical connection between all things in the universe? Is that what you mean by 'entanglement'?

The term 'entanglement' could be confusing and I note it is not sufficient to explain what I intend to mean.

Basically, what I meant with entanglement refers to my anti-philosophical realism which is the contrast against Philosophical Realism as below;

1. Philosophical realism is about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind*-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
2. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.
3. Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.
3. Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.
4. Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

You disputed the term 'mind' and I had stated mind should refer to 'human conditions'.
But you used the term 'mind-independent' in your later posts, so I thought you understand that 'mind' refer to 'human condition'. But I note you brought up the issue again below.

With reference to the above, what is that you disagree with Philosophical Realism as listed above?
You deny 'correspondence' but I argued it is implicit in your realism.

Here the post again.

Strawman!
I had stated it is only incoherent and delusional as in your case, where you claim the existence of mind-independent reality, facts [features of reality, just is] is absolute, i.e. no other way.

I agreed, the idea of mind-independence can be assumed within common sense and conventional sense. If one stand on railway track with an oncoming train, there is 'really' a mind independent train and any rational person would jump off the railway track.

But it is incoherent when you insist on applying what is common sense in the case of the deliberation of moral facts.

Try very very hard to follow what I'm saying, which is this: I don't claim there's a mind-independent reality. I'll say it again, just in case it isn't clear: I don't claim that there is a mind-independent reality.

'Ah', you exclaim, 'but when you say there are features of reality that exist independent from opinion, then you surely are claiming that there's a mind-independent reality!'

Well, what an intellectual tangle. Looks like PH has a bad case of cognitive dissonance. Let's see. PH, what do you have to say for yourself?

Okay, let's try again. I'll try a conditional premise, as follows.

If there is no such thing as 'mind', or 'the mind', then there is no such thing as 'mind-dependence' or 'mind-independence'. In other words, talk of 'mind-independence' is coherent only if there is such a thing as 'mind' or 'the mind'.

Calling VA: do you understand that conditional or hypothetical premise? Because, if you do, then you can understand how it's possible both to assert the existence of independent features of reality (facts) and deny the existence of mind-independent features of reality - because, if there is no 'mind', then talk of mind-independence is incoherent. Abolish one term of a dichotomy, and it's no longer a dichotomy.

As I mentioned above, in my use of mind-independent it it synonymous mean independent of the human conditions.
Are you familiar with Kant's Copernican Revolution? which is TOP-DOWN I have mentioned that many times. I have argued your approach is BOTTOM-UP.

5 The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is a form of realism. By contrast, anti-realism sometimes amounts to the claim that there are no such things as features of reality - so that there are no things that can be entangled.

Nope!
The claim that all features of reality are 'entangled' with each other is basically a form of anti-realism; see my 1 above.

Nope. And this where your anti-realism is self-refuting. What exactly are the features of reality that are entangled? For example, are the aforementioned rock and human being real things - in which case, this is a realist claim. Or are they unreal products of an entanglement - in which case, what the hell are they? Your metaphor of 'entanglement' doesn't do any useful work. You've been hiding behind it.

You are still stuck with 'features of reality' which is the P-Realist claim, thus is illusory and non-existence.

From the anti-Philosophical-realist position, there is no "feature of reality" in your sense.

Let take 'water' as an example, instead of 'rock'.
Humans evolved from their original 'ancestors' the one-celled living things where certain basic neural algorithms are still embedded in us based on our direct experiences of a specific pattern.
As such humans has inherited a 4 billion years old neural algorithm that correlates with a specific pattern of experience.
It is only with the advent of the human common sense that humans label this specific pattern of experience and cognition to some specific thing called 'water'.
What is real is merely the pattern of experience & cognition that is entangled, emerged and realized and we mentally identify this pattern as a thing or object.
As such this is a mental object of common sense [intelligible object by intellectual abstraction] not a real object as such.

When humans developed further intellectual this pattern of experience and cognition is FSKed as 'H20' within the science-Chemistry FSK.

This my point, there is no feature of reality [in your sense].
What you experienced as "water" is the culmination of a 4.3 years of experiences, cognitions and realizations.
This is what I meant by TOP-DOWN, i.e. what counts is only the experienced and what is FSKed.

