Real universal rights

[Rational ethicist]

Rational ethicist seems to be making his case very poorly, and has reached the point where it's just a yes-and routine while you guys argue him to absurd conclusions. He seems to be arguing that the cheese has a right to wear as much satin as it can afford

I was not arguing for that right at all. It is not a right that I would propose when I do that exercise of looking for rights that I would be willing to grant to everything.

but no right to not be eaten.

I would indeed not argue for this right, because that would imply we all have to die from starvation. But I would argue for a closely related right, namely the right not to be eaten against one's will. Cheese cannot be eaten against its will, because cheese does not have a will, so that right of cheese can never be violated, which means it is very easy to grant cheese that right. I don't have to do anything special to respect that right of cheese. I prefer this right, because I do not want to be eaten against my will, and I am also against eating other people against their will. So this is a right that I want to grant to everyone and everything.

Conversely, if you are of the view that rights are some inherent natural quality of being alive and conscious

that is making it unnecessarily complicated. You can consider rights as natural qualities, or as conventions, like language or money, but how you consider rights is irrelevant.

The thing Re is so poorly trying to articulate appears to refer to that last sentence in the previous para. His plan amounts to a general assumption that our current framework of rights is inadequate in every direction

with current framework you mean the approach to start with a list of rights and then figure out to which entities we should grant those rights? That approach is indeed inadequate, as it easily results in unwanted arbitrariness.

and for releif he offers a radical reversal of process such that we automatically extend recognition to all matter. My issue with that is that then we must remove a right every time we want a cheese sandwich.

I don't see how that follows. You can grant cheese the right not to be eaten against its will, and still eat cheese without violating that right.

[Harbal]

Suppose there are two towns, Atown and Btown.
In Atown a new local ordnance is passed that says puppies have the right to be reared by their mother for 8 weeks and cannot be sold until that age.
In Btown a new local ordnance is passed that says puppies under 8 weeks of age cannot be sold seperatelyt from the mother.
You want to open a puppy factory, what reason have you to choose one jurisdiction over the other?

If you are in favour of there being rules of conduct towards animals then whether you describe those as rights pertaining to the animal or duties applied to the human seems to be semantics to me.

Yes, the outcome can be the same, and I don't have a hypothetical scenario to hand that demonstrates how it sometimes isn't the same.

Even so, it seems to me that whether we look at the issue thinking about what an animal is entitled to, or whether we look at it thinking about what ethical standards and values we, as human beings, should be aspiring to, does make a difference. I realise that I need to say quite a bit more than that to justify my opinion, but, at least for now, I don't feel up to the task.

[Harbal]

Don't get me wrong, I think rights are great for human beings, just not for anything else.

I'm still curious why you think so. Because humans can understand rights? No, that cannot be it, as not all humans can understand rights. I don't see the connection between rights and humans. I see as little connection between rights and humans as I see between rights and primates.

I don't have anything to add to the explanation I've already given you, I'm afraid. I think it's more that you don't agree than don't understand, which is fair enough.

[FlashDangerpants]

Rational ethicist seems to be making his case very poorly, and has reached the point where it's just a yes-and routine while you guys argue him to absurd conclusions. He seems to be arguing that the cheese has a right to wear as much satin as it can afford

I was not arguing for that right at all. It is not a right that I would propose when I do that exercise of looking for rights that I would be willing to grant to everything.

On what possible grounds can you deny cheese the right to wear as much satin as it can afford to purchase?

but no right to not be eaten.

I would indeed not argue for this right, because that would imply we all have to die from starvation. But I would argue for a closely related right, namely the right not to be eaten against one's will. Cheese cannot be eaten against its will, because cheese does not have a will, so that right of cheese can never be violated, which means it is very easy to grant cheese that right. I don't have to do anything special to respect that right of cheese. I prefer this right, because I do not want to be eaten against my will, and I am also against eating other people against their will. So this is a right that I want to grant to everyone and everything.

