What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

1 Signs such as words - such as 'good' and 'bad' - can mean only what we use them to mean.

"We" who?

If you are using 'good' the way I am using 'bad' and vice versa - whose use counts as "we"?

[Belinda]

You and I can both play tennis. But just because you play, it doesn't mean you are as good at tennis as I am.

Tennis is a zero-sum game. If I ever engage in a zero-sum game it's only because I am sure I can't lose.

What could make morality objective would be for morality to pertain to clones of God, (who cannot lose)instead of which the reality is Eve decided to be her own woman despite the risks.

[CIN]

So... uuuh. Why are pleasure and pain fundamental to morality?

A central concern of morality is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad. Those are the things that will be fundamental to morality.

My theory is this:
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is a version of fitting attitude theory. Compare the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting injured, and avoidance is an anti-response.

So if my theory is correct, pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad. Since they are natural, and not ideas invented by humans like freedom and justice, they alone are fundamental to morality.

Your theory and views above re Morality are too shallow and narrow.

That's an entirely subjective opinion.

To rely in the concepts of pleasure and pain is too crude, especially in consideration of Morality.

You use words like 'shallow', 'narrow'and 'crude'. These are merely your subjective value judgments, and as such are of no importance or interest to anyone but yourself.

There are many who seek pleasure from acts of evil, e.g. rapes, incest, pedophilia; note the terrible evils related to drug addiction for pleasure; evil acts can arise from those seeking pleasure in eating - those who will kill for food;

If an act which is commonly regarded as evil results in greater long-term happiness fairly distributed, then the act is not in fact evil, but good. You make the very common mistake of taking moral rules of thumb, such as 'incest is evil', 'drug addiction is evil', and supposing that these rules of thumb are eternal truths. They are not.

As for pain, there are many who will bear with pains and sufferings to generate good for others. Mothers in general will bear with pains for the good of ensure their offspring. Many are willing to suffer and bear with pains [mental and physical] to gain means for subsequent pleasures, e.g. laborious worker, entrepreneur, farmer, etc.

You seem unaware of two things: the distinction between the intrinsic and the instrumental, and the fact that ALL the consequences of an action must be considered before we can tell whether the action is good or evil. When mothers undergo pain for the benefit of their children, the pain is intrinsically bad, but it may be instrumentally good, because it enables the children, and their children, and their children....... to have an amount of pleasure which outweighs the mother's pain. You are only considering the immediate pain of the mother; you should consider the long-term pleasures and pains that result from the birth of a single child.

As such pleasure and pain can both be good and bad [evil]. Both pleasure and pain must be modulated to optimize the necessary intent, e.g. Morality as one human objective.

Morality is basically about avoiding evil to promote the related moral good; and morality may necessarily entails either pleasure or pain relative to the circumstances.

Morality is necessary for the well being of the individual and that of humanity; the potential and propensity for morality is innate and inherent in ALL humans existing in various degrees of activation. As such Morality must be Objective in principle.

You assume that your own subjective ideas about what is moral or immoral are correct. You have no justification for assuming that. I agree that morality must be objective, but you have given no reasons why your own moral opinions are the right ones. You simply ASSUME that they are. That is okay in ordinary day-to-day life, but this is a philosophy forum, and here you are expected to back up your opinions with arguments and/or evidence, which you have not done.

[CIN]

With reference to the 'meaning of ought' you are using with reference to the very common 'corrupted' sense of morality in the sense of obligation, duty, enforcement and the like.

Garbage. Everyone except you thinks a moral ought is an obligation. Just because you have a weird theory doesn't mean the rest of us have to take any notice.

Personally I have done extensive research on that. Currently my Morality Folder in D:Drive has 1400 files in 81 Folders.

So your argument is this:
I have done extensive research into morality.
Therefore my opinions about morality must be correct.

You do see that this is an invalid argument?

I'll restate, 'Freedom [liberty] is a basic human right'.
Philosophically this is SO obvious.

When someone says 'this is obvious', it's a sure sign that they have no argument or evidence to support their view.

Yes, I have not provided substantive arguments to support my claims above and I don't intend to.

Because you can't. You have no substantive arguments, and no idea how to construct any.
I think we're done here. I suggest you enrol for a philosophy course at a reputable university and learn how to conduct a proper philosophy debate. I won't talk to you again until you do.

[CIN]

Hi, CIN.

Thanks for your detailed and thoughtful comments.

No worries. I'm afraid my last post to you was somewhat intemperate. There are some people on this forum who clearly haven't the first idea of how to do philosophy, and I come to it nowadays expecting the worst. I've been seriously considering walking away for good, but I will stay for a while if you and I can have a serious and considered discussion. I'll try to reply to your most recent post soon, but I can't predict exactly when, because I am horribly busy these days (despite being in theory retired!).

If I don't speak to you before January, Happy New Year.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Your theory and views above re Morality are too shallow and narrow.

That's an entirely subjective opinion.[/quote]
True, that is my opinion based on my comparison of the contents you had posted and the exhaustive materials on Morality & Ethics within the Philosophical Community out there.
The general rule the supervisor of a thesis advices is, one to ensure one has done a literature review of all related material related to one's thesis to ensure one is not doing a research question that is already answered by someone somewhere.
I always follow the above rule for the major subject I delve into.

To rely in the concepts of pleasure and pain is too crude, especially in consideration of Morality.

You use words like 'shallow', 'narrow'and 'crude'. These are merely your subjective value judgments, and as such are of no importance or interest to anyone but yourself.

I asserted the above based on what you had posted nd the exhaustive materials on Morality & Ethics within the Philosophical Community out there.

There are many who seek pleasure from acts of evil, e.g. rapes, incest, pedophilia; note the terrible evils related to drug addiction for pleasure; evil acts can arise from those seeking pleasure in eating - those who will kill for food;

If an act which is commonly regarded as evil results in greater long-term happiness fairly distributed, then the act is not in fact evil, but good. You make the very common mistake of taking moral rules of thumb, such as 'incest is evil', 'drug addiction is evil', and supposing that these rules of thumb are eternal truths. They are not.

