IS and OUGHT

[Immanuel Can]

There are political oughts, i.e. what ought to be the ideal or optimal political system.

That's a moral question. You just don't realize it is.

You can't rightfully impose on people an evil political arrangement, no matter how well it works for purposes you may like. That's totalitarianism. And the question of whether or not totalitarianism is evil is essential to any political conversation.

So you can't separate ethics from politics. If you imagine you can, then you're being naive, at best, or at worst, mendacious.

[Immanuel Can]

Of course, I hadn't suggested lying to or indoctrinating anybody. Though I suppose I suggested if people could be convinced not to defend moral realism, you might perceive this as "lying" or "indoctrinating" since it's the position you hold. But it was all idle talk anyway, and we should just move on

Sorry...I wasn't intending to imply you would personally do that. That's why I said "we." Rather, I was trying to suggest that even if it was a strategy likely to get a better hearing for my own side, I thought we ought to reject doing it by that strategy.

I think people should believe me, if they do, for only one reason: because they have weighed the arguments and decided it's the truth. So to use indoctrinatory techniques, even to convince them of the "right" things, would be, in my view, wrong. Why people believe is as important as what they believe.

I do wonder about your last sentence: "If it's just her, that is nothing against slavery... unless she's actually, objectively right about slavery being evil." That seems to suggest that if slavery is evil, then that is something "against" slavery. Yet the moral realist believes this is a world of moral realism and slavery still exists, what's "against" it*?

Rightness. The moral realist believes that slavery is just not right. It's ultimately offensive to God and offensive against man. It's just plain, objectively wrong.

Now, what's to be done about that? The Abolitionist movement shows us exactly what was to be done: slavery must be stopped. And so it was: not by subjectivists or relativists, but by moral objectivists grounded firmly in the conviction that injustices like that must not be allowed to persist. It was not a moral noncognitivist who arranged the banning of slavery in the British Empire; it was an evangelical Christian named William Wilberforce, who gave his whole life to it, seeing it only achieved at his death. And the men who marched against the South at Antietam or Gettysburg did so to the sound of hymns, firm in the conviction that God was against slavery.

There were also those that marched at Antietam firm in their conviction that God approved of slavery.

On the South, you mean? Obviously, yes. There were probably even a few on the North. But Abolitionism was strongly driven by theology; of that, there is no doubt. And it's not by accident that anthems like "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" rang out on the Union side.

Let's not say "owns." Let's just say, "Who has the legitimate right to say what a person should do: the person herself, or God?"

So if we combine this attempt at a definition with P2 above, we end up with the following:
P1) God is the creator of all people
P2) To be a creator carries the right to say what their creation should do
C) God has a right to say what all people do

...it just includes the conclusion in question as a premise.

I don't see that it does. You must be interpreting something in a way I'm not anticipating. Perhaps in your word "carrying"?

I do not accept P2, so I need an argument for why P2 is true.

I started to offer one.

God is a candidate for that rule, by way of being Creator. Even if we're not sure He's the right candidate, that much is obvious. Creating something does give at least some claim to justification in saying what happens to one's creation, no? If I create a painting, say, it's pretty obvious that I have some justification in having a say as to where it hangs. Maybe somebody else has more; but I certainly have some. It is, after all, something that owes its very existence to me.

So far, so good.

Who's the rival candidate?

But let's reverse the case, and see if it makes more sense. Let's suppose, for example, that you suppose that God is not the rightful owner of people...and maybe they somehow "own themselves". Perhaps you do believe it. Anyway, let's try it out.

Q1 -- People are created by God
Q2 --
C -- Therefore, people own themselves.

Can you make that syllogism work?

(Note that I have changed "P's" to "Q's" in this quote so that we don't mix up these premises with the premises a few paragraphs above)

Q1) People are created by God
Q2) God wants people to have agency

Wait -- you've just conceded my conclusion. You've assumed that what "God wants" must have some justification in the case.

Q3) To have agency materially implies having one's own values
Q4) Nobody can force one to have different values than one possesses already

Pause again: from what are these "values" to be derived? From the fact that one has inner urges toward them, perhaps? Or from the fact that one finds one somehow "already believes" them, perhaps? But you must have a better answer than those, surely, since those things don't at all compel the belief that those values are right or good in any way, or that a contingent, fallible being is owed them. So you'll have to make that case.

Q5) Values are used with hypothetical imperatives to build oughts

Now you've just assumed your own conclusion. I don't think this is true at all.

Q6) There is no evidence there is an ought that isn't built on a hypothetical imperative

Here you've reversed the proper burden of proof: an "ought" must be argued for. We cannot simply say that we can't think of an argument against it, therefore the existence of an "ought" is our default assumption. You need to show that an "ought" IS built on a hypothetical imperative, and show it positively.

Q7) All demonstrable* oughts a person might be subject to are constructed by their own values

Again, you've only assumed your conclusion. There's no reason a person has to think this is true, and in fact, it's pretty evidently false. One big stroke against it is the fact that values change. They don't just change between people, either; they change within the same person, over time. So you can't "ought" to honour something that has no stable identity over time.

That a person happens, at one moment, to "value" something tells us absolutely nothing about the justification of that value. And if it were even potentially justifiable, it would also be unchanging.

