compatibilism

[Flannel Jesus]

Right. And there are a number of versions. But there isn't free will in the pure sense involved in some of the compatiblisms. Moral responsibility, yes.

I think I maintain that this "pure sense" is not even conceptually possible, that there's no possible arrangement of the world that would satisfy this pure sense, and I think, as far as this whole debate is important at all, is important to understand why that is.

Generally that's my reaction. But I tend to be cautious about ruling things out - in these kinds of discussions. at a schoolboard meeting or at the dinner table, I do rule some things out. I mean, hey, gotta live.)

The reason I rule it out is because of the randomness/determinism spectrum.

People want a form of free will where their choices aren't "decided" by rules like physics,

but they also want their choices to not be decided by randomness.

Maybe it's a mental limitation of mine as a programmer, but I don't see any room outside of this. Things are deterministic, or random, or some combination of the two, but nothing outside of this spectrum seems to me to be possible in a casual framework.

[Iwannaplato]

Maybe it's a mental limitation of mine as a programmer, but I don't see any room outside of this. Things are deterministic, or random, or some combination of the two, but nothing outside of this spectrum seems to me to be possible in a casual framework.

I can't see something else. I did read a book where somehow bringing in QM the author (who was not fluffy) presented a reasonable case for becing able to choose NOT to do something. Sort of like determinism brings up a response in you, but you can stifle it freely. I don't think it convinced me, but at least it was a slightly different category of freedom.

I once tried to throw out a version where every universe in the multiverse is utterly determined, you can slide around. But both this and the previous version in the book don't for me get around the
why did you choose not to
or
why did you choose that universe

IOW motivations, desires and the emotions in the moment before the choice still lead to the choice.

And if they don't, why would it be a good thing?

You can somehow chose not letting your emotions, desires, goals, and understanding pick out the choice.

How is that a good thing?

It seems to leave only a kind of perverse going againsts one's own values and understanding as freedom.

But still. perhaps there is something our deductions mix.

[Flannel Jesus]

Maybe it's a mental limitation of mine as a programmer, but I don't see any room outside of this. Things are deterministic, or random, or some combination of the two, but nothing outside of this spectrum seems to me to be possible in a casual framework.

I can't see something else. I did read a book where somehow bringing in QM the author (who was not fluffy) presented a reasonable case for becing able to choose NOT to do something. Sort of like determinism brings up a response in you, but you can stifle it freely. I don't think it convinced me, but at least it was a slightly different category of freedom.

People like to abuse qm for all sorts of philosophical ends, because they know their readers won't know enough about qm to say "wait a sec, you're just bullshitting!"

Qm is weird enough and hard enough to understand that you can literally just invent whatever concept you want, say it's proven by qm, and most people will just be like "yeah, I guess that's plausible". (Ironically, I'm probably a buyer-in of such a concept myself, not about free will but about an interpretation of qm)

If qm has elements that are indeterministic, imo they're still simply on that spectrum of random-to-determinism (the Schrödinger equation defines what the possibilities are, and their relative probabilities, and the randomness decides which of those possibilities we end up seeing materialised) - and so if quantum stuff is happening in our brain processes it's still just matter behaving mostly deterministically, with a bit of randomness here and there.

Imo

[BigMike]

So, imagine you're a quantum particle, just vibing in your little quantum world. You're all cool, until suddenly you get measured by a scientist. Now, the scientist wants to know where you are and how fast you're going, but unfortunately for you, quantum mechanics means that your position and momentum are kind of... squishy. Like, you could be in two places at once, or you could be moving at two different speeds at the same time. It's a bit like trying to measure the mood of a teenager - one minute they're happy, the next they're grumpy, and you never quite know what you're going to get.

But even though you're a bit squishy, you still have to obey the laws of physics. Just like how a grumpy teenager still has to do their homework, even if they don't feel like it. And one of the most important laws of physics is the conservation of energy, momentum, and angular momentum. Basically, these laws say that you can't just magically disappear, or start moving in a different direction for no reason. If you're going to change something about yourself, you have to make up for it somewhere else.

So, even though you might be in two places at once, or moving at two different speeds, you still have to follow these conservation laws. It's like trying to balance on a unicycle while juggling - sure, you might be wobbling all over the place, but you still have to keep all the balls in the air, or else you'll fall flat on your face.

And that's the hilarious, yet true, explanation of how quantum mechanics and the conservation laws of physics still hold true. Even if you're a squishy, juggling, unicycling quantum particle, you still have to follow the rules.

So, you know how in the movies, they always show time travel by jumping through some kind of portal, and then you magically appear in a different place and time? Well, in real life, things aren't quite so simple. See, it turns out that figuring out where you are in space and time is a bit like trying to find Waldo in a really busy scene. Except instead of Waldo, you're trying to find yourself, and instead of a busy scene, you're dealing with the fabric of the universe.