As for pain, there are many who will bear with pains and sufferings to generate good for others. Mothers in general will bear with pains for the good of ensure their offspring. Many are willing to suffer and bear with pains [mental and physical] to gain means for subsequent pleasures, e.g. laborious worker, entrepreneur, farmer, etc.

You seem unaware of two things: the distinction between the intrinsic and the instrumental, and the fact that ALL the consequences of an action must be considered before we can tell whether the action is good or evil. When mothers undergo pain for the benefit of their children, the pain is intrinsically bad, but it may be instrumentally good, because it enables the children, and their children, and their children....... to have an amount of pleasure which outweighs the mother's pain. You are only considering the immediate pain of the mother; you should consider the long-term pleasures and pains that result from the birth of a single child.

You missed out, I had considered the intrinsic vs instrumental in my point that followed.

While you apply 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' to pain and pleasure, you ignored the same for 'good' and 'evil' which are more fundamental in philosophy.

I had defined what is 'good' in term of moral as 'not-evil'.
The focus re morality is what is intrinsically evil.
The list of evil acts are exhaustive from 99.9% [genocide] to 0.1% [petty crimes, etc.] evil.
What is listed as evil is Absolutely immoral, period!

However there is the instrumental degree of those act in inverse proportion to the degree of evilness.

As such, there no allowance for instrumentality for 99.9% evilness of genocide, but lying [white] say at 1% evilness may be used instrumentally where conditions warrant it. While it may be instrumental and practical, it is absolutely-immorally evil, albeit 1% evilness.

As such pleasure and pain can both be good and bad [evil]. Both pleasure and pain must be modulated to optimize the necessary intent, e.g. Morality as one human objective.
Morality is basically about avoiding evil to promote the related moral good; and morality may necessarily entails either pleasure or pain relative to the circumstances.
Morality is necessary for the well being of the individual and that of humanity; the potential and propensity for morality is innate and inherent in ALL humans existing in various degrees of activation. As such Morality must be Objective in principle.

You assume that your own subjective ideas about what is moral or immoral are correct. You have no justification for assuming that. I agree that morality must be objective, but you have given no reasons why your own moral opinions are the right ones. You simply ASSUME that they are. That is okay in ordinary day-to-day life, but this is a philosophy forum, and here you are expected to back up your opinions with arguments and/or evidence, which you have not done.

This is the intrinsic vs instrumental point I referred to which you stated I overlooked earlier.

Do you think it is possible to present a thorough argument and justification on a one to one basis in a limited forum like this?

I don't SIMPLY ASSUME I am on target; I had raised nearly 200 threads on the subject of Morality in this forum covering the following themes [coded and sorted in my file];

DEF Definition of Moral
MG General
IO Is - Ought
MO Moral Ought-ness
MC Critiques of Moral Realism
MF Moral Facts
MFD Moral Fact Denier
MFS Moral FSK - Credibility
MJ Moral Judgments
MO Moral Objectivity
MN Mirror Neurons
ME Evolutionary Basis
MR Moral Realism

Given that I had asserted your views are narrow, shallow and crude, you should wonder whether it is true or not and do a survey in comparing your existing ideas on morality to ALL that is out there.

[Veritas Aequitas]

With reference to the 'meaning of ought' you are using with reference to the very common 'corrupted' sense of morality in the sense of obligation, duty, enforcement and the like.

Garbage. Everyone except you thinks a moral ought is an obligation. Just because you have a weird theory doesn't mean the rest of us have to take any notice.

Personally I have done extensive research on that. Currently my Morality Folder in D:Drive has 1400 files in 81 Folders.

So your argument is this:
I have done extensive research into morality.
Therefore my opinions about morality must be correct.

You do see that this is an invalid argument?

I'll restate, 'Freedom [liberty] is a basic human right'.
Philosophically this is SO obvious.

When someone says 'this is obvious', it's a sure sign that they have no argument or evidence to support their view.

Yes, I have not provided substantive arguments to support my claims above and I don't intend to.

Because you can't. You have no substantive arguments, and no idea how to construct any.
I think we're done here. I suggest you enrol for a philosophy course at a reputable university and learn how to conduct a proper philosophy debate. I won't talk to you again until you do.

I view this philosophy as a market, anyone want to trade [discuss] then I will do so reciprocally, if not, I will just move on.

It is your discretion to discuss, why the need to impose your condition. If you think I have not met your expectation just ignore it and move on to whatever that suit you.

I stated I will not go into anything Substantive here; as I had stated I have raised nearly 200 threads related to Morality and Ethics to support my claims.

[popeye1945]

Good grief paint it red and put a sign on it!!!!

[CIN]

Hi, CIN.

Thanks for your detailed and thoughtful comments. For now, I just want to address your proposal for two moral facts, because it's the heart of the matter.

Anyway, here you are. Two moral facts, and a supporting argument.

MORAL FACTS
F1) Any action that causes pleasure is, to that extent, a good action.
F2) Any action that causes pain is, to that extent, a bad action.

PREAMBLE
A central concern of ethics is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' actually mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad.

1 Signs such as words - such as 'good' and 'bad' - can mean only what we use them to mean.

True.

So, to ask if there are any things that actually are good and bad can only only mean to ask how we actually use the words 'good' and 'bad'.

The fact that you start this sentence with 'so' implies that you think this assertion is entailed by the assertion in your previous sentence. In other words, you are arguing like this:
i) The words 'good' and 'bad' can mean only what we use them to mean.
ii) Therefore, to ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad is merely to ask how we use the words 'good' and 'bad'.
However, ii) is not entailed by i), for three reasons:
a) the idea of things actually being good and bad appears in the conclusion, but not in the premise, so the conclusion can't be entailed by the premise
b) the assertion in ii) is in fact false, because, for example, if I ask 'was Hitler a bad man?', I am not asking about the meaning of the word 'bad', I am asking for information about Hitler
c) a true premise cannot entail a false conclusion, so there can be no entailment here.

To claim anything else is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are.

Since you seem to regard asking whether something is actually good or bad as equivalent to asking how we use the words 'good' and 'bad', I think this is precisely the mistake YOU are making.

2 We use some important words - good, bad, right, wrong, should and ought to - morally and non-morally. For example 'the right answer' and 'a good move' need have no moral meaning whatsoever. So it's important not to equivocate, which we can easily do, when using these words. (I believe your argument depends on equivocation with the words 'good' and 'bad'.)

