moral relativism

[Immanuel Can]

Now, that's entertainment!!!

No answer, I see.

What are you afraid of, Biggie? Have you started to realize that all your own most cherished certainties are, like all empirical facts, at best only probabilities? And are you afraid to face it?

You shouldn't be...but I wouldn't be surprised if you are.

I'll get around to it.

No you won't. I know your style. You'll drift away with some excuse, then come raging back with "the Pope" again. I'm counting the minutes.

[FlashDangerpants]

Why on Earth would it matter if the premises are arranged with the is or the ought one first?

That's easy.

Because the "is" refers to a fact, and as such, is universally available. The "ought" is the contentious part: it's whatever value judgment a person is trying to deduce from the fact.

The "is" is the foundation, and is agreed-upon. The "ought" is the conclusion, and remains contentious.

That's Hume's point.

Am I now required to explain the basics of propositional logic?

• Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

• Our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

Those are the same fallacious argument whichever order you sort the premises.

And what monstrous insane foolishness makes you think that there is nothing contentious in the statement "There IS moral fact"?
Is statements are contentious on exactly the same basis as ought ones.

[Peter Holmes]

Perhaps not.

To repeat:

Even if true, non-moral premises can't entail a moral conclusion, such as: abortion is morally wrong.

I've heard your arguments, Peter. And if you believe them, you either have to become a complete amoralist or moral nihilist, or any appeal at all to moral standards coming from you will be rationally-inconsistent. I doubt you're personally amoral, so I must take you for somebody inconsistent.

We might add that the old line, which others, if not you often float, to the effect that they are "sociological phenomena" puts moral phenomena merely on par with all other such accidents of history; it fails to justify any moral assessment made therefrom.

For instance, it cannot be deduced from the fact that one person prefers no murder that I should prefer no murder. It cannnot be deduced from the agreement of two or three that I am obligated, either. So it cannot be deduced from a thousand, a million, or all the people currently on the face of the planet that I have moral obligations. All that can be concluded is that the most powerful persons or groups gets to force the others to do actions they prefer...but all are equally amoral.

Yet I have never met a single person who is able to live as if that's the truth. If you're an actually-consistent amoralist, you're the very first.

And all this dodges the question that the existence of any moral intuitions should compel us to ask: namely, if morality is all bunk, how has it come about that people have evolved an overwhelmingly strong belief that they are not? They may not agree on particular precepts, but it's a universal intuition that morality of some sort exists and is compulsory. How do we account for such a thing even existing, if we presuppose the world is nothing more than an accidental collocation of atoms propelled by some accidental original "bang" or "singularity"? What force, law or set of circumstances has created a universal belief in that which the amoralist has to believe is entirely a delusion?

The moralist may not be able to show the grounds of his moral precepts once the cynic cuts him off from appeals to God, to history, to human nature, to moral intuitions, to sociology, and so on. But that doesn't make the moralist wrong.

It just means the cynic is demanding the wrong type of evidence. He's looking for something strictly empirical, something deducible from facts-presumed-tio-be-accidental-themselves. In other words, his epistemic standard is incoherent. His demand that morality should have material grounds is no more sensible than the demand that physics should have music, or rocks should have minds. He's just looking in the wrong place, and saying, "I don't see anything."

Non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions.

This is true. But the presumption of the cynic is that reality is composed of non-moral premises. He thinks creation "means" nothing; so not surprisingly, he simply obdurately refuses any arguments that are premised differently...such as that the creation IS a creation.

But he doesn't win much that way, because people don't have to start with his gratuitious premise. Most of us find it really compelling to think that there is meaning in things, and morals too; and that these things are not just inexplicably evolutionary patterns that "pop up" randomly in a mind severed from its evolutionary past.

Now, you don't find that. For you, Hume's argument is a complete closer. But Hume assumed there was no God, so there could be no meaning to natural facts. The only meaning, he thought, had to be an expression of the emotions of the speaker (he never even went so far as to explain why an evolved chimp would need moral emotions, nor did it seem to occur to him that emotions don't require any agreement from anybody else, and can't convey moral duty anymore than facts-detached-from-all-values can.

