What could make morality objective?

[CIN]

I do love it when people tell me what I am really saying.

What they really mean is...

The phallus of irony seems so succulent! Cup the balls while you are at it.

You and I can both play tennis. But just because you play, it doesn't mean you are as good at tennis as I am.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A central concern of morality is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad. Those are the things that will be fundamental to morality.

My theory is this:
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is a version of fitting attitude theory. Compare the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting injured, and avoidance is an anti-response.

So if my theory is correct, pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad. Since they are natural, and not ideas invented by humans like freedom and justice, they alone are fundamental to morality.

Your theory and views above re Morality are too shallow and narrow.
To rely in the concepts of pleasure and pain is too crude, especially in consideration of Morality.

There are many who seek pleasure from acts of evil, e.g. rapes, incest, pedophilia; note the terrible evils related to drug addiction for pleasure; evil acts can arise from those seeking pleasure in eating - those who will kill for food;

As for pain, there are many who will bear with pains and sufferings to generate good for others. Mothers in general will bear with pains for the good of ensure their offspring. Many are willing to suffer and bear with pains [mental and physical] to gain means for subsequent pleasures, e.g. laborious worker, entrepreneur, farmer, etc.

As such pleasure and pain can both be good and bad [evil]. Both pleasure and pain must be modulated to optimize the necessary intent, e.g. Morality as one human objective.

Morality is basically about avoiding evil to promote the related moral good; and morality may necessarily entails either pleasure or pain relative to the circumstances.

Morality is necessary for the well being of the individual and that of humanity; the potential and propensity for morality is innate and inherent in ALL humans existing in various degrees of activation. As such Morality must be Objective in principle.

To repeat: non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

How is that non-scientific premises can lead to scientific conclusions?
It is possible because non-scientific premises, i.e. empirical premises are processed within a the specific Scientific Framework and System. [of scientific constitution, methodology, assumptions, etc.]

Similarly non-moral premises [e.g. scientific and empirical premises] when processed within a Moral Framework and System will enable moral conclusions.

So facts about what humans and other animal do - such as seek pleasure and avoid pain - can't entail the moral conclusion that humans and other animals should or ought to seek pleasure and avoid pain. That's a separate judgement or opinion.

As is the opinion that the well being of the individual and humanity should or ought to be pursued.

See above

At the beginning - or the bottom - of any moral discussion is a moral belief, judgement or opinion, which is necessarily subjective. And this perplexes or enrages moral objectivists, who want moral facts that simply don't exist.

As I had always said, you are stuck in a dogmatic shallow and narrow paradigm, i.e. of Hume's 'matter of fact' and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy; these are at present considered 'outdated'.

Morality-proper, I repeat [said a 'Million' times] is primarily not about enforcing 'wrong' or 'right' conduct nor involving judgment, opinion, beliefs of individuals.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why ought they? Only to stay alive. So this isn't a categorical ought, it's a hypothetical ought ('if you want to stay alive, you ought to breathe'). But moral oughts are categorical, not hypothetical, so this biological ought is not relevant to the question whether there are moral oughts.

Say, you are the average person, I challenge you to hold your breath for more than a minute if not two or more, surely you will and can experience that 'oughtness' to breathe as you will try to grasp for air or even kill to ensure you can breathe.

'Ought' expresses an obligation or duty. You are not under an obligation to breathe, nor do you have a duty to breathe. What you are referring to here is the very strong desire to breathe. A desire is not the same thing as an obligation or duty.

Note the meaning of 'ought'

• Ought: used to show when it is necessary or would be a good thing to perform the activity referred to by the following verb;
  [ + infinitive ] You ought to be kinder to him.
  We ought not/oughtn't to have agreed without knowing what it would cost.
  "We ought to be getting ready now." "Yes, I guess we ought (to)."
  https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictio ... h/ought-to

Ought imply 'to act' which can range from an imperative to acts with degrees of choice.

As such the oughtness to breathe is a biological ought which is imperative upon the individual grounded on human nature.

My point is there is also the oughtness to be moral which is a biological ought grounded on human nature. Whilst such a moral oughtness is not as obvious as the oughtness to breathe, it nevertheless exists as biological fact, thus a moral fact.
This is merely an analogy as a clue, I have not detailed the full justification yet.

The 'oughtness' to breathe is a 'program' that is innate and involuntary within the human organism and other breathing organisms.