There is no need to speculate on your "feature of reality".
What is the use of this other than to fulfil your psychological vacuum and desperation.

I don't think my explanation above is sufficient, so there still a big gap for you to fill.

6 But sometimes, anti-realism really amounts to a rejection of the idea that any one kind of description captures the 'essence' or 'fundamental nature' of reality - as though there could be such a thing.

Not sure of your point.
I claimed that anti-realism deny there are such thing as any 'essence' or 'fundament nature' of reality that exists independently in-itself from the human conditions.

Okay, let me explain my point again. Anti-realism could be a denial of the existence of what we call reality. But you don't deny its existence - and you promote the importance of empirical evidence for its existence - qualified by your 'framework and system of knowledge' invention.

So you accept the physical existence of what we call reality, but you deny that that reality has an 'essence' or 'fundamental nature'. And I agree with you. I reject any and every kind of ontological essentialism or 'fundamentalism'. It makes no sense to talk about what Kant called noumena, or things-in-themselves.

So all that's left us are things which we can describe in different ways, for different purposes. For example, the thing that, in one context, we call water and describe as H2O, we may call something else and describe differently in a different context. To say 'water is H2O' is not to say that the essence or fundamental nature of this thing we humans call water is H2O. To say that would be as stupid as to say that water is not H2O - which also implies that there is some mysterious thing that water really is.

Note my explanation of the foundation relating to 'what is water' which has a 4.3 billion years old neural algorithm embedded deep in your DNA and brain.

It is not an essence but the experiences and cognition that is coded in your DNA inherited from 4.3 billion years ago.

I think the problem is how VA's 'moral empirical realism' is consistent with her/his professed ontological anti-realism - and, indeed what, anti-realism itself actually amounts to.

Anti-realism is my case is against your philosophical realism, i.e. that things in reality are independent of the human conditions. To you there are no such things as independent moral facts.

If you agree with the following;

1 What we call the universe or reality consists of energy/matter. (True.)

2 Human beings consist of the energy/matter that comprises the universe - what we call reality. (True.)

3 Human beings are not separate and different from the reality of which we're a part. (True.)

If you agree with the reality of 1,2 and 3, why are you insisting facts are features of reality [just-is] are separate and different from the human conditions?

Note mine is 'moral empirical realism', note the emphasis "empirical" but ultimately it is subsumed within antirealism ['moral empirical realism].

I had mentioned, your philosophical realism is subsumed within idealism, i.e.
idealism[philosophical_realism] which is illusory and delusional.

What does the label 'anti-realist empiricism' mean? What can an anti-realist do with empirical evidence?

Empirical realism is literal what it meant, i.e. reality that is conditioned upon empirical evidences and further conditioned by the specific FSK.
There is no speculation [driven by desperate psychology] of any 'feature of reality' beyond the empirical.
In your BOTTOM-UP you are begging the question by assuming there is a feature of reality out there.

[Peter Holmes]

Empirical realism is literal what it meant, i.e. reality that is conditioned upon empirical evidences and further conditioned by the specific FSK.
There is no speculation [driven by desperate psychology] of any 'feature of reality' beyond the empirical.
In your BOTTOM-UP you are begging the question by assuming there is a feature of reality out there.

Why do you assume there is not any feature of reality out there? What evidence do you have for that assumption? And of what is empirical evidence evidence?

[FlashDangerpants]

Empirical realism is literal what it meant, i.e. reality that is conditioned upon empirical evidences and further conditioned by the specific FSK.
There is no speculation [driven by desperate psychology] of any 'feature of reality' beyond the empirical.
In your BOTTOM-UP you are begging the question by assuming there is a feature of reality out there.

Why do you assume there is not any feature of reality out there? What evidence do you have for that assumption? And of what is empirical evidence evidence?

What is he saying is the problem with bottom-up arguments? Normally top down args are the problem because they are teleological and/or just plain religious.

Is there such a thing as a top down empirical argument? I can't see how that works.

[Peter Holmes]

Empirical realism is literal what it meant, i.e. reality that is conditioned upon empirical evidences and further conditioned by the specific FSK.
There is no speculation [driven by desperate psychology] of any 'feature of reality' beyond the empirical.
In your BOTTOM-UP you are begging the question by assuming there is a feature of reality out there.