No, there's no equivocation. 'Good' in 'a good move' means the same as 'good' in 'a good deed'. The difference isn't one of meaning, it's to do with the context in which the word is used, and the reasons why something might be considered to merit a pro-response. In the context of a game, a move may be considered to merit a pro-response because it makes victory more likely (and since victory is assumed to merit a pro-response, the move itself is then also considered to merit a pro-response), or because the move is clever (cleverness is often thought to merit a pro-response). In the wider context of everyday life, there are other reasons from these why a deed may be considered to merit a pro-response, e.g. it causes happiness or reduces unhappiness. The former is conventionally thought to be a non-moral use, the latter a moral use, but the difference isn't because of different meanings of 'good', it's because the contexts and reasons are different.

The same applies to 'right', which I think always means 'correct' in relation to something. A right answer is one that is correct in relation to the question or problem. A right deed is one that is correct according to some supposed moral rule. I haven't used 'right' in my argument because, as an act-consequentialist, I think morality is a matter of consequences, not rules. Insofar as there are moral rules, I think they are just rules of thumb. So I try to avoid using 'right' and 'wrong'; one can be a moral objectivist without them.

THE ARGUMENT
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is my version of fitting attitude theory. Cf the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

Talk about 'analysis' of terms usually demonstrates the reificatory delusion that has plagued philosophy for millennia: abstract nouns are names of things that can be described or 'analysed'. This has been called 'conceptual analysis', as though calling something a concept explains anything. It's always been obfuscatory nonsense.

Okay, here you are offering a theory about the analysis of terms which you evidently believe applies to my theory. Two comments:
1) You say that such talk 'usually' demonstrates reification. This logically implies that it doesn't ALWAYS demonstrate reification. For your criticism to stick, you need to show that my theory does involve reification. If you can do that, I will take it seriously, because like you, I don't believe that abstracta actually exist.
2) The first part of my theory is about the meanings of words, i.e. their usage. My view is that when people describe some object X as good or bad, whether in a moral context or not, they are attributing to X a property which, by using the word 'good' or 'bad', they are identifying as goodness or badness. We can then ask two questions:
i) Since there is not obviously any such property as goodness or badness, is there some other property which is being identified indirectly by means of the word 'good' or 'bad'? (This would be an example of what, in the Stanford Encyclopedia article I have referenced, is referred to as 'buck-passing.') This could be so even if the speaker is unable to identify the property using other words: it is not necessarily the case that a speaker using a word has to be able to explain the meaning of the word for them to be using the word correctly and meaningfully. (Not everyone is a philosopher!)
ii) If there is such a property, what is it?
I don't think we are engaged here in 'conceptual analysis' (whatever that is); the way to find out if there is some property being indirectly identified by the words 'good' and 'bad' is to ask what it is about the relationship between the speaker and whatever object they are calling good or bad that leads them to attribute putative goodness or badness to that object. Someone else on this forum suggested to me that the property was desirability, on the grounds that what is good is desirable. R.M.Hare suggested that the function of 'good' is to commend, on the grounds that when we call something good we are commending it, which would lead to the suggestion that the property is commendability. I think both of these answers are in the right ball-park, but they don't cover all cases, and, taking a hint from Ewing, I have come to the conclusion that the properties referred to by 'good' and 'bad' are more general than that.
Answering these two questions does not involve reification of an abstractum, because all we are concerned with are (a) the usage of words, and (b) the properties of pleasure and pain, neither of which is an abstractum.

So we're back to the use of words. And you suggest 'merits a pro-/anti- response' as synonyms or meanings or explanations for 'good' and 'bad'. Okay - but the expressions 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response' have no moral entailment. There's no mention of moral rightness and wrongness.

No, of course there isn't. The whole point of the suggestion that 'good' means the same as 'merits a pro-response' is to show that a term conventionally considered to be a moral term is equivalent in meaning to a term that is NOT conventionally considered to be a moral term, thus eliminating the supposed gap between fact and value. That is the entire aim of step 1 of my argument. You can hardly refute step 1 by pointing out that it does what I claim that it does!

And, obviously, the claim that anything 'merits' or deserves any kind of response is a matter of opinion, and therefore subjective.

This is not obvious to me at all; in fact I deny it. When I stroke my dog, he pushes himself against me, demanding more. Being stroked evidently gives him pleasure, and he reacts with a pro-response — demanding more. This isn't because his opinion is that the pleasure merits a pro-response, because he's a dog, and dogs don't have opinions; it's because pleasure is something that animals like and want more of. Liking something, and wanting more of it, are pro-responses. Pleasure just is the kind of thing that calls forth pro-responses in animals — and most of the time, in humans too.

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pleasure itself. I have identified this property as 'merits a pro-response', and I suggest that, since pleasure seems to be an end that is pursued for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pleasure has this property intrinsically.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting into fights with larger animals and getting hurt, and avoidance is an anti-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pain itself. I have identified this property as 'merits an anti-response', and I suggest that, since pain seems to be an end that is avoided for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pain has this property intrinsically.

Obviously, the fact that non-human animals seek pleasure and avoid pain has no moral entailment. No non-moral (for example, factual) premise entails a moral conclusion.

Again, this is not obvious to me. Have you not realised that when you say some X is 'obvious', the only fact to which you can be referring is that X seems obvious to Peter Holmes, which is a fact about you, and not about X? When anyone says something is obvious, they are really only saying something about their own belief-state; and why should one person's belief-state have any influence on anyone else's belief-state? If it is your belief that the fact that animals seek pleasure and avoid pain has no moral entailment, you must provide an argument or evidence to support this belief. I think my argument shows that there CAN be a moral entailment.

4) It follows from 1 and 2 that pleasure is intrinsically good.

5) It follows from 1 and 3 that pain is intrinsically bad.

The modifier 'intrinsically' does nothing to clarify the use of the words 'good' and 'bad'.

Of course it does. It makes the point that the goodness or badness is a property of the pleasure or pain, and not of something else that the pleasure or pain is merely instrumental in bringing about.

A 'good' - as in 'goods and services' - has no moral significance. It's just something some people want.