You would need a very odd sort of argument to think otherwise, such as "Anything a person believes at a given moment is always true/good/right." And I don't think anybody's going to see merit in that.

C) Therefore, people are the only ones that determine what they ought to do

I don't think that's obvious. The argument for it isn't sound, and there are additional prima facie problems with it. How can we look to a contingent, transient and fallible being as lone grounds for an immutable and binding justification to the effect that they are self-determining? That's bootstrapping.

A defense of Q5 would be to point out that we form oughts out of hypothetical imperatives all the time. "You better get dressed or we're gonna be late,"

Ah. I see that you're still mistaking an instrumental imperative for a moral one. They're not the same at all.

There are different kinds of "oughts" in the world.

One "ought" is arbitrary. "You ought to give me your ice cream cone, or I'll bash you."
Another is about probability. "The sun ought to come up at 7 tomorrow."
Another is about instrumentality. "If you want the car to start, you ought to flip the air filter."
Only some oughts are moral. "You ought not to kill your brother."

Confusing these various oughts confuses the conversation and creates nonsense. That's what you did above. "You'd better get dressed" is an instrumental instruction, presupposing that we don't want to be late, and this is the instrumental means to getting us to be on time. But it's not in any way moral...unless you mean that arriving later is a sin, which I don't think you do.

Q6 is the basic contention of this whole discussion. One would need to defeat Q6 by explaining how an ought can exist without a hypothetical imperative to give it (the ought) substance/cognitivity.

As I say, the opposite would be the case. You would need to show that a hypothetical imperative even CAN entail an "ought" of a moral kind. And in the example you gave above, it obviously entails only an instrumental one.

I don't see how a hypothetical can imply imperative morality, unless the morality is already assumed: as when we assume that arriving late is a sin.

Now that we have the burden of proof right, can you show an example of a hypothetical imperative that compels a moral conclusion?

I actually think that if it can be established that there are oughts which are not formed by hypothetical imperatives, that will ultimately be the same thing as establishing there is intrinsic purpose. So I think the two things are so closely related as to be dominoes by which one is shown as soon as the other is.

That seems right.

I just also think this is how moral oughts are built: "If I value property, then I ought not to steal."

The problem, of course, is that moral "oughts" are not affirmations of what we want, but constraints on what we are inclined toward doing.

"If I value property, then I ought not to steal" is instrumental, because all it describes is the efficacious method for achieving a goal I already take for granted. But "If I really, really want your brooch, I still ought not to steal it" is moral, because it tells me what will be right regardless of my inclinations, and even contrary to them.

Again, the difference between instrumental and moral reasoning is huge. And it's marked by a discord between my instinctive inclinations and the "ought" proposed.

We need no moral edict, "Thou shalt not bash thyself in the head with a brick," because nobody wants to do it. But we do need "Thou shalt not gossip," because everybody does."

I am really confused by your position here. On one hand you say "I argue they [good and God] are identical," when I ask "so what is goodness?" you respond "God." (period), but now you say that "goodness is a predication of God."

A "predication" points to an attribute of something, but does not indicate its totality.

IC is male is one accurate predication of IC. But IC is not all males, nor maleness itself, nor the sum-and-total of maleness. IC is tall. IC is of a particular age. IC is argumentative, perhaps.

God has this distinctive, though: that when one speaks of something like goodness, that God is not merely a possessor of a feature that can be equally applied to other things, as IC is. God is, Himself, the origin point, paragon of, and ultimate possessor of that quality, such that all further predications to other things are derived from Him.

So when we say, IC Is good, we would literally be saying, "IC is a palid reflection of that ultimate goodness that originates and is exhibited in God." To the extent that IC Is really good, he would be God-like. For God is the wellspring and ultimate possessor of the quality being attributed, much more conditionally and remotely, to IC.

(IC does not, however, regard himself as "good." He's merely using the key moral quality to illustrate the point.)

So we're not saying "God = goodness," as if God were Himself NOTHING BUT the abstract quality of "goodness," but that goodness is a correct predication of God. So is holiness. So is love, and justice, and righteousness...But all of these, God alone has in absolute quality. Any other predications are derived only by analogy and association with His pure love, justice and holiness.

P.S. -- Still not wanting to touch Jenner, eh?

As I said, I felt we completed that topic in the gender essentialism thread, so unless some new concept comes out of it that's pertinent and interesting that hasn't already been discussed and felt to be concluded, then yeah, I'll probably skip it

Well, I won't insist. But I'm pretty certain the transers are coming for you, as soon as they feel they've finished with the "heteronormatives." Once they do that, you're going to be competing with them for the right interpretation of the dysphoric, pubescent female. And I haven't noticed that the transers have any inclination at all to compromise. You can see that from their treatment of both Feminists and Detransers.

You're going to need the concept of "normalcy" or at least of "nature" when that happens. You're going to need an argument showing that transing is not the correct interpretation, in fact.

Don't burn all your engines-of-war on the castle of normativity; you're going to need them when the orcs come calling.

[Astro Cat]

So if we combine this attempt at a definition with P2 above, we end up with the following:
P1) God is the creator of all people
P2) To be a creator carries the right to say what their creation should do
C) God has a right to say what all people do

...it just includes the conclusion in question as a premise.

