What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

Fuck off, you nasty, stupid wanker.

Why?

According to you I am not doing anything objectively wrong.

I am just ignoring the "declarative" rules.

[Sculptor]

Fuck off, you nasty, stupid wanker.

Here. here!!



I'm so glad it's not just me that knows what a dipshit he is.

[Skepdick]

Fuck off, you nasty, stupid wanker.

Here. here!!



I'm so glad it's not just me that knows what a dipshit he is.

Round up the lynch mob!

Tell them you are lunching me for exposing Peter “Dumb Cunt” Holmes’s double standard

[Veritas Aequitas]

Fuck off, you nasty, stupid wanker.

I don't agree and but also agree with Skepdick on many of his views.
At least Skepdick has at least provided many references to his views for anyone to review and accept or counter.

On the other hand, I have not come across a post where you have provided any reference to some credible sources.

Most of the unsubstantiated grounds you are banking your views are personal opinions which are groundless, illusory, mystical, empty, nothing, meaningless and nonsensical within a higher philosophical consideration.

[Peter Holmes]

Though it's necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, if what we call water is indeed what we call H2O, then its being H2O has nothing to do with our agreement on the use of signs.

VA argues that what we call water would not be what we call H2O had we not developed chemistry - that water is H2O only because there is chemistry - which is patently absurd.

Being known and being described - using agreed linguistic rules are not necessary condition for being a fact - a feature of reality that is or was the case. And this is screamingly obvious.

If there are moral facts, then they are things or properties that exist or existed, whether or not they're known and described. Just like neurons, DNA and quantum events.

[Skepdick]

Being known and being described - using agreed linguistic rules are not necessary condition for being a fact - a feature of reality that is or was the case. And this is screamingly obvious.

So describing something truthfully is not a sufficient condition for factuality ?!?!?

What a dumb, intellectually dishonest, double-standard peddling, philosophically bankrupt fucking cunt.

If you can truthfully describe rules and call them facts then you can truthfully describe moral rules and call them facts.

This is screamingly obvious!

[Veritas Aequitas]

Though it's necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs does not constitute what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. For example, if what we call water is indeed what we call H2O, then its being H2O has nothing to do with our agreement on the use of signs.

VA argues that what we call water would not be what we call H2O had we not developed chemistry - that water is H2O only because there is chemistry - which is patently absurd.

Being known and being described - using agreed linguistic rules are not necessary condition for being a fact - a feature of reality that is or was the case. And this is screamingly obvious.

If there are moral facts, then they are things or properties that exist or existed, whether or not they're known and described. Just like neurons, DNA and quantum events.

'Water is H20' only because science-Chemistry said so.
How else? Your father said so?

Even then as Hasok Chang had stated, modern chemistry do take 'water is H20' in the strictest sense.

Being known and being described - using agreed linguistic rules are not necessary condition for being a fact - a feature of reality that is or was the case. And this is screamingly obvious.

Yes it is not a fact per se, i.e. no fact-by-itself.

But,
Being known and being described - using agreed linguistic rules are necessary condition for it being a LINGUISTIC fact .
Note the qualification 'linguistic' here, i.e. processed within the linguistic FSK with its rules.

However,
the emergence of 'water is H20' within a science-chemistry FSK is a science-chemistry fact. The qualification to its specific FSK is imperative.
In addition, there is a realization and emergence process which you ignore, before the fact is known and described.

Yes, there are philosophical neurons, neural correlates, neural algorithm, DNA and quantum events, which are biological, chemistry and physical facts within the respective FSK and biochemistry FSK.
But when these biological, chemistry and physical facts are subsumed within a moral FSK, moral facts emerged.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA bangs on about so-called human nature.

But descriptions of 'human nature' always express opinions. For example, are humans 'naturally' good or evil? For example, there's the religious belief that humans are 'fallen' and frail - easily corrupted, and so needing an invented god's grace and forgiveness.

