IS and OUGHT

[Immanuel Can]

Well I am describing the observable stuff.

You observe only the tip of the iceberg. Then you say, "I'm not prepared to talk about the possibility of underwater ice."

We'll see how that works out for you, I guess.

My view entails that we have to constantly renew the discussion about what rights we assign. That's the way things are whether we like it or not.

Well, in the US, the judiciary discussed what rights were appropriate to assign to women regarding abortion. And they "renewed" the view that the Constitution holds they're in state jurisdiction. So women in the US now have no right at all to an abortion on demand. And, according to your view, the abortion-desiring females have no basis of complaint or protest...because their government mechanisms have ruled on the question.

So what are those pink-hat loonies doing, stomping around the judiciaries, claiming they have "right" to something that they have no "right" to, according to you?

On what basis do you suppose I say people have no right to complain or protest?

They are allowed to protest, of course; but they have absolutely zero grounds for protest.

The government can simply say, "What are these women yelling? We promised no such 'abortion rights.' They should go home, because until we do, none can possibly exist."

[FlashDangerpants]

You observe only the tip of the iceberg. Then you say, "I'm not prepared to talk about the possibility of underwater ice."

We'll see how that works out for you, I guess.


Well, in the US, the judiciary discussed what rights were appropriate to assign to women regarding abortion. And they "renewed" the view that the Constitution holds they're in state jurisdiction. So women in the US now have no right at all to an abortion on demand. And, according to your view, the abortion-desiring females have no basis of complaint or protest...because their government mechanisms have ruled on the question.

So what are those pink-hat loonies doing, stomping around the judiciaries, claiming they have "right" to something that they have no "right" to, according to you?

On what basis do you suppose I say people have no right to complain or protest?

They are allowed to protest, of course; but they have absolutely zero grounds for protest.

The government can simply say, "What are these women yelling? We promised no such 'abortion rights.' They should go home, because until we do, none can possibly exist."

Why do they have zero grounds?

Are you using a circular argument that assumes nothing moral means anything unless your absolutist assumptions are true? Does it go from ought to is?

[Immanuel Can]

On what basis do you suppose I say people have no right to complain or protest?

They are allowed to protest, of course; but they have absolutely zero grounds for protest.

The government can simply say, "What are these women yelling? We promised no such 'abortion rights.' They should go home, because until we do, none can possibly exist."

Why do they have zero grounds?

Because right = whatever the government gave you. No more. And that's according to you.

[Astro Cat]

...that just means that oughtness doesn't come from God's sovereignty.

Ah, we'd best be careful with that word.

Many people think it means something like "dictates" or "arbitrary wishes." It does not. No Christian ever denies that God is "sovereign," when it simply means "king" -- which it does. God is the rightful Lord of the universe He created. It does not imply He is arbitrary.

But to respond, oughtness does not come from "sovereignty," whatever you might actually mean by that. It comes from the intersection of two basic facts: God's own nature, and the teleological purposes built into the universe He created to reflect His character.

First, by sovereignty I just mean something like choice. God has sovereignty over something if he has a choice regarding that thing and the power to make it the way that He wants it in some way.

Second, I think you are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

On one hand you say that oughtness comes from God's nature, on the other hand you say that oughtness comes from "purposes" He built into the world to reflect His character. There is a way for these to be mutually exclusive and a way for them not to be.

The mutually exclusive way is to say that oughtness comes from God's nature (which He has no control over) but also from choices God made when creating the universe. Oughtness can't both come from something God has no choice over and something God has choices over at the same time and in the same respect. This one can't possibly be the case, and if it's what you mean, then the buck stops there and your position is self-contradictory. I suspect you mean the next one.

The non-mutually exclusive way is to say that oughtness comes from God's nature, and God's nature is why God built the way that He did. In this instance, that God built the world in accordance to His nature is just incidental: the only important part is that God has a nature that God didn't choose. In this case there is no sovereignty -- no choice -- over what oughtness is; God has no choice over what ought to be the case, He just agrees that it ought to be the case and makes the world in accordance to that. So there's no point in bringing up that God made the world a certain way because that's not where the buck stops, the buck stops where God made it a certain way because God has a particular nature, and God has no control over what that nature is, no choice in the matter, no sovereignty: He couldn't have made a world where burning people for pleasure is good because His nature demands otherwise. So goodness isn't defined by how God made the world, that's just incidental if God made the world because God has a nature.