I don't see that it does. You must be interpreting something in a way I'm not anticipating. Perhaps in your word "carrying"?

I do not accept P2, so I need an argument for why P2 is true.

I started to offer one.

God is a candidate for that rule, by way of being Creator. Even if we're not sure He's the right candidate, that much is obvious. Creating something does give at least some claim to justification in saying what happens to one's creation, no? If I create a painting, say, it's pretty obvious that I have some justification in having a say as to where it hangs. Maybe somebody else has more; but I certainly have some. It is, after all, something that owes its very existence to me.

So far, so good.

Who's the rival candidate?

My position is that all oughts are constructed by hypothetical imperatives (but I mean this weakly: as of right now, I don't assert that there are no oughts that aren't constructed in such a way, I am skeptical there are such oughts). Below, you draw a distinction between instrumentalist oughts and moral oughts, and I think I'm understanding the language being used a little better to help you understand my view: on my view, what you call moral oughts don’t exist, but people think instrumentalist oughts are moral oughts mistakenly, because the entire point of noncognitivism is skepticism that there are moral oughts. So on my view, the moral realist is making a mistake when he thinks oughts are "moral oughts," they are really probably just instrumentalist oughts.

If to have a moral ought necessarily entails having an ought that is true outside of a hypothetical imperative, which it appears from your usage of the words that it does, then obviously I am skeptical that there are any moral oughts as you use the term. Previously, when I was saying "this ought is moral," I was using the term in a way that just indicated whether a question is historically called moral and didn't mean to impart any kind of actual special status to an idea other than that it has historically been named a certain way.

So, when I was using the term "moral," I was never implying that the ought was anything other than instrumentalist and built on a hypothetical imperative. To me the term is like calling some convention "an American convention," it just contextualizes something rather than proffering it a special status. That is where I think some confusion between us has occurred, and perhaps now that you know that, that will help.

I think the word "moral" could still be useful on noncognitivism, used to mean something other than a "true ought"/ought without a hypothetical, for instance it could be used to demarcate oughts built on values that deal with whether suffering is involved somehow or not because people tend to have heightened emotional responses to such values enough to warrant a name for it, but I will refrain from doing that for now so we minimize confusion in terms.

So what I will pledge to do starting from here on out to avoid confusion is to use the terms "instrumentalist" and "moral" as you understand them, and try to avoid the use of the word "moral" in the way that I think would still be convenient. So if I talk about an ought formed by a hypothetical imperative against theft (e.g., if I value property, then I ought not to steal), then I will call it an instrumentalist ought and not a moral ought. When I refer to your conception of an ought existing, being true, but not formed by a hypothetical imperative, I will call it a moral ought.

So you should understand that my basic contention is that moral oughts don't exist, or at least I have never seen a convincing argument that they do. I'm skeptical of them. I don't think they're cognitive, I don't know what it would mean for one to be true, and so the absence of evidence for them in all my years of exploring moral realism has come to look a lot like evidence of absence.

Now, getting back to your response about the painter. On my view, I'm not convinced even that a painter has a right that isn't formed by a hypothetical imperative to what happens to his painting (I guess we could call it a "moral right" if it's not formed by a hypothetical imperative). I think the painter values having some control over where the painting goes, so he can form a hypothetical imperative that he ought to have some control over what happens to his painting: he forms an instrumentalist ought, or an instrumentalist right, so he puts the painting where he wants. Most people share a version of his value: that "creators of paintings may hang them where they like." So they agree in an instrumentalist way that he ought to put it where he wants.

Things get tricky because people often value autonomy in other beings. I know you frown on sci-fi or fantasy examples, but I think they're useful. If Frankenstein makes his monster and his monster has agency, a lot of people have values such that they form the belief that if the monster is a person, then he ought to control his own destiny (once they put the pitchforks down, anyway). This is despite the fact that if Frankenstein had simply painted a monster, they would have likely formed the belief that he ought to put his painting where he likes. This is because values come in hierarchies and can form complex webs, with some values sometimes overriding others. In this case, many people would have their "beings with agency should have self-autonomy" hypothetical imperative override their "creators should decide what happens with their creations" hypothetical imperative. (And, of course, not everyone would agree; because not everyone shares the same values).

So that's that on my view. That explains why people generally agree that a painter may hang her painting where she wishes, but can disagree that a created being must do everything a creator wishes. There will be those that disagree with one or both of those, and that's to be expected, too.

I got curious at some point about what would happen, on your view, if an evil being were to create a creature with agency. Does the creation owe the evil creator its wishes if the very act of creating imparts a moral duty on the creation? Does the poor monster have some moral duty to go around doing Frankenstein's nefarious business, should he have any? If the answer is "no," then what does it mean for the creation to have any moral duty to the creator? For instance if you say, "well, no, the monster wouldn't have to do Frankenstein's nefarious business because that would be bad and the monster should only do good," but then what's the point of saying the monster has any moral duty to do his creator's wishes if all we're going to do is say the monster ought to do the good, not his creator's wishes? What moral duty is imparted at all by the act of creation if it's still just about what is generally good and not about the creator's wishes? We can say "well, in God's case the creator's wishes also happen to be good," but doesn't that seem to be extraneous if it's the good that matters and not the creator's wishes that matters?