Why do you assume there is not any feature of reality out there? What evidence do you have for that assumption? And of what is empirical evidence evidence?

What is he saying is the problem with bottom-up arguments? Normally top down args are the problem because they are teleological and/or just plain religious.

Is there such a thing as a top down empirical argument? I can't see how that works.

I see what you mean. But I'm inclined not to engage with this top-down v bottom-up distinction that he wants to make. I think it's just another distraction down yet another blind alley.

And anyway, I think empiricism itself is the source of many mistakes. 'Knowledge comes from experience, which is necessarily first person, and therefore subjective - so our conclusions can only ever be products of intersubjective consensus.' Kant inherited and passed on empiricist skepticism, and VA's tortured reasoning is one outcome.

[Skepdick]

But I'm inclined not to engage with this top-down v bottom-up distinction that he wants to make. I think it's just another distraction down yet another blind alley.

And the objective/subjective distinction isn't a "distraction down yet another blind alley"?

[Skepdick]

Is there such a thing as a top down empirical argument? I can't see how that works.

Is there such a thing as a bottom-up argument? Empirical; or othetwise. I can't see how that works.

The "bottom" doesn't produce any arguments.
Only the "top" does.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA has referred to pragmatism, associating it with his approach to objectivism.

But like all so-called philosophical theories, a theory of truth is nothing more than a description of how we do or could use the abstract noun truth, its cognates, and related words, such as falsehood.

And that's why it's so easy to falsify claims made in any theory of truth, such as correspondence, coherence, consensus, redundancy - and pragmatism. All such theories propose to describe a 'thing' - 'truth' - and fail, because there is no such 'thing'.

VA commends pragmatism, because it supposedly doesn't 'hold a mirror up to nature' - which means it doesn't rest on a correspondence theory of truth. But neither does realism, necessarily, though VA straw-mannishly insists it does.

A falsehood that works is nonetheless a falsehood. And our ancestors have survived and even thrived on working falsehoods for millennia - such as the assertion 'our god is real'. An adherent of pragmatism theory has to accept that that assertion is or used to be true. And it likely ain't and never was. Bummer.

[Skepdick]

Elsewhere, VA has referred to pragmatism, associating it with his approach to objectivism.

But like all so-called philosophical theories, a theory of truth is nothing more than a description of how we do or could use the abstract noun truth, its cognates, and related words, such as falsehood.

And that's why it's so easy to falsify claims made in any theory of truth, such as correspondence, coherence, consensus, redundancy - and pragmatism. All such theories propose to describe a 'thing' - 'truth' - and fail, because there is no such 'thing'.

VA commends pragmatism, because it supposedly doesn't 'hold a mirror up to nature' - which means it doesn't rest on a correspondence theory of truth. But neither does realism, necessarily, though VA straw-mannishly insists it does.

A falsehood that works is nonetheless a falsehood. And our ancestors have survived and even thrived on working falsehoods for millennia - such as the assertion 'our god is real'. An adherent of pragmatism theory has to accept that that assertion is or used to be true. And it likely ain't and never was. Bummer.

So the truth/falsehood distinction isn't a "distraction down yet another blind alley"?

Seems you've given yourself far too much leeway in the way of distracting distinctions.

Truth is what's good in the way of belief. --William James

All you have to do now is figure out the difference between good and not-good.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Empirical realism is literal what it meant, i.e. reality that is conditioned upon empirical evidences and further conditioned by the specific FSK.
There is no speculation [driven by desperate psychology] of any 'feature of reality' beyond the empirical.
In your BOTTOM-UP you are begging the question by assuming there is a feature of reality out there.

Why do you assume there is not any feature of reality out there? What evidence do you have for that assumption? And of what is empirical evidence evidence?

Strawman, where did I assume there is no feature of reality out there?