Something that is involuntary can't be an obligation or duty. It can't be the case that you ought to do something if in fact you can't help doing it.

With reference to the 'meaning of ought' you are using with reference to the very common 'corrupted' sense of morality in the sense of obligation, duty, enforcement and the like.

In my case, what is morality is innate and inherent as human nature and thus we need to recognize that moral fact and let the moral potential unfolds by itself naturally, spontaneously and involuntary.
For example, I assume you are moral person and that you don't go about killing another humans is natural in alignment with the unfoldment of your moral potential; in contrast compare your natural moral state to that of a malignant psychopath serial killer.

My point is, whilst not as obvious as the oughtness program to breathe, in a similar way, all humans are embedded with an inherent program for the propensity towards morality-proper. This moral potential inherent in all humans is unfolding within humanity in a range of degrees of activation.

At this point I am saying there an inherent potential for morality within all humans that is similar to the inherent oughtness to breathe in all humans.
I have not provided the justifications of my thesis as yet, but if you researched deeply into the subject, you will get a clue that such an inherent program do exists within all humans.

Well, as it's your thesis, you're the one who should justify it. Since I don't believe that there is 'an inherent program for the propensity towards morality-proper', I'm not going to waste my time researching it. That's your job.

Personally I have done extensive research on that. Currently my Morality Folder in D:Drive has 1400 files in 81 Folders.
I am just providing the information and clues, it is your discretion to do what you like.

You state here that freedom is a basic human right, but you offer no argument or evidence to support your claim. I deny the claim. Since you are making a substantive claim, the burden of proof is on you. So prove it.

I'll restate, 'Freedom [liberty] is a basic human right'.
Philosophically this is SO obvious.
If you are in doubt, just take note.

The physical plus mental sufferings and pains are significant to slavery but is it secondary.

In general no normal humans would want to be enslaved by another in view of the inherent propensity for freedom and the avoidance of the associated physical and mental sufferings.
Those who feel good as being a slave to another are perverts.

'Perverts' is a hate word. I duly note that you are a misanthropist.

What??
Those who feel good about slavery and being enslaved [chattel slavery] definitely deserve the label 'perverts' if not, are deprave or debauch.

Out of 8 billion humans on Earth, how many do you think would feel good and happy to be enslaved and owned by another to the extent they can be sold as a property to another?
1000? that is only 0.0000125% or even 1,000,000 [which is unlikely] that is only 0.0125% and these small groups are really perverts in contrast to normal humans.

More hate speech. Apparently you hate minorities. Not an amiable characteristic.

What??
You seem to be 'engorged' saturated and consumed by the term 'hate' in your system. There is something wrong and irrational with you.
There is nothing wrong in rationally [btw, this is a philosophy forum] condemning the minority of perverts, like those who feel the need to be enslaved and owned by another human to the extent of promoting such acts.

Slavery is recognized by all normal people as evil.

If you mean intrinsically evil, then I don't recognise it as such. I suppose, in your view, that makes me abnormal. Thanks.

If you find slavery acceptable and promote it then, yes, you are abnormal and condoning evil.

You appear here to be saying that well-being and the preservation of the human species are both good. However, once again you offer no argument or evidence to support these views. Again, they are substantive claims, so the burden of proof is on you. Please supply the necessary proofs.

Yes, I have not provided substantive arguments to support my claims above and I don't intend to.
In such a forum like this which is limited, I can only provide information and clues not substantial 'proofs'.

For me, whenever someone introduce new information which are reasonable, I will exhaust the internet to find out what is about, the for and against in the issue, etc.

It appeared to you, but no, I am not asserting "well-being and the preservation of the human species are both good" but rather they are inherently part of human nature.

Btw, have you heard of 'blue balls;' [Q&A]. Why do you think this is happening to all normal man?

Question: I am 44 years old, married for the last 20 years. From the past few years I have been experiencing a problem. Whenever I don't have sex for 10 to 15 days at a stretch, my testicles swell up causing a lot of pain.
This pain becomes unbearable when it starts and I have to literally sit with my legs tight across for the pain to subside. This pain also radiates to my lower back and groin. After this, once I have sex a couple of times the pain vanishes. I wonder if this is normal and happens with all males. Thus, I am curious to know about this and the possible remedies for this. Should I consult a doctor for this? Sometimes circumstances always do not allow regular sex. In such times the above stated problem troubles/pains me a lot. Please advise.

