IS and OUGHT

[henry quirk]

in general it's very good that we tend to cooperate and share.

As I say: Compassion, or strategy, might lead you to share (to choose to share), but you have no (moral) obligation to.

[Immanuel Can]

I do not believe in God, because the existence of God is not a viable proposition.

An interesting claim.

I'm not sure what "not viable" means, though. It's certainly a proposition that most people do accept, and some do not. But "viable"?

Weighed against the standards I currently expect of myself, some of my past actions and behaviours have fallen morally short.

I'm sure we could all say that.

But what would make us feel "shame," since in a world without God, we don't "owe" anybody to do anything different?

.and according to Atheism, there is simply no actual standard to fall short of.

If that is actually the case, then I am not an atheist; I am just a person who does not believe in God, or gods, and does not follow a religion.

Fair enough.

But I'm not sure why the believing in a God would not be a "viable" proposition, then. It would rather seem like one that was "viable" but not being chosen, because disbelief was also a "viable" proposition.

Shame" would then have to be described as a sort of mental dysfunction, wherein one believes one is culpable for something that was actually never "wrong" in the first place; and the cure would be simply to convince oneself of the truth of Atheism, see there's no guilt possible, and let oneself off the hook.

I am going to be gracious, IC, and dignify that disgraceful comment with a response:

I'm sorry -- did something of that seem "disgraceful" to you? It wasn't intended as such. I was merely pointing out what the Atheist worldview would logically imply. It would imply that "guilt" was never justified. It would mean that the feeling of such was a kind of mental disorder, not at all reflective of any reality.

I have already explained what I believe to be the source of our morality, and the feeling of shame is a crucial element in its functioning. To be incapable of feeling guilt and shame would be an indication of a mental dysfunction.

Well, I do agree with that. But I don't see how it squares with Atheism.

If there's no such thing as a "sin," then neither is there any legitimate feeling of "guilt." Why should one feel "guilty" for things that, according to one's lights, are just not wrong?

Tell me, does the arrogance with which you seem to think you are entitled to tell me that I am incapable of feeling regret, shame and guilt because I don't believe in God,

Oh, I did not say any such thing. I beg your pardon, if you thought I did.

I was merely saying that the Atheist view allows that there is no reason for "shame" or "guilt."

But "regret" would be different: one can feel that merely if one misses an opportunity. That's not necessarily provoked by wrongdoing.

...your capacity to practice the morality you insist I cannot possess?

You'll find I never said this, either.

In fact, what I said that was that I would not compare myself with you in any way, and have plenty of my own shortcomings. I'm at a loss how that came to look to you as if I were claiming "a morality you cannot possess".

Well, you've got me wrong, H. I was merely speaking of the logical entailments of Atheism. I would never venture to speak of your own moral condition, since I obviously have absolutely no way of knowing it. That, I think, should be quite obvious, no?

And I think I've been clear in my statements to the effect that Atheists generally tend to be better in their practices than Atheism itself gives them a rationale for being. I don't think I can be kinder. After all, it's Atheism itself that does not allow for any objectivity being ascribed to moral judgments. It's not me.

[Astro Cat]

Anyway. The question is "who is the entity who rightfully determines your oughts?" This is a loaded question, as you may well know. It has two terms that may be assuming moral realism at the outset: "rightfully" and "oughts." I do not think these terms have a sensible meaning. I don't know what it means to have a "moral right" or a "moral ought," if that's what you mean; so any answer I give would be some form of "the question itself isn't sensible."

I understand that, if that's what you genuinely mean. But logically, that also means you're a complete Moral Nihilist. And it is not my suspicion that that is actually the case.

It is genuinely what I mean. So, I think you understand my position best if you do make the assumption I'm a moral nihilist: but that has some small caveats. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia:

Moral Nihilism = Nothing is morally wrong.

You will get the best results if you assume that this is my position. The reasons there are caveats is that I'm a moral noncognitivist (it's not that it's false anything is morally wrong, it's that the statement isn't even propositional, has no truth value, has no cognitive referent) and I'm a moral noncognitivist in a weak way (I don't affirm that moral utterances are noncognitive, I'm just not convinced they are -- I leave open the possibility, in other words, because so far I do not have some argument by which I can prove my doubt; and sometimes such doubts can't be proven).

So I think this means that my position defaults to something that acts exactly like moral nihilism as long as you understand those caveats: I don't say that the statement "there are moral facts" is false, I say "I don't understand what it means" and must default to a position where I carry on without it until it's demonstrated in some way.

I liken this to so-called "weak" atheism. I don't assert that "God exists" is false (though I do for some particularly defined gods which I can demonstrate have internal inconsistencies), I only say that "I'm not convinced one exists." And I think the distinction is important in both cases (the moral noncognitivism case and the atheism case).

There's something profoundly inconsistent in the way you talk.

And on such thing is that you seem to attribute a sort of moral value to things like social beliefs, instrumental purposes, and personal values. You wobble back and forth between the three in your statements, so I find it difficult to locate which one of them you are actually grounding your "oughts" in. Hence, my question about which of the three you actually believe is fundamental...and I'm still not sure I know that answer.

So are you really a total Moral Nihilist? Or do you actually try to "save" a kind of moral "oughtness" through one of those three?

I don't think that I wobble back and forth between where oughts originate, but I do talk about how oughts interact with the three things you mention (social beliefs, instrumental purposes, personal values). I can see how that might lead to a confusion on where I'm saying the oughts are coming from.

