compatibilism

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can thinks that he has psychokinetic abilities due to his "will". He believes that his will can physically move objects.

No, if you read more carefully, you'd see what I actually said. I said the question is whether or not "will" can mobilize "body" into "action."

What does your assertion that "will" can mobilize "body" into "action" mean besides that it can actually move the body?

Exactly that. The human will can start a chain whereby the body moves, action is taken, and effects in the material world ensue.

Determinism holds that the human will cannot do that. It cannot start the chain of causal events that produce a material effect, according to Determinism. Determinism seeks the ultimate explanation for every mind event in the chain of prior causes set off by the Big Bang, or some subsequent material event, not in human choices.

But I notice you do not even try to answer my very reasonable question: how can you campaign for us to choose some political strategy, when choice is utterly impossible, according to Determinism?

Have a try at that.

[BigMike]

You can be free withing various ranges, under some pressure or constraints, and with or without regard for inducements. But so long as you, yourself, had the deciding "vote" on the matter, you were, for our purposes, "free."

Immanuel Can thinks that he has psychokinetic abilities due to his "will". He believes that his will can physically move objects.

Determinists, on the other hand, have to suppose that the world is made up of deluded zombies. "Zombies," because they are mobilized not by their wills, but by powers beyond their brains. And "deluded," because they continue to imagine that they are making a difference to outcomes, whereas you have to insist they are making none at all.

That is categorically false. Brains are a part of the physical world and contribute to humans' actions and movements. The causes of human movement are certainly not "powers beyond their brains."

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can thinks that he has psychokinetic abilities due to his "will". He believes that his will can physically move objects.

Determinists, on the other hand, have to suppose that the world is made up of deluded zombies. "Zombies," because they are mobilized not by their wills, but by powers beyond their brains. And "deluded," because they continue to imagine that they are making a difference to outcomes, whereas you have to insist they are making none at all.

That is categorically false. Brains are a part of the physical world and contribute to humans' actions and movements.

Actually, you are wrong: it's true.

Because according to Determinism, the causal chain does not even start in the brain. It starts outside the brain of every individual in some prior event or cause that happened earlier, and back through a chain of unspecified length into the untrackable past.

To illustrate how it works: Mike only thinks he wants ice cream because his body chemistry is telling his brain he does. But his body chemistry is telling his brain that because he didn't eat breakfast. He didn't eat breakfast, because there was none on hand. There was none on hand because his wife never went shopping. She didn't go shopping because her sister called. Her sister called because her cat died. Her cat died because it ate a poisoned mouse. And the mouse was poisoned because the neighbour put out warfarin.

So Mike experiences the thought of wanting ice cream only because of warfarin. It has nothing at all to do, ultimately, with Mike making a choice.

Mike is now a deluded zombie. He thinks he chose to want ice cream, but warfarin caused it.

But again, to my question, Mike: How can you tell us to choose a social policy, when choice is impossible?

[BigMike]

Determinists, on the other hand, have to suppose that the world is made up of deluded zombies. "Zombies," because they are mobilized not by their wills, but by powers beyond their brains. And "deluded," because they continue to imagine that they are making a difference to outcomes, whereas you have to insist they are making none at all.

That is categorically false. Brains are a part of the physical world and contribute to humans' actions and movements.

Actually, you are wrong: it's true.

Because according to Determinism, the causal chain does not even start in the brain. It starts outside the brain of every individual in some prior event or cause that happened earlier, and back through a chain of unspecified length into the untrackable past.

You didn't notice my clever use of the word "contribute" above, did you?

[Immanuel Can]

That is categorically false. Brains are a part of the physical world and contribute to humans' actions and movements.

Actually, you are wrong: it's true.

Because according to Determinism, the causal chain does not even start in the brain. It starts outside the brain of every individual in some prior event or cause that happened earlier, and back through a chain of unspecified length into the untrackable past.

You didn't notice my clever use of the word "contribute" above, did you?

It doesn't "contribute" anything. It's just a link in a causal chain. Links don't add anything to the equation...they just function to pass on the sequence.

So, not such a "clever" use, as it turns out. The brain is not "being clever": it's just doing what it has to do, and sending on the sequence. That's Determinism.

But you're not answering my question, Mike.

[BigMike]

Actually, you are wrong: it's true.

Because according to Determinism, the causal chain does not even start in the brain. It starts outside the brain of every individual in some prior event or cause that happened earlier, and back through a chain of unspecified length into the untrackable past.

You didn't notice my clever use of the word "contribute" above, did you?

It doesn't "contribute" anything. It's just a link in a causal chain. Links don't add anything to the equation...they just function to pass on the sequence.