Answer: The pain that you are classically experiencing after observing abstinence for 10-15 days is called as ‘Blue balls’.
Blue balls is a condition very commonly experienced by all normal men.
It is the involuntary vaso-congestion, characterized by pain, discomfort and aching of the genitals typically after sexual arousal.
Though uncomfortable, it is not a disease nor is it dangerous or harmful.
Blue balls results from the collection of blood, or vaso-congestion in the genitals during sexual arousal.
Blue balls occur when sexual arousal is not followed by ejaculation/orgasm because the pooled blood takes longer to leave the genitals when ejaculation does not occur.

The above [re biological perspective] is an indication of the natural biological 'ought to fuck' if not blue balls.
Why the biological ought to fuck?
So biologically humans can produce numerous offsprings and the next generation.
Why?
It is human nature to ensure the preservation of the species!

My thesis is, similarly to the above, there is the inherent biological 'ought to be moral' but there is no obvious direct consequences to the individual in the case of morality.

[Age]

Do you have any evidence that children are ever happy when they are being abused?

YES

I wish I hadn't asked. Please don't say any more, I find your answer extremely disturbing.

Here we have ANOTHER PRIME EXAMPLE of one who IS completely and utterly CLOSED, and thus it is an IMPOSSIBILITY for this one to LEARN MORE and to BECOME ANY WISER. So, multiple being this CLOSED, by the number of adults in a whole generation of living ones, and then this is NO wonder WHY those human beings, back when this was being written, were, LITERALLY, STUCK 'where' they WERE.

Those ones, literally, had NOT moved out of, thus nor evolved past, the APE-thinking stage of evolution, and thus WHY it took SO LONG for human beings to REACH and GET TO 'where' 'We' ARE, NOW.

This one has ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA NOR CLUE WHATSOEVER, and AT ALL, YET this one here HAS ALREADY MADE AN ASSUMPTION and PRESUMED that My answer here IS 'disturbing'. Which the ABUSE OF is OBVIOUS, well to 'Us' ANYWAY, and this response, in itself, IS completely and utterly DISTURBING. As it was this WAY of communicating that these adults ACTUALLY perpetrated NOT only among "themselves" but ON children AS WELL. Which is what is OBVIOUSLY the MOST Truly DISTURBING part of all of this here.

ALSO, here this one has PROVED thee IRREFUTABLE Truth of what I have been talking ABOUT and SAYING in regards to even if one does HAVE the ACTUAL IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE or Truth of some 'thing', while one is BELIEVING otherwise, then they are NOT OPEN AT ALL to what thee ACTUAL and IRREFUTABLE True, and/or EVIDENCE, in ANY WAY.

So, THANK YOU "cin" for PROVIDING 'Us' with absolutely IRREFUTABLE PROOF.

[Age]

Do you have any evidence that children are ever happy when they are being abused?

It is hugely unwise to go down the road of proposing ethical enhancements to child abuse such as laughing gas and better hand puppets to keep the little tykes amused while you do your business.

I entirely agree. All child abuse is evil. It does huge psychological damage to the child, and should be met with the full force of the law.

LOL
LOL
LOL

Talk about NOT being ABLE TO GET and MORE CLOSED than this one here, OBVIOUSLY, IS.

[Peter Holmes]

To repeat: non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

How is that non-scientific premises can lead to scientific conclusions?
It is possible because non-scientific premises, i.e. empirical premises are processed within a the specific Scientific Framework and System. [of scientific constitution, methodology, assumptions, etc.]

Similarly non-moral premises [e.g. scientific and empirical premises] when processed within a Moral Framework and System will enable moral conclusions.

Nope. Your invented 'moral framework and system' can't entail moral conclusions from non-moral - for example empirical or 'scientific' - premises.

Morality-proper, I repeat [said a 'Million' times] is primarily not about enforcing 'wrong' or 'right' conduct nor involving judgment, opinion, beliefs of individuals.

Your stricture against moral compulsion is, and has always been, irrelevant. And subjectivity boils down to dependence on belief, judgement or opinion rather than facts - full stop.

[Veritas Aequitas]

To repeat: non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

How is that non-scientific premises can lead to scientific conclusions?
It is possible because non-scientific premises, i.e. empirical premises are processed within a the specific Scientific Framework and System. [of scientific constitution, methodology, assumptions, etc.]