But let's reverse the case, and see if it makes more sense. Let's suppose, for example, that you suppose that God is not the rightful owner of people...and maybe they somehow "own themselves". Perhaps you do believe it. Anyway, let's try it out.

Q1 -- People are created by God
Q2 --
C -- Therefore, people own themselves.

Can you make that syllogism work?

(Note that I have changed "P's" to "Q's" in this quote so that we don't mix up these premises with the premises a few paragraphs above)

Q1) People are created by God
Q2) God wants people to have agency

Wait -- you've just conceded my conclusion. You've assumed that what "God wants" must have some justification in the case.

While I think this whole Q argument should be thrown out or re-done now that we've gotten the confusion mentioned at the top of this post out of the way (I was making Q with different intentions than you were expecting to receive Q, so we should really start over), I want to note that typing "God wants" was really incidental, I could have typed "God created people with agency." The "want" is still implied, I guess; but if oughts come from values, and to have agency implies one's values are one's own (not forced by someone else), and all oughts are instrumentalist, that it doesn't matter what God wants, people would still self-determine their own oughts.

Really I think we should throw out this whole Q-argument because it was born in confusion. What might be helpful is for me to type out my position in formal form (I forget, is it called a syllogism if it has more than two premises?), but that would still not be as helpful as nailing down what a moral ought is (how it's cognitive, what it means for it to be true) because any typing out of my position will involve a premise that looks like "I'm not convinced there are moral oughts, so for now it looks like all oughts are instrumental" and the discussion would move towards proving the existence of moral oughts anyway.

Q3) To have agency materially implies having one's own values
Q4) Nobody can force one to have different values than one possesses already

Pause again: from what are these "values" to be derived? From the fact that one has inner urges toward them, perhaps? Or from the fact that one finds one somehow "already believes" them, perhaps? But you must have a better answer than those, surely, since those things don't at all compel the belief that those values are right or good in any way, or that a contingent, fallible being is owed them. So you'll have to make that case.

Q5) Values are used with hypothetical imperatives to build oughts

Now you've just assumed your own conclusion. I don't think this is true at all.

Q6) There is no evidence there is an ought that isn't built on a hypothetical imperative

Here you've reversed the proper burden of proof: an "ought" must be argued for. We cannot simply say that we can't think of an argument against it, therefore the existence of an "ought" is our default assumption. You need to show that an "ought" IS built on a hypothetical imperative, and show it positively.

Q7) All demonstrable* oughts a person might be subject to are constructed by their own values

Again, you've only assumed your conclusion. There's no reason a person has to think this is true, and in fact, it's pretty evidently false. One big stroke against it is the fact that values change. They don't just change between people, either; they change within the same person, over time. So you can't "ought" to honour something that has no stable identity over time.

That a person happens, at one moment, to "value" something tells us absolutely nothing about the justification of that value. And if it were even potentially justifiable, it would also be unchanging.

You would need a very odd sort of argument to think otherwise, such as "Anything a person believes at a given moment is always true/good/right." And I don't think anybody's going to see merit in that.

C) Therefore, people are the only ones that determine what they ought to do

I don't think that's obvious. The argument for it isn't sound, and there are additional prima facie problems with it. How can we look to a contingent, transient and fallible being as lone grounds for an immutable and binding justification to the effect that they are self-determining? That's bootstrapping.

A defense of Q5 would be to point out that we form oughts out of hypothetical imperatives all the time. "You better get dressed or we're gonna be late,"

Ah. I see that you're still mistaking an instrumental imperative for a moral one. They're not the same at all.

There are different kinds of "oughts" in the world.

One "ought" is arbitrary. "You ought to give me your ice cream cone, or I'll bash you."
Another is about probability. "The sun ought to come up at 7 tomorrow."
Another is about instrumentality. "If you want the car to start, you ought to flip the air filter."
Only some oughts are moral. "You ought not to kill your brother."

Confusing these various oughts confuses the conversation and creates nonsense. That's what you did above. "You'd better get dressed" is an instrumental instruction, presupposing that we don't want to be late, and this is the instrumental means to getting us to be on time. But it's not in any way moral...unless you mean that arriving later is a sin, which I don't think you do.

Q6 is the basic contention of this whole discussion. One would need to defeat Q6 by explaining how an ought can exist without a hypothetical imperative to give it (the ought) substance/cognitivity.

As I say, the opposite would be the case. You would need to show that a hypothetical imperative even CAN entail an "ought" of a moral kind. And in the example you gave above, it obviously entails only an instrumental one.

I don't see how a hypothetical can imply imperative morality, unless the morality is already assumed: as when we assume that arriving late is a sin.

Now that we have the burden of proof right, can you show an example of a hypothetical imperative that compels a moral conclusion?

I actually think that if it can be established that there are oughts which are not formed by hypothetical imperatives, that will ultimately be the same thing as establishing there is intrinsic purpose. So I think the two things are so closely related as to be dominoes by which one is shown as soon as the other is.

That seems right.

I just also think this is how moral oughts are built: "If I value property, then I ought not to steal."

The problem, of course, is that moral "oughts" are not affirmations of what we want, but constraints on what we are inclined toward doing.

"If I value property, then I ought not to steal" is instrumental, because all it describes is the efficacious method for achieving a goal I already take for granted. But "If I really, really want your brooch, I still ought not to steal it" is moral, because it tells me what will be right regardless of my inclinations, and even contrary to them.