I'm starting to think you are quite dense. The brain is a bit more complicated than a passive linear chain of links, it is a three dimensional neural network with feedback loops where previous experiences have caused changes that direct the flow of nerve signals to go this way instead of that way. The brain's dynamic structure unquestionably and decisively influences the outcome.

[iambiguous]

On the contrary, the truly hardcore determinists insist, there is absolutely nothing that we think, feel, say and do that is not wholly subsumed in a wholly determined universe.

What, assessing culpability is the one exception?

That is neither true nor relevant.

Again, the distinction I always make here is between those who will assert things like this as though in asserting them that makes them true, and those who will actually attempt to back up such assertions with substantive experiential and experimental evidence.

Like the "hard guys" do.

Going back to, say, everything that there is to know about the "human condition" given everything there is to know about existence itself?

If a person is determined to do wrong then he is culpable. And as change is always possible with determinism, then the penal system can make that change for the better.

Okay, back to Mary. What are you saying here...that if Mary is wholly compelled by the laws of matter embodied in her brain to abort Jane, she is still culpable -- "meriting condemnation or blame especially as wrong or harmful" -- for doing so? Or, as some might argue, are you holding her culpable because you are wholly compelled by the laws of matter embodied in your brain to hold her culpable.

Deterrence to the degree it can determine new outcomes is more effective than imagining that people can act freely regardless of consequence.

Again, speculation of this sort is no less subsumed in this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Either in the only possible reality in the only possible world or of their own volition.

Thus from their point of view this...

When a person determinedly breaks a law with the full knowledge of breaking the law, he is judged for the person he is not the choice he has made, since he was determined to make that choice he is to be punished for being the sort of person who commits crimes.
This is why we have "correctional" facilities, so that the hardships of imprisonment or the advice of rehabilitating advice might change the nature of the person and so cause a beneficial change.

If determinism is not true then change is not possible and we ought to throw away the key or kill prisoners if they have free will to chose to commit as many crimes as the will.

...too is but one more inherent manifestation of the only possible reality in the only possible world.

Or, sure, in regard to prisoners and our reaction to them, that too is an exception to the immutable laws of matter rule. One of the dominoes that get away.

As though when someone breaks the law in a determined universe their knowledge of what they do is, as well, "somehow" beyond the reach of material laws.

How the hell do you get there.
You are not getting it.

Note to others:

When those like Sculptor tell you you are not getting something it almost always means that you still refuse to get it as they do. Only in regard to questions like determinism/free will/compatibilism philosophers, scientists and theologians have been squabbling now for literally thousands of years regarding what it means to get it.

Still, all the "thrashing about" that we do here could be entirely avoided if we simply recognized that the objectivists among us are never wrong about, well, anything.

[iambiguous]

If Determinism is true, you can't arrange social policy. In fact, you can't change or choose anything. Not a thing. Whatever is going to happen is going to happen. Every action that happens in the universe is caused by nothiing other than some other previous mechanical action. The machine that is this universe is going to turn its cranks and churn out whatever is going to happen. You have no say about it. None.

That's Determinism.

Yep, that's basically my own set of assumptions as well. Nothing that we think, feel, say or do is excluded from the laws of matter. It's just that we still don't have a comprehensive understanding of where "I" fits into this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Either in the only possible reality in the only possible world or of their own volition.

Here in particular most of us go about pondering this mystery as philosophers. We think up these arguments "in our heads"...in "worlds of words" where something is true or false depending on how we define and defend the meaning of the words we use to define and defend the meaning of yet more words still.

Now, IC, of course [compelled or not], makes all the squabbling go away by positing the Christian God. A God, the God, his God plops a "soul" into us at conception. And it is our soul that sustains our free will. He's even got his own circular logic rendition of how to reconcile human freedom with an omniscient God.

And here "I" am [compelled or not] making an existential leap of faith assumption that he too is no less "off the hook" than all the rest of us.

[BigMike]

But again, to my question, Mike: How can you tell us to choose a social policy, when choice is impossible?

I am a strict determinist. I have absolutely no belief in free will. The question you asked is broad enough to write a book about it. I will not do so because I suspect that you possess some prior knowledge. Let me therefore probe your knowledge by asking what you know about how long-term memory and learning can impact comprehension and be transmitted to those in close proximity. I would also need to know how you believe you may be affected by those around you. Then, I would need to know the desired word count for my response.

[bobmax]

But again, to my question, Mike: How can you tell us to choose a social policy, when choice is impossible?

