compatibilism

[attofishpi]

Compatibilism is a philosophical position that attempts to reconcile the idea of free will with the concept of determinism. According to determinism, every event, including human actions, is causally determined by prior events and natural laws. Compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with free will because free will can be defined as the ability to act in accordance with one's own desires and intentions, regardless of whether those desires and intentions are themselves causally determined by prior events.

However, many philosophers have argued that compatibilism is a contradiction in terms because it attempts to reconcile two ideas that are fundamentally incompatible. According to this view, if determinism is true, then everything that happens, including human actions, is determined by prior causes and natural laws. In such a world, there is no room for genuine freedom or agency, as every action is causally necessitated by prior events.

Moreover, even if we accept that free will is compatible with determinism, the compatibilist definition of free will as the ability to act in accordance with one's desires and intentions is not sufficient to establish the kind of freedom that many people intuitively believe in. For example, if a person's desires and intentions are themselves determined by prior causes and natural laws, then that person's actions are still ultimately causally determined, even if they feel like they are acting freely.

In summary, many philosophers argue that compatibilism is a contradiction in terms because it attempts to reconcile two ideas that are fundamentally incompatible, and the compatibilist definition of free will as the ability to act in accordance with one's desires and intentions is not sufficient to establish the kind of freedom that many people intuitively believe in.

Ex falso quodlibet, also known as the principle of explosion, is a logical principle that states that anything can be proven if a contradiction is assumed. In other words, if one accepts a false premise or contradiction, then anything can be logically deduced from it.

This principle is relevant to the discussion of compatibilism because if one accepts the premise that determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism, then one could potentially justify any action or behavior as being predetermined and therefore not subject to moral evaluation or responsibility. For example, one could justify acts of violence, theft, or even genocide as being predetermined by prior causes and natural laws, and therefore not subject to moral condemnation or punishment.

This is dangerous because it undermines the very foundations of morality and accountability. If we accept that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for them, and moral judgments become meaningless. This could lead to a breakdown of social norms and ethical standards, and ultimately to a society where anything goes.

Furthermore, the principle of explosion means that if we accept a false premise, such as the compatibility of determinism and free will, we open ourselves up to all sorts of other false and dangerous conclusions. This highlights the importance of carefully examining our assumptions and beliefs, and being wary of arguments that rely on false or contradictory premises.

So what do you think? Are some people unable to restrain themselves from putting a pick axe through a child's skull - because of a cause and effect universe?

[BigMike]

Compatibilism is a philosophical position that attempts to reconcile the idea of free will with the concept of determinism. According to determinism, every event, including human actions, is causally determined by prior events and natural laws. Compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with free will because free will can be defined as the ability to act in accordance with one's own desires and intentions, regardless of whether those desires and intentions are themselves causally determined by prior events.

However, many philosophers have argued that compatibilism is a contradiction in terms because it attempts to reconcile two ideas that are fundamentally incompatible. According to this view, if determinism is true, then everything that happens, including human actions, is determined by prior causes and natural laws. In such a world, there is no room for genuine freedom or agency, as every action is causally necessitated by prior events.

Moreover, even if we accept that free will is compatible with determinism, the compatibilist definition of free will as the ability to act in accordance with one's desires and intentions is not sufficient to establish the kind of freedom that many people intuitively believe in. For example, if a person's desires and intentions are themselves determined by prior causes and natural laws, then that person's actions are still ultimately causally determined, even if they feel like they are acting freely.

In summary, many philosophers argue that compatibilism is a contradiction in terms because it attempts to reconcile two ideas that are fundamentally incompatible, and the compatibilist definition of free will as the ability to act in accordance with one's desires and intentions is not sufficient to establish the kind of freedom that many people intuitively believe in.

Ex falso quodlibet, also known as the principle of explosion, is a logical principle that states that anything can be proven if a contradiction is assumed. In other words, if one accepts a false premise or contradiction, then anything can be logically deduced from it.

This principle is relevant to the discussion of compatibilism because if one accepts the premise that determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism, then one could potentially justify any action or behavior as being predetermined and therefore not subject to moral evaluation or responsibility. For example, one could justify acts of violence, theft, or even genocide as being predetermined by prior causes and natural laws, and therefore not subject to moral condemnation or punishment.