Similarly non-moral premises [e.g. scientific and empirical premises] when processed within a Moral Framework and System will enable moral conclusions.

Nope. Your invented 'moral framework and system' can't entail moral conclusions from non-moral - for example empirical or 'scientific' - premises.

In principle all facts are grounded to a specific Framework and System of Reality.
The best example is that of scientific facts from the Scientific Framework and System of Reality [FSR].
Therefore in PRINCIPLE there are moral facts from the Moral Framework and System of Reality.

You cannot deny the above principle.

The valid point is to make the moral FSR to as near credible to the scientific FSR.
I have not justified the moral FSR fully yet, but I have already clues over the many threads and posts I have raised.

Morality-proper, I repeat [said a 'Million' times] is primarily not about enforcing 'wrong' or 'right' conduct nor involving judgment, opinion, beliefs of individuals.

Your stricture against moral compulsion is, and has always been, irrelevant. And subjectivity boils down to dependence on belief, judgement or opinion rather than facts - full stop.

As I had stated your knowledge related to the above issue is VERY shallow, narrow and dogmatic.

As I have accused, your views are very archaic, i.e. limited to Hume's 'matter of fact' and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacies, which were once adopted by the Logical Positivists where whatever is claimed as 'moral' is dogmatically deemed meaningless [period!].

The philosophically community has now moved on from the above archaic thinking and the trend is towards evolutionary based objective morality as supported by the more advance knowledge from neurosciences, genetics, genomics, and the likes.

[Peter Holmes]

How is that non-scientific premises can lead to scientific conclusions?
It is possible because non-scientific premises, i.e. empirical premises are processed within a the specific Scientific Framework and System. [of scientific constitution, methodology, assumptions, etc.]

Similarly non-moral premises [e.g. scientific and empirical premises] when processed within a Moral Framework and System will enable moral conclusions.

Nope. Your invented 'moral framework and system' can't entail moral conclusions from non-moral - for example empirical or 'scientific' - premises.

In principle all facts are grounded to a specific Framework and System of Reality.
The best example is that of scientific facts from the Scientific Framework and System of Reality [FSR].
Therefore in PRINCIPLE there are moral facts from the Moral Framework and System of Reality.

Nope. How ever many times you repeat this fallacy, it remains a fallacy.

Yes: any factual assertion - any truth-claim - exists in a descriptive context. So there are physics facts, chemistry facts, history facts, and so on. But an assertion of any kind is factual - and therefore has a truth-value - only if it describes something that actually does, did or could exist in reality. So the discourse - the kind of description - doesn't create the fact. Reality - existence - comes first.

There's no such thing as a moral framework and system of reality, along the lines of a physics 'FSR'. Moral rightness and wrongness, or goodness and badness, or good and evil, don't exist in the way that the things that physics describes exist. Your morality FSK or FSR is a ridiculous fiction.

You cannot deny the above principle.

The valid point is to make the moral FSR to as near credible to the scientific FSR.
I have not justified the moral FSR fully yet, but I have already clues over the many threads and posts I have raised.

Morality-proper, I repeat [said a 'Million' times] is primarily not about enforcing 'wrong' or 'right' conduct nor involving judgment, opinion, beliefs of individuals.

Your stricture against moral compulsion is, and has always been, irrelevant. And subjectivity boils down to dependence on belief, judgement or opinion rather than facts - full stop.

As I had stated your knowledge related to the above issue is VERY shallow, narrow and dogmatic.

As I have accused, your views are very archaic, i.e. limited to Hume's 'matter of fact' and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacies, which were once adopted by the Logical Positivists where whatever is claimed as 'moral' is dogmatically deemed meaningless [period!].

And, as I've retorted, a 'million times', this is a straw-accusation, because I don't think non-physical assertions are meaningless. But, hey, never let the truth spoil a precious canard.

The philosophically community has now moved on from the above archaic thinking and the trend is towards evolutionary based objective morality as supported by the more advance knowledge from neurosciences, genetics, genomics, and the likes.

Rubbish. The argument against moral realism and objectivism remains as powerful and conclusive as it ever was - because non-moral premises - such as scientific ones - can't classically entail moral conclusions. They just can't.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Nope. Your invented 'moral framework and system' can't entail moral conclusions from non-moral - for example empirical or 'scientific' - premises.

