What could make morality objective?

[CIN]

My bad.

Not in the least. Why would you say that?

I'm not sure how the decsion about what constitutes a fundamental good there and how niceness and good manners escape, but I will be interested to read about it one day.

Perhaps you would be able to assist in the miseducation of Henry Quirk. He has a problem in that he has attempted a lossless reduction of the entirety of all moral thingumies into the property rights of the individual who "owns himself". But he has a need to incporporate reciprocity somewhere into that and it's a problem that he currently solves by adding people who notice it to his enemies list. If your method of sideloading fairness could be added to his theory, you would be doing him an enormous favour.

I don't understand any of this. I suspect it may be intended to be humour, but if it is, it goes right past me.

Did I say something to offend you?

No. It's more or less as I wrote - I'm not sure by what argument fairness and pleasure maximisation come to be the two natural goods while all other candidates would be presumably subsidiary to them. But I guess you have an argument for that objection.

Any argument you do have for that objection might be useful to Henry because he has a whole thing on the go that is intended to condense without loss all moral stuff into a single principle, but it is bad because he cannot account for all sorts of stuff such as reciprocity upon which the whole thing depends. So perhaps whatever you use to select a second principle - the thing that makes you not a utilitarian - would help him out of his situation.

Thanks for explaining.

Okay: fairness. I come at fairness via pleasure/pain, because fairness is to do with how we should distribute pleasure/pain among beings who have moral standing. Since, on my theory, pleasure and pain are good and bad, all beings capable of experiencing pleasure/pain have moral standing. The question then is, given this fact, how should pleasure/pain be distributed?

The classic utilitarian answer is that it doesn't matter. I think this is a mistake. The reason it's a mistake is that it overlooks the fact that, since it's entirely by virtue of having the capability to experience pleasure/pain that beings have moral standing at all, it must be the case that every being capable of experiencing pleasure/pain has the same moral standing. If I have 100 units of pleasure to distribute between a man and a mouse, then on the assumption that both the man and the mouse can experience pleasure, I should aim to give 50 units to each of them, or get as close to this as I can. To give the man more than 50 and the mouse less than 50, or vice-versa, would be unfair, because it would be treating them as having different moral standing when their moral standing is in fact the same. (I'm not suggesting that we can actually measure units of pleasure: all of this is simply to establish the basic principles.)

If there are two fundamental goods, pleasure/pain and fairness, it's possible to face a choice between two actions where one maximises pleasure but distributes it unfairly, while the other fails to maximise pleasure but distributes it fairly. I'm not aware of any rational way to decide which of these is better, and so at this point in time I'm inclined to say that which action to choose is indeterminate. However, I'm not entirely happy with this, so I'm still thinking about it.

I don't know if any of this is helpful to Henry, but he's welcome to talk to me himself if he wants to.

As for why I think other things, such as freedom and justice, are not fundamental moral goods, it's simply that I've never seen any argument or evidence to convince me that they are. To me they look like rules of thumb. I think they're very good rules of thumb, and I think a society that adopts them as a basis for its legal system will usually produce more pleasure or happiness than one that doesn't; but that doesn't make them fundamental principles.

[Harbal]

I don't know if any of this is helpful to Henry, but he's welcome to talk to me himself if he wants to.

Just make sure it's in a public place, with plenty of witnesses. If you tell him I said this, I will deny it.

[henry quirk]

I don't know if any of this is helpful to Henry, but he's welcome to talk to me himself if he wants to.

I'm good, thanks. My notions are sound and flash is just grousin' cuz I don't love him no more (that is: he's not reliable as a conduit of my views...take what he sez, about me, with a pinch of salt).

[FlashDangerpants]

No. It's more or less as I wrote - I'm not sure by what argument fairness and pleasure maximisation come to be the two natural goods while all other candidates would be presumably subsidiary to them. But I guess you have an argument for that objection.

Any argument you do have for that objection might be useful to Henry because he has a whole thing on the go that is intended to condense without loss all moral stuff into a single principle, but it is bad because he cannot account for all sorts of stuff such as reciprocity upon which the whole thing depends. So perhaps whatever you use to select a second principle - the thing that makes you not a utilitarian - would help him out of his situation.