So, the one that I actually believe is fundamental is "personal values." It's not that I ought not to murder because society largely believes that I ought not to, it's because of my personal values that I ought not to murder. When I have mentioned society, it is usually to make the point that the noncognitivist world looks exactly like the moral realist world: that societies would still have in aggregate similar values. That's a different point than arguing where oughts come from, and I perhaps wasn't doing a good job of making sure I was making that clear. So, to be clear, I do not think oughts originate from popularity at all. I was only saying incidentally that oughts can be popular (as a point that this worldview can describe the world that we see).

Someone on another forum, whom I shall not name since I don't have permission from them, actually said something about my worldview that I think they believed put it in a negative light, but I think is actually nicely descriptive in a different choice of words than I've used (so maybe that helps!):

I think what you're doing here is presenting an amoral description of people self-interestedly acting to satisfy their values. Which includes using the word "ought" to describe instrumental thinking about the best way to achieve one's ends.

And then finding that the concept of duty plays no role in such a description and thus finding it meaningless.

That this is an impoverished description of human decision-making is indeed part of the point. In such a world, nothing has moral force, because we're all slaves to our "values" which we are powerless to choose (even if they may be changed by experience as you describe). In your description, all choices are about means to satisfy ends (values) and there is no constraint on the means employed other than those same values.

They say "impoverished," but I say "accurate" and also "parsimonious," because I think that this describes the world that we see without needing to invoke the existence of something mysterious like a "moral truth" or "intrinsic good." I do think that "all choices are about means to satisfy ends (values) and there is no constraint on the means employed other than those same values." That is why we see people causing other people suffering: because of their values. That is why we see people alleviating the suffering of others: because of their values.

So, I think all of the oughts we experience are instrumentalist in nature. We have values, we act on those values with hypotheticals, and we form imperatives -- oughts -- from them. If I value human life, then I ought not to murder. If I value taking that guy's stuff, then I ought to steal it. Neither is "correct" and neither is "incorrect."

Now this is where I might have confused you originally. Most of us look at this and think, "ooh, that sounds gloomy." So I usually point out the silver lining: "don't worry," basically. "If you possess the common values of empathy and altruism, so do most people. So just because moral realism might not be the case doesn't mean society will collapse into chaotic hedonism, because most people are still going to value altruism, and most people are still going to value empathy, and so on. And they won't be able to help but to value those things: learning that moral realism is nonsensical won't change their values because that's not how values work." I would say something like that, and again, I think that's where you started wondering if I thought oughts originated from social consensus.

Hopefully you can see that I don't think oughts come from social consensus now, that I was just bringing it up for other reasons. And hopefully I shouldn't have to point it out by this point (but I will, just in case), but there's nothing intrinsically good about society or a person valuing altruism and empathy, either. I just point it out to explain why on moral noncognitivism we still get a world that looks like ours, where societies at large do at least nominally hold these values. I hold these values.

The moral realist position would be that "S ought to do what is intrinsically good."

Yes, but then you'd have to go on to say what makes something "intrinsically" good. For it is not the case that adjectives exist in some kind of Platonic realm as concrete nouns. An entity can "have goodness," but cannot BE goodness, because "good" is an adjective, not a concrete noun. An apple can "have redness," but it cannot "be redness itself." Nothing IS redness. "Red" is an adjective.

Beware the category error and Neo-Platonism there.

Yes, maybe I worded that poorly or didn't explain what it meant very well. The reason I'm sticking "intrinsically" in front of "good" here is because we're coming from two different worldviews and it's important to demarcate somehow which one we're talking about. On my worldview, I can still use the word "good," but "good" means something like "in accordance with my values," and it's personal, subjective. On your worldview, "good" is something universal not defined by peoples' values. So I've been calling the moral realist concept of good "intrinsic good." I'm not trying to make it into a Platonic object, just demarcating the moral realist "good" from the anti-realist's "good." Does that help? Is there a better way for me to do that?

So I was ultimately saying that on moral realism, S ought to do what is universally good, not what seems good to S. Maybe "universally" is a better way to demarcate the ways to use "good?" Then of course, I am unsure what "universally good" means under examination, so I'll remind that I'm only treating the term as meaningful for the sake of argument.

If we add the position that "If P creates S, then P rightfully determines S's oughts," then there is a problem if P's determinations are intrinsically evil:

That's not at all the Christian position, though. God is not evil. So He never "determines" us to do evil. And since we are free agents, we are responsible for our own choices, in that regard. We are not "determined" at all.

That's actually what morality is fundamentally about: will we, as choice agents, go God's way, or our own?

I know that it's not the Christian position that God would be evil, but I think to point this out is to misunderstand the point of thought experiment. Thought experiment invokes circumstances that might not even be under consideration to test if some proposition is true under all circumstances.

Take the concept of "ownership," that if P creates S, then P rightfully determines S's oughts. The point of thought experiment is to ask, "well is this proposition always true?" Even if you're a Christian and you don't believe P on your actual worldview would be evil, it's still useful to wonder if the proposition would still be true under different circumstances because if it works in some circumstances but not others, why it works in one situation and not the other tells us something about the proposition and we make progress, we learn something.

God may not be evil, but the proposition "If any P creates any S, then P rightfully determines S's oughts" makes a contradiction if P is morally reprehensible and we also hold the moral realist supposition "for any S, S ought to do what is universally good." If it makes a contradiction, then we know the proposition was wrong (or at least that we must choose which one we want to keep). The moral realist would obviously keep "for any S, S ought to do what is universally good." But then we have to figure out what to do with the other proposition. We either abandon it or fix it. That's progress.