In principle all facts are grounded to a specific Framework and System of Reality.
The best example is that of scientific facts from the Scientific Framework and System of Reality [FSR].
Therefore in PRINCIPLE there are moral facts from the Moral Framework and System of Reality.

Nope. How ever many times you repeat this fallacy, it remains a fallacy.

Yes: any factual assertion - any truth-claim - exists in a descriptive context. So there are physics facts, chemistry facts, history facts, and so on. But an assertion of any kind is factual - and therefore has a truth-value - only if it describes something that actually does, did or could exist in reality. So the discourse - the kind of description - doesn't create the fact. Reality - existence - comes first.

There's no such thing as a moral framework and system of reality, along the lines of a physics 'FSR'.
Moral rightness and wrongness, or goodness and badness, or good and evil, don't exist in the way that the things that physics describes exist. Your morality FSK or FSR is a ridiculous fiction.

Strawman as usual.

I have not defined Morality in terms of Moral rightness and wrongness.

I have defined morality as promoting good and avoiding evil.

The term 'morality' used at present is very loose and in many cases corrupted within various groups.
I define 'morality' [proper] as 'promoting good and avoiding evil' for the well being of the individual and humanity.
What is 'good' in this case means not-evil.
What is 'evil' is the net-negative impact on the well-being of the individual and humanity.
What is negative to the well-being is that which to the extreme form threatens the preservation of the human species and in lesser forms, the related physical & mental sufferings and freedom of the individual.
In this sense, slavery [especially chattel slavery] is a moral element which must be eliminated morally [in contrast to politically].
viewtopic.php?p=613603#p613603

What I am referring as objective moral facts are not the wrongness or rightness of human acts, but rather to the existence of physical elements [neurons] and the neural algorithms [programs] of the moral sense and potential within the human brain.

How can you deny these are not physical facts.
Since they are related to morality, they are moral facts.

You cannot deny the above principle.
The valid point is to make the moral FSR to as near credible to the scientific FSR.
I have not justified the moral FSR fully yet, but I have already clues over the many threads and posts I have raised.

Your stricture against moral compulsion is, and has always been, irrelevant. And subjectivity boils down to dependence on belief, judgement or opinion rather than facts - full stop.

Strawman again.
I have never related morality to any "moral compulsion."
Morality proper is as spontaneous as breathing.

As I had stated your knowledge related to the above issue is VERY shallow, narrow and dogmatic.

As I have accused, your views are very archaic, i.e. limited to Hume's 'matter of fact' and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacies, which were once adopted by the Logical Positivists where whatever is claimed as 'moral' is dogmatically deemed meaningless [period!].

And, as I've retorted, a 'million times', this is a straw-accusation, because I don't think non-physical assertions are meaningless. But, hey, never let the truth spoil a precious canard.

It is implied, whatever is deemed moral to you is meaningless in the sense that they are not factual and objective which the Logical Positivists were aggressively clinging onto then.

The philosophically community has now moved on from the above archaic thinking and the trend is towards evolutionary based objective morality as supported by the more advance knowledge from neurosciences, genetics, genomics, and the likes.

Rubbish. The argument against moral realism and objectivism remains as powerful and conclusive as it ever was - because non-moral premises - such as scientific ones - can't classically entail moral conclusions. They just can't.

As usual you are living in your tall thin silo of reality.

Whichever the latest references from the philosophical community insisting morality is not objective, they are dogmatically clinging to Hume's 'matter of fact' and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy.
I believe you have not exhausted the majority of the latest writings on the subject re Morality & Ethics to cover all the current views, thus your stance is dogmatic and intellectually bankrupt.

[Iwannaplato]

Strawman as usual.

I have not defined Morality in terms of Moral rightness and wrongness.

I have defined morality as promoting good and avoiding evil.

Sigh.
Let's help the poor little VA...

There's no such thing as a moral framework and system of reality, along the lines of a physics 'FSR'.
Moral rightness and wrongness, or goodness and badness, or good and evil, don't exist in the way that the things that physics describes exist.

My emphasis.
PH has taken pains to describe moralities in a way that covers a wide range of interpretations and LO....
VA says

I have defined morality as promoting good and avoiding evil.

and in his convenienty spotty vision only manages to quote and presumably even see from PH

I have not defined Morality in terms of Moral rightness and wrongness.