The thing is, space and time are kind of like a giant, stretchy, bendy sheet. And when you move through that sheet, it can get all warped and twisted, kind of like when you accidentally put your hoodie in the dryer and it comes out looking like it belongs to a toddler. So, even if you think you know where you are in space and time, you might not actually be there. It's like trying to find your phone in the dark - you might think it's on the bedside table, but it could have fallen off and rolled under the bed without you realizing.

And that's where things get tricky. Because if you don't know where you are in space and time, how can you be sure that the laws of physics still apply to you? It's like being lost in a forest - sure, you know that gravity is still pulling you down, but what about the other stuff? Are you still experiencing time in the same way? Are you moving at the same speed as everything else? Who knows!

So, in conclusion, figuring out where you are in space and time is kind of like playing a giant game of "Where's Waldo" with the universe. It's wacky, it's unpredictable, and sometimes it feels like you're just wandering around aimlessly. But even though it's not easy, scientists keep trying to solve this puzzle, because they know that understanding the fabric of the universe is one of the most important challenges we face. Determined does not mean predicted. And that's no joke!

[phyllo]

I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences.

What I find interesting is his complete lack of interest in examining his ideas and changing them.

But at the same time he claims to be "fractured and fragmented" and he keeps asking questions.

[Flannel Jesus]

I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences.

What I find interesting is his complete lack of interest in examining his ideas and changing them.

But at the same time he claims to be "fractured and fragmented" and he keeps asking questions.

Physics has determined his lack of curiosity for him.

[Flannel Jesus]

That actually kind of ties into this funny thought process I regularly have, which illustrates a possible mental strategy for compatibilists:

There was a time when I was very lonely. As a pure determinist at the time, I thought "maybe I'm determined to be lonely."

And then the thought occurred to me, I don't *want* to be determined to be lonely.

And then I did something about it, and now I'm not lonely.

I "chose" what I was determined to be.

I didn't do that as some sort of exception to the laws of physics though, I did it as part of the physical system we're all in.

You can accept determinism, and make choices about what sort of determined future you would prefer to have.

Sort of

[Flannel Jesus]

Perhaps that's why I'm a compatibilist. I'm comfortable being a physical thing in a physical universe. I'm comfortable with the fact that every atom in my body behaves exactly as atoms do, all the time, without exception.

I'm comfortable with all of that, and also with choosing what I want my determined future to look like. This doesn't cause me real mental discomfort.

[BigMike]

Perhaps that's why I'm a compatibilist. I'm comfortable being a physical thing in a physical universe. I'm comfortable with the fact that every atom in my body behaves exactly as atoms do, all the time, without exception.

I'm comfortable with all of that, and also with choosing what I want my determined future to look like. This doesn't cause me real mental discomfort.

Oh, dear me, what a funny thing to say! You're a compatibilist because you're comfortable being a physical thing in a physical universe? Well, I'm a potato because I'm comfortable being a starchy tuber in a world full of hungry humans. It makes just as much sense!

I mean, it's great that you're comfortable with every atom in your body behaving exactly as atoms do, all the time, without exception. But are you really telling me that you've never wanted to be a flying spaghetti monster or a talking donkey? Come on, be honest!

And choosing what you want your determined future to look like? That's like saying you can choose which way the wind blows or what color the sky is. I mean, sure, you can set goals and work towards them, but ultimately, your future is determined by all sorts of factors outside of your control.

But hey, if believing in compatibilism helps you sleep at night, who am I to judge? Just remember, the universe has a funny way of making us eat our words, so don't get too comfortable!

[iambiguous]

Defending Compatibilism
Bruce R. Reichenbach
at the Science, Religion and Culture website
[the focus here being on free will given an omniscient God]

Fischer’s Incompatibilist Argument

We begin with Fischer’s version of the conditional argument for incompatibility between God’s knowledge and human freedom.

1. God exists and is essentially omniscient.
Omniscience might be characterized in two ways. One is that God knows all the facts that can be known (where facts are states of affairs that were, are, or will be the case). This is a claim about what God knows, not how he knows it.

Does it really matter how God became omniscient if in fact He is omniscient? We may as well ask how God came to exist at all. So, for me, it's not how an omniscient God knew that I would be typing these words but how I can be typing them of my own volition if what I do is to be squared with an omniscient God.

The other is that God knows all true propositions that can be known, leaving open how God knows them. Since facts can be expressed by tensed propositions, for our purposes we will treat for the time being the two as equivalent, though the significance of this distinction is important, for some deny that propositional formulation of knowledge is appropriate to God.

