compatibilism

[iambiguous]

I don't see that that answers the question I asked. I also don't see what Benjamin button syndrome has to do with this, perhaps you have some unique meaning you give to that that I don't understand.

You ask me if I would hold Mary morally responsible in a free will world. I responded to that above.

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?

Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is.

Absolutely shameless.

You know, if it is.

Again, in some detail, explain to us why my answer below...

Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.

...is not an adequate answer to your question.



Then back to the point I can never get you to address:

Explaining how your "intellectual contraption" assessments of compatibilism above are applicable to Mary and Jane.

Or, rather, okay, assessments that certainly seem to be "intellectual contraptions" to me.


Also, in some detail, please note your reaction to this:

As for this...

https://youtu.be/mTDs0lvFuMc

...the point is to connect the dots between all of the variables in Daisy's life that she was either oblivious to or were beyond her control; resulting in her life changing forever.

What, you don't see how that can be applicable to our moral values pertaining to abortion?

Well, with respect to myself, I delved into that in the OP here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=194382

What's not to get about how these profoundly complex and convoluted interactions can predispose us to any number of conflicting value judgments?

You really don't grasp the "for all practical purposes" implications of this in your life?!!

Well, not to worry. None the objectivists here are likely to either. After all the more it comes to sink in, the more likely one is to [perhaps] become "fractured and fragmented" as "I" am in regard to abortion.

And for the objectivists, in my view, it's all about the "psychology of objectivism". What they are right about [for or against abortion] pales next to the comfort and the consolation they sustain in "just knowing" that they are right.

[Flannel Jesus]

Again, in some detail, explain to us why my answer below...

Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.

...is not an adequate answer to your question.

Well, the root of my question was a yes/no question. I don't know, given all of those words of yours above, if the answer is yes, or no, or possibly "I don't know". That's a pretty good place to start. Can you give a clear answer there?

[iambiguous]

Again, in some detail, explain to us why my answer below...

Given some measure of human autonomy, I root moral and political value judgments existentially in dasein. In a No God world.

Mary lived a particular life. And as a result of her childhood indoctrination and her own personal experiences as an adult, she came to think and to feel what she did about abortion.

Given the manner in which I construe the "self" in the is/ought world here: https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtop ... 1&t=176529

And given the profoundly problematic "for all practical purposes" implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome...for all of us in regard to our own value judgments.

So, the question for philosophers and ethicists is this: given the above is it possible, using the tools of philosophy, to propound the optimal or the only rational manner in which to resolve the "conflicting goods" embedded in the abortion wars?

Yes? Okay let's explore your own frame of mind.

Then the part where the objectivists among us actually do attempt this with me. And, here, I'll leave it to others to assess how well they fared.

...is not an adequate answer to your question.

Well, the root of my question was a yes/no question. I don't know, given all of those words of yours above, if the answer is yes, or no, or possibly "I don't know". That's a pretty good place to start. Can you give a clear answer there?

What can I say. How would -- could -- anyone reading my post above actually imagine that my answer might be either "yes" or "no"?!!

As though, after reading my posts on this thread, someone would actually suggest that if Mary asked me if she was morally responsible for aborting Jane given a free will world, I would tell her "yes" or "no".


Note to myself:

How can someone fail so miserably to grasp the thrust of my own argument here...other than because his brain compels him to do so in the only possible world.

And, if that's the case, he's off the hook.

[Flannel Jesus]

Is there a way to bookmark posts permanently? I'd like to have something to reference to remind myself of why I'm done with this guy.

[phyllo]

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?

Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is. Big Mike apparently also does not.

Is it that complicated?

Yes, Mary is morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

or

No, Mary is not morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

[iambiguous]

Is there a way to bookmark posts permanently? I'd like to have something to reference to remind myself of why I'm done with this guy.

Nature to Flannel Jesus:

Really mean it this time.

[Flannel Jesus]

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?

Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is. Big Mike apparently also does not.

Is it that complicated?

Yes, Mary is morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

or

No, Mary is not morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

Apparently that is, in fact, too much to ask

[iambiguous]

Okay, how does my assessment not meet your own requirements here?

Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is. Big Mike apparently also does not.

Is it that complicated?

Yes, Mary is morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

or

No, Mary is not morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

Yes, and in a wholly determined universe they are the only reasons you were ever able to have. And in a free will universe you opted for "yes" or "no" or "I'm not sure" after weighing the pros and the cons to the best of your ability, given an existential assessment of your own set of circumstances.

Of course, in a determined universe where Jane was never not going to be aborted, she was never not going to be toast.

So, Jane will never, ever be here herself to weigh in on it. Other than in a free will universe where, of her own volition, Mary's friend persuades Mary of her own volition not to abort Jane.

