It's a reasonable presumption, just as with the lightning strike. The person that claims there's a plan is the one that has the burden to demonstrate there's a plan. We will only go back and forth on this until we have the discussion about revelation, I think; since that's your purported evidence there is a plan.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Mar 04, 2023 8:02 pmAnd yet, it remains nothing at all but a presumption. And it's one that requires us not to notice the amphiboly between lightning "strikes" and other events that "strike" in a metaphorical sense only.Astro Cat wrote:If it's reasonable to suppose lightning strikes are natural occurrences (until proven otherwise), it's reasonable to suppose that lightning striking people is a natural occurrence (until proven otherwise). Then, of course, it's obvious that people suffer if struck by lightning (with injuries including muscle pains, broken bones, cardiac arrest, hearing loss, seizures, burns, ocular cataracts, and death). It follows that it's reasonable (not omnisciently certain, but reasonable) to suppose that lightning strikes on people are an example of a natural and random example of suffering the same way it's reasonable to suppose lightning striking a rock is a natural and random event. If a person claims that all suffering is non-gratuitous, they are the ones that have to demonstrate there is a plan behind all suffering to render it non-gratuitous, including lightning strikes.
But let me grant you your presumption. You're free to regard it reasonable to think that cancer "just struck" Aunt Phillis. But then again, Aunt Phillis smoked. Or maybe Uncle Phil did, and she breathed his smoke. And you're free to think the plagues "just struck" the Egyptians; but then again, maybe God "struck" them, and had a purpose in so doing.
We're very far from the sort of evidence you need. We need a certain case of "gratuitious" suffering, suffering that simply CANNOT be explained as meaningful, anytime, by anyone, even God. Absent that, you've lost the basis of your first two premises, and have only a gratutious conclusion left.
Which is what a presumption is: it's a conclusion without the requisite evidence.
As I've argued, you can't be agnostic about whether there is a plan for suffering as you are wording yourself to be here. If you accept the premise that God would seek to never cause or allow gratuitous suffering, then it follows that no suffering is gratuitous: if you believe that premise about God, then you're already committed to the premise that no suffering is gratuitous, which means being committed to the premise that there is a plan behind all suffering.Immanuel Can wrote:Look back. You will not find I have said this. Anywhere. Ever.Astro Cat wrote:Your position is the one that adds, positively, "...but there is a plan behind it such that it happens for a purpose,"
You'll find, instead, that I've been consistently asking for the evidence of "gratuitious suffering." And while I don't deny that what you attribute to me is possible for somebody to assert, it's a paraphrasing from you about what you hope I might say, but have not said. It's not my words, and it's not my argument.
What I would, in fact, say, and what I have already said, is somewhat different. I've said that mankind is limited, contingent, time-bound and fallible. As such, he/she has no reasonable expectation of ever eliminating so many variables and possible explanations for suffering that he/she can safely ask us to conclude that "gratuitious" suffering exists. He/she would have to be God Himself.
And that's my real position. I think it's quite evident that every clause in it is true beyond reasonable dispute. We are limited, localized, fallible, perspectival beings. No doubt about it. If there is an explanation of suffering it's bound to be complicated, involved multiple, complex interplays of purpose, cross various timelines, and thus exceed the mental capacities of any person who has ever lived. If there's an answer to why suffering happens, it's clearly not an easy one-off kind of explanation. It's bound to be complicated, very complicated.
If you don't accept the premise that God would seek to cause or allow gratuitous suffering, then the Problem simply doesn't apply to your conception of God. Though I personally wouldn't call a God that doesn't have such a property as seeking to never cause or allow gratuitous suffering a sort of being I'd want to have anything to do with, though.
If we start from a tabula rasa, the way this would go would be that I might say something like, "if God is supposed to be good, then why is there suffering?" It's an open question; a problem. The theist's response would usually be, "well, because maybe suffering serves a purpose." Presenting the Problem the way I have presented it just skips some steps to save time, it is ultimately the theist that brings up a plan "first."
We could start all the way over from the bare basics for me to make this point. I could argue that "good" beings generally don't cause or allow other beings to suffer, then I could point out that there's all kinds of suffering in the world that God ostensibly created, and then I could point out that this doesn't seem to mesh together well conceptually. So far the only positive claim having been made is that suffering exists, which both sides agree on. Very quickly, when the theist moves to explain the apparent contradiction, they will be the ones to make a positive claim in some way: that there is a plan, or that suffering is caused by free will, etc. It would be a waste of time because we'd just end up back to redefining the Problem a few times to take care of some common objections until we get back to where we started; but it's still the theist that has the onus of evidence if they argue there is a plan behind suffering that renders it non-gratuitous.
So, I think we need to move on to a discussion about revelation and how or why you think it has sufficient warrant.