Your attempt to identify the philosophical use of 'good' with the use of 'good' in 'goods and services', which is a purely commercial use, is mere obfuscation. Philosophers commonly speak of various non-commercial things, such as freedom and justice, as 'goods'; in philosophy, a 'good' is anything that anyone might regard as good. You can't just set common philosophical usage aside without arguing why this should be done.

It may not be morally good for people to have some goods, even if they want them - even if they elicit a pro-response.

I was careful to say that it is pleasure itself that is intrinsically good. I did not say that anything that causes pleasure, such as the ownership of certain items, is good. Such causes of pleasure are never intrinsically good, in my view, and they are only instrumentally good if they help to promote greater pleasure, fairly distributed, for everyone affected by them, not just in the short term, but in the long term as well. In practice we can hardly ever calculate the overall goodness or badness of actions, because we cannot foresee all of their consequences; we have instead to rely on rules of thumb (such as 'slavery is wrong'), which we have reason to expect will produce good results (or prevent bad results) most of the time.

6) Since pleasure is intrinsically good, any action which produces pleasure must to that extent be (instrumentally) good.

7) Since pain is intrinsically bad, any action which produces pain must to that extent be (instrumentally) bad.

The introduction of instrumentality here is revealing, because it's definitely morally neutral. It refers to something being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent.

You make two statements here:
i) instrumentality is morally neutral
ii) instrumentality refers to something being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent.
You appear to think these two statements are contradictory. They aren't. If my goal is to cause my dog pain, kicking him hard is consistent with this goal, and this is not a morally neutral act.
The notion of instrumentality is a common one in moral philosophy, where it is not morally neutral, but is linked to the notion of value:
"In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. Things are deemed to have instrumental value if they help one achieve a particular end." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumen ... nsic_value)
Pleasure is intrinsically good, and any action that produces pleasure is a means to that end, so any action that produces pleasure is, to that extent, instrumentally good.

And in this context, 'goodness' and 'badness' have no moral significance, and to claim they do is equivocatory.

If an action that produces pain is deliberately intended to cause pain, then I think we should say that the action is morally bad. The fact that the action is bad comes from the badness of the pain, and the fact that it is morally bad comes from the fact that it is intentional.

QED

Okay, but you haven't demonstrated anything about morality - and certainly not the existence of moral facts.

I think I have — and as I pointed out in an earlier post, you have not demonstrated that there are NO moral facts.

My aim is to demolish the arguments for moral realism and objectivism - for the existence of moral facts - because I think those positions are morally pernicious.

If objectivism is false, nothing CAN be morally pernicious, so your position contains a contradiction.

As I keep pointing out to you, you make moral claims (such as 'slavery is wrong', 'moral realism is morally pernicious') that can only be true if objectivism is true, and yet you deny that objectivism is true, so your position is inconsistent. The 'is' in 'slavery is wrong' is the 'is' of predication, so when you say 'I think slavery is wrong', you are saying that you think that wrongness is a property of slavery. This makes you an objectivist, yet you claim not to be. You have not answered this charge, and it requires an answer.

But I dislike the baggage that comes with labels such as 'non-cognitivism' and 'anti-realism'. Perhaps I'm a moral anti-objectivist. Don't care. It's the arguments that count, not the pigeon-holes.

It's not only the arguments that count, it's also the theories, and the labels are not superfluous, because once you have theories, you need labels by which to refer to them.

I don't think you really are an anti-objectivist, because you keep making objectivist moral claims. I think you are an objectivist who dislikes the normative opinions of some other objectivists, and you are mistakenly blaming objectivism itself for what you see as the moral perniciousness of these other objectivists' views. The reason why you are reluctant to admit that you're an objectivist is that you don't see how objectivism could be true. I've explained how, and I don't think you have yet shown that I am wrong.

[Veritas Aequitas]

But I dislike the baggage that comes with labels such as 'non-cognitivism' and 'anti-realism'. Perhaps I'm a moral anti-objectivist. Don't care. It's the arguments that count, not the pigeon-holes.

It's not only the arguments that count, it's also the theories, and the labels are not superfluous, because once you have theories, you need labels by which to refer to them.

I don't think you really are an anti-objectivist, because you keep making objectivist moral claims. I think you are an objectivist who dislikes the normative opinions of some other objectivists, and you are mistakenly blaming objectivism itself for what you see as the moral perniciousness of these other objectivists' views. The reason why you are reluctant to admit that you're an objectivist is that you don't see how objectivism could be true. I've explained how, and I don't think you have yet shown that I am wrong.

I noted you seem to seek pleasure in engaging in long-winded, never-ending, till the cows come home, ... sort of postings??
That is the reason why this thread is >400 pages mainly because of the above reasons and that Peter Holmes is dogmatically stuck within a paradigm of archaic ideological ideas related to Morality and Ethics.

As I had recommended, with foreseeable contentious issues like Morality and Ethics, it is critical one set out the definition of the relevant* terms and seek consensus [full or compromised] before one proceed to argue one's point.

* I said relevant terms [as deemed fit] not as you retorted in the other thread that we must define every term in the widest sense.

In this thread you'll need to define and seek consensus [with Peter Holmes] on terms like 'morality' 'ethics', objectivity, subjectivity, fact, matter-of-fact, state-of-affairs and others where relevant.

Peter Holmes believes in 'objectivity' in the sense of Philosophical Realism, i.e. [edited]:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
Philosophical realism .. about a certain kind of thing is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding.
Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views, which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.
Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.[7]

Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

Thus for Peter, what is real and objective has a mind-independent existence as above, e.g. physical objects out there external to the person's mind & self - tables, chairs, apples, and he likes.

To Peter, ALL or whatever Moral Conclusions, moral claims or anything related to 'morality' [his definition] cannot be objective [based on the above definition of Philosophical Realism], i.e. literally nonsense and meaningless because they are not mind-independent 'facts' but are merely opinions, beliefs and judgments relating to the rightness and wrongness of some acts related to morality. Peter is mostly likely influenced by the Logical Positivists;

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/AyerbyTH.html
Ayer says various things, in .. Language, Truth and Logic ... An utterance that does not satisfy the Verification Principle is said to be nonsense, literally senseless, not meaningful, not significant, without literal significance, not factually significant, a pseudo-proposition rather than a real one, not true or false. ........ as in the declaration that metaphysics, centrally understood as putative knowledge of a transcendent reality, and also religion and morality, are nonsense.