But if Christians are right, then abortion is wrong when nobody wants to say it is, even if the preponderance of a particular society were to say it's fine, or even if ever last human being in the world thought killing children was just jolly. It is wrong because God made parents to care for their children, and children to be cared for by their parents. That's in their design, empirically and actually. And the butchery of infants is not, under any circumstances, a neutral act. It is always a stark violation, a blasphemy, one might say, the wanton destruction of a creature made in the image of God Himself.

You agree that non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions. And that demolishes moral objectivism. The end. This isn't cynicism. It's just how deductive logic works. And the existence, nature and actions of a god or any other agent are utterly irrelevant in this context.

In exactly the same way, non-aesthetic premises can't produce aesthetic conclusions. But that doesn't mean aesthetics is bunk - that talk about beauty and ugliness is meaningless or pointless.

[Skepdick]

You agree that non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions. And that demolishes moral objectivism. The end. This isn't cynicism. It's just how deductive logic works. And the existence, nature and actions of a god or any other agent are utterly irrelevant in this context.

What the fuck? That is such a contrived view of how logic works; or what deduction is good for.

Surely it follows then that non-factual premises can't produce factual concludions?
So please demonstrate what factual premises allows you to deduce that this color is red?

Attempting to frame objectivity in terms of logic is utterly idiotic.

[Immanuel Can]

Why on Earth would it matter if the premises are arranged with the is or the ought one first?

That's easy.

Because the "is" refers to a fact, and as such, is universally available. The "ought" is the contentious part: it's whatever value judgment a person is trying to deduce from the fact.

The "is" is the foundation, and is agreed-upon. The "ought" is the conclusion, and remains contentious.

That's Hume's point.

Am I now required to explain the basics of propositional logic?

What's below ain't it...so I guess you can't.

• Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

Whose premise is this? It's certainly not mine. If it's yours, you've got a problem.

• Our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

Or this? Who said this? Certainly not me.

Those are the same fallacious argument whichever order you sort the premises.

So whose argument are they? Not mine.

You're not very good at this propositional logic stuff, I guess...but you're even worse at repeating what people actually say.

And what monstrous insane foolishness makes you think that there is nothing contentious in the statement "There IS moral fact"?

Who said this?

Is statements are contentious on exactly the same basis as ought ones.

Hume didn't think so. He believed we all have access to the same empirical facts. All we debate are the values.

But maybe you just don't agree with Hume.

[FlashDangerpants]

That's easy.

Because the "is" refers to a fact, and as such, is universally available. The "ought" is the contentious part: it's whatever value judgment a person is trying to deduce from the fact.

The "is" is the foundation, and is agreed-upon. The "ought" is the conclusion, and remains contentious.

That's Hume's point.

Am I now required to explain the basics of propositional logic?

What's below ain't it...so I guess you can't.

• Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

Whose premise is this? It's certainly not mine. If it's yours, you've got a problem.

• Our moral propositions ought not to be erroneous; Without moral Truth all moral propositions are effectively erroneous; therefore there is moral fact

Or this? Who said this? Certainly not me.

Those are the same fallacious argument whichever order you sort the premises.

So whose argument are they? Not mine.

You're not very good at this propositional logic stuff, I guess...but you're even worse at repeating what people actually say.

I was giving you an example of how an argument can fgallaciously move from ought to is.
That was a challenge you set for me only today, your memory should not be exhausted by this.
Remember you were saying something about it only working is-to-ought?

I gave you that one with the premises in two different orders in reply to your objection to my prevous post.

Are you senile?

And what monstrous insane foolishness makes you think that there is nothing contentious in the statement "There IS moral fact"?

Who said this?

Is statements are contentious on exactly the same basis as ought ones.

Hume didn't think so. He believed we all have access to the same empirical facts. All we debate are the values.

But maybe you just don't agree with Hume.

Yeah, you aren't making any sense there.
There are lots of is questions that are clearly under debate.

[Immanuel Can]

You agree that non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions.

If such things as amoral premises existed, that would be true.

But it's false.

All of life is embedded in the moral, which is a transcendent property, not immanent feature. You're starting with the wrong assumption, and a wrong assumption, even if followed by unimpeachable logic, terminates in an errant or invalid conclusion. That's where you're at.

And that demolishes moral objectivism. The end.

It would, if you were right. But you're not. Your first premise is where the fault is.

Take murder, as an example.

If "Peter has murdered Tom" is a non-moral premise, then we can't produce the conclusion, "Peter should go to jail." And it can be viewed that way: Tom is dead, Peter is the proximate cause, therefore Peter has murdered Tom.