Perhaps fixing it will be easy. I tried a quick fix in my last post: perhaps we just amend the proposition to say, "If any morally good P creates any S, then P rightfully determines S's oughts." I also explained why I think that has problems, but the point is that this is a form of progress. It wasn't useless to bring up evil-P even though the Christian doesn't posit an evil-P: we still got closer to a proposition that's true (debatably, again I made comments on it last time). And that is the point of thought experiment.

Her thinking in choosing a place may be. But ours, in deciding that it is her who has that right, is not evidently so. Rather, we're deciding -- before all instrumental concerns even come into play -- that it is she who has the primary right to decide the disposition of her creation.

Why do we do that?

Because we have a value that says so.

That's circular.

I'm asking why we value that. Are we just gratuitously "valuing," or do we actually think that value aligns with some objective good or truth?

If we're doing it gratutiously, then it is NOT true that painters own the right to say anything about what happens in the disposition of what they create. It's totally a gratuitous claim, with no objective reality behind it.

But if it's actually better (in some sense; and we all think it is) to accord to the creator a right over the disposition of her creation, then WHY do we intuitively think that? If it's not gratuitious, there must be some real reasons behind it.

Those are the only two possibilities. Which shall we pick?

If I understand your usage of "gratuitous" correctly, then yeah, that's what I'm saying. Nothing about the universe makes the painter "correct" in thinking she can place it where she wants. In order for that to be true, a "moral right" would have to be sensible and true; and I doubt that.

So the painter's ought is gratuitously formed, and comes solely from her values. (And someone else may value her putting it where she wishes, too, so they do not interfere with her doing so). There is no objective reality behind it. You ask "if it's actually better..." but it is not, insofar as I don't know what it being "better" in some non-personal way, some objective way would mean.

So, on my view, the painter values her own property, and makes the hypothetical imperative "if I value controlling what I do with my painting, then I ought to put it where I want." She's not "correct" in a universal sense, she just experiences the feeling that she wants to put it where she wishes -- she instrumentally ought to put it where she wishes (the instrumentalism is that the ought is about satisfying her value). Someone else could reject this kind of value and think she shouldn't put it where she wishes, and they would not be "incorrect" any more than she is "correct," and vice versa (she's also not "incorrect" and her objector is not "correct").

Of course it's not a moral quality. On my view there is no moral anything until someone steps up to make a "moral truth" sensible.

"There is no moral anything" is too strong a claim, unless you have reasons for believing it. Personally not knowing the evidence isn't a strong enough reason.

Consider what happened when America had not been discovered. The king of Spain, say, might have said, "There is no continent across the seas until somebody steps up to make it sensible." That would be too strong. What he ought to say would be, "If there is a continent over there, I do not yet have reason to know there is." And that would be fair enough.

You don't know what would ground morality. Fair enough. That does not, however, warrant the belief there is none. It only warrants the claim, "If there is, Cat doesn't (yet) realize what it is."

I concede this point totally, I admit that being in a neutrally skeptical position is not easy with the English language. It is a lot more typing, for every claim, to say "well I'm not convinced that's true" rather than to just carry on as if it's not true. This is entirely colloquial speech and more about brevity than anything else.

You are right, I can't truly say "there is no moral anything," I can only say "I'm not convinced anything is moral." But it is taxing on speech to do this, so hopefully that is forgiven in the future where it might matter less. When it's important I do try to demarcate it. I will do my best to use my judgment on how carefully I need to speak on it.

As for the complex hierarchies claim, it is the observation that you note: people value some things more than they value others.

Then it's trivial.

For then, the hierarchies are arbitrary. That people happen to put some things higher than others, and others believe in different hierarchies tells us nothing about the legitimacy of any particular hierarchies. A value doesn't become "more valuable" simply because somebody happens to arbitrarily rank it "above" another.

But in fact, the very existence of hierarchies creates an additional problem for you to entertain: namely, that all hierarchies are criterial. People put one value higher than another for reasons, at least reasons they personally hold. (If they did not, they'd have no hierarchy of values, and they would simply be paralyzed in decision making. Because to make a decision is to make a definite choice about what to value in a given situation.) So what are the good reasons for making, say, the preserving of life "higher" than the eating of ice cream? Both are things people can "value," and everybody does, in fact, rank them hierarchically in relation to each other: on what basis can any such thing be done? What's the fundamental mechanism underneath the valuing and the creating of value hierarchies?

Indeed, which hierarchies are which are probably arbitrary if there isn't moral realism. I think that still accurately describes the world that we see either way: whether moral realism is true or not, it seems our value hierarchies just are what they are (because even on moral realism, some people value differently than others).

I am not convinced there is a good reason for making the preservation of life "higher" than the eating of ice cream. Valuing life more than ice cream wouldn't be correct while moral realism is unproven, indeed.

Now if the question is "why do more people seem to value life higher than ice cream than the other way around," I think that is just a question with a nature/nurture answer: that there are demographics of values humans hold (some are more popular than others), but that these demographics have nothing to do with moral truth. For instance I think altruism is a popular value because of evolutionary reasons and because societies instrumentally work better with concepts of altruism most of the time, so it's a popular value that has survived and flourished. I'm glad that it has, since it's a value I hold very dearly. But it's not that it "must" be the case, it's not that it "morally ought" to be the case: until those terms are given some kind of meaning.

I have given a very simple example involving only two values: I value property, I value life. I value life more.

Good example.

Why?

What criteria do you use to decide that life is of higher value than property? If they're both values, why don't you just value them equally?