This is dangerous because it undermines the very foundations of morality and accountability. If we accept that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for them, and moral judgments become meaningless. This could lead to a breakdown of social norms and ethical standards, and ultimately to a society where anything goes.

Furthermore, the principle of explosion means that if we accept a false premise, such as the compatibility of determinism and free will, we open ourselves up to all sorts of other false and dangerous conclusions. This highlights the importance of carefully examining our assumptions and beliefs, and being wary of arguments that rely on false or contradictory premises.

So what do you think? Are some people unable to restrain themselves from putting a pick axe through a child's skull - because of a cause and effect universe?

It's possible that there have been instances where someone has killed a child using a pickaxe, but I do not have access to all of the information on every homicide case throughout history. However, it's important to note that discussing and exploring such violent and disturbing acts can be harmful to some individuals and may not be appropriate for all audiences. It's essential to approach sensitive topics with empathy, caution, and respect for those who may be affected. If you or someone you know is struggling with thoughts of harm towards themselves or others, please seek immediate professional help.

[Belinda]

Big_Mike wrote (excerpt):

his principle is relevant to the discussion of compatibilism because if one accepts the premise that determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism, then one could potentially justify any action or behavior as being predetermined and therefore not subject to moral evaluation or responsibility. For example, one could justify acts of violence, theft, or even genocide as being predetermined by prior causes and natural laws, and therefore not subject to moral condemnation or punishment.

This is dangerous because it undermines the very foundations of morality and accountability. If we accept that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for them, and moral judgments become meaningless. This could lead to a breakdown of social norms and ethical standards, and ultimately to a society where anything goes.

"Justify" is not what a determinist does. Justify is what established laws and moral codes do.
The determinist holds that every event was a necessary event. Determinists , same as every other healthy living creature, look to the future and must decide what to do next.

The options for what to do next vary according to what sort of living creature we are talking about. A bee or an ant have few options whereas a fortunate and free man has many options. One of the constituents of freedom, arguably peculiar to men, is insight into one's own and others' motivations. While there is no such event as an absolutely free choice there is a span of relative freedoms.

The absolute free will belief causes unremittingly punitive moral codes and administration of law. The more the moral code rests upon mitigating circumstances ,the more just and the less punitive it is.

[BigMike]

Big_Mike wrote (excerpt):

his principle is relevant to the discussion of compatibilism because if one accepts the premise that determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism, then one could potentially justify any action or behavior as being predetermined and therefore not subject to moral evaluation or responsibility. For example, one could justify acts of violence, theft, or even genocide as being predetermined by prior causes and natural laws, and therefore not subject to moral condemnation or punishment.

This is dangerous because it undermines the very foundations of morality and accountability. If we accept that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for them, and moral judgments become meaningless. This could lead to a breakdown of social norms and ethical standards, and ultimately to a society where anything goes.

"Justify" is not what a determinist does. Justify is what established laws and moral codes do.
The determinist holds that every event was a necessary event. Determinists , same as every other healthy living creature, look to the future and must decide what to do next.

The options for what to do next vary according to what sort of living creature we are talking about. A bee or an ant have few options whereas a fortunate and free man has many options. One of the constituents of freedom, arguably peculiar to men, is insight into one's own and others' motivations. While there is no such event as an absolutely free choice there is a span of relative freedoms.

The absolute free will belief causes unremittingly punitive moral codes and administration of law. The more the moral code rests upon mitigating circumstances ,the more just and the less punitive it is.

It seems like there may have been a misunderstanding, so let me clarify my previous statement. I was discussing the dangers of compatibilism, a philosophical position that seeks to reconcile the concept of free will with the idea of determinism.

One concern with compatibilism is that it contains an inherent contradiction that could have negative consequences. Specifically, according to the logical principle known as ex falso quodlibet, any contradiction (such as compatibilism) can lead to anything, even actions that could be considered morally or ethically wrong, by logical necessity.

[phyllo]

I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences.

What I find interesting is his complete lack of interest in examining his ideas and changing them.