Well, given the Benjamin Button Syndrome of course. Jane's friend is on her way to meet Mary, forgets her purse, goes back inside to get it, comes out again and on the way to her car is hit by a bus and killed.

[iambiguous]

Because I still don't know what your answer to the question is. Big Mike apparently also does not.

Is it that complicated?

Yes, Mary is morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

or

No, Mary is not morally responsible because ... {state reasons here}.

Apparently that is, in fact, too much to ask

Click.

How about this...

You and phyllo go up into the clouds and attempt to pin down the most rational philosophical assessment of compatibilism.

Then you take that to Mary.

Is she or is she not morally responsible for aborting Jane if she was never able not to abort her?

Well, after you establish what all "serious philosophers" are obligated to define determinism to mean.

[Iwannaplato]

Of course, in a determined universe where Jane was never not going to be aborted, she was never not going to be toast.

Or the determined universe where Svetlana got to live.

So, Jane will never, ever be here herself to weigh in on it. Other than in a free will universe where, of her own volition, Mary's friend persuades Mary of her own volition not to abort Jane.

Or Mary despite an overwhelmingly clear and compelling appeal from Mary's friend, perversely uses her free will to abort Jane and then, just as Mary's friend was concerned would happen, Mary regrets the choice because it doesn't fit her desires and values.

I haven't undertood what these examples are supposed to show. It seems like in your free will universes the abortion doesn't take place. I mean, in the examples. You don't assert this, but is it meant to be implicit?

What do these possible events in the two universes show us? What do they indicate?

[iambiguous]

So, Jane will never, ever be here herself to weigh in on it. Other than in a free will universe where, of her own volition, Mary's friend persuades Mary of her own volition not to abort Jane.

Or Mary despite an overwhelmingly clear and compelling appeal from Mary's friend, perversely uses her free will to abort Jane and then, just as Mary's friend was concerned would happen, Mary regrets the choice because it doesn't fit her desires and values.

Hell, in a free will world where human behaviors are often predicated on dasein and on the Benjamin Button Syndrome, the possibilities are practically endless. But in the free will world Jane might stick around, while in the determined world she's necessarily toast.

I haven't undertood what these examples are supposed to show. It seems like in your free will universes the abortion doesn't take place. I mean, in the examples. You don't assert this, but is it meant to be implicit?

What do these possible events in the two universes show us? What do they indicate?

Well, as I noted above in a post I am waiting for you to respond to...

Ask Jane why it is important to her that her mother was able to opt not to abort her instead of having no other option but to abort her. Then ask the compatibilists to explain how they reconcile determinism as they understand it with moral responsibility as they understand it. Unless, again, in a determined universe as I understand it in a free will world, even their explanation itself is wholly compelled by their material brains.

[BigMike]

So, Jane will never, ever be here herself to weigh in on it. Other than in a free will universe where, of her own volition, Mary's friend persuades Mary of her own volition not to abort Jane.

Or Mary despite an overwhelmingly clear and compelling appeal from Mary's friend, perversely uses her free will to abort Jane and then, just as Mary's friend was concerned would happen, Mary regrets the choice because it doesn't fit her desires and values.

Hell, in a free will world where human behaviors are often predicated on dasein and on the Benjamin Button Syndrome, the possibilities are practically endless. But in the free will world Jane might stick around, while in the determined world she's necessarily toast.

I haven't undertood what these examples are supposed to show. It seems like in your free will universes the abortion doesn't take place. I mean, in the examples. You don't assert this, but is it meant to be implicit?

What do these possible events in the two universes show us? What do they indicate?

Well, as I noted above in a post I am waiting for you to respond to...

Ask Jane why it is important to her that her mother was able to opt not to abort her instead of having no other option but to abort her. Then ask the compatibilists to explain how they reconcile determinism as they understand it with moral responsibility as they understand it. Unless, again, in a determined universe as I understand it in a free will world, even their explanation itself is wholly compelled by their material brains.

Could someone kindly clarify the concept of the "great paradox or dilemma" regarding Mary and Jane? It appears to me that this might be related to determinism or science, and I'm curious to understand why it's significant. Despite my repeated attempts to comprehend the matter, I've been unsuccessful thus far.

[iambiguous]

Could someone kindly clarify the concept of the "great paradox or dilemma" regarding Mary and Jane? It appears to me that this might be related to determinism or science, and I'm curious to understand why it's significant. Despite my repeated attempts to comprehend the matter, I've been unsuccessful thus far.

Right, the "concept". That doesn't surprise me.

