Hq, your efforts are heroic. Unfortunately, you are dealing with ideologues, who are incapable of reason in this area.
Mind
might emerge out of matter, they assert, and it's up to henry quirk to prove that it
cannot, as though this proof had not already been provided. Only fools believe that consciousness can emerge out of non-consciousness. You have been altogether too accommodating of these fools, hq, in allowing that you are open to a proof of mind out of matter. That door doesn't open. It is locked shut. You need not affirm your openness to it.
I've already pointed out that "Mind out of matter" is analogous to "Fire drowns" or "Lego bricks can be arranged into a meal". If your Lego bricks are already made of chocolate, as has been suggested (or something like it - I forget), and thus
can be arranged into a meal, then we're working with panpsychism, not physicalism, but it is physicalism that these fools propose.
"But wetness emerges out of non-wet particles", comes the desperate cry, "and thus consciousness might emerge out of particles too".
There are two possibilities here:
- Wetness is a physical property. This, though, is irrelevant to demonstrating that a (non-physical) mind might emerge out of matter. All it shows is that physical stuff emerges out of physical stuff. Well, sure, that's exactly what we'd expect, but it doesn't at all help the physicalist case of "mind from matter".
- Wetness is a mental property. Well, sure, the mind-brain-body complex interacts with physical particles of a certain structure and perceives wetness, but this, again, does nothing to demonstrate that mind itself can emerge out of arrangements of physical particles, only that, once a mind exists, it can translate physical inputs into mental properties.
So, you guys have got nothing, but you see fit to try to shift the burden of proof onto hq. How weak. If you can demonstrate that mind can emerge from matter, as hq has been so persistently been challenging you to do, then do so - but you quite obviously can't, because it's impossible, and thus it's unsurprising that you haven't even attempted it.
I'm pleased that @bahman has finally raised "the hard problem". This is recognition that, as hq has been oh so patiently pointing out in other words, there is as yet no solution to this problem - and, indeed, there cannot be, because, as outlined above, it is insoluble on its own terms. The only solution - in other terms - is to adopt an alternative ontological approach, such as substance dualism (my preferred approach) or idealism.
I think that it's worth also raising:
- David Chalmers's philosophical zombie argument, and,
- John Searle's Chinese room argument
(I say that these are worth raising because they might benefit casual readers of this thread, not because I expect our antagonists to actually respond to them).