Thanks for explaining.

Okay: fairness. I come at fairness via pleasure/pain, because fairness is to do with how we should distribute pleasure/pain among beings who have moral standing. Since, on my theory, pleasure and pain are good and bad, all beings capable of experiencing pleasure/pain have moral standing. The question then is, given this fact, how should pleasure/pain be distributed?

The classic utilitarian answer is that it doesn't matter. I think this is a mistake. The reason it's a mistake is that it overlooks the fact that, since it's entirely by virtue of having the capability to experience pleasure/pain that beings have moral standing at all, it must be the case that every being capable of experiencing pleasure/pain has the same moral standing. If I have 100 units of pleasure to distribute between a man and a mouse, then on the assumption that both the man and the mouse can experience pleasure, I should aim to give 50 units to each of them, or get as close to this as I can. To give the man more than 50 and the mouse less than 50, or vice-versa, would be unfair, because it would be treating them as having different moral standing when their moral standing is in fact the same. (I'm not suggesting that we can actually measure units of pleasure: all of this is simply to establish the basic principles.)

If there are two fundamental goods, pleasure/pain and fairness, it's possible to face a choice between two actions where one maximises pleasure but distributes it unfairly, while the other fails to maximise pleasure but distributes it fairly. I'm not aware of any rational way to decide which of these is better, and so at this point in time I'm inclined to say that which action to choose is indeterminate. However, I'm not entirely happy with this, so I'm still thinking about it.

I don't know if any of this is helpful to Henry, but he's welcome to talk to me himself if he wants to.

As for why I think other things, such as freedom and justice, are not fundamental moral goods, it's simply that I've never seen any argument or evidence to convince me that they are. To me they look like rules of thumb. I think they're very good rules of thumb, and I think a society that adopts them as a basis for its legal system will usually produce more pleasure or happiness than one that doesn't; but that doesn't make them fundamental principles.

Well, first up, let's begin with my traditional bout of underhandedness. I would say that you have a unique position still among our moral realists at present if a 12 week fetus and a totally vegetablised coma patient are both unable to experience pleasure or pain then they have no standing in their own rights? So technically if my great aunt is on life support, and even if she might pull through and make a recovery, her breathing aparatus is mine to switch off if nobody else really cares just at this moment?

I also note the oblique reference to utilitarian calculus, but I assume you wouldn't go so far as to endorse actually creating a measurement system to assign units of pleasurability and pain-ness to the mouse and the man's situations, assuming them to be scientific data now, because that would be giberring insanity? In that case, VA has some truly earth shaking scholarship to explain to you. I predict entertainment.

I am not sure up front how you can use fairness that way. The thing that makes utilitarianism tempting is that it massively simplifies the situation and provides a principle allows assignation of internally uncontroversial statuses of right and wrong. By which I mean that all who agree to the pleasure/pain thing can agree on which is the rigth or wrong course of action in any hypothetical or factual scenario where the outcome is known. but fairness breaks that unless you deal with the rthings that might make any outcome fair or unfair. That would at the very least include dessert, unless we are simplifying "fairness" into equality of outcome or something?

For an example (and back to me splendid bastardry): I think it's massively unfair that Americans don't all have quality healthcare free at point of use as it is in Britain. Henry definitely doesn't think it's fair for him to pay taxes so that people who aren't himself can consume cancer medication at his notional expense. We're both really just applying the nebulous concept of fairness very differently.

So I think your list of simple foundational goods must expand beyond pleasure/pain and fairness to a principle of justice that can justify the application of the fairness principle.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I agree with the intuition that slavery is immoral but that is not factual until say an experiment or survey is taken to confirm everyone or even the majority agree that slavery is immoral.
But there are people like CIN who do not agree with 'slavery is immoral'.

To be more precise the proof of factuality need to be trace to its physical correlates in terms of neural algorithms, genes, DNAs and whatever its physical representations that is inherent in ALL humans regardless of their opinions, beliefs and influence by other secondary psychological states.

So, if an experiment or survey confirms that everyone, or just a majority, think (or have an intuition) that X is morally wrong, then (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

What nonsense. And so much for moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts!