Because some hard version of doxastic voluntarism is false: we don't choose what our values are. For some nature/nurture reason, I value life more than property. That doesn't mean it's universally correct that my value is this way, or "more" correct than someone with a different value. It's just the case that I value life more than property. I could speculate why my values are this way perhaps, though it may be some sort of just-so story (to use creationist language from the 90's, lol); but the important part is that I have the values I have because I just have them, I didn't choose them, I didn't arrive to them because of an argument (putting aside, for now, that our values can shift during belief revision). I have my values because of nature/nurture, and so does someone that has different values than me; neither of us is "correct" and neither of us is "incorrect."

I'm skipping over some responses that are about driving home the need to clarify my position that I have already clarified above.

Yeah, it follows that if all oughts are amoral (because they are all based on values, built by hypothetical imperatives), then "moral" does not have meaning, so it wouldn't make sense to say what Hitler did was "immoral." Correct.

Nor would it be "immoral" to gas homosexuals, because the word itself is without meaning.

I have to commend you on your rational consistency here. But about the morality of it, I think even intuitively, many people, including myself, would say you've clearly wandered into extremely dangerous territory, and possibly lost the thread of morality altogether here.

However, I don't think that's really the case. I believe you when you say you have a hierarchy of values. But I still have to know what criterion or criteria you personally employ to create that ranking.

I don't think that it's dangerous because I think it already describes the world that we see. Doxastic voluntarism is false. An altruist could go from a moral realist to a moral nonrealist and would still be an altruist (case in point: myself). People don't just become chaotic hedonists because that's not how values work.

If someone truly values not stealing, then even placed in a situation with something that they desperately want that isn't theirs, even with a 100% guarantee they wouldn't be caught, they will not steal it. Because that's what it means to value. If someone does do something like theft just because they believe they wouldn't be caught or punished, then it means they never actually valued not stealing in the first place (they valued not being punished!) This is sort of how like on the moral realist viewpoint, someone that doesn't kill just because they want to avoid Hell might not even be called a good person because they're only not killing because it's the consequences they fear rather than loving the good of not killing.

The world that we look at right now: I think my worldview describes it. Some people value things like altruism and not stealing. Some people value things like selfishness and just not getting caught and punished. My worldview on it seems accurate in that it describes the world that we see. I also think it's parsimonious in that it doesn't posit the existence of a mysterious thing like "universal good" or "moral oughts" while still correctly modeling the world that we see.

If I compare my worldview to moral realism's worldview, I can see why my worldview describes the world. When I look at moral realism's worldview, and compare it to the world, it confuses me: "but then why is there so much stuff that's ostensibly bad going on? What 'good' did the moral realism do if the moral realist world looks just like the world without it?" We have talked about that a little bit. This part isn't an argument, by the way, just me navel gazing about it.

Don't get me wrong, I don't think a world without moral realism is bleak. In fact it gives me great hope. I think it's up to people that value altruism and empathy and all these values that people like you and I have (I believe we do share a lot of values, perhaps not all, but enough that we might call each other "good people"!) to spread those values, maintain those values -- because we better believe people that don't share them will be trying to spread and maintain theirs! So it's hopeful in the sense that it implies we can do things with our values like trying to shape the world closer to them. Even if there's nothing about our values that are "right" and others' that are "wrong," they are still our values, and we can root for them. We must root for them, perhaps: that's what it means to have a value. Just as our "value enemies" must root for theirs, I suppose.

What does it mean to say I should value X?

It would appear to mean that if your value hierarchy is different, you're wrong. But we won't know why until we explain how hierarchies are assembled in the first place.

Well, I meant something more like this. On my worldview, our value hierarchies aren't right or wrong, they just are. On the moral realism worldview, some are right, some are wrong, some are "more" right, some are "more" wrong. But I don't understand what this means. I understand a personal value leading to saying "x is right," it just means x aligns with the personal values. But I don't know what it means for there to be a "universal right," or "intrinsic right."

I think that's a nonsensical phrase. But I think this is why some theists just say, "well, ok, so it's universally right if God thinks it's right (to be specific: if God's thinking it is right is what makes it right)." That's DCT. But that's problematic because it's not really moral realism, it's just one whim being the foundation rather than any whim being the foundation. "X is right" might as well just be replaced with "X is what God values." On its surface that does solve the problem: everyone can universally decide what is "right" by simply checking to see what God values about the thing. But the problem comes as soon as we ask "ought we to value what God thinks about it?" and I don't think we get an answer to that. There would be no explanation for why you should care what God thinks. God has power to back it up, but maybe you don't care that God has power to back it up. It's still just subjective under DCT, no matter what we try to do to get realism into the picture. It's "more" objective in that a lot of moral questions become simple (ok, well what does God think on the matter?), but not objective because we can't answer why one "ought" to care what God thinks on the matter.

We couldn't even say "well, God thinks you ought to care," because why ought you care about that? And you get an infinite regress that never really goes anywhere. So moral realism just isn't possible on DCT.

But if DCT isn't true, then we're still stuck trying to answer what it would mean to have something like a "universal good." What does that even mean? This is what I'm trying to get answered. It feels like it would mean there's just something about the universe that makes some things undeniably "good" and some things undeniably "bad," which everyone must agree on inspection. But for one, nobody does seem to agree even on inspection, and secondly, what does it even mean to be "good" at that point if it's not compared to values?