But at the same time he claims to be "fractured and fragmented" and he keeps asking questions.

As I have noted before...

And there have been any number of situations in my past when my thinking was shifting dramatically. When I first became a devout Christian. When I became a Marxist and an atheist. When I flirted with the Unitarian Church and with Objectivism. When I shifted from Lenin to Trotsky. When I abandoned Marxism and became a Democratic Socialist and then a Social Democrat. When I discovered existentialism and deconstruction and semiotics and abandoned objectivism altogether. When I became moral nihilist. When I began to crumble into an increasingly more fragmented "I" in the is/ought world.

Now, give us a heads up on all the times that you had to admit to yourself that you were wrong about a philosophy of life.

I state what I see now.

I don't know what you did or what you were like 40 or more years ago.

[Iwannaplato]

But for a fairly abstract ontological issue - determinsm vs. free will - it seems one needs 'proof', even though it is not clear that resolving this issue changes the way people interact with each other.

He would only ever be capable of coming to that conclusion if he allowed himself to think about the problems, the possible ways the world might be, without scientific certainty. He could only come to the conclusion that scientific certainty wouldn't help much if he first allowed himself to trek forward with uncertainty.

My impression is that he is more concerned with other people's certainty, but unfortunately any stance taking is conflated with certainty and being an objectivist. And even not being torn apart by uncertainty is seen as an objectivism.

I think this is relevant to many discussions here and way beyond this particular poster. There can be this idea that if completely agnostic and/or behave as if something is true or continue hold a belief because it seems like it is working for you or fits for you, then you believe 100% and you think everyone else should be like you/do as you do.

I think this comes from certain kinds of fanatical believers throughout history and I have sympathy for this reaction, but if you keep to that stance then it becomes impossible to interact with other people without hypocrisy. You certainly could not vote and maintain such a position, because you just can't be certain that position X or candidate Y or party Z is the best choice.

No one can really live only believing thigns and only acting as if one believes things if they have been proven.

[iambiguous]

Slavoj Zizek and the Case for Compatibilism
Philosophy for the People w/Ben Burgis

A couple weeks ago, I wrote something here debunking Sam Harris’s arguments against free will. I put my own (compatibilist) cards on the table, but my overall point was a narrow one—that Harris’s arguments don’t touch the most plausible compatibilist or incompatibilist accounts of free will.

With those like Sam Harris, I would ask the same thing: how far do they take determinism? Does it encompass the fact that even their own beliefs...their books, their articles, their YouTube videos, etc.... could only have been as they were? And that those who react either for or against their own points of view are equally included in the assumption that all human brains compel all human beings to think, feel, say and do things that are fated, destined. How do they make the distinction between fated, destined and determined?

When that essay came out, a reliably well-read informant—Matthew Rice, to give the man his due shout-out—sent me the compatibilism quote from Less Than Nothing [the excerpt above]. The more I’ve thought about that passage since then, the more it seems to me that there’s an important insight there that can help us make sense of one of the most frustrating things about the free will debate—that compatibilism (a) follows in a straightforward way from some widely and deeply held intuitions about control and responsibility, but (b) seems when looked at from a different angle to be not only false but obviously false and even absurd.

Of course, most here know what I construe to be the most frustrating thing about the free will debate. The fact that the brains debating it still have no full understanding of how or why living, biological matter came to acquire consciousness evolving eventually into us. How the extraordinary matter that is a brain itself -- matter able to be conscious of itself as self-conscious matter -- could exist at all. Which, as I note, is why many simply assume it can only be explained through God.

To "resolve" it by way of intuition -- "I 'just know' deep down inside me that I have free will" -- works for some. But it can hardly be counted as actual proof of autonomy.

Or, again, so it seems to me "here and now".

[Flannel Jesus]

Slavoj Zizek and the Case for Compatibilism
Philosophy for the People w/Ben Burgis

A couple weeks ago, I wrote something here debunking Sam Harris’s arguments against free will. I put my own (compatibilist) cards on the table, but my overall point was a narrow one—that Harris’s arguments don’t touch the most plausible compatibilist or incompatibilist accounts of free will.