You missed my point.
I stated it can be factual but it is not precise; to be precise we need to verify and justify whatever is factual to its specific neural correlates within a specific FSK.

Note Biden is the 46th President of the USA is a fact.
You deny this?
And this fact is based on the agreement of merely 24% [81 million] of 333 million people in the US via an election [similar to a survey].
Yes, Biden is the 46th President of the USA is a fact BUT it is a Political fact conditioned upon a specific political FSK grounded on the US Constitution.

There is no absolute fact!
So if 90% of the world population agree 'slavery is immoral' then it is a fact qualified to the conditions.
As I had mentioned, this qualified fact it is not precise, so we need a FSK that is more precise.

And whatever 'neural algorithms, genes, [and] DNA' all humans may have, the moral rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness (evil) - how ever defined - of human behaviour is a separate matter. Facts have no moral entailment.

Strawmaning again.

For me, morality-proper in alignment with what is inherent in human nature is not essentially about 'rightness' and 'wrongness'.
If anyone or group were to impose 'rightness' and 'wrongness' on me, I will shut them off with 'WHO THE FUCK' are you to do that!
But if one had entered into a 'social contract' as a citizen of a government, then one has to comply with the rightness and wrongness they impose, but such dictates are not of morality but are by definition political 'rightness' and 'wrongness' within the specific Constitution.

My focus is on the moral potential and function of moral ought-not-ness within human nature which is supported by physical neural algorithms, genes, [and] DNA' inherent in ALL humans.
It is on this basis of objective moral facts that humanity can expedite moral progress based on empirical evidences.
On the other hand, your views are merely NATO which is a hindrance to moral progress.

PH: "Facts have no moral entailment"
WHO THE FUCK ARE YOU [& on what authority] to insist the above claim is a factual.
You are acting as if you are GOD to impose the above claim on everyone else.

Basically your views are that of the archaic Non-cognitivism and its likes;

Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions (i.e., statements) and thus cannot be true or false (they are not truth-apt).
A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world".[1]
If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cognitivism

[Veritas Aequitas]

I agree with the intuition that slavery is immoral but that is not factual until say an experiment or survey is taken to confirm everyone or even the majority agree that slavery is immoral.

I say you don't have to do that! I say you can take the contra-positive hypothesis and test that.

Lets assume that slavery is moral.

Invite a bunch of people to be your slaves. No pay, daily lashings, hard work. Denigration. Sexual exploitation etc.

See how many people sign up.

If only 10,000 of 8 billion people signed up, can you make a true conclusion. There could 500 million who would want to sign up but do not want to expose their stance.

As I am aware, the most I can confirm with the above is 'you are intuitively right' because it aligns with what is inherent within your basic nature, i.e. the generic human nature in all humans.

To be more precise [not 100% certain], it would be more effective to trace that intuition to the specific genes, algorithm, and DNA that is basic in all humans that is driving that intuition that slavery is immoral, i.e. naturally abhorrent.
We cannot confirm the above facts but we are moving towards its possibility [given coding the whole human genome was once thought impossible, but it is not a reality].

[Veritas Aequitas]

I agree with the intuition that slavery is immoral

To be clear: the intuition is not slavery is immoral.

The intuition of every man, any man, any-where or -when, is I am my own. My life, liberty, and property are mine.

That is the fundamental intuition, the moral fact.

From that he can surmise what is and isn't permissible between and among men.

I'd say Henry's view is pretty fucking empirical, factual and objectively verified.

Yep.

Reminder. Morality is about the rightness or goodness and wrongness or badness of behaviour. For example, we may think it's morally wrong to steal someone's car.

Here is where you are ignorant of what is morality proper.
Morality is NOT primarily about the rightness or goodness and wrongness or badness of behaviour.
Morality is about the oughtness and ought-not-ness potential and function which is physical that is inherent within human nature and thus within the individual's human nature.

Stealing is not primarily a moral element but more of a 'virtue' element. Generally, the majority conflate morality with virtue [e.g. honesty, helpful, truthful, has integrity and the likes]. Morality are related to issue that has direct or indirect fatal element and basic human freedom].
Whilst 'stealing' is more to virtue, it can be a moral issue only if say one steal another food to the degree [note this] the other person died of starvation.
Thus stealing someone's car is not a moral issue but a virtue issue.