But in point of fact, willfully terminating the life of another person is not an amoral action. It's murder. And murder has moral entailments. So we can well say, "Peter has murdered Tom, Murderers deserve jail, therefore Peter should be in jail." And the moral assessment comes bundled with the empirical facts.

So the difference between me and you is simply this: you believe you're living in an amoral world. Thus (not surprisingly) all moral assessments seem gratuitous to you. I believe we are living in a world infused with moral characteristics and purposes, those of God: naturally, I conclude that the facts have moral entailments.

Nobody's being illogical. We're just presupposing different things.

The next problem for you, though, is to wonder how moral assessments ever managed to appear or become a thing in a world which, you have to believe, is inherently completely devoid of morals.

[Peter Holmes]

You agree that non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions.

If such things as amoral premises existed, that would be true.

But it's false.

All of life is embedded in the moral, which is a transcendent property, not immanent feature. You're starting with the wrong assumption, and a wrong assumption, even if followed by unimpeachable logic, terminates in an errant or invalid conclusion. That's where you're at.

And that demolishes moral objectivism. The end.

It would, if you were right. But you're not. Your first premise is where the fault is.

Take murder, as an example.

If "Peter has murdered Tom" is a non-moral premise, then we can't produce the conclusion, "Peter should go to jail." And it can be viewed that way: Tom is dead, Peter is the proximate cause, therefore Peter has murdered Tom.

But in point of fact, willfully terminating the life of another person is not an amoral action. It's murder. And murder has moral entailments. So we can well say, "Peter has murdered Tom, Murderers deserve jail, therefore Peter should be in jail." And the moral assessment comes bundled with the empirical facts.

So the difference between me and you is simply this: you believe you're living in an amoral world. Thus (not surprisingly) all moral assessments seem gratuitous to you. I believe we are living in a world infused with moral characteristics and purposes, those of God: naturally, I conclude that the facts have moral entailments.

Nobody's being illogical. We're just presupposing different things.

The next problem for you, though, is to wonder how moral assessments ever managed to appear or become a thing in a world which, you have to believe, is inherently completely devoid of morals.

To clarify. A moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong / good or bad, or that we should or shouldn't do something because it's morally right or wrong, and so on.

So your analysis in incorrect. 'Peter has murdered Tom' isn't a moral assertion, so it can't be a moral premise. Murder is unlawful killing - and you're aware of the crucial distinction between law and morality. To repeat, non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions. You agree, but then forget what it means.

(Of course - there are moral premises. Who ever said there aren't!? And moral premises can entail moral conclusions. But that doesn't demonstrate the existence of moral facts.)

How humans developed and are still developing moral values and codes - consistent with the 'proto-morality' evident in many other species - and not just primates - is much-studied and theorised - an inconvenient fact obdurately ignored by supernaturalists. The existence and evolution of morality is explicable naturalistically. No need for invented gods and devils which, anyway, explain nothing.

[Iwannaplato]

You agree that non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions.

If such things as amoral premises existed, that would be true.

But it's false.

All of life is embedded in the moral, which is a transcendent property, not immanent feature. You're starting with the wrong assumption, and a wrong assumption, even if followed by unimpeachable logic, terminates in an errant or invalid conclusion. That's where you're at.

And that demolishes moral objectivism. The end.

It would, if you were right. But you're not. Your first premise is where the fault is.

Take murder, as an example.

If "Peter has murdered Tom" is a non-moral premise, then we can't produce the conclusion, "Peter should go to jail." And it can be viewed that way: Tom is dead, Peter is the proximate cause, therefore Peter has murdered Tom.

But in point of fact, willfully terminating the life of another person is not an amoral action. It's murder. And murder has moral entailments. So we can well say, "Peter has murdered Tom, Murderers deserve jail, therefore Peter should be in jail." And the moral assessment comes bundled with the empirical facts.

So the difference between me and you is simply this: you believe you're living in an amoral world. Thus (not surprisingly) all moral assessments seem gratuitous to you. I believe we are living in a world infused with moral characteristics and purposes, those of God: naturally, I conclude that the facts have moral entailments.

Nobody's being illogical. We're just presupposing different things.

The next problem for you, though, is to wonder how moral assessments ever managed to appear or become a thing in a world which, you have to believe, is inherently completely devoid of morals.