It's the same as asking what it means for there to be something about the universe that means we ought to do something, and not in the instrumentalist way: we just ought to. Why? What does that mean? It's really the is/ought gap. How do we get from "there are humans" to "we ought not murder them" without invoking valuing humans on a personal level? It all just doesn't form any kind of cognitive content, it's a confused mess, and I think it's a confused mess even for moral realists. I doubt moral realists really form a good picture if they examined it intently. I think they form just enough of a picture to talk about it colloquially (like I can, when I "put on my moral realist hat" in some of these examples), but that doesn't mean the terms being used hold up under examination.

So that's what I was asking. What does it mean to say I should, in some universal way, in some way that isn't based on values itself, value X?

Not quite. You're missing an element.

The jokers in the pink hats, or the pinheads burning down neighbourhoods don't just want to yell "I value rebellion." They want to tell me I should, as well. They want others to agree with their cause. That's why they hold up the signs, chant the slogans, seek out media opportunities, stage events, burn things, and so on. They hope and expect to effect changes in other people's value structures, to make them more favourable to their particular revolutionary goals.

But on what basis? Do they not want to self-present as "liberators?" And do they not want us to believe that being such a "liberator" is "better" than being a proponent of the status quo?

But if they don't believe racism is intrinsically wrong, say, then on what basis can they expect to change my mind? Are they nothing more than empty propagandists, hoping to convince me by nothing but show of force?

I don't think they are. I think they actually think they are, in some sense, "right." And they want me to believe they're "right," and to want to be "right" too, and that society itself won't be "right" until the laws and systems change to accommodate their view of the "right."

Moralizing is intrinsic to all social justice claims. So without morality, goodbye social justice. Instead, what you get is merely social upheaval, gratuitous destruction with no promise of "progress" at all.

For "justice" itself is a moral value. And a conception of "justice" must be argued for. We don't all have the same one.

My answer to this is simply that most people are not philosophers, and for historical reasons, most people are nominally moral realists. But I also think most people can't give an account of moral realism, or even attempt to. So sure, some social justice people are probably operating under the illusion of moral realism. I don't deny that. Most humans do.

But if everyone woke up tomorrow suddenly as skeptical of moral realism as I am, nothing would change about who they are and what values they have. The world would continue to work in exactly the same way. The language people use would just slightly change its meaning. But I submit that it would actually just clarify what's going on. The social justice person would still value what they value and they would still attempt to get people to undergo belief revision to align their values closer to social justice, it would still all carry on the same way.

So, I need to know what goodness is.

I think you do. But only intuitively. The intellectual task is to make that intuitive knowledge more conscious and rational.

I need help doing that, as I described above. When I try to make sense of it, I come up with nothing. I don't feel as though I'm a stupid woman, either; nor do I feel like it's for lack of trying.

But what does having the property of goodness mean on the moral realism view? Does it mean the person values the intrinsically good (but then what is that)?

Ultimately? It means to value God for that property. And it means to value things because of that property in them, the property which is only perfectly realized in God Himself.

This is so close to something cognizable, I think. So people value goodness as a property, so they would value God for having the most of that property: that's completely sensible. But that doesn't tell us what the property is that's being valued, though.

It would not work to say that "being good" is "being Godlike" because then we must ask "in what respect?" If we say it is in respect to God's behavior and beliefs, then we're saying that we value people behaving like God and value God the most for behaving the most like God -- which sounds reasonable on its face, until you realize this is just flirting with (and may arrive to, or not, depending on where you go with this) describing DCT (where goodness is defined by God's behavior). We could always ask "well what if someone doesn't value God's behavior?" It doesn't answer why they "ought" to, and according to moral realism, there must be something that means they "ought" to regardless of their own values. And that doesn't make any cognitive sense. So, this is getting closer to some cognizable schema, but it's not quite there.

I can see why you're perplexed. Like Euthyphro, you continue to insist that "goodness" must exist in a sort of Platonic difference from God. But again, if there is no separating the terms "what God likes" and "what is good," then you're perplexing yourself with trying to separate into two things that which is inherently one.

God may like the set of all things which are good -- every single element of that set -- but it is still important to ask whether the elements of that set are good because God likes them, or if they are called "good" for some other reason and God happens to like them. That is important for a lot of metaphysical and even ontological reasons.

For instance, an unie may like every yellow thing in existence: in the set of all yellow objects, an unie likes every single element of that set. But it's clear that the things in that set aren't yellow because an unie likes all of them (the unie's liking them isn't causal to their being yellow): there is a metaphysical distinction there. The proposition, "The elements in the set of all yellow objects are yellow because an unie likes them all" is clearly false.

Consider the proposition, "The elements in the set of all good things are good because God likes them all." It's less clearly false than the unie/yellow example, perhaps, but it's still an important question. God liking all good things doesn't mean that all good things are good because God likes them -- not unless DCT is true, because that is what DCT is: God having a causal role in defining goodness through His likes. That's what DCT is.

So, we must ask: if the set of all good things is defined by God liking their elements, then DCT is true. If the elements in the set of all good things are good because of some other reason (usually just said "because they are good"), then God liking every last one of them can still be true yet not play a causal role in why they are good.

It's an important, crucial distinction. If God's liking the elements in the set is what defines them as good, then DCT is true. (Do not take the word "command" too seriously. It is just about whether God's values in any way definitionally sets what is good). Otherwise the elements in the set are good for some other reason, and God just likes them all. But then we must understand what makes them good.

There's no escaping this: either DCT is true (God's valus definitionally makes what is good), or something else defines what is good and God just participates passively by liking what is good because it is good.

The utterance "if adultery is wrong, it is because God is faithful" does demand an answer to whether adultery is wrong because God is faithful (and so DCT is true*),

Well, I'm afraid that's just a Non-sequitur. It does not follow from what you say that DCT is entailed at all.