But then we are left with the question: "Why is His nature that way?" If His nature is good, then God is not the explanation for that goodness since it's out of God's control. Do you see the problem? Whatever it is that makes God = good is external to God, transcendental to God, and God has no part in the explanation for why it is good, why God is good, and thus why God's creation (made in accordance to His nature) is good. There is still no explanation what an "ought" even is: this is to say that an ought is not formed with a hypothetical imperative, but then never explains what it is. So that question I originally asked still isn't answered: what is an "ought" outside of a hypothetical imperative?

Maybe I can try this by manually doing a recursion and start with something like "Charity is good." Why is charity good? Because God intends us to be charitable. Why does God intend us to be charitable? Because it's God's nature to intend that. (Do you see how God's intentions, then, are not the answer, since we must keep going?) Why is it God's nature to intend that? Well, now we are in a noncognitive pickle: we can ask things like "ought God to intend that humans ought to do charity?" If God "ought" to do anything, then oughts are outside of God's choice, His sovereignty: he is subject to oughts in the same way that we are, then. Oughtness is transcendental to Him. And if oughts exist external to God, which God is subject to, oughts which are not formed with hypothetical imperatives, what does that mean? This is what still has no cognitive explanation from anybody!

That God commands something becomes irrelevant because that thing would be good regardless of whether God commanded it on the view that rejects Divine Command Theory (DCT). But then we are all of a sudden left without an account of what an "ought" is,

Wait: why are we going back to DCT? I thought I was quite clear that I'm not a DCTer, and that I have good reasons not to be.

I know. I was only saying that DCT would at least answer my question of what an "ought" is (in a way that agrees with me, though). I was saying that if we're rejecting DCT, then we still have no account of what an "ought" is outside of a hypothetical imperative.

...there is a problem in that God must have had some sort of "initial" properties.

The word "initial" seems wrong, here. It seems to imply again you have some thought of a God with an "initial" point. But Christians do not believe in created "gods," nor in a single god with an origin point.

Could it be you mean something like "inherent"? Are you asking if God has eternally possessed any particular qualities descriptive of His character? Because a Christian could respond to that. But "initial" just doesn't work, because it compels an non-Christian supposition.

I do not mean "initial" in some temporal sense. I just mean that if God has properties, there were some properties God did not control whether God had or not. We can use power as an easy example of one. God couldn't have controlled whether God had power or not because ostensibly it would require having power to give oneself power. Likewise with knowledge, God couldn't have controlled whether He had knowledge or not because it would require having knowledge to give oneself the property of having knowledge (you would have to know how to do it). The point is that some aspects of existence are outside of God's sovereignty, God can't help them, has no control over them. God's own nature is one such thing because it puts the cart before the horse to say He had sovereignty over His own nature.

So if God has a nature, then God has properties;

What do you mean by "properties"?

Are you trying to say that God wasn't "good" until a human being existed and knew He was "good"?

Properties are characteristics of things. My keyboard has the property of being black, the property of being composed of plastic, the property of having the spacebar somewhat scuffed, and so on. God is described as having properties like omnipotence, omniscience, personhood, and so on. Properties are limitations: things are limited to being what they are and limited from being what they are not. A horse is not a basketball because of his properties, and vice versa.

As for your second sentence, I'm not saying any such thing. I'm saying that God has properties, and that it's a paradox to assert that God had a choice over His own properties: in order to have had a choice, He would have already had to have had properties to make a choice, which is absurd. So if God has properties, God didn't have a choice over that fact: God couldn't control whether He was omnipotent or not. I said "initially" because maybe God can choose to give up His power, or something (maybe He did when He was Jesus per Christian belief), so I'm only saying that I'm not arguing God can't change His properties in an absolute sense. I say "initially" because as you go backwards through God's choices about Himself, there is eventually a point (perhaps at infinity) where God possesses properties that He did not choose to have, He had no sovereignty over whether He had them or not. While God can maybe choose to be a green bust of Julius Caesar if He wants to, He can only do that because He has power and knowledge. He couldn't have chosen to have power and knowledge because it would have required already having power and knowledge to make such a choice. So, God has -- or had, however we want to phrase this -- properties that He didn't choose, had no choice over, had no sovereignty over.