And there you go. No actual God has, to the best of my own not omniscient knowledge, ever been demonstrated to exist. So we mere mortals with our mere mortal limitations regarding knowledge of this sort are tasked with suggesting "propositions" about the existential relationship between our behaviors down here and an alleged omniscient God up there.

See the problem?

It's just the theological rendition of the fact that neither scientists nor philosophers know how or why mindless matter evolved into living matter evolved into us in a No God world.

[iambiguous]

As with phyllo above -- click -- we think about this differently. The Janes aborted in the free will world were aborted only because their mothers did not have a friend around to talk them out of it. Or in regard to all the other components/factors in their life that, had they been different, might have resulted in them changing their minds.

The problem that FJ and I, perhaps others keep reacting to is that your examples with Mary and Jane seem to have the more positive outcome in the free will world and the more negative reaction in the determinist world.

I commented on this above. If Jane's life is a good life then she owes it all to the fact that her mother's friend of her own free will discussed the pregnancy with her mother. And while Mary of her own free will had opted to abort Jane, now she opts to give birth as a result of this exchange between two autonomous minds. Whereas in a wholly determined world where Mary aborts her, she was never able to opt not to. I merely interject here with my own assessment of the role that dasein and the Benjamin Button Syndrome play here.

But if Jane's life has become a miserable hellhole, she might curse her mother for freely choosing to bring her into this stinking world. So, of her own free will, she might choose to commit suicide.

It's all rooted existentially in a particular life and in particular sets of circumstances and personal experiences.

It seems you do not mean the following:
things are better in a free will world because the outcomes will be better (Jane will live, for example).
You have stated that you do not mean this.

However, given your examples often ending with what seems like an appeal to sympathy for the Jane that did not get to live, it is as if we keep getting this message:

In the determinist world more babies get aborted and more Jane's don't get to live.

What is always crucial [for me] is that only in a free will world is there a possibility that Jane might be out in the world with the rest of us. But: for better or for worse.

As for how many babies are aborted and how many are not, that is entirely derived from the laws of matter. Here we can only speculate on whether there is in fact a teleological component embedded in nature. Why are some brains compelled to abort and other not to? Then entangled in all of the other brains in the community compelled to do what they must in regard to abortion as a moral and a legal issue.

There's no example like
In the determinist world Mary wasn't going to get an abortion because she was Catholic and afraid of her father's opinion. Jane got to live.
In the free will world, Mary was not compelled by external circumstances nor by internal causes (fear of her father) and chose to abort. In the free will world Jane never got to be asked anything.

Again, from my frame of mind, what difference does it make in a determined world that Mary was a Catholic and was afraid of her father's opinion? All of that is no less an inherent manifestation of the only possible world.

In the free will world, there must must be some factors -- external/internal -- that predisposed her to choose abortion. The part I root in dasein. Or, sure, re Anton Chigurh, she could just flip a coin.

So, when I respond with other possibilities, I am not referring to the specific Mary case you are thinking of. I am pointing out that in general free will could even lead to more abortions and more 'Janes' never get to live.

Sure. Maybe. Take the case of China. Some years ago when there was a fear of too many people, the government enacted laws that forbade couples from having more than one child. Millions of abortions followed. Most of them were female. Now, however, the fear revolves around not enough people. So the government enacts a policy that encourages more births. Fewer abortions no doubt.

But the paradox here is that some point out the more prosperous China becomes in a surging economy, the more couples [as in the West] choose not to have a lot of children.

So, sure, in free will world, the number of abortions may rise and fall due to any number of social, political and economic factors. But what doesn't change is that this revolves around at least some measure of autonomy.

Perhaps not compelled as one would be in a determined universe, but even in a free will universe our experiences can become so deeply engrained that it is very, very unlikely that we would have behaved other than in how we came to be predisposed to embrace one rather than another belief about abortion. Based on our childhood indoctrination say or on people we met as adults who were instrumental in shaping our value judgments.

Well, if you think you know what a free will world would be like. Me, I don't know.

Right. Me with the "fractured and fragmented" mind in regard to both the morality of abortion and regarding the extent to which free will is factor at all here thinks I know what a free will world would be like.

Dasein predisposes us in a free will world. If you were born and raised in a Chinese village in 500 BC, or in a 10th century Viking community or in a 19th century Yanomami village or in or in 20th century Soviet Union city or in a 21st century American city, how might your value judgments be different? But that's not to say that these very different components of very different lives compels every behavior someone makes.

Instead, as I note in the OP here -- https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382 -- new experiences can have a profound impact on how you view any number of things. Only in a determined universe "I" is just along for the ride.

