Christianity

[Immanuel Can]

In the Pygmy example, he changed random ideas and values held by individuals into a moral code held by the group. And he changed random action into establishing "rules, laws and conventions".

Right. Thanks.

Well, "a code." Whether or not is was genuinely "moral" is the question, the one he's avoiding.

What is a genuinely moral code? As opposed to "a code"? As opposed to a non-genuine moral code?

"Moral" is a value judgment, not, as AJ wrongly thinks, just an empirical one. That is, it's an ask about the rightness of a code or precept, not merely about the existence of a precept or code.

To illustrate, Stalin had his beliefs. His peers had their own social codes. There's absolutely no doubting that, historically, so we can accept that.

But then we have to ask, can we still ask if his code was "moral"?

If merely "to have a code, any code" is sufficient for the code to be "moral," then we cannot: the question isn't even coherent, but is merely circular.

But if "moral" means an objectively-good or objectively right code, then we can ask the question, "Was Stalin's code morally right?"

So which sense does AJ believe "moral" has: a value-sense, or a value-absent-sense?

[Alexis Jacobi]

You don't understand how meanings change, then. Both "morals" (from "mores") and "ethics" (from "ethos") used to refer to "the customs of the people." But that's not how the word is ordinarily used today. It's used to refer to the larger question of whether or not the "customs" or "choices" of a particular people are objectively right.

And if that's not how you meant it, then your definition was merely circular: anything a "people" can want to do or be is then "moral." But I don't think you meant your definition to be circular and vapid, hence you need to say what you did mean.

I admit to not being so concerned with how the term is 'used' today. It has become, in truth, another hot term. So, we have to back away from the conventional definition, or a Christian or Judaic definition, and work out a definition again. This points to the fact that we are in an age of transition. You assert a 'moral truth' for example, and one you are absolutely certain about, but others, with their 'ideas' and their 'beliefs', assert another.

I am less interested in arriving at what I think is moral and ethical, and more interested in presenting how moral systems are defined (established, uncovered, invented -- take your pick).

For you though, as with your Creationist belief, morals are given. And it is through revelation that they are presented.

You have a position, or you define for yourself a position (arbitrarily though you could never say that, where you can and do make statements about 'objective morals'. You do this because you are a Christian. Not because there are, in fact, objective morals.

[iambiguous]

Go get him, AJ!!!

Define "belief". Define "morality".

Yes! Yes! When I have his head on a pike I will post the photo.

Fine, fine. As long as, in the interim, the other races and the Jews have nothing to fear from you. Well, unless, of course, you count, say, the actual Nazis among us who do walk your talk. But, then, we're not likely to find them here are we?

Anyway, back to this:

"Grow a pair":

(chiefly US, colloquial, idiomatic, somewhat vulgar) To be brave; to show some courage, especially in a situation in which one has so far failed to do so.

To a tee, right?

[phyllo]

Right. Thanks.

Well, "a code." Whether or not is was genuinely "moral" is the question, the one he's avoiding.

What is a genuinely moral code? As opposed to "a code"? As opposed to a non-genuine moral code?

"Moral" is a value judgment, not, as AJ wrongly thinks, just an empirical one. That is, it's an ask about the rightness of a code or precept, not merely about the existence of a precept or code.

To illustrate, Stalin had his beliefs. His peers had their own social codes. There's absolutely no doubting that, historically, so we can accept that.

But then we have to ask, can we still ask if his code was "moral"?

If merely "to have a code, any code" is sufficient for the code to be "moral," then we cannot: the question isn't even coherent, but is merely circular.

But if "moral" means an objectively-good or objectively right code, then we can ask the question, "Was Stalin's code morally right?"

So which sense does AJ believe "moral" has: a value-sense, or a value-absent-sense?

A social code establishes a right and wrong behavior. In that sense, it is the same as a moral code.

The only difference is that moral codes deal with issues that get people really riled up ... life, death, reproduction, property.

A social or ethical code deals with less important stuff ... spitting in a public shower, rudeness, etc.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Well, unless, of course, you count, say, the actual Nazis among us who do walk your talk

Now hold on a doggone minute. Now you are getting me all turned around. Is there another me here who has something different than what I have said about Judaism and Jews?

This is getting spooky . . .

Is my left hand writing what my right hand is unaware of?!?

[Immanuel Can]

You don't understand how meanings change, then. Both "morals" (from "mores") and "ethics" (from "ethos") used to refer to "the customs of the people." But that's not how the word is ordinarily used today. It's used to refer to the larger question of whether or not the "customs" or "choices" of a particular people are objectively right.

And if that's not how you meant it, then your definition was merely circular: anything a "people" can want to do or be is then "moral." But I don't think you meant your definition to be circular and vapid, hence you need to say what you did mean.