To clarify. A moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong / good or bad, [i[/i]or that we should or shouldn't do something because it's morally right or wrong, and so on.

So your analysis in incorrect. 'Peter has murdered Tom' isn't a moral assertion, so it can't be a moral premise. Murder is unlawful killing - and you're aware of the crucial distinction between law and morality. To repeat, non-moral premises can't produce moral conclusions. You agree, but then forget what it means.

(Of course - there are moral premises. Who ever said there aren't!? And moral premises can entail moral conclusions. But that doesn't demonstrate the existence of moral facts.)

How humans developed and are still developing moral values and codes - consistent with the 'proto-morality' evident in many other species - and not just primates - is much-studied and theorised - an inconvenient fact obdurately ignored by supernaturalists. The existence and evolution of morality is explicable naturalistically. No need for invented gods and devils which, anyway, explain nothing.

There's another possible tack - and one commonly used. He's taking responsibility for a presupposition that there are objective morals. You don't make that one. Fine. What epistemological process does he use when confronted by a moral realist who sees or 'sees' other objective morals. There isn't just presupposition, there's also some kind of knowledge acquisition process to determine what objective morals there are.

[Iwannaplato]

When is it ok to nuke a city or a military base near a city?

Never. Only way such a thing is just is if you're defending self or other from every person in that city or base, a silly notion.

And, of course, fetuses get nuked in that situation.

[Immanuel Can]

To clarify. A moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong / good or bad, or that we should or shouldn't do something because it's morally right or wrong, and so on.

Well, yes, but not just that.

A moral assertion is also one that says an action is praiseworthy or base, and even that it's useful or non-useful, or functional or non-functional, because even "function" and "use" are moral concepts. "Function" is always "function for" something that has to be assessed morally, and "use" is always "use for" a goal that needs to be assessed for its moral status or which has moral implications.

To say, "This knife functions to terminate Tom's life" is not the same as to say, "This knife functions to remove Tom's cancerour tumour." The relative moral statuses of taking Tom's life and of curing his cancer have to be included in the moral assessment. "Function" or "use," by themselves do not dignify an action morally.

So all value-laden language, of whatever kind it is, is also moral language. And that even includes pragmatic language, the language of use and function.

So your analysis in incorrect. 'Peter has murdered Tom' isn't a moral assertion, so it can't be a moral premise.

Actually, it is. Because Peter has undertaken a particular action that already has moral status. And don't let the word "murder" become a distraction: we could equally say, "Peter has terminated Tom's life by willful premeditation," and the willful premeditation of the taking of a life would still be an action with moral status.

As for "unlawfulness," all human laws, such as are legitimate, are mere attempts to approximate the Divine Law: as such, and as a collective, they are flawed and partial. They are not themselves capable of making anything good or bad; they are capable only of being attempts to describe the moral status that things already have. The moral truth exists prior to the making of the laws, and the moral truth itself judges the status of every particular law.

Of course - there are moral premises.

Interesting. You say "of course," as if we all know there are. But it's not obvious, on your account of things, that there are, at all.

So can you suggest one? What is a moral premise? I'm not asking for one that is merely premised on human law, because those are obviously contingent, socially-local and provisional. And as I pointed out above, they are flawed. Give me one that stands on its own. Give me one that's "obvious" as you put it, one we can't get away from by pleading temporary arrangment or local custom.

...the 'proto-morality' evident in many other species...

This asks us to assume that humans evolved from lower primates. I don't. So even if we did find what you call "proto-morality" among lower animals like chimps, that would not suggest continuity or analogy with human morality. And in fact, I think those studies are highly suspect. They ask us to interpret merely animal-instinctive behaviours (and you can tell they're instinctive, because they are passed genetically from generation to generation, regardless of all else) as if they were self-conscious social arrangements. It's argument from anthropomorphism, really, and as such, a fallacy.

But as I say, it wouldn't matter if that were the case. It still wouldn't let us say that evolved patterns of behaviour we had inherited from the past were morally legitimate. It would just tell us they were inherited from the past...like our penchant for theft, lying, prostitution, slavery and war, which are, I think, in any reasonable moral view, highly suspect but are also inherited from the past.

...an inconvenient fact obdurately ignored by supernaturalists.

Well, rightly so. As you see, it's premised on a false and contentious analogy that they have no reason to believe.

