moral relativism

[promethean75]

"Only unicorns have two tails.
This horse-creature has two tails.
This is a unicorn"

this is the most brilliant thing I've heard u say, IC, becuz it's a comprehensive demonstration of a rule that permits philosophy to happen at all... as so much nonsense that it is. the fact that statements can masquerade as meaningful if only they are formally valid. and it's so wonderfully ironic that u, sir, the resident Christian theologist, would be just such the person in demonstratio (yes i left the n off on purpose dude i speak latin becuz that's the language of renaissance intellectuals of which i am one. I would give you a lesson on Dwaynehowsenburgs three discourses on the corpus res desiderata of Italian futurist cubism as defined by Deleuze and Guitari if i were so inclined).

[Peter Holmes]

Here's a definition of 'premise': a previous statement or proposition from which another is inferred or follows as a conclusion.

Notice, there's no requirement that a premise be true, or even have a truth-value at all. A premise is just a declarative sentence - an assertion with the general form: X is/was the case. So there can be moral premises from which moral conclusions follow.

That's only speaking of the logical form of an argument, Peter. And you are quite right about that. We call an argument with the correct form, "formally valid." But you're also right: we don't necessarily call it "true." There are false arguments that are formally valid.

As you also rightly say, an argument that is both valid and truthful is called "sound." And only sound arguments have implications for the real world. Merely "valid" arguments that are false have none: they're merely formally elegant but devoid of truth value. And false arguments, of course, have no binding implications for the real world because they get the facts wrong.

But then your conclusion, after all this, has to be not that there are merely moral premises that can form part of a valid (but false) argument (which is a trivial thing to say, since ANY subject matter can form a premise in a formally valid argument that's false), but rather that there are simply no true premises that can depend on moral premises. For all moral premises are false.

That means we don't need to do any moral thinking at all, and any attempt to invoke a moral claim is simply an attempt to deceive, through the specious generating of formally-valid-but-factually-false arguments.

Is that how you think it is?

And that's why disagreement about important moral issues is rational.

Non-sequitur. That does not follow.

If all arguments about morality are factually false, then the arguments you generate about them become formal-logical, but not rational tio generate (i.e. valid, but not sound, and not relevant to the real world). Replace the word "morals" with the word "unicorns," and you'll get exactly the same thing: arguments that are perhaps formally valid, but entail nothing in the real world.

Only unicorns have two tails.
This horse-creature has two tails.
This is a unicorn.

Formally valid, factually false. There are no unicorns. They don't have any tails at all, let alone two. They are mythical only.

Again, I have to ask: is this what morality is to you?

But if it is, what is the value of making any moral premise? None can be true, so there can no longer be any rational moral arguments. They turn out to be as stupid as arguing about how many tails unicorns have. They're arguments about nothing: and no matter how formally elegant, they add up to nothing legit.

You make two mistakes.

1 Arguments aren't true or false - in this context, only declaratives can have truth-value: assertions/statements/claims/propositions. In other words, premises and conclusions can have truth-value, but not the arguments they compose.

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent. So you're misrepresenting the non-cognitivist or anti-realist position.

I put it this way: Assertions are factual or non-factual, depending on their function. Factual assertions claim something about reality that may or may not be the case, independent from opinion - so they have truth-value. Non-factual assertions, instead, express value-judgements, and have no truth-value. Moral and aesthetic assertions are non-factual.

For example, it can't be a fact that [capital punishment] is or isn't morally wrong - that the assertion 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is true or false. All that that moral assertion can ever do is express a judgement, belief or opinion about capital punishment. (And an opinion held by everyone is still and opinion.)

And this is why the 'this-is-how-we-use-these-words' argument for moral (or aesthetic) objectivity is useless - though I know you have no truck with that argument anyway.

[Skepdick]

You make two mistakes.

1 Arguments aren't true or false - in this context, only declaratives can have truth-value: assertions/statements/claims/propositions. In other words, premises and conclusions can have truth-value, but not the arguments they compose.

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent. So you're misrepresenting the non-cognitivist or anti-realist position.

I put it this way: Assertions are factual or non-factual, depending on their function. Factual assertions claim something about reality that may or may not be the case, independent from opinion - so they have truth-value. Non-factual assertions, instead, express value-judgements, and have no truth-value. Moral and aesthetic assertions are non-factual.

That's horseshit...

In all logic a judgment (or assertion) is a statement or enunciation in a metalanguage. The paragon example is the judgment is that a premise is true; or that an argument is valid/sound; or (refexively) that the value-judgment itself is correct.

All of those are meta-linguistic value-judgments. Including the assertion that this color is red; an the assertion that the previous assertin is factual.

[Belinda]

You make two mistakes.

1 Arguments aren't true or false - in this context, only declaratives can have truth-value: assertions/statements/claims/propositions. In other words, premises and conclusions can have truth-value, but not the arguments they compose.