Thus, no matter how you present your point, as long at your view that 'morality' is related to objectivity, then it is instantly a taboo for Peter Holmes, which is just like what dogmatic fundamentalist theists do.

I agree if moral claims are related to merely opinions, beliefs and judgments, then they cannot be objective [as generally defined], not in terms of philosophical realism.
My definition of 'What is Objectivity' is;

What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416
Moral Objectivity:
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707
7 Dimensions of Objectivity – Mathew Kramer
viewtopic.php?p=471122#p471122

What is Morality?
viewtopic.php?p=469799#p469799

I argued that moral [proper] claims are not related to opinions, beliefs and judgments [nor Platonic ideas nor God commands out there] but rather objective moral facts are based on a matter-of-fact as represented by specific neural algorithms, i.e. physical neurons, genes, DNA operating within a system as a moral function.

From Moral Sense Theory to Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39196
This is what makes Morality objective.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, CIN.

Thanks for your detailed and thoughtful comments. For now, I just want to address your proposal for two moral facts, because it's the heart of the matter.

Anyway, here you are. Two moral facts, and a supporting argument.

MORAL FACTS
F1) Any action that causes pleasure is, to that extent, a good action.
F2) Any action that causes pain is, to that extent, a bad action.

PREAMBLE
A central concern of ethics is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' actually mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad.

1 Signs such as words - such as 'good' and 'bad' - can mean only what we use them to mean.

True.

So, to ask if there are any things that actually are good and bad can only only mean to ask how we actually use the words 'good' and 'bad'.

The fact that you start this sentence with 'so' implies that you think this assertion is entailed by the assertion in your previous sentence. In other words, you are arguing like this:
i) The words 'good' and 'bad' can mean only what we use them to mean.
ii) Therefore, to ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad is merely to ask how we use the words 'good' and 'bad'.
However, ii) is not entailed by i), for three reasons:
a) the idea of things actually being good and bad appears in the conclusion, but not in the premise, so the conclusion can't be entailed by the premise
b) the assertion in ii) is in fact false, because, for example, if I ask 'was Hitler a bad man?', I am not asking about the meaning of the word 'bad', I am asking for information about Hitler
c) a true premise cannot entail a false conclusion, so there can be no entailment here.

Fair point. I need to reformulate my argument to make it valid. But my point is that you seem to make a distinction between what we say is good and bad and what actually is good and bad, as though the words 'good' and 'bad' are names of the forms or universals about the existence of which Platonists and nominalists still argue.

And I think your Hitler example demonstrates the truth of my (unfortunately elliptical) conclusion. An answer to the question 'was Hitler a bad man?' - the 'information' it can elicit - depends completely on the meaning given to the word 'bad'. And the claim that that depends on the supposed existence and nature of what actually is bad is a delusion - because there's no such thing.

But if you think there is such a thing as what actually is bad or badness, by all means make that assertion and provide evidence for its existence.

To claim anything else is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are.

Since you seem to regard asking whether something is actually good or bad as equivalent to asking how we use the words 'good' and 'bad', I think this is precisely the mistake YOU are making.

Not so. You agree that words can mean only what we use them to mean. We call various things green. But is it sensible to ask what actually is green? Isn't 'well, we call these things green' at least one reasonable answer? What other answer is being sought?

2 We use some important words - good, bad, right, wrong, should and ought to - morally and non-morally. For example 'the right answer' and 'a good move' need have no moral meaning whatsoever. So it's important not to equivocate, which we can easily do, when using these words. (I believe your argument depends on equivocation with the words 'good' and 'bad'.)

No, there's no equivocation. 'Good' in 'a good move' means the same as 'good' in 'a good deed'. The difference isn't one of meaning, it's to do with the context in which the word is used, and the reasons why something might be considered to merit a pro-response. In the context of a game, a move may be considered to merit a pro-response because it makes victory more likely (and since victory is assumed to merit a pro-response, the move itself is then also considered to merit a pro-response), or because the move is clever (cleverness is often thought to merit a pro-response). In the wider context of everyday life, there are other reasons from these why a deed may be considered to merit a pro-response, e.g. it causes happiness or reduces unhappiness. The former is conventionally thought to be a non-moral use, the latter a moral use, but the difference isn't because of different meanings of 'good', it's because the contexts and reasons are different.

No, you're wrong. Of course context is critical: meaning is use, and we use words in contexts. And in the expressions 'a good game' and 'good behaviour', the word 'good' is being used completely differently. And there need be nothing moral about going in 'the right direction'. Your gloss for 'good' - 'merits a pro-response' - doesn't alter the fact that moral 'good' is different from other 'goods', such as instrumental 'goods'.

The same applies to 'right', which I think always means 'correct' in relation to something. A right answer is one that is correct in relation to the question or problem. A right deed is one that is correct according to some supposed moral rule. I haven't used 'right' in my argument because, as an act-consequentialist, I think morality is a matter of consequences, not rules. Insofar as there are moral rules, I think they are just rules of thumb. So I try to avoid using 'right' and 'wrong'; one can be a moral objectivist without them.

Same mistake. A gloss for 'right' - such as 'correct' - doesn't alter the fact that the right move in chess is not the same as the morally right thing to do. And this is just a fact about linguistic usage.

As for moral act-consequentialism, that just kicks the problem (and the failure) of moral objectivism down the road from the act itself. If there are no deontological moral facts, then there are no consequential moral facts either.

THE ARGUMENT
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is my version of fitting attitude theory. Cf the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

Talk about 'analysis' of terms usually demonstrates the reificatory delusion that has plagued philosophy for millennia: abstract nouns are names of things that can be described or 'analysed'. This has been called 'conceptual analysis', as though calling something a concept explains anything. It's always been obfuscatory nonsense.

Okay, here you are offering a theory about the analysis of terms which you evidently believe applies to my theory. Two comments:
1) You say that such talk 'usually' demonstrates reification. This logically implies that it doesn't ALWAYS demonstrate reification. For your criticism to stick, you need to show that my theory does involve reification. If you can do that, I will take it seriously, because like you, I don't believe that abstracta actually exist.