...and if God has properties, then God does not have absolute sovereignty.

Well, it's seems we're going to need to clear up your definition of "sovereignty," absolute or otherwise. Because as it stands, I can't grasp the claim you're making here.

I'm wondering if you've left out Trinitarianism and self-existence, possibly. But I'll wait to see what you mean by sovereignty. Your "god" sounds like a kind of monad, something incapable of existing or knowing himself without the existence of human beings to name his attributes. But that seems a bit extreme, so I'll have to wait to see what you mean.

With hopefully new understanding reading my clarifications, go back over the post I made that these responses were aimed at perhaps.

If DCT is false, then God has no choice over what "oughts" there are. If God has no choice over what "oughts" there are, then God is just agreeing that we ought to do X. But if God is just agreeing, then God is not part of the explanation of what an "ought" is. So I am still having to ask: what is an ought? What does it mean to have an ought outside of a hypothetical imperative? God doesn't seem to help with an explanation!

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Edit: I just realized that I can pose the goodness problem in terms of the aseity-sovereignty problem. If God is good, that is a property: God has the property of being good.

Did God give Himself that property? I think that would put the cart before the horse to say yes: ostensibly, it is good to make things good, so if God made Himself good, then He would have had to already be good. If we say that God is good, then we have to admit that God is good for reasons outside of God's own control: God doesn't have sovereignty over His goodness. But then if we say God ought to do things, and God will do those things because God is good, we're tacitly saying that goodness and oughtness is external to God, that God just observes and agrees with it rather than causes or founds it. So what is it? Whatever it is, God isn't part of the explanation in the same way that God isn't part of the explanation for why A = A!

[Immanuel Can]

First, by sovereignty I just mean something like choice. God has sovereignty over something if he has a choice regarding that thing and the power to make it the way that He wants it in some way.

Well, that runs immediately afoul of the Biblical record.

For what the Bible says is that there are some "choices" God cannot make. It says He cannot lie, He cannot sin, He cannot deny Himself, and so on. So any view of "sovereignty" that requires any such things is clearly not Biblical, whatever else one can say about it.

Now, the objection (which I have already heard) to this, is that if God cannot do such irrational and ungodly things, then He wouldn't be "sovereign." And my answers is that then, the word "sovereign" is being used in a way that is not Biblical. And I would pose the rejoinder that the alleged "freedom" to do things that are against one's character is not a "freedom" at all.

You were talking earlier about people who value truth, but who sell it out for other things, like the approval of their friends, maybe. Is their "ability" to lie a demonstration of their "sovereignty," or a demonstration of their limitedness, their timidity, their fear? Especially if they genuinely DO value truth, we were wondering why they would ever sell it out.

God's actual sovereignty means this: that God never needs, or has reason, to act in any way that is not harmonious with his own character. We humans sell out our values all the time; but God never does. He is, in fact, so powerful that He alone can afford to be perfectly consistent with who He is. Nothing can compel Him to be anything other than just, good, righteous, consistent, truthful, loyal, and loving. Those are some of His inherent qualities, and He alone can live up to every one of them.

That's sovereignty.

Second, I think you are trying to have your cake and eat it too.

On one hand you say that oughtness comes from God's nature, on the other hand you say that oughtness comes from "purposes" He built into the world to reflect His character.

Those are completely consistent.

God has a certain character. Romans 1 tells us he wrote that character into the features and purposes of His Creation. Even in its fallen state, there is enough of the nature of God reflected in the natural world to make any person who doubts the existence of God, His divine nature and His eternal power, "without excuse," as Romans puts it.

God is good. And His creation reflects that goodness. So often as we discover what we "ought" (genuinely) to be doing or being, we discover the inherent moral nature God with which God Himself has underwritten the creation.

God's nature (which He has no control over)

"Has no control over"? It seems to me there is no entity in the universe that has more "control" over everything than God does. That's why He alone can be perfectly consistent to His own ultimate nature, and can inscribe it on creation.

God has a nature that God didn't choose.