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent. So you're misrepresenting the non-cognitivist or anti-realist position.

I put it this way: Assertions are factual or non-factual, depending on their function. Factual assertions claim something about reality that may or may not be the case, independent from opinion - so they have truth-value. Non-factual assertions, instead, express value-judgements, and have no truth-value. Moral and aesthetic assertions are non-factual.

That's horseshit...

In all logic a judgment (or assertion) is a statement or enunciation in a metalanguage. The paragon example is the judgment is that a premise is true; or that an argument is valid/sound; or (refexively) that the value-judgment itself is correct.

All of those are meta-linguistic value-judgments. Including the assertion that this color is red; an the assertion that the previous assertin is factual.

I was taught (as Skepdick explains) that an argument is not true or false but is valid or invalid. Premisses on the other hand are true or false.

However I think Peter is talking about inductive, not formal, deductive logic
despite that Peter's terminology suggests deductive logic.

[Skepdick]

I was taught (as Skepdick explains) that an argument is not true or false but is valid or invalid. Premisses on the other hand are true or false.

However I think Peter is talking about inductive, not formal, deductive logic
despite that Peter's terminology suggests deductive logic.

Irrespective of the logic/proof method - asserting truth-value is a judgment in the meta-language.

To say this color is red is to judge the redness of the thing as true.
To say this color is blue is to judge the blueness of the thing as true.

You could assert/judge that I am misrepresenting this color as "blue", because you represent it as "red".

Of course, I could lay the inverse accusation at you.

I could judge/assert that you are misrepresenting this color as "red", because I represent it as "blue".

Judgments everywhere, about everything! Language wouldn't work without judgment.

[Immanuel Can]

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent.

Well, I asked you two questions...or rather, really the same question emphatically, and twice. And I don't see an answer.

But I'll rephrase that question, so as to reflect the claim above and circumnavigate the diversion.

Do you believe that moral language predicates claims that have no truth value?

[Peter Holmes]

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent.

Well, I asked you two questions...or rather, really the same question emphatically, and twice. And I don't see an answer.

But I'll rephrase that question, so as to reflect the claim above and circumnavigate the diversion.

Do you believe that moral language predicates claims that have no truth value?

You asked if I think 'all moral premises are false'. And I pointed out that, if an assertion has no truth-value, then it can be neither true nor false.

I also pointed out that the claim 'all arguments about morality are factually false' is incoherent, because arguments don't have truth-value in the first place. So, of course, I don't believe that all arguments about morality are factually false.

As you know, validity refers to the structure of the argument, and soundness refers to the truth-value of premises and conclusions. So if premises and conclusions have no truth-value, soundness is not relevant.

Language doesn't 'predicate' anything, so your question is non-sensical. Perhaps what you mean is: can a moral assertion have truth-value? And my answer is - obviously - no. It can only ever express a value-judgement, which is a matter of opinion, even if everyone holds that opinion.

[Immanuel Can]

2 If an assertion has no truth-value, then to say it's false is incoherent.

Well, I asked you two questions...or rather, really the same question emphatically, and twice. And I don't see an answer.

But I'll rephrase that question, so as to reflect the claim above and circumnavigate the diversion.

Do you believe that moral language predicates claims that have no truth value?

You asked if I think 'all moral premises are false'. And I pointed out that, if an assertion has no truth-value, then it can be neither true nor false.

Yes, yes...I know all that.

It's assumptive on your part: you assume that (even accurate) moral statements do not articulate objective realities. I believe otherwise. But it really matters not at all, though, for the present question. And here's why.

To say that a moral evaluation is "not false" technically, but refers to no objective quality present in reality is to say it's something just as bad. It is to mean that moral assessments, at best, are an utter fabrication total irrelevancy to reality, a complete delusion, a local social construct, and in total, illegitimate. Such exist, but only as errors, as impositions, as unrealistic ways of characterizing the situation.

What I want to know, and what I'm asking you directly, is if you see ANY legitimate application for moral claims. Any at all. And if you do, I want to know on what basis you attribute that legitimacy.

Let's address that next, please.

[Peter Holmes]

Well, I asked you two questions...or rather, really the same question emphatically, and twice. And I don't see an answer.

But I'll rephrase that question, so as to reflect the claim above and circumnavigate the diversion.

Do you believe that moral language predicates claims that have no truth value?

You asked if I think 'all moral premises are false'. And I pointed out that, if an assertion has no truth-value, then it can be neither true nor false.

Yes, yes...I know all that.

It's assumptive on your part: you assume that (even accurate) moral statements do not articulate objective realities. I believe otherwise. But it really matters not at all, though, for the present question.

On the contrary - this issue is all that matters. And poncing it up with 'articulate objective realities' doesn't help.

The question is: do moral assertions describe actually existing features of reality? And, pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, actually existing means existing physically.