VA's 'theory' taps into this view: humans supposedly have both 'ought-to-kill-humans' and 'ought-not-kill-humans' neurons. And VA thinks these are 'moral facts' about human nature - and assumes 'oughtness-not-to-kill' is the behavioural tendency that should be enhanced, even by means of genetic engineering.

The leap from physiological (or any other) facts to moral conclusions is always assumed, as Hume pointed out - from the way things are to the way they ought to be. Challenged to explain and justify the leap, moral realists and objectivists have nothing to say. They have no evidence for the supposed existence of moral facts - because there are none.

All VA can offer is: 'feed actual physical facts into a morality framework and system of knowledge, and out come moral facts'. How this happens is unexplained. It's laughable.

And meanwhile, the dick-for-brains claims that agreement on the use of signs in descriptions is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity in the first place. Which VA hasn't noticed would, if it were true, utterly demolish her/his 'theory' about supposed moral facts.

What a clown-show.

[Skepdick]

And meanwhile, the dick-for-brains claims that agreement on the use of signs in descriptions is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity in the first place. Which VA hasn't noticed would, if it were true, utterly demolish her/his 'theory' about supposed moral facts.

By what criteria for "theory demolishment"?

You must have some theory about "correct" and "incorrect" theorizing.

Want to tell us about it?

[Peter Holmes]

Perhaps someone can explain the theoretical basis for the claim that agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

And perhaps someone can describe the foundation beneath our linguistic practices against which those practices can or should be assessed and criticised. Why are what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity not what we say they are?

[Skepdick]

Perhaps someone can explain the theoretical basis for the claim that agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

And perhaps someone can describe the foundation beneath our linguistic practices against which those practices can or should be assessed and criticised. Why are what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity not what we say they are?

Perhaps somebody can explain how and why Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes keeps talking on bahalf of this theoretical "we".

Use is meaning, so why does he keep assuming he knows how and why other people use language?
Why does he keep assuming what other people mean?

Is he dellusional?
Hearing voices in his head?
Does he need psychiatric help?

[Iwannaplato]

Perhaps someone can explain the theoretical basis for the claim that agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

And perhaps someone can describe the foundation beneath our linguistic practices against which those practices can or should be assessed and criticised. Why are what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity not what we say they are?

One should always go to the big overview first:
1) moral realism + ontological anti-realism.
2) Morals are real + things are not real (especially when we are not looking at them).
3) So, there are at least two categories: morals & things
4) How would we possibly be objective about the latter? They aren't real.
5) We have studied brains - which should not be confused with 'things' and found oughtness-not-to-kill neurons. These are also not things. Further, it might seem like the oughtness is superfluous, that in fact those neurons simply enhance feelings of care for others. That they merely lead to caring about others. But no, then those moral neurons would be mere neurons. Pure things and thus not real. It's the oughtness of the moral neurons that makes them real. So, they exist, even when we are not looking at them, which we rarely do.
6) We have studied stuff at the quantum level - which should be confused with things, since things are not real. How do we know this? We can read about this online on our computers. The computers may not be real. And the researchers who won the Nobel Prize did not carefully isolate certain things to research on, because things are not real. The computers are apparant when we look at them, not to be confused with real.
7) Conclusion: don't be so old-fashioned, unless it's convenient for making a point. Well, 'old-fashioned' implies that there is a past. Remember the five minutes hypothesis. Don't adhere to a past that might not exist. Though jeez, in that case, it'd be hard not to!!

[Peter Holmes]

Perhaps someone can explain the theoretical basis for the claim that agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

And perhaps someone can describe the foundation beneath our linguistic practices against which those practices can or should be assessed and criticised. Why are what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity not what we say they are?

