compatibilism

[Immanuel Can]

"Running with your tail between your legs?"

I have reason to believe the speaker may have committed the complex question fallacy

You mean because you find it too "complex" for you? Or that you mistook it for a "question"? Or both?

[phyllo]

Are you guys claiming that consciousness and subconscious do not originate in a physical brain?

[Immanuel Can]

Are you guys claiming that consciousness and subconscious do not originate in a physical brain?

"Originate in." Explain what you mean, please.

Do you mean, "the physical brain creates the conscious and the subconscious"?
Or do you mean, "the consciousness takes place within a physical brain"?
Or do you mean, "the existence of the consciousness is exclusively due to physical causes"?
Or something else?

What question are you trying to ask here?

[phyllo]

I'm asking you where you think consciousness and subconscious come from.

Because if it's from the brain then it's reasonable to consider both to be deterministic.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm asking you where you think consciousness and subconscious come from.

That's an interesting mystery. Mind-brain philosophers are working very hard on that question.

And just because we don't know the answer, it doesn't imply the answer is "physical stuff" -- especially when "physical stuff" turns out to be a totally inadequate explanation, as it does with Determinism. For rocks, trees and atoms are "physical stuff," but if we imagine they have consciousness, identity, reason, science, choice, volition...and so on, then we're certainly without evidence of any of that. So the "physical stuff" explanation does not get to win-by-default.

Some better explanation awaits, and it's that one we should be looking to. Thomas Nagel tries to offer some suggestions, for example; but he admits he doesn't have anything very compelling yet on that. And Jaegwon Kim is as astute as anybody you'll ever find on picking apart the problems with the Physicalist and "epiphenomenal" sorts of attempts at explanation, but he too is not able to say positively what "mind" is.

This, it seems, is currently beyond our ability to say. We are rapidly mapping the brain, but apparently not finding what the "ghost in the machine" is, in the process. And very likely, the problem is that we continue to look in the physical "stuff" for answers the physical "stuff" simply is not the right "stuff" to provide.

Because if it's from the brain then it's reasonable to consider both to be deterministic.

No, you're too fast with that assumption. It doesn't follow. It's a specimen of the old "correllational fallacy," where one imagines that if two things occur together then inevitably, one must be "causing" the other. But that doesn't follow. One MAY be causing the other, or the other MAY be causing the one; or they MAY not have a causal connection at all, just a correlational one. Or some third thing not-yet-mentioned COULD BE causing both.

We never know which is the case, if our observation is merely that two types of things always seem to happen together.

My favourite joke about the correllational fallacy goes like this:

A woman walks into her doctor's office, and says, "Doc, every time I drink tea, my right eye hurts."

And the doctor says, "Well, take the spoon out of the cup."

[phyllo]

I'm asking you where you think consciousness and subconscious come from.

That's an interesting mystery. Mind-brain philosophers are working very hard on that question.

And just because we don't know the answer, it doesn't imply the answer is "physical stuff" -- especially when "physical stuff" turns out to be a totally inadequate explanation, as it does with Determinism. For rocks, trees and atoms are "physical stuff," but if we imagine they have consciousness, identity, reason, science, choice, volition...and so on, then we're certainly without evidence of any of that. So the "physical stuff" explanation does not get to win-by-default.

Some better explanation awaits, and it's that one we should be looking to. Thomas Nagel tries to offer some suggestions, for example; but he admits he doesn't have anything very compelling yet on that. And Jaegwon Kim is as astute as anybody you'll ever find on picking apart the problems with the Physicalist and "epiphenomenal" sorts of attempts at explanation, but he too is not able to say positively what "mind" is.

This, it seems, is currently beyond our ability to say. We are rapidly mapping the brain, but apparently not finding what the "ghost in the machine" is, in the process. And very likely, the problem is that we continue to look in the physical "stuff" for answers the physical "stuff" simply is not the right "stuff" to provide.

Because if it's from the brain then it's reasonable to consider both to be deterministic.

No, you're too fast with that assumption. It doesn't follow. It's a specimen of the old "correllational fallacy," where one imagines that if two things occur together then inevitably, one must be "causing" the other. But that doesn't follow. One MAY be causing the other, or the other MAY be causing the one; or they MAY not have a causal connection at all, just a correlational one. Or some third thing not-yet-mentioned COULD BE causing both.

We never know which is the case, if our observation is merely that two types of things always seem to happen together.

My favourite joke about the correllational fallacy goes like this:

A woman walks into her doctor's office, and says, "Doc, every time I drink tea, my right eye hurts."

And the doctor says, "Well, take the spoon out of the cup."

Well, then all this talk about consciousness and subconscious doesn't support or advance your position. So there is really no reason to bring it up.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm asking you where you think consciousness and subconscious come from.