Again, the difference between instrumental and moral reasoning is huge. And it's marked by a discord between my instinctive inclinations and the "ought" proposed.

We need no moral edict, "Thou shalt not bash thyself in the head with a brick," because nobody wants to do it. But we do need "Thou shalt not gossip," because everybody does."

This is all one quote block because again, the Q-argument was born in confusion over what you were asking for. I was never arguing for any kind of moral ought. I was trying to argue something like this:

Q1) God created people
Q2) People have agency
Q3) To have agency comes with having values that are one's own values (values not determined by someone else)
Q4) Values are used with hypothetical imperatives to form instrumentalist oughts
Q5) There is no evidence that there are moral oughts
C1) All known oughts are instrumentalist oughts
Q6) Instrumentalist oughts can only be formed by one's own values
C2) People are the only ones that determine what they, themselves, ought to do

But I don't think this is useful or interesting because the real battle is over Q5 (in this new version), so we might as well just forget about making this argument and debate Q5.

But it's actually you that has the onus of proof on Q5: you have the onus of proof to show that a moral ought can be cognitive and true. And that will involve us returning to some of our discussions about things like "what is goodness," because if there is goodness, there is a moral ought. So I suggest we skip everything else and go back to that.

I am really confused by your position here. On one hand you say "I argue they [good and God] are identical," when I ask "so what is goodness?" you respond "God." (period), but now you say that "goodness is a predication of God."

A "predication" points to an attribute of something, but does not indicate its totality.

IC is male is one accurate predication of IC. But IC is not all males, nor maleness itself, nor the sum-and-total of maleness. IC is tall. IC is of a particular age. IC is argumentative, perhaps.

God has this distinctive, though: that when one speaks of something like goodness, that God is not merely a possessor of a feature that can be equally applied to other things, as IC is. God is, Himself, the origin point, paragon of, and ultimate possessor of that quality, such that all further predications to other things are derived from Him.

So when we say, IC Is good, we would literally be saying, "IC is a palid reflection of that ultimate goodness that originates and is exhibited in God." To the extent that IC Is really good, he would be God-like. For God is the wellspring and ultimate possessor of the quality being attributed, much more conditionally and remotely, to IC.

(IC does not, however, regard himself as "good." He's merely using the key moral quality to illustrate the point.)

So we're not saying "God = goodness," as if God were Himself NOTHING BUT the abstract quality of "goodness," but that goodness is a correct predication of God. So is holiness. So is love, and justice, and righteousness...But all of these, God alone has in absolute quality. Any other predications are derived only by analogy and association with His pure love, justice and holiness.

OK, so I have some further questions about this concept. First, that this doesn't help your "goodness is identical with God" statements make any sense. Let us suppose that there is some largest object in the universe. It possesses "largeness" as a property, but it still possesses it in the same way that any large thing does: it's a difference of quantity, not a difference in quality. Some of your language suggests that God's property of being good is a difference in quantity, but some of your comments suggest it's a difference in quality. Which do you mean?

There is a huge problem if you mean that God's goodness is different in quality (not just quantity) than IC's goodness. That would mean that God's goodness is not the same thing as IC's goodness. For instance, we may say that Cat's cat is "loving," and we may also say that Cat is loving. It's clear that there are certain similarities that allow us to colloquially describe them with the same terms, but it's also obvious that there are huge differences between Cat and her cat: so we don't mean the terms in precisely the same sense. If we say that God's goodness is qualitatively different than human goodness, and that we're just drawing an analogy, then Cat calling her cat loving is predicated analogically in the same way. Cat possesses the capacity to be loving within the bounds of her nature, and her cat possesses the capacity to be loving within the bounds of his, and God must possess the capacity to be loving within the infinite nature of His being. So far so good, right?

Well, even if we grant that terms like "loving" can be applied to cats "analogically" (and that is not itself a clear claim), we know what we're talking about when we say "cat." If I say my cat has a quality in proportion to its nature, I have some idea of what his nature is. We don't have the same privilege when it comes to God. Analogical knowledge of God's nature would presuppose some non-analogical knowledge of God's nature. So we would have to have some idea of what it means for God to be good if it's qualitatively different than Cat or IC being good in order to say God is good (but not like we mean when we say IC is good).

For instance, I quote Lewis Carroll's nonsense all the time, so I might as well do it here. If I were to tell you that toves (whether they be slithey or not) possess goodness in accordance to a tove's nature (while stipulating that it's qualitatively different from a human's goodness), what does that tell you about slithey toves? It doesn't tell you anything at all. It might if I said it's qualitatively the same kind of goodness, but quantitatively greater or lesser. But since it's qualitatively different, I haven't given you enough information to form a cognitive picture of what "goodness" even means when talking about slithey toves. All we know about them is that they gyre and gimble in the wabe.

We might as well just say God is slithey (while insisting, of course, that this doesn't mean the same when applied to God as when applied to humans, and that God possesses slitheyness in a mode appropriate to His infinite nature). To say that God is good, but not good in the way that humans are, is really just to say that God possesses an unknown quality in an unknown way, which is really not to say anything at all: there's no cognitive substance to it without more information.