One should always go to the big overview first:
1) moral realism + ontological anti-realism.
2) Morals are real + things are not real (especially when we are not looking at them).
3) So, there are at least two categories: morals & things
4) How would we possibly be objective about the latter? They aren't real.
5) We have studied brains - which should not be confused with 'things' and found oughtness-not-to-kill neurons. These are also not things. Further, it might seem like the oughtness is superfluous, that in fact those neurons simply enhance feelings of care for others. That they merely lead to caring about others. But no, then those moral neurons would be mere neurons. Pure things and thus not real. It's the oughtness of the moral neurons that makes them real. So, they exist, even when we are not looking at them, which we rarely do.
6) We have studied stuff at the quantum level - which should be confused with things, since things are not real. How do we know this? We can read about this online on our computers. The computers may not be real. And the researchers who won the Nobel Prize did not carefully isolate certain things to research on, because things are not real. The computers are apparant when we look at them, not to be confused with real.
7) Conclusion: don't be so old-fashioned, unless it's convenient for making a point. Well, 'old-fashioned' implies that there is a past. Remember the five minutes hypothesis. Don't adhere to a past that might not exist. Though jeez, in that case, it'd be hard not to!!

Brilliant.

Though, of course, I'm merely assuming that you're using words in the way I use them, so I may not understand anything you or anyone else says or writes. After all, each of us is stuck in solipsistic, epistemological, linguistic isolation. Talking to ourselves using rules that no one else may use. Tsa nightmare.

[Skepdick]

Perhaps someone can explain the theoretical basis for the claim that agreement on the use of signs is all that constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

And perhaps someone can describe the foundation beneath our linguistic practices against which those practices can or should be assessed and criticised. Why are what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity not what we say they are?

One should always go to the big overview first:
1) moral realism + ontological anti-realism.
2) Morals are real + things are not real (especially when we are not looking at them).
3) So, there are at least two categories: morals & things
4) How would we possibly be objective about the latter? They aren't real.
5) We have studied brains - which should not be confused with 'things' and found oughtness-not-to-kill neurons. These are also not things. Further, it might seem like the oughtness is superfluous, that in fact those neurons simply enhance feelings of care for others. That they merely lead to caring about others. But no, then those moral neurons would be mere neurons. Pure things and thus not real. It's the oughtness of the moral neurons that makes them real. So, they exist, even when we are not looking at them, which we rarely do.
6) We have studied stuff at the quantum level - which should be confused with things, since things are not real. How do we know this? We can read about this online on our computers. The computers may not be real. And the researchers who won the Nobel Prize did not carefully isolate certain things to research on, because things are not real. The computers are apparant when we look at them, not to be confused with real.
7) Conclusion: don't be so old-fashioned, unless it's convenient for making a point. Well, 'old-fashioned' implies that there is a past. Remember the five minutes hypothesis. Don't adhere to a past that might not exist. Though jeez, in that case, it'd be hard not to!!

Brilliant.

Though, of course, I'm merely assuming that you're using words in the way I use them, so I may not understand anything you or anyone else says or writes. After all, each of us is stuck in solipsistic, epistemological, linguistic isolation. Talking to ourselves using rules that no one else may use. Tsa nightmare.

Dumb philosopher is even dumber than assumed. Still misses the forrest for the trees.

How are you using the word "understand"?

If use is meaning, and I am using the word differently do you is your understanding the same as mine?

Is there any evidence that could convince us; or convince you that despite claiming to understand you have failed to understand?

If there's no such evidence then your claim is not even wrong.
If there is such evidence then your claim may as well be wrong.

So should I believe your words when you say that you "understand" or should I look for signals to the contrary?

[Peter Holmes]

Some interesting claims.

1 Agreement on the use of signs in descriptions constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity. Therefore, if we agree on the use of the signs in the expression 'X is morally wrong', then it's a fact that X is morally wrong.

2 By the same argument, if we agree on the use of the signs in the expression 'there are pink unicorns on the moon', then it's a fact that there are pink unicorns on the moon.

3 However. We can never really know how other people actually use signs, so agreement on their use is impossible. After all, they may suddenly and secretly use them differently, from moment to moment.

Why do you think you understand what I've just written? And why do you think you understand that question? Or this question? Assumptions, or what?

Come to think of it, why do I think I understand what I've written? After all, how did I understand the way the people who taught me English were using words? I didn't usually ask them. And I couldn't have really understood what they meant if they'd explained.

I appear to be down the fetid rabbit hole where philosophers furkle.