Fair enough. I believe that your assumption that there are things that actually are good and bad - that moral goodness and badness are actually existing properties of real things and actions - is reificatory. But I guess this needs more development - and what you say next is pertinent.

2) The first part of my theory is about the meanings of words, i.e. their usage. My view is that when people describe some object X as good or bad, whether in a moral context or not, they are attributing to X a property which, by using the word 'good' or 'bad', they are identifying as goodness or badness. We can then ask two questions:
i) Since there is not obviously any such property as goodness or badness, is there some other property which is being identified indirectly by means of the word 'good' or 'bad'? (This would be an example of what, in the Stanford Encyclopedia article I have referenced, is referred to as 'buck-passing.') This could be so even if the speaker is unable to identify the property using other words: it is not necessarily the case that a speaker using a word has to be able to explain the meaning of the word for them to be using the word correctly and meaningfully. (Not everyone is a philosopher!)
ii) If there is such a property, what is it?
I don't think we are engaged here in 'conceptual analysis' (whatever that is); the way to find out if there is some property being indirectly identified by the words 'good' and 'bad' is to ask what it is about the relationship between the speaker and whatever object they are calling good or bad that leads them to attribute putative goodness or badness to that object. Someone else on this forum suggested to me that the property was desirability, on the grounds that what is good is desirable. R.M.Hare suggested that the function of 'good' is to commend, on the grounds that when we call something good we are commending it, which would lead to the suggestion that the property is commendability. I think both of these answers are in the right ball-park, but they don't cover all cases, and, taking a hint from Ewing, I have come to the conclusion that the properties referred to by 'good' and 'bad' are more general than that.
Answering these two questions does not involve reification of an abstractum, because all we are concerned with are (a) the usage of words, and (b) the properties of pleasure and pain, neither of which is an abstractum.

To put it simply: if there are no abstract things, then there are no abstract properties. So goodness and badness are not properties of things or actions.

So we're back to the use of words. And you suggest 'merits a pro-/anti- response' as synonyms or meanings or explanations for 'good' and 'bad'. Okay - but the expressions 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response' have no moral entailment. There's no mention of moral rightness and wrongness.

No, of course there isn't. The whole point of the suggestion that 'good' means the same as 'merits a pro-response' is to show that a term conventionally considered to be a moral term is equivalent in meaning to a term that is NOT conventionally considered to be a moral term, thus eliminating the supposed gap between fact and value. That is the entire aim of step 1 of my argument. You can hardly refute step 1 by pointing out that it does what I claim that it does!

Genius. Agree that words can mean only what we use them to mean. Then deny the difference between moral and non-moral uses of the word 'good', and thus eliminate the gap between fact and value. Game over.

And, obviously, the claim that anything 'merits' or deserves any kind of response is a matter of opinion, and therefore subjective.

This is not obvious to me at all; in fact I deny it. When I stroke my dog, he pushes himself against me, demanding more. Being stroked evidently gives him pleasure, and he reacts with a pro-response — demanding more. This isn't because his opinion is that the pleasure merits a pro-response, because he's a dog, and dogs don't have opinions; it's because pleasure is something that animals like and want more of. Liking something, and wanting more of it, are pro-responses. Pleasure just is the kind of thing that calls forth pro-responses in animals — and most of the time, in humans too.

I suggest you're mistaking 'gets a pro-response' for 'merits a pro-response'. Does your stroking your dog merit or deserve a pro-response? Would your dog be an ingrate if it didn't respond in the way your stroking merited or deserved? To repeat, the claim that an action merits or deserves any kind of response is subjective. Causing pleasure may elicit a pro-response, but that doesn't mean it deserves that response. And it may well not get it in some circumstances anyway.

Like all moral objectivists, you're trying to argue from some fact (or at least factual assertion) to a moral conclusion. But if you deny that moral assertions are any different from non-moral assertions, then you're not making a moral argument in the first place - and certainly not establishing the existence of a moral fact.

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pleasure itself. I have identified this property as 'merits a pro-response', and I suggest that, since pleasure seems to be an end that is pursued for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pleasure has this property intrinsically.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting into fights with larger animals and getting hurt, and avoidance is an anti-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pain itself. I have identified this property as 'merits an anti-response', and I suggest that, since pain seems to be an end that is avoided for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pain has this property intrinsically.

Obviously, the fact that non-human animals seek pleasure and avoid pain has no moral entailment. No non-moral (for example, factual) premise entails a moral conclusion.

Again, this is not obvious to me. Have you not realised that when you say some X is 'obvious', the only fact to which you can be referring is that X seems obvious to Peter Holmes, which is a fact about you, and not about X? When anyone says something is obvious, they are really only saying something about their own belief-state; and why should one person's belief-state have any influence on anyone else's belief-state? If it is your belief that the fact that animals seek pleasure and avoid pain has no moral entailment, you must provide an argument or evidence to support this belief. I think my argument shows that there CAN be a moral entailment.

Your argument does nothing of the sort. You merely substitute 'good' with 'merits a pro-response' and possibly with 'causing pleasure', and then deny that a moral assertion using 'good' is any different from a non-moral assertion using 'good'.

You haven't established the moral goodness or rightness of getting a pro-response, such as by causing pleasure', you merely assert and assume it. This is the objectivist sleight-of-hand at its sneaky business. And besides, there are obviously situations in which an action that gets a pro-response, perhaps by causing pleasure, could be judged to be morally bad or wrong.

4) It follows from 1 and 2 that pleasure is intrinsically good.

5) It follows from 1 and 3 that pain is intrinsically bad.

The modifier 'intrinsically' does nothing to clarify the use of the words 'good' and 'bad'.

Of course it does. It makes the point that the goodness or badness is a property of the pleasure or pain, and not of something else that the pleasure or pain is merely instrumental in bringing about.

Word salad: pleasure has the property of goodness; goodness has the property of meriting a pro-response; and all of this means there are moral facts. Claptrap.

A 'good' - as in 'goods and services' - has no moral significance. It's just something some people want.