I am a strict determinist. I have absolutely no belief in free will. The question you asked is broad enough to write a book about it. I will not do so because I suspect that you possess some prior knowledge. Let me therefore probe your knowledge by asking what you know about how long-term memory and learning can impact comprehension and be transmitted to those in close proximity. I would also need to know how you believe you may be affected by those around you. Then, I would need to know the desired word count for my response.

It is not determinism that makes individual free will impossible.

There can be no free will because everything that happens happens either by necessity or by chance.

Therefore individual free will is not possible.

However, this very impossibility proves the existence of absolute freedom!

As an individual self, separated from everything else, I have no freedom to choose other than what I choose.

This implies that the individual self is an illusion.
And for this very reason I am absolutely free.

Everything that happens is due to myself.
As I am the origin of all things.
And those things I am.

And when I feel who I really am, great is the compassion.

[Immanuel Can]

You didn't notice my clever use of the word "contribute" above, did you?

It doesn't "contribute" anything. It's just a link in a causal chain. Links don't add anything to the equation...they just function to pass on the sequence.

I'm starting to think you are quite dense.

And I'm starting to think you're afraid to answer my question.

How do you get to campaign for us to make choices of social policy, when you don't believe in choices changing anything?

[Immanuel Can]

But again, to my question, Mike: How can you tell us to choose a social policy, when choice is impossible?

I am a strict determinist. I have absolutely no belief in free will. The question you asked is broad enough to write a book about it.

No, it's not. You can't hide behind appealing to "complexity."

Your problem is very simple: if you think Determinism is true, you can't possibly argue in favour of social policy choices. They don't mean anything, then. They don't change squat.

[BigMike]

It is not determinism that makes individual free will impossible.

There can be no free will because everything that happens happens either by necessity or by chance.

This is exactly what I have in mind. To answer IC's question, I must explain everything, just as I answered you a week ago. But it seems you've already forgotten what I said:

True and false. Obviously, the old notion of determinism is no longer valid. Heisenberg stabbed this literal interpretation of determinism in the heart. However, in a modern language, the conservation laws remain valid (even conservation of energy, which for a few years was in serious doubt). Determinism in its amended sense, conformity to conservation principles (which, by the way, are the basis of all physical laws), remains valid.

If IC does not comprehend, for instance, that energy, momentum, electric charge, angular momentum, and two other physical properties cannot be created or destroyed, he lacks the prerequisite knowledge to comprehend my response. I am trying to ascertain how much he knows, but he refuses to even answer that. And I have no intention of addressing all of his cognitive deficiencies.

[bobmax]

It is not determinism that makes individual free will impossible.

There can be no free will because everything that happens happens either by necessity or by chance.

This is exactly what I have in mind. To answer IC's question, I must explain everything, just as I answered you a week ago. But it seems you've already forgotten what I said:

True and false. Obviously, the old notion of determinism is no longer valid. Heisenberg stabbed this literal interpretation of determinism in the heart. However, in a modern language, the conservation laws remain valid (even conservation of energy, which for a few years was in serious doubt). Determinism in its amended sense, conformity to conservation principles (which, by the way, are the basis of all physical laws), remains valid.

I haven't forgotten what you wrote.

And I replied to you by telling you that your idea was insufficient.

Because indeterminability is not the same as randomness.

In fact, there exists the indeterminable which in any case belongs to necessity, even if indeterminable not only practically but also in theory.

But there is also the indeterminable due to true chance, which is the negation of necessity.

Randomness is Chaos.

Instead you are still clinging to the Cosmos.

[BigMike]

True and false. Obviously, the old notion of determinism is no longer valid. Heisenberg stabbed this literal interpretation of determinism in the heart. However, in a modern language, the conservation laws remain valid (even conservation of energy, which for a few years was in serious doubt). Determinism in its amended sense, conformity to conservation principles (which, by the way, are the basis of all physical laws), remains valid.

I haven't forgotten what you wrote.

And I replied to you by telling you that your idea was insufficient.

Because indeterminability is not the same as randomness.

In fact, there exists the indeterminable which in any case belongs to necessity, even if indeterminable not only practically but also in theory.

But there is also the indeterminable due to true chance, which is the negation of necessity.

Randomness is Chaos.

Instead you are still clinging to the Cosmos.

OK. Perhaps you have not forgotten what I said. Maybe you just didn't understand it.
I said that I use the word "determinism" in its modern, revised meaning, which is to follow the laws of conservation. This fits with both Heisenberg's "principle of uncertainty" and Bobmax's "principle of indeterminism." I don't need the old version of determinism to prove my point. Only the six conservation laws and four fundamental forces (which really are interactions) are required. That alone strips away any "freedom" that people claim the will has.