If an object is the largest object in the universe, it makes sense to simply say that it has the property of largeness, it just has the most quantity of largeness. Likewise if God is the most good being in the universe, it would make sense to say that God has goodness like anyone else, He just has the most quantity of it, the maximum possible quantity. But it does not make sense to say that God is good, but in a different meaning of the word good. That's just saying "God is slithey" with extra steps.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There are political oughts, i.e. what ought to be the ideal or optimal political system.

That's a moral question. You just don't realize it is.

You can't rightfully impose on people an evil political arrangement, no matter how well it works for purposes you may like. That's totalitarianism. And the question of whether or not totalitarianism is evil is essential to any political conversation.

So you can't separate ethics from politics. If you imagine you can, then you're being naive, at best, or at worst, mendacious.

To update [refresh] your knowledge base, note the following distinction between politics and morality & ethics;

What is Politics

• Politics (from Greek: Πολιτικά, politiká, 'affairs of the cities') is the set of activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations among individuals, such as the distribution of resources or status. The branch of social science that studies politics and government is referred to as political science. WIKI

Note especially its etymology; politiká, 'affairs of the cities'

Note What is Morality

• Morality (from Latin moralitas 'manner, character, proper behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions between those that are distinguished as proper (right) and those that are improper (wrong). WIKI

Morality is fundamentally about doing good and avoiding evil as inherent and driven by human nature.
The majority [90%]* are doing 'good and avoiding evil' naturally and spontaneously [not killing, rape, being violent, etc.] without the need for enforcement from political power, rules and threats of HELL.
* where 10* are evil prone, that is 800 !!!! million around the world. That is why evil acts are very noticeable. The minority can be 20% and that is 1.6!!! billion or 30% at 2.4 billion.

So you can't separate ethics from politics. If you imagine you can, then you're being naive, at best, or at worst, mendacious.

From the above, you cannot simply conflate politics with morality/ethics in general without contexts.
I presume you understand Venn Diagram analysis???
If you think rationally, the morality/ethics [good vs evil] circle would likely overlap the politics-circle at best at 10% [currently] via the imposing of criminal laws. The rest of the duty of governance of the affairs of cities/countries has direct moral elements [e.g. water, electricity, roads, buildings codes, finance, health, laws, etc.]

Specialization [& subsequent holistic] is the most optimal approach to manage humanity's activities. As such politics must be separated from morality/ethics deliberately to ensure efficient managements and results.

If you don't, I would not accuse you of being mendacious but rather you are ignorant and not thinking critically [as expected from theists who are clinging to irrationality of such issues].

[Veritas Aequitas]

My position is that all oughts are constructed by hypothetical imperatives (but I mean this weakly: as of right now, I don't assert that there are no oughts that aren't constructed in such a way, I am skeptical there are such oughts). Below, you draw a distinction between instrumentalist oughts and moral oughts, and I think I'm understanding the language being used a little better to help you understand my view: on my view, what you call moral oughts don’t exist, but people think instrumentalist oughts are moral oughts mistakenly, because the entire point of noncognitivism is skepticism that there are moral oughts.
So on my view, the moral realist is making a mistake when he thinks oughts are "moral oughts," they are really probably just instrumentalist oughts.

Because it is impossible for a God to exists as real [it is illusory], there are no real moral oughts nor moral facts from a God.

I argued there are objective moral facts;
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
You can counter my view in the Ethical Theory Section.

My point is there are moral oughts which are inherent in human nature as a potential of oughtness where it is active and not-so-active in the majority.
Such moral oughtness can be verified and justified empirically via the scientific and then the moral framework and system [FSR].

Note we have oughts that are specifically biological, e.g. one ought to breathe else they will die is a universal ought which is a biological fact.

We can translate the above oughts that are specifically moral, e.g. "one ought-not to kill" which is evil [not good] are related to morality.
In a way, the above moral oughts are a subset of intrumentalist oughts. The are specific moral oughts because they relate directly to morality [as defined].

What is critical with morality is, morality must NEVER be imposed nor enforced but rather the moral potential within each individual must be triggered [voluntarily] to activate progressively from their current state.

[Astro Cat]

Because it is impossible for a God to exists as real [it is illusory], there are no real moral oughts nor moral facts from a God.

I argued there are objective moral facts;
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
You can counter my view in the Ethical Theory Section.

My point is there are moral oughts which are inherent in human nature as a potential of oughtness where it is active and not-so-active in the majority.
Such moral oughtness can be verified and justified empirically via the scientific and then the moral framework and system [FSR].

Note we have oughts that are specifically biological, e.g. one ought to breathe else they will die is a universal ought which is a biological fact.

We can translate the above oughts that are specifically moral, e.g. "one ought-not to kill" which is evil [not good] are related to morality.
In a way, the above moral oughts are a subset of intrumentalist oughts. The are specific moral oughts because they relate directly to morality [as defined].

What is critical with morality is, morality must NEVER be imposed nor enforced but rather the moral potential within each individual must be triggered [voluntarily] to activate progressively from their current state.