Your attempt to identify the philosophical use of 'good' with the use of 'good' in 'goods and services', which is a purely commercial use, is mere obfuscation. Philosophers commonly speak of various non-commercial things, such as freedom and justice, as 'goods'; in philosophy, a 'good' is anything that anyone might regard as good. You can't just set common philosophical usage aside without arguing why this should be done.

Perhaps you need reminding that your whole fallacious argument hangs on the word 'good' meaning, in all contexts, 'merits a pro-response', and that saying something is morally good is no different from saying something is good in some other way. And pointing out the mistakes commonly made by some philosophers does nothing to improve your argument.

It may not be morally good for people to have some goods, even if they want them - even if they elicit a pro-response.

I was careful to say that it is pleasure itself that is intrinsically good. I did not say that anything that causes pleasure, such as the ownership of certain items, is good.

Again, 'intrinsically' makes no useful distinction, because the unqualified assertion 'pleasure itself is good' makes, as you agree, no moral claim, unless it equivocates on 'good'. Why is 'pleasure itself' a moral good - intrinsic or otherwise? This is nothing but a belief, judgement or opinion, which is therefore subjective.

Such causes of pleasure are never intrinsically good, in my view, and they are only instrumentally good if they help to promote greater pleasure, fairly distributed, for everyone affected by them, not just in the short term, but in the long term as well. In practice we can hardly ever calculate the overall goodness or badness of actions, because we cannot foresee all of their consequences; we have instead to rely on rules of thumb (such as 'slavery is wrong'), which we have reason to expect will produce good results (or prevent bad results) most of the time.

Hume's ghost sighs. Same old, same old.

6) Since pleasure is intrinsically good, any action which produces pleasure must to that extent be (instrumentally) good.

7) Since pain is intrinsically bad, any action which produces pain must to that extent be (instrumentally) bad.

The introduction of instrumentality here is revealing, because it's definitely morally neutral. It refers to something being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent.

You make two statements here:
i) instrumentality is morally neutral
ii) instrumentality refers to something being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent.
You appear to think these two statements are contradictory.

No, I don't. Being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent are morally neutral precisely because they apply to any goal.

They aren't. If my goal is to cause my dog pain, kicking him hard is consistent with this goal, and this is not a morally neutral act.

And here's your confusion. Both a goal and an action consistent with that goal can be judged to be morally right or wrong. And that's why instrumentality itself - this action is consistent with this goal - is morally neutral. A morally good goal doesn't make an action consistent with that goal necessarily morally good.

The notion of instrumentality is a common one in moral philosophy, where it is not morally neutral, but is linked to the notion of value:
"In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. Things are deemed to have instrumental value if they help one achieve a particular end." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumen ... nsic_value)

This may be interpreted as equivocation. Instrumental value is not the same as moral value.

Pleasure is intrinsically good, and any action that produces pleasure is a means to that end, so any action that produces pleasure is, to that extent, instrumentally good.

Unrecognised equivocation on 'good'. 'Pleasure is intrinsically good' does not mean 'pleasure is intrinsically morally good'. And 'instrumental goodness' is equally equivocatory.

And in this context, 'goodness' and 'badness' have no moral significance, and to claim they do is equivocatory.

If an action that produces pain is deliberately intended to cause pain, then I think we should say that the action is morally bad. The fact that the action is bad comes from the badness of the pain, and the fact that it is morally bad comes from the fact that it is intentional.

Eh, voila. The sleight-of-hand: 'then I think we should say that the action is morally bad'. So here is your supposed moral fact:

Intentionally causing pain is morally bad.

Now, you can explain your reasons for thinking that we should say this till you're blue in the face. And you've constructed an elaborate argument to justify your opinion - as have many moral objectivists. But it remains an opinion. And an opinion held by everyone is still an opinion. This moral conclusion, like all the others, does not and logically cannot follow deductively from a non-moral (such as factual) premise - such as yours about responses to pleasure and pain.

QED

Okay, but you haven't demonstrated anything about morality - and certainly not the existence of moral facts.

I think I have — and as I pointed out in an earlier post, you have not demonstrated that there are NO moral facts.

Nope. I've demonstrated that your argument for the existence of moral facts is fallacious. And the burden of proof is yours as the claimant - not mine.

My aim is to demolish the arguments for moral realism and objectivism - for the existence of moral facts - because I think those positions are morally pernicious.

If objectivism is false, nothing CAN be morally pernicious, so your position contains a contradiction.

I'd like to think this is unworthy of you. If there are no abstract things, there are no abstract properties, such as moral rightness or goodness, and wrongness or badness. And if so, to say something is morally right or wrong is not to ascribe it a property by making a claim with a factual truth-value. Instead, it's to express a value-judgement with no factual truth-value. And then there's no contradiction in denying moral objectivism.

As I keep pointing out to you, you make moral claims (such as 'slavery is wrong', 'moral realism is morally pernicious') that can only be true if objectivism is true, and yet you deny that objectivism is true, so your position is inconsistent. The 'is' in 'slavery is wrong' is the 'is' of predication, so when you say 'I think slavery is wrong', you are saying that you think that wrongness is a property of slavery. This makes you an objectivist, yet you claim not to be. You have not answered this charge, and it requires an answer.

Same mistake. And it's getting tedious.

But I dislike the baggage that comes with labels such as 'non-cognitivism' and 'anti-realism'. Perhaps I'm a moral anti-objectivist. Don't care. It's the arguments that count, not the pigeon-holes.

It's not only the arguments that count, it's also the theories, and the labels are not superfluous, because once you have theories, you need labels by which to refer to them.

A theory is nothing but an explanation, which involves an argument and evidence.

I don't think you really are an anti-objectivist, because you keep making objectivist moral claims. I think you are an objectivist who dislikes the normative opinions of some other objectivists, and you are mistakenly blaming objectivism itself for what you see as the moral perniciousness of these other objectivists' views. The reason why you are reluctant to admit that you're an objectivist is that you don't see how objectivism could be true. I've explained how, and I don't think you have yet shown that I am wrong.

If I say something is ugly, I'm not saying it's a fact that it's ugly, that the assertion 'this thing is ugly' is factually true, nor that the assertion 'this thing is not ugly' is factually false. And to insist that my assertion 'this is ugly' entails those conclusions is nonsense. As is the claim that 'this is morally right/good' has the entailments that moral objectivists claim for it.