To put it another way. Is moral wrongness an actually existing property of, say, abortion, such that to say abortion is morally wrong is to make a falsifiable claim whose truth-value is independent from opinion? I think it patently obvious that this moral realist/objectivist claim is ridiculous.

And here's why.

To say that a moral evaluation is "not false" technically, but refers to no objective quality present in reality is to say it's something just as bad. It is to mean that moral assessments, at best, are an utter fabrication total irrelevancy to reality, a complete delusion, a local social construct, and in total, illegitimate. Such exist, but only as errors, as impositions, as unrealistic ways of characterizing the situation.

What extraordinary nonsense. If I say Bach's music is sublimely beautiful, is that an utter fabrication with no relevance to reality, a complete delusion, a local social construct, illegitimate, an error, an imposition, an unrealistic way of characterising the situation? And would another's assertion that his music is tedious, footling rubbish have any better or worse status? And by what criterion?

If I yum marmalade as delicious, and loathe peanut butter as disgusting, are those not judgements about reality, just because deliciousness and disgustingness aren't independently existing properties of these edibles?

What I want to know, and what I'm asking you directly, is if you see ANY legitimate application for moral claims. Any at all. And if you do, I want to know on what basis you attribute that legitimacy.

Let's address that next, please.

Legitimacy isn't an independently existing quality, attribute or property. It's always contextual, and contingent upon other criteria whose 'legitimacy' is also contingent, and so on. So your demand for 'moral legitimacy' is flapping in the wind until you tie it down.

Seems to me, what we're asking is this: what makes something morally right or wrong? And: if there is such a thing, does it exist independently from belief, judgement or opinion? In other words: are moral rightness and wrongness real things about which true and false assertions can therefore be made?

Have a go at answering those questions.

[Skepdick]

The question is: do moral assertions describe actually existing features of reality?

What a stupid question! What else could they describe?

And, pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, actually existing means existing physically.

Special pleading.

Existing means existing! Physical existents are a subset of all existents, so it's obvious to any non-idiot (but not to you) that things such as non-physical existents actually exist too! It's in the word "exist". All things that exist, exist and they exist physcally; or otherwise!

If you want to argue that non-physical existents (such as your thoughts, beliefs; and ideas!) don't exist; then by all means - take up the burden and share your non-existing thoughts, beliefs and ideas with us.

[Belinda]

I was taught (as Skepdick explains) that an argument is not true or false but is valid or invalid. Premisses on the other hand are true or false.

However I think Peter is talking about inductive, not formal, deductive logic
despite that Peter's terminology suggests deductive logic.

Irrespective of the logic/proof method - asserting truth-value is a judgment in the meta-language.

To say this color is red is to judge the redness of the thing as true.
To say this color is blue is to judge the blueness of the thing as true.

You could assert/judge that I am misrepresenting this color as "blue", because you represent it as "red".

Of course, I could lay the inverse accusation at you.

I could judge/assert that you are misrepresenting this color as "red", because I represent it as "blue".

Judgments everywhere, about everything! Language wouldn't work without judgment.

"

this colour is my favourite purplish blue

and

this colour stands for a united Ireland

are true claims "are not metalanguage.For the sentence to be metalanguage I'd have to add "and these are both simple sentences composed of subject and predicate with no subordinate clauses".

[Skepdick]

are true claims "are not metalanguage.For the sentence to be metalanguage I'd have to add "and these are both simple sentences composed of subject and predicate with no subordinate clauses".

That's not what I am saying.

All claims are claims. That's what they are.

This claim claims that this color is red.
This claim claims that this color is blue.
This claim claims that this colour is my favourite purplish blue.
This claim claims that this colour stands for a united Ireland.

Asserting which of the above claims is a "true" claim is an assertion coming from some metalanguage.

[Iwannaplato]

are true claims "are not metalanguage.For the sentence to be metalanguage I'd have to add "and these are both simple sentences composed of subject and predicate with no subordinate clauses".

That's not what I am saying.

All claims are claims. That's what they are.

This claim claims that this color is red.
This claim claims that this color is blue.
This claim claims that this colour is my favourite purplish blue.
This claim claims that this colour stands for a united Ireland.

Asserting which of the above claims is a "true" claim is an assertion coming from some metalanguage.

Why not work with examples less dependant on qualia.

Like say the difference between....
Many people make claims.
and
Blue is the best color.
or
Blue is morally better than red.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's an argument.

1 An existent is a thing that exists. (The clue's in the name.)
2 Therefore, a non-physical existent exists - non-physically. (Der!)

Genius.

[Skepdick]

Here's an argument.

1 An existent is a thing that exists. (The clue's in the name.)
2 Therefore, a non-physical existent exists - non-physically. (Der!)

Genius.

Yesterday you agreed with deductive reasoning - today you don't. Make up your mind.

It sure sounds like you've accepted the burden of proving that non-physical existents don't exist.

Genius indeed.