The existence and evolution of morality is explicable naturalistically.

It's not, actually.

We can explain-away morality by simply insisting that it's a product of the past plus evolution. But that's just instinct. And as I have pointed out above, instinct is a mixed bag of moral and immoral things. What it cannot do -- at all -- is legitimize that "morality." That is, it cannot prove that slavery or prostitution is moral, just because each is one of our oldest institutions and is inherited from the past, by evolution or otherwise.

So it ends up being an "is" with no "oughtness." We might say, it IS the case that humans have a tradition of rape or infanticide. That doesn't mean we OUGHT to regard those traditions as moral. And if we got them from the chimps, that certainly doesn't dignify them more.

So back to your earlier claim, because it's the one I found most intriguing. You say there are moral premises. Can you give one?

[FlashDangerpants]

The existence and evolution of morality is explicable naturalistically.

It's not, actually.

We can explain-away morality by simply insisting that it's a product of the past plus evolution. But that's just instinct. And as I have pointed out above, instinct is a mixed bag of moral and immoral things. What it cannot do -- at all -- is legitimize that "morality." That is, it cannot prove that slavery or prostitution is moral, just because each is one of our oldest institutions and is inherited from the past, by evolution or otherwise.

So it ends up being an "is" with no "oughtness." We might say, it IS the case that humans have a tradition of rape or infanticide. That doesn't mean we OUGHT to regard those traditions as moral. And if we got them from the chimps, that certainly doesn't dignify them more.

Are you arguing here that we OUGHT to believe there is an ultimate moral truth for some reason (that it is useful to believe so for a practical purpose for instance)...
.... or that because there OUGHT to be such a truth (otherwise statements about abhoring certain behaviours aren't "legitimate" enough) then therefore there IS such a truth?

[Immanuel Can]

The existence and evolution of morality is explicable naturalistically.

It's not, actually.

We can explain-away morality by simply insisting that it's a product of the past plus evolution. But that's just instinct. And as I have pointed out above, instinct is a mixed bag of moral and immoral things. What it cannot do -- at all -- is legitimize that "morality." That is, it cannot prove that slavery or prostitution is moral, just because each is one of our oldest institutions and is inherited from the past, by evolution or otherwise.

So it ends up being an "is" with no "oughtness." We might say, it IS the case that humans have a tradition of rape or infanticide. That doesn't mean we OUGHT to regard those traditions as moral. And if we got them from the chimps, that certainly doesn't dignify them more.

Are you arguing here...

Neither. I'm arguing that the "naturalistic" and "evolutionary" explanation is useless as a way of "explaining" anything about morality...it doesn't get to the job that needs to be done IF, as Peter asserts, there is any such legitimate thing as "a moral premise.

Now, you may deny that there is. That's your prerogative. But Peter says there is -- unless he wishes to reword, which he is allowed to do. (Personally, I think Peter's view has to compel the conclusion that there simply IS no such thing as a legitimate moral premise. But I'll wait for him to speak.)

But IF there is, then that claim needs showing: namely, the claim that that naturalistic and evolutionary explanations can produce a legitimate moral premise.

[henry quirk]

When is it ok to nuke a city or a military base near a city?

Never. Only way such a thing is just is if you're defending self or other from every person in that city or base, a silly notion.

And, of course, fetuses get nuked in that situation.

Everyone gets nuked.

[FlashDangerpants]

It's not, actually.

We can explain-away morality by simply insisting that it's a product of the past plus evolution. But that's just instinct. And as I have pointed out above, instinct is a mixed bag of moral and immoral things. What it cannot do -- at all -- is legitimize that "morality." That is, it cannot prove that slavery or prostitution is moral, just because each is one of our oldest institutions and is inherited from the past, by evolution or otherwise.

So it ends up being an "is" with no "oughtness." We might say, it IS the case that humans have a tradition of rape or infanticide. That doesn't mean we OUGHT to regard those traditions as moral. And if we got them from the chimps, that certainly doesn't dignify them more.

Are you arguing here...

Neither. I'm arguing that the "naturalistic" and "evolutionary" explanation is useless as a way of "explaining" anything about morality...

that seems to depend upon assumptions about universality and legitimacy.

Pete is only saying that we have the practice of making moral assertions and of rationalising with moral premises. You appear to be inserting a requirement for singular universal truth to do this "legitimizing" thing, no?