[CIN]

... it's getting tedious.

You made a similar complaint recently, referring to this discussion as 'interminable'.

I'm happy to call it a day if you are. I don't see any likelihood of either of us changing the other's mind.

[CIN]

But I dislike the baggage that comes with labels such as 'non-cognitivism' and 'anti-realism'. Perhaps I'm a moral anti-objectivist. Don't care. It's the arguments that count, not the pigeon-holes.

It's not only the arguments that count, it's also the theories, and the labels are not superfluous, because once you have theories, you need labels by which to refer to them.

I don't think you really are an anti-objectivist, because you keep making objectivist moral claims. I think you are an objectivist who dislikes the normative opinions of some other objectivists, and you are mistakenly blaming objectivism itself for what you see as the moral perniciousness of these other objectivists' views. The reason why you are reluctant to admit that you're an objectivist is that you don't see how objectivism could be true. I've explained how, and I don't think you have yet shown that I am wrong.

I noted you seem to seek pleasure in engaging in long-winded, never-ending, till the cows come home, ... sort of postings??

What I do or do not take pleasure in has nothing to do with the subject of this thread.

That is the reason why this thread is >400 pages mainly because of the above reasons and that Peter Holmes is dogmatically stuck within a paradigm of archaic ideological ideas related to Morality and Ethics.

I'm not here to defend Peter Holmes, he can do that for himself.

I argued that moral [proper] claims are not related to opinions, beliefs and judgments [nor Platonic ideas nor God commands out there] but rather objective moral facts are based on a matter-of-fact as represented by specific neural algorithms, i.e. physical neurons, genes, DNA operating within a system as a moral function.

From Moral Sense Theory to Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39196
This is what makes Morality objective.

Here is the standard meaning of 'objective' in modern philosophy:

"The terms “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” in their modern usage, generally relate to a perceiving subject (normally a person) and a perceived or unperceived object. The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it." (https://iep.utm.edu/objectiv/)

I don't think you can make up your own definition and then expect other people to accept it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

It's not only the arguments that count, it's also the theories, and the labels are not superfluous, because once you have theories, you need labels by which to refer to them.

I don't think you really are an anti-objectivist, because you keep making objectivist moral claims. I think you are an objectivist who dislikes the normative opinions of some other objectivists, and you are mistakenly blaming objectivism itself for what you see as the moral perniciousness of these other objectivists' views. The reason why you are reluctant to admit that you're an objectivist is that you don't see how objectivism could be true. I've explained how, and I don't think you have yet shown that I am wrong.

I noted you seem to seek pleasure in engaging in long-winded, never-ending, till the cows come home, ... sort of postings??

What I do or do not take pleasure in has nothing to do with the subject of this thread.

That is the reason why this thread is >400 pages mainly because of the above reasons and that Peter Holmes is dogmatically stuck within a paradigm of archaic ideological ideas related to Morality and Ethics.

I'm not here to defend Peter Holmes, he can do that for himself.

I argued that moral [proper] claims are not related to opinions, beliefs and judgments [nor Platonic ideas nor God commands out there] but rather objective moral facts are based on a matter-of-fact as represented by specific neural algorithms, i.e. physical neurons, genes, DNA operating within a system as a moral function.

From Moral Sense Theory to Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39196
This is what makes Morality objective.

Here is the standard meaning of 'objective' in modern philosophy:

"The terms “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” in their modern usage, generally relate to a perceiving subject (normally a person) and a perceived or unperceived object. The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it." (https://iep.utm.edu/objectiv/)

I don't think you can make up your own definition and then expect other people to accept it.

Where did I insist every other person MUST accept my views?

This is a philosophical forum; as expected, I present my views, it is up to the discretion of others to agree or reject it.
However I will make it a point to justify my views as critically and rationally as possible.

If you were to read the full article from the IEP link you will find that the term 'objective' is very contentious within the philosophical community since 500BCE to the present;
Major Historical Philosophical Theories of Objective Reality
https://iep.utm.edu/objectiv/#H5

Note:

Is There No Escape From the Subjective?
https://iep.utm.edu/objectiv/#SH2f

Despite plausible ways of arguing that interSubjective disagreement indicates error and agreement indicates some probability of truth, defenses of Objective Knowledge all face the philosophically daunting challenge of providing a cogent argument showing that any purported “mark” of reliability (including apparent interSubjective agreement) actually does confer a high likelihood of truth.
The task seems to presuppose some method of determining Objective truth in the very process of establishing certain sorts of Subjective impressions as reliable indicators of truth.
That is, we require some independent (non-Subjective) way of determining which Subjective impressions support Knowledge of Objective Reality before we can find Subjectively accessible “markers” of the reliable Subjective impressions.
What could such a method be, since every method of Knowledge, Judgment, or even thought seems quite clearly to go on within the realm of Subjective impressions?

One cannot get out of one’s Subjective impressions, it seems, to test them for reliability.

The prospects for Knowledge of the Objective world are hampered by our essential confinement within Subjective impressions.

What the above implied is, it is impossible to achieve Pure Objectivity as defined, i.e. purely independent of the subject[s].

As such whatever is 'objective' is always conditioned upon a method [agreed by many subjects], i.e. a Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK] or Reality [FSR].

The most credible knowledge of objects, i.e. objectivity, is that of scientific knowledge along with Mathematics. What else?

Do you agree to the above perspective of objectivity?
It is your discretion, if not, why?

I have always been using scientific objectivity as the standard and where morality is claimed to be objective, it must be in similar or near to scientific objectivity.

[Peter Holmes]

... it's getting tedious.

You made a similar complaint recently, referring to this discussion as 'interminable'.

I'm happy to call it a day if you are. I don't see any likelihood of either of us changing the other's mind.

Okay. When an argument I've been wedded to is refuted, I change my mind, cos it's rational, if painful, to do so.

But moral realism and objectivism are matters of faith, so the uselessness of apologetic arguments supporting them is irrelevant - as it is for religious apologetics.

Thanks. And I think my discussion with you has been far from tedious or interminable. I was referring to the OP discussion as a whole.