It seems to me that you are again positing some kind of "origin point" here. You're imagining a God sitting around in eternity past, going, "Hmmmm...what qualities do I want to have...?"

But I don't think we can apply such anthropomorphic metaphors to God. He is eternal. There is, by definition, no "starting point" at which God should have "chosen" His own characteristics, in order to demonstrate his "sovereignty" over values.

But we're really back to the fundamental flaw I already pointed out in Euthyphro: it requires us to believe that "good" and "God" must be different things...possible for a polytheist, but impossible within a Christian worldview.

But then we are left with the question: "Why is His nature that way?"

Because He is who He is.

He is the Great 'I AM," as the Hebrews so powerfully put it. You cannot ask why or how He is what He has always been. That supposes some prior cause or explanation is possible. But it is not. No matter how far you cast back in eternity, you'll not find a moment when such a thought could become relevant or possible.

Do you see the problem?

I see what Euthyprho advocates THINK is the problem. But I see what the answer is, too. I wonder why they can't.

Maybe because the Euthyphro dilemma strikes them as comforting...that it gives them an opportunity to declare unilaterally that God is "an irrational concept," and to walk away. But since there is an appropriate answer in the faultiness of their own reasoning, one to which they are reluctant to listen, I wonder if that little paradox they've invented will protect them from accountability for what they ought to have known, but refused to.

Maybe I can try this by manually doing a recursion and start with something like "Charity is good." Why is charity good? Because God intends us to be charitable. Why does God intend us to be charitable? Because it's God's nature to intend that.

Not quite the right answer.

The answer is, "Because God is charitable." As Scripture says, He "sends the rain on the just and the unjust," and "He is kind to ungrateful and evil men." Jesus Himself told us, "Love your enemies, and do good to those who use you spitefully." These are reflections of the patience, love and gracious character of God; and we Christians are called to attempt to emulate and acquire that character. Charity is part of all that.

That God commands something becomes irrelevant because that thing would be good regardless of whether God commanded it on the view that rejects Divine Command Theory (DCT). But then we are all of a sudden left without an account of what an "ought" is,

Wait: why are we going back to DCT? I thought I was quite clear that I'm not a DCTer, and that I have good reasons not to be.

I know. I was only saying that DCT would at least answer my question of what an "ought" is (in a way that agrees with me, though). I was saying that if we're rejecting DCT, then we still have no account of what an "ought" is outside of a hypothetical imperative.

I'm certain we do. It's the character of God.

God couldn't have controlled whether God had power

Wait.

We're doing the mythical "God made a choice at some time in the mythic past" thing again. But no, God is eternal, and HIs nature is eternal. There is no "point of choice" at which He could be said to have "succeeded" or "failed" in "making a choice" about power.

And I can see no problem with that at all. It's exactly what the Bible says is the case, and it makes sense, too.

Properties are limitations:

I don't think they are.

"Limitation" implies the inability to "do" something. But evil is not a "doing," but a kind of "undoing." It's a kind of failure, a short-falling, a decine, a decay, a diminishment.

So God's "inability" to do evil is actually a positive attribute. He is so good, and so powerful that nothing can possibly induce Him, even for a second, to act in any way that is evil.

What's the problem?

...had no sovereignty over.

Ugh. That word, again. It's so abused.

...and if God has properties, then God does not have absolute sovereignty.

Well, it's seems we're going to need to clear up your definition of "sovereignty," absolute or otherwise. Because as it stands, I can't grasp the claim you're making here.

I'm wondering if you've left out Trinitarianism and self-existence, possibly. But I'll wait to see what you mean by sovereignty. Your "god" sounds like a kind of monad, something incapable of existing or knowing himself without the existence of human beings to name his attributes. But that seems a bit extreme, so I'll have to wait to see what you mean.

With hopefully new understanding reading my clarifications, go back over the post I made that these responses were aimed at perhaps.

I'm not finding that helpful, I have to admit. "Sovereignty" means too many things to too many people.

I'm wanting to know what "sovereignty" means to you, so I can fill out your claims involving that term with some specific content or concept, and then see whether I agree or disagree with the particular claim it involves.

If DCT is false, then God has no choice over what "oughts" there are.