The unfortunate reality is that it's more interesting to satirise this position than to anything else with it. Enumeration of rights that the subject cannot claim and which nobody can claim on behalf of those objects, and which provide nothing and nobody any value is a fundamentally comedic principle, more so than it is a philosophical one.

It's the setup for a joke about a nun and a cucumber that we cannot tell because it breaches the cucumber's right to privacy.

Conversely, if you are of the view that rights are some inherent natural quality of being alive and conscious

that is making it unnecessarily complicated. You can consider rights as natural qualities, or as conventions, like language or money, but how you consider rights is irrelevant.

It isn't irrelevant and if you have cococted some scheme where it becomes so, that is a you problem.

The thing Re is so poorly trying to articulate appears to refer to that last sentence in the previous para. His plan amounts to a general assumption that our current framework of rights is inadequate in every direction

with current framework you mean the approach to start with a list of rights and then figure out to which entities we should grant those rights? That approach is indeed inadequate, as it easily results in unwanted arbitrariness.

We were just discussing the rights of cheese to wear satin and not get eaten, the arbitrary ship has arbitrarily sailed.

and for releif he offers a radical reversal of process such that we automatically extend recognition to all matter. My issue with that is that then we must remove a right every time we want a cheese sandwich.

I don't see how that follows. You can grant cheese the right not to be eaten against its will, and still eat cheese without violating that right.

Equally you can just not bother with the absurd fiction of rights for cheese to start with.

[henry quirk]

I would say rights should not be restricted to any group, but should be granted to everyone and everything.

Me, I'm not talkin' about restricting anything. I'm talkin' about recognizing what actually is (a person has natural rights and a, for example, toaster does not).

[henry quirk]

Yes, humans have dominion over all they perceive. This is uncorrupted human nature. We have a 3-year old in the big family. He has dominion over all that he perceives. As with all youngsters, he must be taught to control that natural impulse in order to someday walk through crowds of people without touching a stranger or being touched, which we all learn how to do.

That reminds me of sumthin' I wrote elsewhere...

the toddler indeed, as he goes about discoverin' what his limits are, where the world begins and he ends, instinctually knows he is his own...it's the very basis for his fearless exploration...to him everything, all of it, is his...it's through exploration and experience that he comes to understand the world is not his

what he never arrives at -- except when taught otherwise -- is the conclusion that he is not his own (and even in the teaching -- indoctrination, really -- the road is long and hard for the teacher...as I say, you have to wear a man, or boy, down to a nub, make him crazy through abuse and deprivation to get him to willingly accept the yoke, to accept he is not his own)

[Rational ethicist]

On what possible grounds can you deny cheese the right to wear as much satin as it can afford to purchase?

because neither I nor the cheese nor you care about that right. And if we grant cheese that right, we cannot violate that right anyway. So yeah, let's grant cheese that right if you want, it doesn't make a difference.

I would indeed not argue for this right, because that would imply we all have to die from starvation. But I would argue for a closely related right, namely the right not to be eaten against one's will. Cheese cannot be eaten against its will, because cheese does not have a will, so that right of cheese can never be violated, which means it is very easy to grant cheese that right. I don't have to do anything special to respect that right of cheese. I prefer this right, because I do not want to be eaten against my will, and I am also against eating other people against their will. So this is a right that I want to grant to everyone and everything.

The unfortunate reality is that it's more interesting to satirise this position than to anything else with it.

we were talking about the right not to be eaten against one's will. Not something to satirise!

Enumeration of rights that the subject cannot claim and which nobody can claim on behalf of those objects, and which provide nothing and nobody any value is a fundamentally comedic principle, more so than it is a philosophical one

We can claim the right not to be eaten on behalf of those subjects. For the subject who does not want to be eaten, this right provides much value.

Conversely, if you are of the view that rights are some inherent natural quality of being alive and conscious

that is making it unnecessarily complicated. You can consider rights as natural qualities, or as conventions, like language or money, but how you consider rights is irrelevant.

It isn't irrelevant

if it is relevant, it means it makes a difference. So what difference does it make?