If you say so.

Look, in the OP of this thread -- https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382 -- I examine my own take on dasein pertaining to my own views on the morality of abortion. Given a free will world.

How then is your own opinion regarding the morality of abortion, predicated on your own experiences, different?

I don't know if our world is a deterministic one or one with free will. I can deduce what determinism means, with some confidence. But a free will world. I have no idea how that would function and I don't know how you know.

I definitely don't know. At least pertaining to my own capacity to actually demonstrate what "I" think "I" know "here and now" is in fact true. I'm not an objectivist here myself. Quite the contrary.

So, two issues:
1) when you choose examples of what happens when comparing free will world outcomes vs. determinism world outcomes, the determinism world outcomes are presented in a negative light compared to the free world outcomes. This has been consistant. When asked if this is the case on a general level, you say no, but go right back to negative outcomes in determinism and better in free will.

If you say so.

2) You seem to know somehow that in a free will world dasein still, to some degree controls people. Please don't explain why you believe dasein does this. I understand the arguments. I just have no idea why this need apply in a free willl world. I don't even know what a free will world functions like. How do you know that in a free will world there are limits on freedom?

Controls people? As though dasein turns them into robots or cyborgs? That's your take on my take. I merely note here -- https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529 -- how I construe the existential parameters of dasein. Given a particular context.

And if you really understood my arguments you wouldn't sound [to me] like you really don't at all.

As for how a free will world functions, well, assuming that we do live in a free will world, just look around you. It functions like that.

[iambiguous]

Mary's heart was heavy with grief and despair as she faced the most difficult decision of her life. She had just learned that the precious life growing inside her was not as healthy as she had hoped. The doctors had given her the devastating news that her baby had a rare and severe medical condition, one that would cause it immense pain and suffering throughout its short life.

Mary's mind was in turmoil as she tried to process the reality of the situation. She knew that she couldn't bear the thought of bringing a child into the world only to watch it suffer every moment of its existence. She couldn't fathom the idea of subjecting a helpless, innocent being to such agony, knowing that there was no cure or treatment that could save it.

As she considered her options, Mary's heart ached with a sense of profound loss. She had dreamed of holding her baby in her arms, watching it grow and thrive, and loving it with all her heart. But now, she faced the heartbreaking reality that this dream could never come true.

The thought of ending her pregnancy was agonizing, but Mary knew that it was the only humane choice. She couldn't bear the thought of her baby enduring a life of pain and suffering. She couldn't bear the thought of bringing a child into the world, only to watch it die a slow, agonizing death.

With tears streaming down her face, Mary made the heart-wrenching decision to have an abortion. She knew that it was the only way to spare her baby from a life of pain and misery, and she prayed that she could find the strength to heal from the emotional wounds that this decision would undoubtedly leave behind.

As Mary walked out of the hospital, her heart shattered into a million pieces. She knew that the road ahead would be long and painful, but she also knew that she had made the right choice. She had chosen to spare her baby from a life of suffering and to give it the peace and love that it deserved, even if that meant saying goodbye before it had a chance to take its first breath.

Free will?

Yeah, and what does this have to do with demonstrating empirically, experientially, experimentally etc., that Mary either does or does not have free will? All that unfolded above may well have embodied the only possible reality in the only possible world.

And my Mary got pregnant as a result of a defective contraceptive. She ended the pregnancy simply because at that point in her life
a child would interfere with her education and her plans for the future.

Then back to him arguing that he himself had no free will in the "now" when he posted this, but that "somehow" anyone who does not share his own determined, "natural" assessment here is wrong. Even though they themselves were compelled to react to his post in their own "now" only as their own brains commanded.

[iambiguous]

I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences.

Or: "I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that, because he doesn't think exactly as I do about this centuries old conundrum, he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences."

Flannel Jesus meet BigMike.

And God knows how many other "my way or the highway" authoritarians here.

[Flannel Jesus]

I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences.

Or: "I think his reply tells you a lot of pertinent information. Mainly, that, because he doesn't think exactly as I do about this centuries old conundrum, he doesn't understand what determinism actually means and its consequences."

Flannel Jesus meet BigMike.

And God knows how many other "my way or the highway" authoritarians here.

Do you think that someone thinking their beliefs are correct is itself inherently a problem? I don't really understand this.

It's like, you're not disagreeing with him, or with me, but instead you're disagreeing with the principle that I could think I'm correct, about anything at all. Like there's no reason for anybody ever to think they are correct about anything.

That's how it comes across anyway

[Flannel Jesus]

I'm like 75% sure that's what you mean when you keep on bringing up "objectivists" even though, as far as I know, nobody you've been talking to considers themselves objectivists ...