DCT is a false theory; or at least it's a partial truth with huge holes in it, as Christ Himself pointed out. But your conclusion doesn't seem to follow from that. God gives us the "oughts" that reflect His character. We receive them as givens, but that's not how He "gets" them, if we can use that horribly misleading verb.

Let's take the picture from kingship, which is what "sovereignty" actually means. If a king issues an order, such as, "Give a portion of my treasury to the poor," do we ask, "Where did He get that idea from?" Do we ask, "Did he have to do it, or did he want to do it?" Or can we simply understand that it's possible for a king to be kind, to have good intentions, and to act from them decisively and with power, bringing them about? It's his treasury; why should he not dispose of it as he sees fit? He has the authority; why should he not exercise it? And we have the benefits: why should we not receive them?

But that His order ought to be carried out...well, that's a function of his sovereignty, his right to do it.

A human analogy, of course, and flawed, therefore. There are no absolutes in human sovereigns. But it puts the word "sovereign" in the right sort of context, instead of the more contrived, often Calvinist one.

[Astro Cat]

That's sovereignty.

Then let us just use a word like agency or choice, because that is all that I'm using the word to mean. It was Plantinga that used the word "sovereignty" in this context in his little book, "Does God Have A Nature?" so that is how I would use the word as well. Yet it doesn't matter as long as you understand what's being said. Rather than being unsure about the term, let us just use "agency" or similar. Just replace all the instances where I said "sovereignty" with "agency" and it should be fine.

God has no agency or choice over what properties He has, that is what all of that boils down to.

Those are completely consistent.

God has a certain character. Romans 1 tells us he wrote that character into the features and purposes of His Creation. Even in its fallen state, there is enough of the nature of God reflected in the natural world to make any person who doubts the existence of God, His divine nature and His eternal power, "without excuse," as Romans puts it.

God is good. And His creation reflects that goodness. So often as we discover what we "ought" (genuinely) to be doing or being, we discover the inherent moral nature God with which God Himself has underwritten the creation.

If God has a nature, God didn't choose that nature, God created the world in accordance to that nature, then God's intentions in creating the world still don't matter. If we are curious what an "ought" is, the answer doesn't lie in God's intentions because God's intentions are just following a nature that God did not choose to have.

So for instance when a noncognitivist asks you "what is an ought that isn't part of a hypothetical imperative," that means God isn't really part of the answer. God doesn't choose what ought to be, God just agrees that some things ought to be; so God can be left out of the explanation altogether (God is subject to morality in the same way that we are, then). The question is what an "ought" is that is not part of a hypothetical imperative.

God's nature (which He has no control over)

"Has no control over"? It seems to me there is no entity in the universe that has more "control" over everything than God does. That's why He alone can be perfectly consistent to His own ultimate nature, and can inscribe it on creation.

This response doesn't seem to actually speak towards what I said. I said "God has no control over His nature," but your response is about how God can be consistent to His nature to control other things. But that has nothing to do with what I said.

How do you feel about the proposition, "God has no control over what God's nature is?" Do you agree with this proposition?

God has a nature that God didn't choose.

It seems to me that you are again positing some kind of "origin point" here. You're imagining a God sitting around in eternity past, going, "Hmmmm...what qualities do I want to have...?"

But I don't think we can apply such anthropomorphic metaphors to God. He is eternal. There is, by definition, no "starting point" at which God should have "chosen" His own characteristics, in order to demonstrate his "sovereignty" over values.

But we're really back to the fundamental flaw I already pointed out in Euthyphro: it requires us to believe that "good" and "God" must be different things...possible for a polytheist, but impossible within a Christian worldview.

When I make arguments like "God couldn't have given Himself power," I am not trying to posit that there was some time before time where God hemmed and hawed over what kind of properties He wanted. The purpose of speaking like that is to show by reductio ad absurdum that there is no possible scenario in which God could have chosen His own nature even if we tried to imagine a scenario in which He might.

If you already agree that God has no choice but to have the properties He has, then great. But the rest of the argument follows: if God is good, then God had no choice but to be good. If God ought to do certain things, then God is not the explanation for what "oughts" are. God is subject to them, they are transcendental to God.

So perhaps let me ask this: do you think God is subject to oughts? Are there things that God ought to do?