If the reason that unfaithfulness is evil is because God is faithful, it does not follow that commanding it makes it so. Rather, it follows that God is faithful, and that makes unfaithfulness immoral; and consequently, because He is also truthful and just, He commands us to be faithful too. But the command, so to speak, does no work in that equation. It is an after-the-fact issuance. We are told (or commanded) to be faithful because faithfulness is already moral, because God is already faithful and true.

So DCT is NOT true, on this account. Divine Command does not make things righteous. Rather, they are commanded because they are righteous, and righteous because they reflect the character of God.

If “good” is defined as “reflecting the character of God” then what part of the character of God is “good” reflecting? Unless I’m quite mistaken, it can only mean God’s values!

If “good” is defined as “what God values” we don’t have a reason to value what God values.

If it’s said “it’s good to value what God values,” then by the definition of “good” that just means “God values that you value what God values.”

But what if you don’t care what God values? Why ought you value what God values?

What does “ought” mean, contextually?

We have instrumentalist oughts: S ought to do y if S values x and y furthers x

(S experiences a want to do y because y furthers S’s valuation of x, this want to do y is the “ought”)

We have moral oughts: S ought to do x because x is good

But on the above definition of “good,” we can amend this definition to read:

S ought to do x because x is what God values

But this seems incomplete! Why ought S care what God values if S has her own values? We can’t say that S experiences a want to do x under this supposition (since S’s values are different than God’s), so while we could understand an “ought” as a want in the instrumentalist definition, how do we understand what the “ought” is in the moral definition?

We can’t just use a circular definition by saying S has an obligation to do some x that God values, or a duty to do some x that God values, or that S “should” do some x that God values, or any such thing because the next question will always be “well what does that mean if it’s not a want to do x?”

We can’t say “well an ought is when you have to do x even if you don’t want to do x,” because why do you “have to,” it’s just another synonym for ought?

If an ought is not a want driven by your own personal values, what is it at all?

One problem with that "should" you've inserted there: there is absolutely nothing that God has not created. So anything that has any property, is ultimately indebted to Him for that property, in that He makes it possible and real in the first place.

But moral properties and physical properties are, as you and I both know, quite different things. And nobody believes that God possesses in Himself all physical properties, as if they were all "excellencies" or "great-making properties," (to quote Plantinga). Moral properties ARE great-making properties: yellowness is not. Length is not. They are mere physical properties, and contingent ones, too.

Your post greatly cleared up a lot of uncertainties I had over what you were saying, this was a really good post. Moving on from there as some of those comments I was making don't matter now that I get you better.

P.S. -- See? I told you we'd soon find something to chew over. It wasn't long, was it?

Yeah, I'm having fun. Hope you are too!

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is moral is supposed to be universal ...

Yes...

Since political systems are not accepted by all, they cannot be associated with morality.

That doesn't mean that universal assent is what makes morality moral. That's absurd, and obviously wrong.

Where did I state "universal assent"??

Morality is "universal" in the sense that even if every single person on the planet failed to believe it at all, it would still be true. It's so universal that it doesn't depend on anyone's mere opinion.

This is what I meant.

In this, it's like reality. Because reality does not change, no matter what people believe. When every person on the Earth thought there was no such thing as bacteria, that did not mean bacteria did not exist. All it meant was that a lot of people were wrong.

What is reality is independent of individual[s] beliefs and opinion. Reality which is 'all there is' including humans therein is entangled with humans and humanity.

So if the entire planet decided that murdering children was acceptable, they would still all be wrong about that, because the objective truth of morality would remain that murdering children is evil. And God would still know what the moral truth was, even if every person on the planet lost the idea.

It is not that they are wrong with the above, but rather they have the intuition murdering children is evil which is driven by an inherent moral potential and drive within all humans. God is illusory, thus whatever morality is assigned to God is pseudo-morality.

As for politics, political systems immediately involve morality. Because political systems involve the way we treat other people. So we can't even design a political system without already having in mind some view of what is right or wrong treatment of others. And we can be right or wrong about what we think.

I would suggest that to accord others dignity, rights and respect is right, and to tyrannize or propagandize them is immoral. And that would mean, all the time, and regardless of what society we were in, or what the people there thought. But even if I were wrong about that, God would know the truth. And He would be right, even when I was wrong.

As I had stated the fundamental function of politics is to govern the affairs of the state.
While politics is involved in deterring evil it also condoned and engaged in evil, i.e. wars, capital punishment, permit abortion, etc. As such this deterrence of evil is a political act and not a moral act per se.

Since morality is about absolutely good and absolutely no evil, politics cannot be conflated nor be associated with morality.

What is morality-proper involved the development of the moral potential by each individual on their own [supported by NGOs, government efforts, society at large, etc.] to the extent that each individual will act morally in a spontaneous manner without external enforcement or threats.

This spontaneity of the inherent moral drive had been going on via evolution and you will note the majority [7 billion people] do not simply kill anyone arbitrary upon any conflict situations.

The knowledge of morality by the majority and most is not in alignment with reality, i.e. they still associate morality with judgments of right or wrong and rely on morality from an illusory God .

But since the moral development at present is not up to expectation [i.e. there are the minority still committing all sorts of evil acts] it is imperative that humanity expedite the progress of the inherent moral potential by recognizing this inherent moral mechanisms.

My point, morality [absolute good] must be independent from politics [doing good at the same time doing evil].

[Dontaskme]

There is no such thing as a 'theist' or an 'atheist' except as concept known.

Back to drama and irrationality?