Any ought constructed on a hypothetical imperative, though, will only be objective within that hypothetical imperative (e.g., it would be "objective" in that it could be demonstrated that the hypothetical imperative itself is true: that if one values X, one ought to do Y, we can show that indeed doing Y will get one closer to one's goals of X). Consider "If one values life, then they ought to breathe." The microcosm question is "ought one value life?" Someone could answer "no" and there's nothing objective about whether they "ought" to say yes. These microcosm type questions will be available for any ought, because for any ought there is a hypothetical imperative based on some value that isn't objective (that I'm aware of -- until someone demonstrates that an ought might exist which isn't formed by hypothetical imperative).

We can say that it's objectively true there are demographics of values, because it is: a majority of societies at least nominally reject things like murder and theft. This is likely because for evolutionary reasons, most humans are going to value things like being alive and (to some extent, as it is an evolutionarily advantageous trait) altruism. So in aggregate, we're going to see a lot of commonalities in the values that people hold which lead to common hypothetical imperatives which lead to commonly accepted oughts.

But there's still nothing objective about whether or not they ought to have those values. Someone could not value altruism, and there is nothing about the universe that makes them "wrong" and a person that does value altruism "right."

[Veritas Aequitas]

Because it is impossible for a God to exists as real [it is illusory], there are no real moral oughts nor moral facts from a God.

I argued there are objective moral facts;
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
You can counter my view in the Ethical Theory Section.

My point is there are moral oughts which are inherent in human nature as a potential of oughtness where it is active and not-so-active in the majority.
Such moral oughtness can be verified and justified empirically via the scientific and then the moral framework and system [FSR].

Note we have oughts that are specifically biological, e.g. one ought to breathe else they will die is a universal ought which is a biological fact.

We can translate the above oughts that are specifically moral, e.g. "one ought-not to kill" which is evil [not good] are related to morality.
In a way, the above moral oughts are a subset of intrumentalist oughts. The are specific moral oughts because they relate directly to morality [as defined].

What is critical with morality is, morality must NEVER be imposed nor enforced but rather the moral potential within each individual must be triggered [voluntarily] to activate progressively from their current state.

Any ought constructed on a hypothetical imperative, though, will only be objective within that hypothetical imperative (e.g., it would be "objective" in that it could be demonstrated that the hypothetical imperative itself is true: that if one values X, one ought to do Y, we can show that indeed doing Y will get one closer to one's goals of X). Consider "If one values life, then they ought to breathe." The microcosm question is "ought one value life?" Someone could answer "no" and there's nothing objective about whether they "ought" to say yes. These microcosm type questions will be available for any ought, because for any ought there is a hypothetical imperative based on some value that isn't objective (that I'm aware of -- until someone demonstrates that an ought might exist which isn't formed by hypothetical imperative).

We can say that it's objectively true there are demographics of values, because it is: a majority of societies at least nominally reject things like murder and theft. This is likely because for evolutionary reasons, most humans are going to value things like being alive and (to some extent, as it is an evolutionarily advantageous trait) altruism. So in aggregate, we're going to see a lot of commonalities in the values that people hold which lead to common hypothetical imperatives which lead to commonly accepted oughts.

But there's still nothing objective about whether or not they ought to have those values. Someone could not value altruism, and there is nothing about the universe that makes them "wrong" and a person that does value altruism "right."

There are two imperatives to consider in this case, i.e. the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative.

That every human is embedded within their DNA "to breathe else they die" is a categorical imperative. As such this is objective [universal to all humans] and it is represented by a biological potential supported by physical DNA codes and neural connectivity. There is no exception to it. Thus all humans are inherent driven to 'value' life until the inevitable. Can you show me one exception to the above?

Due to epigenetics and environmental factors, the primary categorical imperative may be overridden, a person may grow up to be suicidal, risk death, etc. and thus may end up with a hypothetical imperative.

There may other reasons why people choose premature deaths BUT the inherent primary imperative to survive at all costs is still embedded deep in the person's brain and DNA genes and codes.

Similarly, there is an inherent moral potential in all humans which is represented by genes and DNA codes. Btw, this claim must be verified and justified - albeit I am not doing it here.
It is like the puberty potential in all humans embedded in the DNA codes but are expressed in a later phase of life. The ways this potential is expressed will depend on various epigenetic [not DNA] and environmental factors.

[Astro Cat]

There are two imperatives to consider in this case, i.e. the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative.

That every human is embedded within their DNA "to breathe else they die" is a categorical imperative. As such this is objective [universal to all humans] and it is represented by a biological potential supported by physical DNA codes and neural connectivity. There is no exception to it. Thus all humans are inherent driven to 'value' life until the inevitable. Can you show me one exception to the above?

Due to epigenetics and environmental factors, the primary categorical imperative may be overridden, a person may grow up to be suicidal, risk death, etc. and thus may end up with a hypothetical imperative.

There may other reasons why people choose premature deaths BUT the inherent primary imperative to survive at all costs is still embedded deep in the person's brain and DNA genes and codes.

Similarly, there is an inherent moral potential in all humans which is represented by genes and DNA codes. Btw, this claim must be verified and justified - albeit I am not doing it here.
It is like the puberty potential in all humans embedded in the DNA codes but are expressed in a later phase of life. The ways this potential is expressed will depend on various epigenetic [not DNA] and environmental factors.

My point was that it's objectively true that humans demographically have values like "I value living" so form imperatives that they ought to breathe, but that doesn't at all cover whether they ought to value living.