If so, then you are agreeing that oughtness is transcendental to God, that God is subject to it. And aaaaaaall of this, all this discussion, is ultimately to answer the question: what is an ought? Understood to mean, what is an ought if it isn't formed by a hypothetical imperative?

If God is subject to oughts, then obviously those oughts aren't formed by hypothetical imperatives. But what does that mean? I asked how an ought (which isn't formed by a hypothetical imperative) corresponds to reality. You brought up God as part of the explanation. But if God is subject to oughts, then God is not part of the explanation. So we still have this undefined, noncognitive concept: what does it mean for an ought, which isn't a hypothetical imperative, to correspond to reality? The realist must answer this. If they can't, then they aren't saying anything. Moral realism would just be noncognitive utterances.

But then we are left with the question: "Why is His nature that way?"

Because He is who He is.

He is the Great 'I AM," as the Hebrews so powerfully put it. You cannot ask why or how He is what He has always been. That supposes some prior cause or explanation is possible. But it is not. No matter how far you cast back in eternity, you'll not find a moment when such a thought could become relevant or possible.

Sure, so God has a nature; but a nature that wasn't chosen by God. So if God is good, that means God has nothing to do with explaining what goodness is. Likewise we know what logical self-identity is, we know what it means for A to = A. We might ask "is God responsible for this, does God have anything to do with explaining what this is?" The answer is no: God is also subject to identity, it is transcendental to God. God depends on identity to be God in a relevant way. So when explaining to someone what identity is, we do not have to bring God into the discussion at all, we can just talk about what identity is.

So, with goodness and oughtness, the same scenario arises: if God is subject to goodness and oughtness, then God is not part of the explanation for what they are. We can skip God-talk when we're defining what they are; He just observes them and agrees with them the same way we might, He has nothing to do with why they are what they are or how they're defined. So what are they? What is an "ought" that is not part of a hypothetical imperative, and how does it correspond to reality? If God ought to make the world a certain way, what does it mean that God "ought" to do that?

It would be different to say that God must create the world a certain way than it would be to say God ought to create the world a certain way. We could of course say both at once (that God ought to create the world a certain way, and also must create it that way), but it's important to distinguish the two concepts nonetheless. I could understand an argument that God must do X because X is God's nature. But this whole "ought" business is still noncognitive. What is an ought (outside of a hypothetical imperative)? That remains unanswered, and clearly, God is not part of the answer. Again, which is probably obvious from some of my redundancy (sorry, I dread not being understood, and this is probably a stereotypical feminine thing to repeat in an attempt to stave off misunderstanding), but it is crucial for a moral realist to be able to give an account for what oughtness is: how it corresponds to reality, what is corresponding to reality, in what way, etc. Otherwise they are just talking about slithey toves gyring and gimbling in wabes.

Not quite the right answer.

The answer is, "Because God is charitable." As Scripture says, He "sends the rain on the just and the unjust," and "He is kind to ungrateful and evil men." Jesus Himself told us, "Love your enemies, and do good to those who use you spitefully." These are reflections of the patience, love and gracious character of God; and we Christians are called to attempt to emulate and acquire that character. Charity is part of all that.

So this is ignoring the obvious question: ought God to be charitable? What would that mean if so? If there's something to oughtness at all, then the realist should be able to describe what that means.

Properties are limitations:

I don't think they are.

"Limitation" implies the inability to "do" something. But evil is not a "doing," but a kind of "undoing." It's a kind of failure, a short-falling, a decine, a decay, a diminishment.

So God's "inability" to do evil is actually a positive attribute. He is so good, and so powerful that nothing can possibly induce Him, even for a second, to act in any way that is evil.

What's the problem?

A limitation isn't just an inability to do something. When I say I'm not a cell phone because of my properties I'm not just saying I lack the ability to become a cell phone (though that is incidentally true). It means that I have properties like personhood that a cell phone doesn't have. Properties are limitations because what it means to be one thing and not some other thing is because of properties. God is God because God is limited from having the properties of weakness and ignorance, and limited to having properties of power and knowledge, etc.

If DCT is false, then God has no choice over what "oughts" there are.

DCT is a false theory; or at least it's a partial truth with huge holes in it, as Christ Himself pointed out. But your conclusion doesn't seem to follow from that. God gives us the "oughts" that reflect His character. We receive them as givens, but that's not how He "gets" them, if we can use that horribly misleading verb.