Okay, bye.

Point to the one who knows god?

You can’t can you can.

Because your claim is irrational and dramatic fantasy.

Ok adios.


Be careful on your journey to further, movement goes nowhere the only place there is.

[Dontaskme]

I was merely speaking of the logical entailments of Atheism. I would never venture to speak of your own moral condition, since I obviously have absolutely no way of knowing it. That, I think, should be quite obvious, no?

And I think I've been clear in my statements to the effect that Atheists generally tend to be better in their practices than Atheism itself gives them a rationale for being. I don't think I can be kinder. After all, it's Atheism itself that does not allow for any objectivity being ascribed to moral judgments. It's not me.

Absolutization is dramatization.

Point to an ''Atheist''

See if you can physically touch an 'Atheist' ?

You can't can you?

Until you can do that, it'll be just more drama from another cosmic imposter. (Comics R US )

The devil is in the details. Lets just get straight to the point. See if you can point to the point without obscuring it with your finger.

You can't do it can you.

[Dontaskme]

But what would make us feel "shame," since in a world without God, we don't "owe" anybody to do anything different?

A questioner realises that there is only the knowing of experience and that no practice brings us closer to ourself.

All experience is made out of consciousness. We're all this consciousness. Which is just another word for God, and bye the way, there is no consciousness without consciousness.

Awareness is the carrier of all shameful experience. The knowing of our experience does not take place in subject-object relationship. It's just an appearance within one. The only knowing there is.

You really need to keep it simple IC...your posts are just getting more and more irrational and dramatic, like trying to understand Algebra while completely wasted and pissed out of ones mind.

Why do you keep including this other you in your discussion, as if you have two heads, which is not unheard of in your case.

[Age]

in general it's very good that we tend to cooperate and share.

As I say: Compassion, or strategy, might lead you to share (to choose to share), but you have no (moral) obligation to.

Do you have a 'moral obligation' to do anything?

If yes, then what is that or are they?

[Age]

I do not believe in God, because the existence of God is not a viable proposition.

An interesting claim.

I'm not sure what "not viable" means, though. It's certainly a proposition that most people do accept, and some do not. But "viable"?

Weighed against the standards I currently expect of myself, some of my past actions and behaviours have fallen morally short.

I'm sure we could all say that.

But what would make us feel "shame," since in a world without God, we don't "owe" anybody to do anything different?

"Other" human beings.

The only reason you began to feel 'shame' was because of "other" human beings, and absolutely nothing else.

.and according to Atheism, there is simply no actual standard to fall short of.

If that is actually the case, then I am not an atheist; I am just a person who does not believe in God, or gods, and does not follow a religion.

Fair enough.

But I'm not sure why the believing in a God would not be a "viable" proposition, then. It would rather seem like one that was "viable" but not being chosen, because disbelief was also a "viable" proposition.

Shame" would then have to be described as a sort of mental dysfunction, wherein one believes one is culpable for something that was actually never "wrong" in the first place; and the cure would be simply to convince oneself of the truth of Atheism, see there's no guilt possible, and let oneself off the hook.

I am going to be gracious, IC, and dignify that disgraceful comment with a response:

I'm sorry -- did something of that seem "disgraceful" to you? It wasn't intended as such. I was merely pointing out what the Atheist worldview would logically imply. It would imply that "guilt" was never justified.

"immanuel can" comes up with these Truly ABSURD notions, based solely upon its OWN BELIEFS, and absolutely nothing else.

Because "immanuel can" has no actual proof for its own beliefs it has to resort to absurdity, like just exampled.

It would mean that the feeling of such was a kind of mental disorder, not at all reflective of any reality.

I have already explained what I believe to be the source of our morality, and the feeling of shame is a crucial element in its functioning. To be incapable of feeling guilt and shame would be an indication of a mental dysfunction.

Well, I do agree with that. But I don't see how it squares with Atheism.

You do NOT see how it squares with "atheism" BECAUSE you only BELIEVE "theism" is true.

See you could NOT see how absolutely ANY thing squares with "atheism" because you BELIEVE wholeheartedly that God exists. Although you are not able to provide one 'sound and valid argument' for God.

If there's no such thing as a "sin," then neither is there any legitimate feeling of "guilt."

Just because you BELIEVE there is 'sin', then in no way means that a so-called "atheist" believes nor thinks that there is no such thing as a 'sin'.

The amount of what are called 'red-herrings' you throw about in here is getting ridiculous "immanuel can".

Why should one feel "guilty" for things that, according to one's lights, are just not wrong?

If one knows or believes that they are not doing wrong, then they would NOT feel guilty. How much simpler and easier could this get.

Tell me, does the arrogance with which you seem to think you are entitled to tell me that I am incapable of feeling regret, shame and guilt because I don't believe in God,

Oh, I did not say any such thing. I beg your pardon, if you thought I did.

Acting all innocent and apologetic now.

Either you are Truly ignorant of the way you judge, ridicule, and 'argue' to 'try to' belittle, the "other", or your attempts of innocence, apologies, and regret are just absolutely shallow, as you will continue to do this again and again. As you will, once again, prove me here irrefutably True, once more.

I was merely saying that the Atheist view allows that there is no reason for "shame" or "guilt."

WHEN did you conjure up this absurd notion, and, from WHAT, exactly?

But "regret" would be different: one can feel that merely if one misses an opportunity. That's not necessarily provoked by wrongdoing.

'you', human beings, learn to feel 'shame' and 'guilt' because of the way 'you', adult human beings, treated 'you', as a child.