Empirical evidence for a proposition is evidence, i.e. what supports or counters this proposition, that is constituted by or accessible to sense experience or experimental procedure.
Empirical evidence is of central importance to the sciences and plays a role in various other fields, like epistemology and law.
Often different fields work with quite different conceptions.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what determines whether holding a certain belief is rational. This is only possible if the evidence is possessed by the person, which has prompted various epistemologists to conceive evidence as private mental states like experiences or other beliefs.
In philosophy of science, on the other hand, evidence is understood as that which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses and arbitrates between competing theories. For this role, it is important that evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects or events and unlike private mental states, so that evidence may foster scientific consensus.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_evidence

TOP-DOWN vs BOTTOM-UP dichotomy is not absolute but a matter of perspective, thus the contexts used need to be explained.
See here for a clue; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top-down_ ... -up_design
My explanation below;

TOP_DOWN [in this case] means we start with empirical evidence as justified and verified by a credible and reliable FSK, then made inference therefrom 'downward' to subtler elements to as far as the empirical evidences conditioned upon a FSK can support.

While my emphasis is on the empirical, I am not into Empiricism.
True, empirical evidence has its limitation, e.g. what is perceived could be a hallucination or other sense illusions - a bent stick between water and air is not bent in reality.
This is why we need a credible and reliable FSK [with rationality] to eliminate as much of the limitations of empirical-based evidence as possible.

Example of TOP_DOWN is we start with the more obvious empirical objects and events, then dig down to its smaller units, then molecular structures, atomic structures, to as far as the empirical limits of quarks and particles and no further.
Thus there is no need to speculate on a 'feature of reality' that is 'just is'.

In case of your BOTTOM-UP approach, you merely assume there is a feature of reality [just is] which is not supported by empirical evidences, then you probably jump -"the-GAP' upward to quarks and particles, then atomic structures, molecular to smaller matter to the objects and events.
This is also how theists [BOTTOM_UP] approach their reality, i.e. at the Bottom of it all is GOD [just is] that create all things [quarks and particles] in the universe.

Because of the inherent Reality-GAP within your Bottom-UP approach, it is inherently never realistic.
Besides why do you need to speculate on that "just-is" i.e. "feature of reality" which is illusory, nothing, empty and meaningless. It serves nothing as realistic in terms of knowledge other than to soothe your desperate psychology driven by an inherent existential crisis.

What is your counter to the above to justify your 'Bottom-Up' approach to reality?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why do you assume there is not any feature of reality out there? What evidence do you have for that assumption? And of what is empirical evidence evidence?

What is he saying is the problem with bottom-up arguments? Normally top down args are the problem because they are teleological and/or just plain religious.

Is there such a thing as a top down empirical argument? I can't see how that works.

I see what you mean. But I'm inclined not to engage with this top-down v bottom-up distinction that he wants to make. I think it's just another distraction down yet another blind alley.

The top-down v bottom-up distinction is effective in simplifying issues when we explain them in the contexts and perspective they are used. I have explained that above.

And anyway, I think empiricism itself is the source of many mistakes. 'Knowledge comes from experience, which is necessarily first person, and therefore subjective - so our conclusions can only ever be products of intersubjective consensus.'

Note I don't indulge in Empiricism [i.e. insist the empirical is the ONLY WAY].
As explained above, it is very obvious to the knowledgeable, empirical evidences are first person's experience and cannot be fully reliable.
This is why we need a reliable and credible FSK, e.g. the human based scientific FSK to ensure scientific facts has the optimal truths based on intersubjective consensus, not the absolute truth.
You reject scientific knowledge?

Kant inherited and passed on empiricist skepticism, and VA's tortured reasoning is one outcome.

Ignorant! Don't be an ultracrepidarian on Kant.
Hume was a ultra-empiricist, while Kant before his CPR was an ultra-dogmatic-rationalists.
It was Hume's empiricism that triggered Kant from his ultra-dogmatic-rationalism slumber. Kant then gave up his rationalism and walked the tightrope to reconcile between empiricism and rationalism, i.e. acknowledge the weakness of both and working on a complementarity between both.

Note Kant's famous saying;
'Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without conceptions blind'?

'Thoughts [rationalism] without content [empirical] are empty; intuitions [empirical] without conceptions [rationalism] blind'?

This is why my view of reality is based on the empirical supported by strong philosophical reasonings within a credible and reliable FSK.