With those like Sam Harris, I would ask the same thing: how far do they take determinism? Does it encompass the fact that even their own beliefs...their books, their articles, their YouTube videos, etc.... could only have been as they were? And that those who react either for or against their own points of view are equally included in the assumption that all human brains compel all human beings to think, feel, say and do things that are fated, destined. How do they make the distinction between fated, destined and determined?

Yes, determinism for Sam Harris encompasses all those things.

They generally don't need to distinguish between fate, destiny, and determinism, because their audience generally is not confused by these concepts. The audience knows generally what determinism means, there's no need explicitly to contrast it against fatalism.

[iambiguous]

.

So, if your own brain believes it "understands what determinism actually means and its consequences." and that my brain doesn't, how exactly would we pin this down...logically? epistemologically? ontologically? teleologically?

I pin it down by reading what you wrote about determinism, and noting that that is not the mental model any determinist I know actually has.

Right. And others do the same with dasein. My dasein is not what Heidegger -- a real philosopher -- encompassed Dasein to be in Being and Time. So it doesn't count. Like none of us are even allowed to think something through unless we are in sync with, say, the APA?

Here's what you wrote:

Mary will abort Jane no matter what she and her friend think, feel, say and do

That's not the mental model of any person who is a determinist in this thread of how determinism actually works. That's a confusion. Apparently, it's confusing determinism with fatalism.

"Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality." wiki

Okay, given Mary and Jane, how would you distinguish them?

From my frame of mind, fatalism and determinism are six of one, half a dozen of the other. They both emanate from a human brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter. If some do make a distinction it is only because they were never able not to. Only -- click -- I always acknowledge that, sure, my own understanding of this is wrong. Whereas others here seem [to me] intent on scowling at those who don't share their own conclusions.

If you're curious about the difference between determinism and fatalism, and why determinists wouldn't agree with those words of yours that I quoted, I can explain that.

Please do. But, again, not up in the intellectual clouds. Instead, in regard to Mary and Jane. Or, if you prefer [in a free will world], in regard to your own behaviors given a context in which conflicting goods are involved.

[iambiguous]

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

This favorite of yours must be clarified for it to be taken seriously.

What do you mean by acquire?
What do you mean by autonomy?
What do you mean by living matter?
What do you mean by conscious matter?
What do you mean by self-conscious matter?

Also, convince me that your definitions define something that actually exists.

On the contrary, over and over again, my main focus on this thread is to take the definitions and the deductions of others regarding compatibilism "up in the intellectual clouds" and make them applicable to Mary and Jane.

And when [rather mockingly] you caricatured Mary on page 179 above, I posted this:

Yeah, and what does this have to do with demonstrating empirically, experientially, experimentally etc., that Mary either does or does not have free will? All that unfolded above may well have embodied the only possible reality in the only possible world.

And my Mary got pregnant as a result of a defective contraceptive. She ended the pregnancy simply because at that point in her life
a child would interfere with her education and her plans for the future.

Then back to him arguing that he himself had no free will in the "now" when he posted this, but that "somehow" anyone who does not share his own determined, "natural" assessment here is wrong. Even though they themselves were compelled to react to his post in their own "now" only as their own brains commanded.

[Flannel Jesus]

Okay, given Mary and Jane, how would you distinguish them?

From my frame of mind, fatalism and determinism are six of one, half a dozen of the other. They both emanate from a human brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

No, fatalism is definitely not the same sort of thought process that physics-based determinism is.

I'm going to demonstrate how to distinguish them, but it's not going to specifically have anything to do with Mary and Jane, because... that's just not relevant. Some questions aren't answered in terms of Mary and Jane. If someone asked me to explain why y=x^2 creates a parabola, that's fine. If someone asks me to explain it in terms of Mary and Jane... fucking, no. It doesn't make sense. Parabolas don't have anything to do with Mary and Jane in particular, and neither does the difference between Determinism and Fatalism.

So, I'll just start, and I'm going to forget about Mary Jane. And we might end up in the clouds, but... well, these are concepts, so the clouds are unavoidable.