We were just discussing the rights of cheese to wear satin and not get eaten

why were you discussing those rights? If it is worth discussing, it means you take those rights seriously. But I don't think you take those rights seriously...

Equally you can just not bother with the absurd fiction of rights for cheese to start with.

ok, but what approach do you suggest that avoids unwanted arbitrariness? My idea to grant rights to everything, was guaranteed to avoid unwanted arbitrariness.

[Rational ethicist]

I would say rights should not be restricted to any group, but should be granted to everyone and everything.

Me, I'm not talkin' about restricting anything. I'm talkin' about recognizing what actually is (a person has natural rights and a, for example, toaster does not).

ok, how do you recognize entities that have natural rights? Or rather, how can I recognize them? What do I have to do to recognize them?

[FlashDangerpants]

On what possible grounds can you deny cheese the right to wear as much satin as it can afford to purchase?

because neither I nor the cheese nor you care about that right. And if we grant cheese that right, we cannot violate that right anyway. So yeah, let's grant cheese that right if you want, it doesn't make a difference.

Excellent, a crucial injustice against the sumptuary rights of decaying milk products has now been addressed. Really we should stop here while we are winning so big.

I would indeed not argue for this right, because that would imply we all have to die from starvation. But I would argue for a closely related right, namely the right not to be eaten against one's will. Cheese cannot be eaten against its will, because cheese does not have a will, so that right of cheese can never be violated, which means it is very easy to grant cheese that right. I don't have to do anything special to respect that right of cheese. I prefer this right, because I do not want to be eaten against my will, and I am also against eating other people against their will. So this is a right that I want to grant to everyone and everything.

The unfortunate reality is that it's more interesting to satirise this position than to anything else with it.

we were talking about the right not to be eaten against one's will. Not something to satirise!

Well, your theory becomes dreadfully boring if we reduce it to nothing but "everything has a right not to have stuff done to it against its will" doesn't it? You make satire tedious by just making your theory incredibly dull aparently by accident.

Enumeration of rights that the subject cannot claim and which nobody can claim on behalf of those objects, and which provide nothing and nobody any value is a fundamentally comedic principle, more so than it is a philosophical one

We can claim the right not to be eaten on behalf of those subjects. For the subject who does not want to be eaten, this right provides much value.

Are you intentionally reducing your previously universal theory that was supposed to apply to molecules and other inanimate objects to a dreary one that applies only to things that have desires? Or are you fucking it all up right now?

that is making it unnecessarily complicated. You can consider rights as natural qualities, or as conventions, like language or money, but how you consider rights is irrelevant.

It isn't irrelevant

if it is relevant, it means it makes a difference. So what difference does it make?

We were just discussing the rights of cheese to wear satin and not get eaten

why were you discussing those rights? If it is worth discussing, it means you take those rights seriously. But I don't think you take those rights seriously...

Equally you can just not bother with the absurd fiction of rights for cheese to start with.

ok, but what approach do you suggest that avoids unwanted arbitrariness? My idea to grant rights to everything, was guaranteed to avoid unwanted arbitrariness.

Bored

[henry quirk]

I would say rights should not be restricted to any group, but should be granted to everyone and everything.

Me, I'm not talkin' about restricting anything. I'm talkin' about recognizing what actually is (a person has natural rights and a, for example, toaster does not).

ok, how do you recognize entities that have natural rights? Or rather, how can I recognize them? What do I have to do to recognize them?

Persons have natural rights. So we're back to what is a person?

[Rational ethicist]

Well, your theory becomes dreadfully boring if we reduce it to nothing but "everything has a right not to have stuff done to it against its will" doesn't it?