[Skepdick]

Yes: any factual assertion - any truth-claim - exists in a descriptive context. So there are physics facts, chemistry facts, history facts, and so on. But an assertion of any kind is factual - and therefore has a truth-value - only if it describes something that actually does, did or could exist in reality. So the discourse - the kind of description - doesn't create the fact. Reality - existence - comes first.

Idiot. There's reality and there's facts ABOUT reality. It's pretty obvious that facts are in the social sphere, because it can't be that both reality AND facts are "out there".

It is a fact about reality that Jeffrey Dahmer committed murder. Because murder (a wrongful killing!) exists in reality.

There's no such thing as a moral framework and system of reality, along the lines of a physics 'FSR'.

Of course there is! It's called a frame.

Without a frame for chemistry you wouldn't have the language to speak about "hydrogen" and "oxygen".
Without a frame for morality you wouldn't have the language to speak about Jeffrey Dahmer's acts as "murder".

Human create facts. Reality has no use for them.

[CIN]

1 Here are two assertions between which there's no logical contradiction:
There are no moral facts. Slavery is morally wrong.
I assume you understand why there's no contradiction.

Okay, I'll parody this argument of yours.
Here are two assertions between which there is no logical contradiction:
There are no physical facts. The earth is physically round.
I assume you now understand why your argument is crap.

Your parody demonstrates my point precisely. Since the shape of the earth is indeed a physical fact, the claim 'there are no physical facts' is false - and the two assertions are contradictory.

So we have two pairs of assertions, viz:
There are no moral facts. Slavery is morally wrong.
There are no physical facts. The earth is physically round.
You tell me that the shape of the earth is a physical fact, and therefore the claim 'there are no physical facts' is false. Since the form of the two pairs of statements is identical, why should I not say that the wrongness of slavery is a moral fact, and that therefore the claim 'there are no moral facts' is false? You haven't given a reason why this doesn't work, you merely posted the remark 'I assume you understand why there's no contradiction'; I don't agree that there is no contradiction, so if you think there is no contradiction, have the common politeness to explain why — I'm not a mind-reader.

2 If there are no moral facts, then a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value.
I assume you understand the function of a hypothetical premise.

You haven't yet shown that there are no moral facts, so the antecedent of your hypothetical premise has not been satisfied.

So my assumption was incorrect: you don't understand the function of a hypothetical premise. The premise 'If X is the case, then Y is the case' doesn't assume that X is the case. That's the whole point. It merely asserts a hypothesis: if...then... And I think my hypothesis is correct. If you disagree, by all means explain why you think it's incorrect: why the subsequent doesn't follow from the antecedent.

Of course I understand the function of a hypothetical premise. I wasn't challenging the correctness of your hypothetical, I was simply pointing out that because you haven't yet shown that there are no moral facts, the antecedent has not been satisfied, and therefore the hypothetical does not serve to advance the discussion.

4 The analogy between aesthetic and moral assertions is precise. Both express value-judgements with no factual truth-value. Since beauty and ugliness are not independent properties, neither are moral rightness and wrongness.

You have provided no support for your assertion 'Both express value-judgements with no factual truth-value', so this reply gets you precisely nowhere.

Not so. I've been consistently supporting my assertion for ages through this interminable discussion.

Where? Copy and paste an example here, or link to where you provided such support.

The trouble with your posts, Peter, is that, on analysis, they always turn out to ASSUME that subjectivism is true. If you merely stated that you were unaware of any moral facts, that statement would be unexceptionable; but you go much further, and make the substantive claim that there are NO moral facts. You can't expect anyone to accept this claim if you don't provide reasonable grounds for believing that it is true, and you're just not doing this. Also, it would be unexceptionable for you, as a supposed subjectivist, to say something like 'I strongly disapprove of slavery'; that would be okay, because it would be merely a statement about you, and not about slavery (though of course, for that reason, it would be of no real interest to anyone else in a forum like this). But you muddy the waters by saying things like 'I think slavery is wrong', which, in a forum like this where people must be assumed to understand the implications of the words they use, can only reasonably be taken as a statement that you think this is a fact.

I agree that there are two parts to my argument - but they're intimately connected. I, and other skeptics, ask for evidence for the existence of even one moral fact: one supposed moral feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. Rational response comes there none. Nothing but question-begging and/or equivocatory rubbish.