But how hard is it to differentiate between a world where the human species has "somehow" acquired free will and Mary is able to weigh the pros and the cons of killing her unborn clump of cells/baby and chooses of her own volition not to abort Jane, and a world in which Mary is compelled by a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort Jane.

Then the part where the compatibilists among us reconcile determinism as they understand it with moral responsibility as they understand it.

As for BigMike...

Click.

Again, with BigMike, my main interest lies in grasping whether, given how he understands a "no free will determined universe", he either does or does not opt freely to post this. Instead, compelled or not, he produces yet another "general description intellectual/philosophical contraption" in which the explanation revolves around words defining and then defending yet more words still. And, apparently, his aim/"aim" here seems to be that of the objectivist: to convey to others that it is his explanation or they are wrong.

Unless of course he can offer us a definitive/demonstrable account of how lifeless matter did evolve into biological matter here on earth billions of years ago evolving further into conscious biological matter millions of years ago evolving into philosophers a few thousand years ago.

Using, I suppose, the scientific method to establish this?

[BigMike]

Could someone kindly clarify the concept of the "great paradox or dilemma" regarding Mary and Jane? It appears to me that this might be related to determinism or science, and I'm curious to understand why it's significant. Despite my repeated attempts to comprehend the matter, I've been unsuccessful thus far.

Right, the "concept". That doesn't surprise me.

But how hard is it to differentiate between a world where the human species has "somehow" acquired free will and Mary is able to weigh the pros and the cons of killing her unborn clump of cells/baby and chooses of her own volition not to abort Jane, and a world in which Mary is compelled by a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort Jane.

I have no difficulty distinguishing an illusion from the real world.

Then the part where the compatibilists among us reconcile determinism as they understand it with moral responsibility as they understand it.

There is no moral responsibility since the natural world has no free will.

Is this what you have been discussing for the past few months? I would expect that you had come to some kind of conclusion by now. What is it?

[Iwannaplato]

I'm repetitive below. Apologies. I am just hoping that one of the wordings will make clear the question I have. All the various versions come down to something like: in giving these two examples of what might happen to Jane, one in a determined world and one in a free will world, are you saying that the free will world is a better one in general? and if so on what grounds?

Hell, in a free will world where human behaviors are often predicated on dasein and on the Benjamin Button Syndrome, the possibilities are practically endless. But in the free will world Jane might stick around, while in the determined world she's necessarily toast.

In that specific case, sure. Jane who probably does not get a name never gets born. But in the free will universe, maybe she gets born, maybe not. And other babies who will get born in the determinist universe will get aborted in the free will universe, since people are free to do this and not compelled by religion, guilt, or whatever to bring the child to term. So, I don't really get the point.

Are you arguing that more babies will live in a free will world?
Are you arguing that people will do better in general in a free will world?

I haven't undertood what these examples are supposed to show. It seems like in your free will universes the abortion doesn't take place. I mean, in the examples. You don't assert this, but is it meant to be implicit?

What do these possible events in the two universes show us? What do they indicate?

Well, as I noted above in a post I am waiting for you to respond to...

Ask Jane why it is important to her that her mother was able to opt not to abort her instead of having no other option but to abort her.

Ask the babies who in a determinist universe would have been born, but in a free will universe would not have been?
Ask Svetlana whose mother in the determinist universe was compelled by motherly love to stop her boyfriend from raping Svetlana, but in the free will universe for some reason was not compelled by her motherly love.


I still don't get the point. For some reason you focus on one instance and seem to imply that free will leads to better outcomes for fetuses and maybe all of us. Again, I say 'seem to imply'. Maybe you don't mean that. Please be clear.

Yes, in a free will world different things will happen than in a determined world, since things are not determined. But it seems like you are saying it will be better for babies and I see no reason to believe that.

Or maybe you aren't saying it.

In a free will universe some people who are not killers will kill. Some people who kill in the determinist universe might not. Since their background and mood won't compel the murder.

I don't see any reason to see better outcomes in a free will universe or in a determinist universe.

Are you arguing that? Can you be clear about that?

Mentioning that one fetus that was aborted in a determinist might get birthed in a free will universe doesn't really demonstate anything. And the babies killed in the free will universe or the adults...well that would be important to them.

In a free will universe no one is compelled by guilt or love or hate or compassion or frustration to do things to and with other people. Who knows what it would be like. More abandoned children? More murders? Less murders?

Do you think one universe will have better outcomes for people and what do you base this opinion on?

I have tried to word this a few ways to make it clear.

I mean, perhaps you are just saying that Jane got aborted in a determinist world, and she might not have been in a free will one. Perhaps that's all you're saying, but since your example has always been, as far as I can see, one where we are asked about Jane's feelings, it seems like you are saying a free will is better IN GENERAL. Is that true?