I admit to not being so concerned with how the term is 'used' today.

Well, that would be silly...because it's the only way that could make any sense of your claim to have defined "morality." If "moral" merely means "the customs of the people," then let's just say "customs," to keep it clear: and then we can never ask, "Is a particular custom (wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever) moral"? The question no longer has any meaning, because those things are "customs" in particular societies.

If that's what you want, you can have it. Which way do you want it?

[Immanuel Can]

What is a genuinely moral code? As opposed to "a code"? As opposed to a non-genuine moral code?

"Moral" is a value judgment, not, as AJ wrongly thinks, just an empirical one. That is, it's an ask about the rightness of a code or precept, not merely about the existence of a precept or code.

To illustrate, Stalin had his beliefs. His peers had their own social codes. There's absolutely no doubting that, historically, so we can accept that.

But then we have to ask, can we still ask if his code was "moral"?

If merely "to have a code, any code" is sufficient for the code to be "moral," then we cannot: the question isn't even coherent, but is merely circular.

But if "moral" means an objectively-good or objectively right code, then we can ask the question, "Was Stalin's code morally right?"

So which sense does AJ believe "moral" has: a value-sense, or a value-absent-sense?

A social code establishes a right and wrong behavior. In that sense, it is the same as a moral code.

Not good enough, I'm afraid.

If we're asking if a society has a code, that's one kind of question. If we are asking, "It their code moral?" We're asking quite a different one.

Now, if you want to say there's no sense of value in the word "moral," then you can have that: but then, if that's the case, then you can't ask any question about the moral justifiability of that culture -- just about its existence.

So Russia has a social code that says that Ukraine is legitimately part of its territory. If "moral" means "customs of the people," or something like that, then it's undeniable that Russia has that custom. But then, you can't coherently ask if what Russia is doing in Ukraine is moral in a value sense. It's no longer a question of right and wrong, but just of custom. And it's simply moral if they have the custom.

And they do.

Want to see that happen?

[Alexis Jacobi]

I admit to not being so concerned with how the term is 'used' today.

Well, that would be silly...because it's the only way that could make any sense of your claim to have defined "morality." If "moral" merely means "the customs of the people," then let's just say "customs," to keep it clear: and then we can never ask, "Is a particular custom (wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever) moral"? The question no longer has any meaning, because those things are "customs" in particular societies.

If that's what you want, you can have it. Which way do you want it?

Typically of your methods you are going to focus on a distracting issue. You are really terrible in debate. And you waste a great deal of time.

I said I am not so concerned about how the term is used today because I am not talking about conventional uses. I do not wish to use a conventional term but rather try to expose what is going on at a meta level with the notion of morality.

Everything you do involves twisting. Because you cannot achieve your purposes honestly. You must resort to dishonesty.

and then we can never ask, "Is a particular custom (wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever) moral"? The question no longer has any meaning, because those things are "customs" in particular societies.

The view that you have here, and which animates you, is essentially a Judaic and a Christian one. You have special rights, accorded to you by 1) the god you define and 2) the moral authority you assume to yourself, to act against what you define as 'objectively moral'.

There has to be a 'judge' to have established a base-line -- and obviously, for you, all your references are to the god Yahweh. In that is your 'objective morality'.

wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever

You mean the social ethic where a wife jumped on the pyre of her deceased husband, right? That is somewhat different than grabbing a wife and burning her.

The betrothal of a very young girl by her family to a man who has agreed to marry her was and perhaps in some places still is a respectable practice. That is to say that it may well serve perfectly decent social and cultural purposes. What is your essential objection though? That is what interests me. That the girl does not have agency? That other people, here parents, determine her lot?

Oddly, slavery was condoned in both the OT and the NT and it was not hearily objected to in and of itself. The god Yahweh encouraged and supported the taking of slaves. In a sense one had to become counter-Christian to oppose slavery and to see it as 'absolutely immoral'.

Your 'whatever' does not apply. Things are never reducible to whatevers.

[phyllo]

So Russia has a social code that says that Ukraine is legitimately part of its territory.

Let's say that this is true.

If "moral" means "customs of the people," or something like that, then it's undeniable that Russia has that custom. But then, you can't coherently ask if what Russia is doing in Ukraine is moral in a value sense. It's no longer a question of right and wrong, but just of custom. And it's simply moral if they have the custom.

Yes. It follows that it is moral for Russians to want to add Ukraine to their territory.

Then the next part of the morality of the situation ... is it moral to kill people and destroy in order to add Ukraine to Russian territory.

Convincing Ukraine to join does not appear to be at all immoral but forcing it to join is another matter.

[Immanuel Can]

I admit to not being so concerned with how the term is 'used' today.