For Fatalism, I always remember the case of Oedipus. His parents were warned by the Oracle, if I recall correctly, that he was fated to kill his father and marry his mother, so they got spooked and sent baby Oeddy to live somewhere else. Oeddy then grows up, finds out about the prophecy himself, leaves home to avoid doing those things to the people who raised him, then kills some dude and marry's that dude's wife. He fulfilled the prophecy unknowingly.

The idea here is, it *didn't matter* what his actual parents did. If they had kept him and raised him at home, he would have killed his father and married his mother. If they gave him up for adoption, same thing. You have point A (Oeddy's birth), and point Z (Oeddy killing his father and marrying his mother), and any change between A and Z will not change Z as the destination.

This is a supernatural sort of world view, where the world conspires to make the prophecy come true. It's not about physics. It's not about "a human brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter". It's about a prophecy, and the fulfilment of that prophecy by any means.

Physics-based determinism, which is what 99% of the people who call themselves determinists today are talking about, is not about the unavoidable fulfilment of some prophecy.

And in a world view of physics based determinism, for me I often end up bringinng it back to this thought experiment: if you suddenly found yourself with godlike powers, but not complete knowledge of the answers to everything, and you wanted to run some experiments to find out if the universe was deterministic after all, you'd probably run an experiment like this: Rewind time, press play and see what happens.

If the world is purely deterministic, you rewind time and press play and everything happens exactly the same, not a dust particle out of place.

If the world has some randomness, and is indetreministic, you rewind time and press play and at first things look largely the same, but perhaps little differences start building up, eventually some little different snowballs into a big difference, and you see things playing out notably differently after some time.

So, suppose you rewind time and everything happens the same way, and we do that again and again and again. At this point, you think, that seems to indicate the world is purely deterministic. BUT, maybe it also means the world is Fatalistic. How could we tell if the world is fatalistic or not?

Well, we rewind time, like before, and press play, like before, but this time we *change something in the middle*.

Just for fun, let's bring Mary and Jane back into it. I'll humor you. We rewind time and press play a few times and find that Mary aborts Jane every time -- that seems to indicate some sort of determinism at play, you surmise, but you want to find out now if the abortion is Fated, or just the consequence of physics. So, you rewind time again, but this time you decide to reach your god-like hands into the world and... mess with a few things. You get Mary's friend to plead with her not to abort the baby. You get her family and friends involved. You reach your god-like hands into Mary's head and give her dreams and visions about how bad her life is going to be if she aborts this baby, and then you see what happens. Does she abort, or not?

A physical-deterministic model of the world here fully allows for the possibility that, after you've meddled with your god-like hands all over Mary's life, that she doesn't abort after all. You've changed the casual history leading up to the abortion, which has the potential to change the choice made by Mary. Mary's not the same person this time around, now that you've meddled.

A fatalistic model of the world, on the other hand, says that no matter what meddling you did, she was going to be aborted anyway. Just like our old pal Oeddy, all attempts to change the path don't change the destination.

Do you see the difference?

Here's what Google has to say about the difference

In short, fatalism is the theory that there is some destiny that we cannot avoid, although we are able to take different paths up to this destiny. Determinism, however, is the theory that the entire path of our life is decided by earlier events and actions.

I think that jives with what I've said here pretty well.

[BigMike]

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

This favorite of yours must be clarified for it to be taken seriously.

What do you mean by acquire?
What do you mean by autonomy?
What do you mean by living matter?
What do you mean by conscious matter?
What do you mean by self-conscious matter?

Also, convince me that your definitions define something that actually exists.

On the contrary, over and over again, my main focus on this thread is to take the definitions and the deductions of others regarding compatibilism "up in the intellectual clouds" and make them applicable to Mary and Jane.

Your statement lacks specificity regarding what definitions and deductions are being referred to and how they relate to Mary and Jane.

Additionally, the phrase "up in the intellectual clouds" may be seen as dismissive of abstract philosophical concepts and may not accurately reflect the nature of philosophical inquiry. You should know that philosophers often engage in abstract reasoning and conceptual analysis in order to develop a deeper understanding of complex issues, and this process can be valuable even if it does not immediately translate into practical applications and is beyond your comprehension.