And the way 'you' speak AT, and TO, "others" here "immanuel can" is a PRIME EXAMPLE of that Wrongdoing.

'you' are just copying your learned ways, and have just NOT YET grown up.

...your capacity to practice the morality you insist I cannot possess?

You'll find I never said this, either.

In fact, what I said that was that I would not compare myself with you in any way, and have plenty of my own shortcomings. I'm at a loss how that came to look to you as if I were claiming "a morality you cannot possess".

Well, you've got me wrong, H. I was merely speaking of the logical entailments of Atheism.

But they are NOT 'logical entailments' of "atheism". Instead they are your DISTORTED views of "athesim". Which have come from and are a result of just being a DIE HARD "theist".

I would never venture to speak of your own moral condition, since I obviously have absolutely no way of knowing it. That, I think, should be quite obvious, no?

The 'superiority complex', which you strongly possess and SHOW OFF here "Immanuel can" so frequently, never ceases to amaze.

Even when what you say and claim has been POINTED OUT to be so Wrong and DISTORTED you still manage to turn it on to the other as be LESS THAN 'you'.

And I think I've been clear in my statements to the effect that Atheists generally tend to be better in their practices than Atheism itself gives them a rationale for being. I don't think I can be kinder. After all, it's Atheism itself that does not allow for any objectivity being ascribed to moral judgments. It's not me.

Your words "immanuel can" can be some of the best attempts at being the MOST DECEITFUL I have seen here.

[Dontaskme]

Interesting claim.

How is a claim interesting to someone like you IC?

Is that what you find interesting these days?

Point to the ''claimer'' IC ..then ask it to make a claim

You can't do it can you.

Everyone knows you are just being a poser...you are the poster boy for who can tell the biggest whopper.

Just tell the truth IC, it's not that difficult. Don't be ashamed. No one will condemn you for confessing the truth IC, that's for sure.

Bye the way, this belief in God you have can only exist in the mental sphere of conscious knowing...aka the mind.

Now point to the mind IC...

See, you cannot do it can you, is that because the mind is just a myth? can an illusion know it is an illusion IC ?

[Harbal]

I'm not sure what "not viable" means, though. It's certainly a proposition that most people do accept, and some do not. But "viable"?

The notion of God goes contrary to what we know about nature and the universe, and it certainly goes contrary to my own experience of the world. Things like God just don't happen. God goes against the logic that I use to make sense of the world, and why would I suspend a logic that works for me unless I had a pressing reason to do so? When an idea does not conform to logic that you have hitherto found to be reliable, you tend to think of it as being unviable.

But what would make us feel "shame," since in a world without God, we don't "owe" anybody to do anything different?

Firstly, Even if I were to accept the possibility of their being God, it does not necessarily follow that I would believe we owed him anything. Why would I think I owed God anything? I haven't asked God for anything, or entered into any agreement with him.

Is shame purely a thing that you feel when you consider how you must appear in the eyes of others? If so, I am more concerned about how I appear in the eyes of my fellow human beings than in the eyes of God. You do not need to believe in God to be capable of feeling remorse; I and many others are proof of that.

I'm sorry -- did something of that seem "disgraceful" to you? It wasn't intended as such. I was merely pointing out what the Atheist worldview would logically imply. It would imply that "guilt" was never justified. It would mean that the feeling of such was a kind of mental disorder, not at all reflective of any reality.

I think your whole position on this issue is disgraceful. You are implying that anyone who doesn't believe what you believe is morally less than you. As for what you claim to be the logical implications of atheism; you are wrong. If God can come up with moral directives, that means that coming up with moral directives is possible, and if it is possible, I and anyone else can also come up with them. And if it is possible to feel guilt under God's judgement, then it is also possible to feel it under your own.

I was merely saying that the Atheist view allows that there is no reason for "shame" or "guilt."

So you are here not only as spokesman for the Christian view, but you have also appointed yourself as the definative authority of the atheist view. I obviously belong to a different denomination of atheism than the one you describe above.

I was merely speaking of the logical entailments of Atheism.

No you weren't. You were making a false claim as to what the logical entailments of atheism are.

[Iwannaplato]

in general it's very good that we tend to cooperate and share.

As I say: Compassion, or strategy, might lead you to share (to choose to share), but you have no (moral) obligation to.

Yeah, yeah. I don't really think in terms of moral obligations. Compassion, sure, empathy, sure, well wishing sure, urges to protect some people, sure, etc.

[Belinda]

in general it's very good that we tend to cooperate and share.

As I say: Compassion, or strategy, might lead you to share (to choose to share), but you have no (moral) obligation to.

Yeah, yeah. I don't really think in terms of moral obligations. Compassion, sure, empathy, sure, well wishing sure, urges to protect some people, sure, etc.

In your own interest you have a practical obligation to share. If nobody shared anything everybody would suffer.

Enlightened self-interest is a philosophy in ethics which states that persons who act to further the interests of others (or the interests of the group or groups to which they belong), ultimately serve their own self-interest. [1] It has often been simply expressed by the belief that an individual, group, or even a commercial entity will "do well by doing good

[Iwannaplato]

In your own interest you have a practical obligation to share. If nobody shared anything everybody would suffer.

That doesn't really contradict what I wrote to henry. Further, here's what I wrote earlier in the thread in a previous post to him...
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=35271&p=588206&hilit=komodo#p588206

[Belinda]

She is a right bitch.

Probably the opinion of a man who has been bitten.

Don't get me wrong but I'd prefer a tickle to a fickle.

It's the shock of the new that stimulates us to learn than we did before fortune tickled our inventiveness.