A person could ostensibly just not value living, and nothing about the universe means that they're doing something wrong -- there isn't a truth to the utterance "One ought to value life," it's not even false, it's just not propositional because it contains no cognitive content. They either value life or they don't. Most will, like 99.9999% will (figure ex mea culo), because of nature/nurture reasons; but that doesn't say anything about whether they ought to, just that they do. And that's the point against moral realism.

[Belinda]

Astro Cat wrote:

I got curious at some point about what would happen, on your view, if an evil being were to create a creature with agency. Does the creation owe the evil creator its wishes if the very act of creating imparts a moral duty on the creation? Does the poor monster have some moral duty to go around doing Frankenstein's nefarious business, should he have any? If the answer is "no," then what does it mean for the creation to have any moral duty to the creator? For instance if you say, "well, no, the monster wouldn't have to do Frankenstein's nefarious business because that would be bad and the monster should only do good," but then what's the point of saying the monster has any moral duty to do his creator's wishes if all we're going to do is say the monster ought to do the good, not his creator's wishes? What moral duty is imparted at all by the act of creation if it's still just about what is generally good and not about the creator's wishes? We can say "well, in God's case the creator's wishes also happen to be good," but doesn't that seem to be extraneous if it's the good that matters and not the creator's wishes that matters?

It's an argument from the principle of nature=goodness, that Frankenstein's monster owes to his creator what his creator is whatever that may be in relative terms.The theist is an optimist who believes that existence itself = good and in addition that existence itself is an interventionist agent.

I myself believe in the first two premises but I don't believe in the third which makes me a pantheist not a theist.

I gather from IC's messages that he believes in all three premises and in addition that the Interventionist Agent has issued a detailed code of conduct for use in the relative world.

[henry quirk]

The Creator made me as a free will, but he owns me?

Nah.

[henry quirk]

Sumthin' else that makes no sense to me: all this dickin' around with is & ought.

It's a fact: you and me are free wills each with a right to our own lives, liberties, and properties. I belong to myself. You belong to yourself. So: it's wrong, as (moral) fact, for either of us to deprive the other of life, liberty, or property without just cause.

Fit that into is & ought as you can.

[Immanuel Can]

Sumthin' else that makes no sense to me: all this dickin' around with is & ought.

It's a fact: you and me are free wills each with a right to our own lives, liberties, and properties.

Yep. So far, so good.

I belong to myself. You belong to yourself.

Why?

It certainly does not follow automatically from the fact that we are free will beings. All that implies is that we have been granted the power to do the wrong thing, if we so choose. But it doesn't seem to imply that we have ownership papers on ourselves. It might well mean, instead, that we are going to be answerable for our decisions to the Person who does, in fact, actually hold that right.

If a basis to believe we "own ourselves" exists, the truth of that is going to have to be established somehow. But free will alone won't do it. Something more is needed there.

[Immanuel Can]

To update [refresh] your knowledge base...

Yeah.

You're actually wrong, of course; you can't legitimize any political system without also proving it's moral. But maybe I'm trying to drill a hole in water here.

Accept it or reject it, as you wish: it will still be the case. The only think that will change is how much you realize.

[FlashDangerpants]

Sumthin' else that makes no sense to me: all this dickin' around with is & ought.

Think of that stuff Skepdick does quite often where you are talking about something that has nothing to do with computers, and then he tells you that you are a moron because a computer wouldn't do that thing. It makes sense to him I expect, but to nobody else because there is usually no reason to link a premiss about the door handles on a 1996 Toyota to a CPU scheduling algorithm for embedded computers.

That's similar to the is/ought thing. The types of reasoning that apply to discussions of factual matters such as whether there is a rhino under the table, or if the King of France is bald... don't apply to matters of taste, opinion and so on. We don't observe these things in the same ways, or confirm sightings, etc.

So there's no direct way to link a premiss about the shape of a Toyota door handle to the way all handles ought to be. You need an intermediate step that does some conversion, if this is possible.

[Alexis Jacobi]

The Creator made me as a free will, but he owns me?

Nah.

The notion of human freedom, and the notion that a god or a Supreme God created everything and, simultaneously, the rules & regulations for the emergent beings of a human sort, then in a very real sense the creator is the 'owner'. You become really human when you decide, as an act of your own free choice, to submit absolutely to God's will.

All non-human beings that we are aware of do not have the free choice we do. They are not moral beings. (If we accept that no other animal has free will as we do which seems to be the case.)

OTOH if freedom is given to man, and if freedom is taken in its truest sense, then such freedom means that one is free really & truly to do what one desires -- God be damned.

There is of course the Luciferian option. And certainly this is the conceptual dynamic one notable local interlocutor is devoted to. The Christian concept of Lucifer is a bit strange. The choice Lucifer is said to have made is non-revokable. He (of *he*) cannot back out of it. So Lucifer is more, really, a principle of opposition -- sheer, absolute and eternal -- to God's rule and God's laws. And in our domain -- the world -- Lucifer/Satan is given a great deal of free reign. The freedom to oppose God taken to its ultimate point.

Lucifer (or Satan) cannot ever have a 'moral awakening'. In the Christian mythology Satan is finally vanquished and then restricted to a domain like a prison 'for all eternity'.

In any case and no matter I always recommend paying parking tickets no matter how one feels about it.