That's an interesting mystery. Mind-brain philosophers are working very hard on that question.

And just because we don't know the answer, it doesn't imply the answer is "physical stuff" -- especially when "physical stuff" turns out to be a totally inadequate explanation, as it does with Determinism. For rocks, trees and atoms are "physical stuff," but if we imagine they have consciousness, identity, reason, science, choice, volition...and so on, then we're certainly without evidence of any of that. So the "physical stuff" explanation does not get to win-by-default.

Some better explanation awaits, and it's that one we should be looking to. Thomas Nagel tries to offer some suggestions, for example; but he admits he doesn't have anything very compelling yet on that. And Jaegwon Kim is as astute as anybody you'll ever find on picking apart the problems with the Physicalist and "epiphenomenal" sorts of attempts at explanation, but he too is not able to say positively what "mind" is.

This, it seems, is currently beyond our ability to say. We are rapidly mapping the brain, but apparently not finding what the "ghost in the machine" is, in the process. And very likely, the problem is that we continue to look in the physical "stuff" for answers the physical "stuff" simply is not the right "stuff" to provide.

Because if it's from the brain then it's reasonable to consider both to be deterministic.

No, you're too fast with that assumption. It doesn't follow. It's a specimen of the old "correllational fallacy," where one imagines that if two things occur together then inevitably, one must be "causing" the other. But that doesn't follow. One MAY be causing the other, or the other MAY be causing the one; or they MAY not have a causal connection at all, just a correlational one. Or some third thing not-yet-mentioned COULD BE causing both.

We never know which is the case, if our observation is merely that two types of things always seem to happen together.

My favourite joke about the correllational fallacy goes like this:

A woman walks into her doctor's office, and says, "Doc, every time I drink tea, my right eye hurts."

And the doctor says, "Well, take the spoon out of the cup."

Well, then all this talk about consciousness and subconscious doesn't support or advance your position.

Oh, that doesn't follow at all, in fact.

My "position," as you call it, is that physicalism is a totally inadequate explanation for the mind phenomena, and that Determinism is a reductional and utterly unsatisfactory attempt at "explaining away" things we simply cannot live without.

I would say I've made 100% of that point.

[iambiguous]

But...

Like all the rest of us, you are unable to propound a definitive explanation for where BigMike fits into this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Either in the only possible reality in the only possible world or of their own volition.

So, as with all the rest of us, your argument falls somewhere between an educated guess and a wild-ass guess.

I don't see how your "But...", normally used to start a sentence in contrast to what has already been said, introduces anything relevant to what was said about determinism. I have not attempted to explain the things that you find so perplexing and I have no problem waiting until such information becomes accessible. The only effect it will have on my worldview is to enlighten me on that one unrelated thing.

The gap between what any of us here think we know about determinism/free will/compatibilism and all that would need to be known regarding '...all of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter'...has surely got to be staggering.

From my frame of mind, you come off as a run-of-the-mill objectivist here. There's how you construe free will [the right way] and how the fools construe it [the wrong way].

To me, you're like IC and his Christian God or henry and his bazookas. Dare not to share their own conclusions and you are quite simply wrong.

The question of how we should collectively adapt to a world that has rejected the concept of free will is far more urgent and intriguing, in my view. And "everybody" should take part in this process because, in the end, our collective decisions will have a big effect on everyone's life.

As though how we do or do not collectively adapt is not in and of itself a fated, destined trajectory in the only possible world.

As though anything that you find urgent or intriguing you were able to opt not to.

Over and again, in defending determinism you do as as many would imagine a libertarian might. Everybody should -- is obligated -- to take part if, in the end, we want to live in, what, a better world?

You sound like peacegirl over at ILP. We have no free will but if we read her father's book there's still hope of ridding the world of Evil.

[Iwannaplato]

From my frame of mind, you come off as a run-of-the-mill objectivist here.

BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Jul 30, 2022 7:25 pm
Even though they don't have a choice, people who believe they have free will are intrinsically evil.

I realize that is combining his certainty in determinism, which I assume you are focusing on most here, with his belief in Evil and his simple heuristic for determining that a few billion people are evil.

But this seems hardly run of the mill objectivism.

[phyllo]

You sound like peacegirl over at ILP. We have no free will but if we read her father's book there's still hope of ridding the world of Evil.

Just to get this straight.

If I was to read a book on First Aid, you think that I would not be able to apply any of the knowledge I got from the book. I would not be able to make a splint or bandage a wound, for example. I would not be able to help anyone.

You think that reading the book would change nothing.

You think free-will is required just to read a book.

Is that right? Is that your position?

[Immanuel Can]

From my frame of mind, you come off as a run-of-the-mill objectivist here.

BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Jul 30, 2022 7:25 pm
Even though they don't have a choice, people who believe they have free will are intrinsically evil.

I realize that is combining his certainty in determinism, which I assume you are focusing on most here, with his belief in Evil and his simple heuristic for determining that a few billion people are evil.

Well, and he's got a worse problem...Determinism has no account of evil. Because to say something is "evil" is to say it's something that shouldn't be done, or shouldn't be allowed, or we shouldn't choose it, or it shouldn't happen.

But in Determinism, there is no "should." There is only "is." There is only ever what DOES happen, and the idea of what "ought to have happened" simply doesn't exist.

And so there's no evil. There's just "what is." Determinism is 100% amoral about that. There is nothing a person can be said to "should have done," or "not to have done." There's only what he, in fact, did...and it's never good or bad, because there was never any alternate possibility anyway.

[iambiguous]

If we look at Biggus' abortion problem, we can see the issues.

One can only say that Mary is "predetermined" to have an abortion after the abortion has been done.

Or some would say that anything at all that you or I or anyone else says we and they were never able not to say.

And, whatever one is compelled to say about Mary [before, during or after she does something], it's all seamlessly intertwined in the only possible reality. Up to and including me typing these words and you reading them.

Nothing is not a domino toppling over inevitably onto the next one in line.

Prior to that event, any number of events could have prevented the abortion.

-She got hit by a bus on the way to the clinic.

-An anti-abortion bomb threat closed the clinic on that day. The delay led to other events which caused her to change her mind.

-Something happened on the way to the clinic which made her change her mind.

-It turns out that she was never pregnant. The initial test/diagnosis was wrong. An abortion did not get done.

Who cares about the prior events if, like the event itself and the subsequent consequential events, everything unfolds wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

Including those who do care only as they were ever able to.

[iambiguous]

We can marvel at the extraordinary achievements of a colony of termites in building their mound. But how much of that revolves around them accomplishing it freely, of their own volition?

"of their own volition" being better than some other alternative.

Click.

Yeah, I suppose one could argue that the "volition" of the living termites rooted entirely in biological imperatives [instinct] is better than the lifeless earthquake that unfolds bringing the termite mound crashing down. And that our volition in building human communities is better than the termites.

But if the laws of matter are wholly behind all three then what does one thing being better than another thing really mean? How about whatever each one of us is compelled to think it means.

The evaluation of the achievement not being based on the achievement itself but on something else.

Unless, of course, everything consisting of matter is based on the laws of matter. Period.

You didn't create yourself. You didn't design yourself. You didn't build yourself. Are all your achievements worthless as a result?

Something deemed to have worth or deemed to be worthless...what's the difference if both the achievement and our reaction to it is only as it ever could have been?

That's the part most have trouble with. They just know that they really are acting freely in choosing their behaviors.

And that certainly may well be the case. But how to explain that if the human brain itself is just more matter.

Of course: a God, the God, your God.

[BigMike]

It doesn't concern me that "determinism" cannot explain why people think they have control over their actions when they do not. Those questions have nothing to do with what we're talking about. Physics says that something that is not physical cannot have an effect on something that is. Even a single atom needs a force to move this way instead of that. This is the first law of motion from Newton.

Fortunately, there are only four possible forces in the whole universe:

1. gravity,
2. electromagnetism,
3. the weak nuclear force,
4. and the strong nuclear force.

Common to each is that they are interactions between physical objects. There is no force or interaction between "free will" and atoms. People who believe they can make things happen through their own non-physical free will, i.e., move particles in their brains and thus initiate nerve signals through non-physical "willpower," are, therefore, mistaken. Despite these fundamental truths, I have noticed that most people believe they possess such psychokinetic powers when they do not. But it is not the job of physics to explain why people are so delusional.

I ask libertarians and compatibilists: Which of the four existing forces is involved in executing your free will? This question is clear, fair, factual, and crucial to the discussion at hand. So please do not seek refuge in a confusing labyrinth of consciousness gobbledygook.

[phyllo]

Common to each is that they are interactions between physical objects. There is no force or interaction between "free will" and atoms. People who believe they can make things happen through their own non-physical free will, i.e., move particles in their brains and thus initiate nerve signals through non-physical "willpower," are, therefore, mistaken. Despite these fundamental truths, I have noticed that most people believe they possess such psychokinetic powers when they do not. But it is not the job of physics to explain why people are so delusional.

I think it's important to note that free-will is already 'thinking' and 'deciding' independent of a brain or some other physical organ.

So it's not just a question of making something move once your free-will wills it to move. It's a question of how can free-will function in the first place.

And if it's using the brain, then how is it different from what determinists are saying.

I ask libertarians and compatibilists: Which of the four existing forces is involved in executing your free will?

Compatibilists don't believe in free-will.