Well, that would be silly...because it's the only way that could make any sense of your claim to have defined "morality." If "moral" merely means "the customs of the people," then let's just say "customs," to keep it clear: and then we can never ask, "Is a particular custom (wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever) moral"? The question no longer has any meaning, because those things are "customs" in particular societies.

If that's what you want, you can have it. Which way do you want it?

I said I am not so concerned about how the term is used today because I am not talking about conventional uses.

You're talking to other people. If you want to be comprehensible, you either have to stick to normal usage, or explain very precisely how you are going to be departing from it. You've done neither.

and then we can never ask, "Is a particular custom (wife burnings, child brides, slavery, revenge rape, whatever) moral"? The question no longer has any meaning, because those things are "customs" in particular societies.

I note you haven't answered this.

There has to be a 'judge' to have established a base-line

So what is your "judge" in this case? How do you make your own "moral" judgments without one? Do you actually want us to believe that "moral" now means "whatever AJ thinks?"

[Immanuel Can]

So Russia has a social code that says that Ukraine is legitimately part of its territory.

Let's say that this is true.

We don't have to "say" it. It is.

If "moral" means "customs of the people," or something like that, then it's undeniable that Russia has that custom. But then, you can't coherently ask if what Russia is doing in Ukraine is moral in a value sense. It's no longer a question of right and wrong, but just of custom. And it's simply moral if they have the custom.

Yes. It follows that it is moral for Russians to want to add Ukraine to their territory.

Stop.

Is that moral? Is Russia's claim to Ukraine, then, a moral claim?

Then the next part of the morality of the situation ... is it moral to kill people and destroy in order to add Ukraine to Russian territory.

Now you're trying to use "moral" in the second sense, that of a value judgment, not a custom.

Convincing Ukraine to join does not appear to be at all immoral but forcing it to join is another matter.

But in Russia's thinking, Ukrainians are already part of Russia. As such, Ukranians have no legitimate right to pretend to anything else. That's their customary way of seeing it.

We would need a separate precept in order for us to argue that Ukraine had a right to choose. That precept would read something like, "People have a right to choose their own government," or "People have a right to determine their own nationality." But Russia doesn't have that custom. So when they claim Ukraine, they're being "moral" (i.e. acting according to their custom).

Happy with that?

[Alexis Jacobi]

So what is your "judge" in this case? How do you make your own "moral" judgments without one? Do you actually want us to believe that "moral" now means "whatever AJ thinks?"

Good work Immanuel! Now you have arrived at the core.

I am not concerned right at this moment in defining, nor locating, a judge or the Judge. That is your department. What I am saying is that morals begin when people assert ideas, and then beliefs, about the nature of this reality. Once these are defined then they are acted on.

Really, it is a simple statement.

I can go further and say that in this age where the Idea of God is in definite disarray -- and indeed there are some, perhaps many, who are no longer able to believe in the god that you for example define -- that as a result there is no specific Judge to refer to. And if there is no Judge (i.e. a god that can be presented and demonstrated as existing and being) then moral systems will, inevitably, become very confused.

That seems to describe our present.

How then will we make moral decisions. That is the question my dear child.

Do you actually want us to believe...

Holy Shit! Is there more than one of you too?!?

This thread has been infected by doppelgängers! Someone call the authorities!

::: runs screaming away :::

[Immanuel Can]

So what is your "judge" in this case? How do you make your own "moral" judgments without one? Do you actually want us to believe that "moral" now means "whatever AJ thinks?"

I am not concerned right at this moment in defining, nor locating, a judge or the Judge.

You should be, because without it, your term "moral" is rendered circular and vacuous again.

But it's an interesting admission, coming from you..."moral" needs a judge, a legitimative basis of some kind. On that, we agree.

[Alexis Jacobi]

So what is your "judge" in this case? How do you make your own "moral" judgments without one? Do you actually want us to believe that "moral" now means "whatever AJ thinks?"

I am not concerned right at this moment in defining, nor locating, a judge or the Judge.

You should be, because without it, your term "moral" is rendered circular and vacuous again.

But it's an interesting admission, coming from you..."moral" needs a judge, a legitimative basis of some kind. On that, we agree.

That is again less than honest on your part. You are trying to make me say what you want to say. But not what I am saying.

I might have you stuffed and mounted on ny wall …

[Immanuel Can]

I am not concerned right at this moment in defining, nor locating, a judge or the Judge.

You should be, because without it, your term "moral" is rendered circular and vacuous again.

But it's an interesting admission, coming from you..."moral" needs a judge, a legitimative basis of some kind. On that, we agree.

You are trying to make me say what you want to say.

No, I repeated what you said...or what what you said meant. If you intended something different, you can say what it was.