But it's not a moral fact that you own your car. It's just a fact. So, even if it's the case, it's not a moral fact that you own your self. And we may think it's morally wrong to own someone else as property. I certainly do.

I don't agree with Henry's 'you own your self' is primary but what is primary re morality is the 'freedom' for one to live optimally to one well being. The state in maintaining freedom for oneself can be represented by its related physical elements in of neural correlates, an algorithm, genes, and DNA.

'You own your self' is a crude manifestation of the inherent state of 'freedom' [liberty] in all humans.

The term 'one own property' is also crude, our earlier ancestors survived without any concept of owning property. Currently we have the competing ideology of Communism. The concept of owning property is a secondary effect of basic 'freedom'.

[Skepdick]

Reminder. Morality is about the rightness or goodness and wrongness or badness of behaviour. For example, we may think it's morally wrong to steal someone's car.

Reminder. Any property e.g whiteness, rightness, sweetness, ownership (the sort of stuff we express using adjectives and adverbs in language) is about the relationship between mind and matter.

Snow is not inherently white. Whiteness is a quality of snow.

But it's not a moral fact that you own your car. It's just a fact.

What or where is the "ownership" relation between me; and my car?

So, even if it's the case, it's not a moral fact that you own your self. And we may think it's morally wrong to own someone else as property. I certainly do.

Own is an adjective.
Moral is an adjective.

What or where are those properties?

[Harbal]

So, even if it's the case, it's not a moral fact that you own your self. And we may think it's morally wrong to own someone else as property. I certainly do.

Own is an adjective.
Moral is an adjective.

What or where are those properties?

In the quoted text, "own" is functioning as a verb, not an adjective.

[Skepdick]

In the quoted text, "own" is functioning as a verb, not an adjective.

So rewrite the grammar and syntax while preserving the semantics.

What is the nature of the relationship between A and B?

Does A "own" B?
is A the owner of B?
Is B property of A?


Turn the verb into an adjective if you want to make an epistemic argument about the nature of "ownership".
Turn the verb into a noun if you want to make an ontological argument about the nature of "ownership".

[Peter Holmes]

'I own X' is a factual assertion. So it has a truth-value, because I either do or don't own X. But it has no moral entailment, such as in: 'I own X; therefore I should own X'. For example, there are situations in which, arguably, I shouldn't own X.

Now, for X, substitute 'my self' - and the absence of moral entailment is identical. To claim moral entailment uniquely for ownership of the human self (whatever 'I own myself' means), is to engage in special pleading.

Meanwhile, an appeal to intuition - 'we know this intuitively' - is always a last resort when valid and sound argument is missing. It's as useless as an appeal to natural rights.

[Skepdick]

'I own X' is a factual assertion. So it has a truth-value, because I either do or don't own X. But it has no moral entailment, such as in: 'I own X; therefore I should own X'. For example, there are situations in which, arguably, I shouldn't own X.

Tricksy slight of hand! Treating "I own X" as a true premise, and not as a conclusion or implication.

What fact in the world implies my ownership of X?
What or where is "my ownership"?

[Harbal]

In the quoted text, "own" is functioning as a verb, not an adjective.

So rewrite the grammar and syntax while preserving the semantics.

What is the nature of the relationship between A and B?

Does A "own" B?
is A the owner of B?
Is B property of A?


Turn the verb into an adjective if you want to make an epistemic argument about the nature of "ownership".
Turn the verb into a noun if you want to make an ontological argument about the nature of "ownership".

That's the kind of thing someone who didn't know what they were talking about would say.

[Harbal]

What fact in the world implies my ownership of X?

Didn't you keep the receipt?

[Belinda]

So, even if it's the case, it's not a moral fact that you own your self. And we may think it's morally wrong to own someone else as property. I certainly do.

Own is an adjective.
Moral is an adjective.

What or where are those properties?

In the quoted text, "own" is functioning as a verb, not an adjective.

Yes, but "you own yourself" is an adjectival clause that describes an attribute of what is not " a moral fact".