The question-begging is entirely on your side. See my next comment.

And I argue that the reason for this moral realist/objectivist failure is the absurdity of the claim that there even could be a moral fact; that the very expression 'moral fact' is incoherent; that it represents an extraordinary category error; that such a thing doesn't exist because it can't exist.

But that's the whole problem, Peter; you DON'T argue in favour of these assertions. This paragraph is typical of your lazy approach to the subject; here you state or imply the following claims:
- that the claim that there could be a moral fact is absurd
- that the expression 'moral fact' is incoherent
- that the expression 'moral fact' represents a category error
- that a moral fact can't exist.
Four substantive claims, and not a single argument in support of any of them!

Moral realists/objectivists claim that it's a fact that, say, abortion is/is not morally wrong. That it must be one or the other, so that the assertion 'abortion is morally wrong' is true or false. And I'm saying that's a ridiculous idea.

Ridicule is not an argument.

By all means, have a go at demolishing my argument at a stroke, by producing one moral fact and showing that it is indeed a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. That's all it would take. Put your money where your mouth is. Over to you.

Well, you don't deserve it after all your posturing and evasions, but I recognise (as you do not, in your own case) that a substantive claim requires support from argument and/or evidence, so I will offer you what, in my view, are two moral facts. Whether they are indeed moral facts depends on two things: the correctness of my theory as to the meanings of the words 'good' and 'bad', and the correctness of my interpretation of some empirical evidence, namely the behaviour of non-human animals. You are of course at liberty to challenge either or both of these. It would be nice if, before doing so, you would at long last post a substantive argument to back up your claim that there are no moral facts. Were you to do so, this debate would become far more interesting, because instead of merely an exchange of opinions, we would then be forced to weigh the respective merits of two opposing substantive arguments; but I know you too well by now to hope that you have any such arguments in support of subjectivism available to post.

Anyway, here you are. Two moral facts, and a supporting argument.

MORAL FACTS
F1) Any action that causes pleasure is, to that extent, a good action.
F2) Any action that causes pain is, to that extent, a bad action.

PREAMBLE
A central concern of ethics is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' actually mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad.

THE ARGUMENT
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is my version of fitting attitude theory. Cf the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pleasure itself. I have identified this property as 'merits a pro-response', and I suggest that, since pleasure seems to be an end that is pursued for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pleasure has this property intrinsically.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting into fights with larger animals and getting hurt, and avoidance is an anti-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pain itself. I have identified this property as 'merits an anti-response', and I suggest that, since pain seems to be an end that is avoided for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pain has this property intrinsically.

4) It follows from 1 and 2 that pleasure is intrinsically good.

5) It follows from 1 and 3 that pain is intrinsically bad.

6) Since pleasure is intrinsically good, any action which produces pleasure must to that extent be (instrumentally) good.

7) Since pain is intrinsically bad, any action which produces pain must to that extent be (instrumentally) bad.

QED

Note re assumption 1):
You can, of course, argue against my theory as to the meaning of 'good' and 'bad'; the argument is only sound if this theory (or something very like it) is correct. But 'good' and 'bad' must mean SOMETHING. If you don't like my theory as to their meaning, try to stir yourself from your usual philosophical indolence, and produce one of your own. (I would appreciate it if, for starters, you would state which kind of subjectivist you are: non-cognitivist? error theorist?)

[Peter Holmes]

CIN

My apologies for messing up my response to your previous post - things became horribly tangled. I hope to address your points properly very soon.

[Peter Holmes]

Hi, CIN.

Thanks for your detailed and thoughtful comments. For now, I just want to address your proposal for two moral facts, because it's the heart of the matter.

Anyway, here you are. Two moral facts, and a supporting argument.

MORAL FACTS
F1) Any action that causes pleasure is, to that extent, a good action.
F2) Any action that causes pain is, to that extent, a bad action.

PREAMBLE
A central concern of ethics is the question: what is good (or bad)? To answer this question, we first need to work out what the words 'good' and 'bad' actually mean, otherwise we don't know what the question itself means. Once we've worked out what 'good' and 'bad' mean, we can then ask if there are any things that are actually good and bad.

1 Signs such as words - such as 'good' and 'bad' - can mean only what we use them to mean. So, to ask if there are any things that actually are good and bad can only only mean to ask how we actually use the words 'good' and 'bad'. To claim anything else is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are.