It's a good start, but I don't think you can apply that right consistently to everything. You will face conflicts. I would go for a more limited set of rights, such as "everything has a right not to be used as a means against its will"

Are you intentionally reducing your previously universal theory that was supposed to apply to molecules and other inanimate objects to a dreary one that applies only to things that have desires?

it is not really a reduction. But indeed, a right not to have stuff done to it against its will, explicitly refers to "will", and that means that right is always trivially satisfied/respected for entities that do not have a will. The right becomes only non-trivial for entities that have a will, or as you'd say, things that have desires. Now, if you would really reduce those rights to things that have desires, there is no problem, because the excluded entities do not have any desires, and hence do not have a desire for their rights to be respected.

[Rational ethicist]

Persons have natural rights.

is this by definition of a person? Probably not, because then it would be very trivial, it doesn't allow me to recognize entities that have natural rights. If it is not a priori true that persons have natural rights, then what evidence do you have for your claim that persons have natural rights?

So we're back to what is a person?

So we first have to be able to detect entities that have natural rights, then we have to figure out what is a person, and finally we have to check your claim that persons are the entities that have natural rights. I don't think this is helping... It raises an extra question: how can I recognize a person?

[FlashDangerpants]

Well, your theory becomes dreadfully boring if we reduce it to nothing but "everything has a right not to have stuff done to it against its will" doesn't it?

It's a good start, but I don't think you can apply that right consistently to everything. You will face conflicts. I would go for a more limited set of rights, such as "everything has a right not to be used as a means against its will"

The.... cheese is an end in itself, not a means to an end?

Eat the cheese only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law that cheese should be eaten

Are you intentionally reducing your previously universal theory that was supposed to apply to molecules and other inanimate objects to a dreary one that applies only to things that have desires?

it is not really a reduction. But indeed, a right not to have stuff done to it against its will, explicitly refers to "will", and that means that right is always trivially satisfied/respected for entities that do not have a will. The right becomes only non-trivial for entities that have a will, or as you'd say, things that have desires. Now, if you would really reduce those rights to things that have desires, there is no problem, because the excluded entities do not have any desires, and hence do not have a desire for their rights to be respected.

So that stuff about "Everything, from humans to plants to computers to rocks to planets to molecules, deserves equal rights" was all just silly bullshit and you only intended all living things that meet some boundary condition you can't describe of setience. And some meaningless arbitrary stuff about unwanted arbitrariness.

[Rational ethicist]

The.... cheese is an end in itself, not a means to an end?

could be, but I do not know how to interpret those words of Kant. for me it suffices to say that cheese should not be used as a means against its will.

So that stuff about "Everything, from humans to plants to computers to rocks to planets to molecules, deserves equal rights" was all just silly bullshit

no, because it was necessary to avoid unwanted arbitrariness

and you only intended all living things that meet some boundary condition

I didn't intend that, but I derived it from the basic principles. It is true that the universal rights, granted to everything, are only non-trivial for sentient beings (who have a will). That means my approach to grant universal rights to everything is the same as another approach to grant those same rights to only sentient beings. The problem with the latter approach is that it assumes in advance that sentience is important. This is based on the discussion in animal rights ethics: animal rights activists say that granting rights to only humans is discrimination, and that we therefor should grant rights to all animals, or basically all sentient beings. The activists say: "you eat animals and that is discrimination." And then the objection goes: "You animal activists are also discriminating, because you exclude the non-sentient objects. You discriminate plants when you eat plants." With my approach, I can say that I am not discriminating at all. I am granting plants the same rights as animals, and I still respect those rights when I eat plants.

you can't describe of setience.

How do you mean? At least you know what "having a will" means.

And some meaningless arbitrary stuff about unwanted arbitrariness.

that is not meaningless: if you are allowed to allow unwanted arbitrariness in your ethical theory, then so am i and so is everyone, and yu cannot consistently want that, because it allows others to arbitrarily exclude you (discriminate you) against your will, and you cannot consistently want to be excluded against your will.

[henry quirk]

is this by definition of a person?

No. I didn't say it was.

So we first have to be able to detect entities that have natural rights, then we have to figure out what is a person

Assbackwards. Define person (use yourself as a model). Then interrogate yourself: is my life, my being, my existence mine?

Let me know what definition and answer you come up with.