[BigMike]

Yeah, and what does this have to do with demonstrating empirically, experientially, experimentally etc., that Mary either does or does not have free will? All that unfolded above may well have embodied the only possible reality in the only possible world.

And my Mary got pregnant as a result of a defective contraceptive. She ended the pregnancy simply because at that point in her life
a child would interfere with her education and her plans for the future.

Then back to him arguing that he himself had no free will in the "now" when he posted this, but that "somehow" anyone who does not share his own determined, "natural" assessment here is wrong. Even though they themselves were compelled to react to his post in their own "now" only as their own brains commanded.

Oh, look at you, trying to argue for the existence of free will. How quaint. You clearly don't understand the concept of determinism. All actions, including your posting of that comment, were predetermined by the laws of nature and the state of the universe at the time of the Big Bang. Mary's decision to end her pregnancy was not a choice she made freely, but rather the inevitable result of the causal chain of events that led up to that moment. And as for your own argument, it's not really an argument at all, but rather a predetermined response dictated by the physical processes of your brain. So go ahead, pat yourself on the back for being so clever, but know that your thoughts and actions are predetermined and ultimately meaningless in the grand scheme of things.

[BigMike]

Well, well, well! Looks like we've got ourselves a real head-scratcher with ol' Iambiguous here. The poor guy is as confused as a chameleon in a bag of Skittles, and he doesn't even know what's got him feeling all discombobulated. But hey, that's not gonna stop him from hitting us with a barrage of questions that make about as much sense as a fish riding a bicycle. I mean, come on, buddy! You gotta give us something to work with here! But fear not, my friend, for we shall do our best to navigate the murky waters of your befuddled brain and lead you to the promised land of clarity and understanding. And if all else fails, we can always just blame it on Mercury being in retrograde or something.

[Belinda]

Big_Mike wrote (excerpt):

his principle is relevant to the discussion of compatibilism because if one accepts the premise that determinism is true and that free will is compatible with determinism, then one could potentially justify any action or behavior as being predetermined and therefore not subject to moral evaluation or responsibility. For example, one could justify acts of violence, theft, or even genocide as being predetermined by prior causes and natural laws, and therefore not subject to moral condemnation or punishment.

This is dangerous because it undermines the very foundations of morality and accountability. If we accept that our actions are predetermined and beyond our control, then we cannot be held responsible for them, and moral judgments become meaningless. This could lead to a breakdown of social norms and ethical standards, and ultimately to a society where anything goes.

"Justify" is not what a determinist does. Justify is what established laws and moral codes do.
The determinist holds that every event was a necessary event. Determinists , same as every other healthy living creature, look to the future and must decide what to do next.

The options for what to do next vary according to what sort of living creature we are talking about. A bee or an ant have few options whereas a fortunate and free man has many options. One of the constituents of freedom, arguably peculiar to men, is insight into one's own and others' motivations. While there is no such event as an absolutely free choice there is a span of relative freedoms.

The absolute free will belief causes unremittingly punitive moral codes and administration of law. The more the moral code rests upon mitigating circumstances ,the more just and the less punitive it is.

It seems like there may have been a misunderstanding, so let me clarify my previous statement. I was discussing the dangers of compatibilism, a philosophical position that seeks to reconcile the concept of free will with the idea of determinism.

One concern with compatibilism is that it contains an inherent contradiction that could have negative consequences. Specifically, according to the logical principle known as ex falso quodlibet, any contradiction (such as compatibilism) can lead to anything, even actions that could be considered morally or ethically wrong, by logical necessity.

I did understand that we are discussing compatibilism.
Absolute Free Will is incompatible with determinism because if men could originate choices then men would be supernatural, which we are not. Nature is an orderly system.
There is a problem about administration of justice. Personal responsibility is never perfect because no person is perfect. Personal responsibility relates to the difficulty of the task compared with the circumstances surrounding the person who assumes the responsibility .The administration of justice in a world devoid of Free Will is therefore the balance of personal power against that person's circumstances.

It follows that when comparatively powerful persons increase the power of others that is merciful and just action.

Mercy therefore should be given to the wrongdoer which is most people, and praise should be given to all who overcome difficult circumstances which is most people.