2 We use some important words - good, bad, right, wrong, should and ought to - morally and non-morally. For example 'the right answer' and 'a good move' need have no moral meaning whatsoever. So it's important not to equivocate, which we can easily do, when using these words. (I believe your argument depends on equivocation with the words 'good' and 'bad'.)

THE ARGUMENT
1) 'Good' and 'bad' mean, respectively, 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response'.
(This is my version of fitting attitude theory. Cf the following passage: 'Thus A. C. Ewing (1948) writes: “if we analyse good as ‘fitting object of a pro attitude’, it will be easy enough to analyse bad as ‘fitting object of an anti attitude’, this term covering dislike, disapproval, avoidance, etc.”' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitt ... -theories/)

Talk about 'analysis' of terms usually demonstrates the reificatory delusion that has plagued philosophy for millennia: abstract nouns are names of things that can be described or 'analysed'. This has been called 'conceptual analysis', as though calling something a concept explains anything. It's always been obfuscatory nonsense.

So we're back to the use of words. And you suggest 'merits a pro-/anti- response' as synonyms or meanings or explanations for 'good' and 'bad'. Okay - but the expressions 'merits a pro-response' and 'merits an anti-response' have no moral entailment. There's no mention of moral rightness and wrongness. And, obviously, the claim that anything 'merits' or deserves any kind of response is a matter of opinion, and therefore subjective.

2) Pleasure intrinsically merits a pro-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to seek out experiences that give them pleasure, e.g. eating and sex, and seeking out is a pro-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pleasure itself. I have identified this property as 'merits a pro-response', and I suggest that, since pleasure seems to be an end that is pursued for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pleasure has this property intrinsically.

3) Pain intrinsically merits an anti-response. There is strong empirical evidence for this. Non-human animals tend to avoid experiences that give them pain, e.g. getting into fights with larger animals and getting hurt, and avoidance is an anti-response. This behaviour can hardly be due to evaluative opinions held by non-human animals; it can only be due to a property of pain itself. I have identified this property as 'merits an anti-response', and I suggest that, since pain seems to be an end that is avoided for its own sake and not as a means to some other end, pain has this property intrinsically.

Obviously, the fact that non-human animals seek pleasure and avoid pain has no moral entailment. No non-moral (for example, factual) premise entails a moral conclusion.

4) It follows from 1 and 2 that pleasure is intrinsically good.

5) It follows from 1 and 3 that pain is intrinsically bad.

The modifier 'intrinsically' does nothing to clarify the use of the words 'good' and 'bad'. A 'good' - as in 'goods and services' - has no moral significance. It's just something some people want. It may not be morally good for people to have some goods, even if they want them - even if they elicit a pro-response.

6) Since pleasure is intrinsically good, any action which produces pleasure must to that extent be (instrumentally) good.

7) Since pain is intrinsically bad, any action which produces pain must to that extent be (instrumentally) bad.

The introduction of instrumentality here is revealing, because it's definitely morally neutral. It refers to something being fit-for-purpose or goal-consistent. And in this context, 'goodness' and 'badness' have no moral significance, and to claim they do is equivocatory.

QED

Okay, but you haven't demonstrated anything about morality - and certainly not the existence of moral facts.

Note re assumption 1):
You can, of course, argue against my theory as to the meaning of 'good' and 'bad'; the argument is only sound if this theory (or something very like it) is correct.

Your argument's validity and soundness aren't the issue. The problem is that its conclusion isn't a moral assertion, so it doesn't demonstrate the existence of a moral fact - were such a thing to exist.

But 'good' and 'bad' must mean SOMETHING. If you don't like my theory as to their meaning, try to stir yourself from your usual philosophical indolence, and produce one of your own. (I would appreciate it if, for starters, you would state which kind of subjectivist you are: non-cognitivist? error theorist?)

My aim is to demolish the arguments for moral realism and objectivism - for the existence of moral facts - because I think those positions are morally pernicious. But I dislike the baggage that comes with labels such as 'non-cognitivism' and 'anti-realism'. Perhaps I'm a moral anti-objectivist. Don't care. It's the arguments that count, not the pigeon-holes.

[Skepdick]

You and I can both play tennis. But just because you play, it doesn't mean you are as good at tennis as I am.

Tennis is a zero-sum game. If I ever engage in a zero-sum game it's only because I am sure I can't lose.