Let's take the picture from kingship, which is what "sovereignty" actually means. If a king issues an order, such as, "Give a portion of my treasury to the poor," do we ask, "Where did He get that idea from?" Do we ask, "Did he have to do it, or did he want to do it?" Or can we simply understand that it's possible for a king to be kind, to have good intentions, and to act from them decisively and with power, bringing them about? It's his treasury; why should he not dispose of it as he sees fit? He has the authority; why should he not exercise it? And we have the benefits: why should we not receive them?

But that His order ought to be carried out...well, that's a function of his sovereignty, his right to do it.

A human analogy, of course, and flawed, therefore. There are no absolutes in human sovereigns. But it puts the word "sovereign" in the right sort of context, instead of the more contrived, often Calvinist one.

I think a lot of miscommunication will be cleared up when I nail down your position on the two questions I asked somewhere above: "Does God have control over His own nature?" and "Is God subject to oughts: are there things that God ought to do and ought not to do?"

[FlashDangerpants]

They are allowed to protest, of course; but they have absolutely zero grounds for protest.

The government can simply say, "What are these women yelling? We promised no such 'abortion rights.' They should go home, because until we do, none can possibly exist."

Why do they have zero grounds?

Because right = whatever the government gave you. No more. And that's according to you.

I definitely mentioned that they change for a start, you might have picked up on the hint buried in the phrase "this stuff is quite observably in constant flux". I totally said that we debate what rights we want as a society, not a government. The currently codified set as described in law are not complete and I never authorised you to represent me as some legalist.

[Immanuel Can]

God has no agency or choice over what properties He has, that is what all of that boils down to.

Then it doesn't seem like a problem. Why should we imagine God would be better if His properties were a matter of choice, rather than intrinsic?

If God has a nature, God didn't choose that nature, God created the world in accordance to that nature, then God's intentions in creating the world still don't matter.

I don't get that. It doesn't seem to follow, to me.

Rather, the opposite seems true. It would only matter what nature the world had if it had some relation to God's purposes and intentions. An aimless, accidental, amoral, teleology-less world is that one that looks to me to "not matter."

So for instance when a noncognitivist asks you "what is an ought that isn't part of a hypothetical imperative," that means God isn't really part of the answer.

I suppose that would be the case only if the noncognitivist stipulates that as a condition of her engagement. For anyone else, it would certainly remain relevant.

But a hypothetical imperative has absolutely no "oughtness" about it. What does it "hypothesize"? Normally, we think of a "hypothesis" as referring to a theory about what is possibly, plausibly true. But "true" means "conforming to the way things really are," or "objective." And a noncognitivist cannot be "hypothesizing" about truth. She doesn't believe in objective truth.

So there's nothing to "hypothesize" about. There's no "cognitive" content to cogitate on, either.

God's nature (which He has no control over)

"Has no control over"? It seems to me there is no entity in the universe that has more "control" over everything than God does. That's why He alone can be perfectly consistent to His own ultimate nature, and can inscribe it on creation.

This response doesn't seem to actually speak towards what I said. I said "God has no control over His nature," but your response is about how God can be consistent to His nature to control other things. But that has nothing to do with what I said.

Oh, so we're back to the, "If God didn't choose His own nature..." idea.

How do you feel about the proposition, "God has no control over what God's nature is?" Do you agree with this proposition?

I don't think anybody has control over what his/her own "nature" is. That seems to me to be the nature of what is meant by a thing's "nature": it means, what it really is, regardless of what others think it is or what it (perhaps) wants to make itself out to be.

When I make arguments like "God couldn't have given Himself power," I am not trying to posit that there was some time before time where God hemmed and hawed over what kind of properties He wanted. The purpose of speaking like that is to show by reductio ad absurdum that there is no possible scenario in which God could have chosen His own nature even if we tried to imagine a scenario in which He might.

"Chosen nature" another oxymoron.

Nothing "chooses its own nature," nor should it be expected to. It's a contradiction of the word "nature" to suppose that, and so it self-contradicts.

Even the most PC thought about transing and so forth presupposes a "nature," an identity that cannot be altered and must be respected.

Do you doubt that? Would you point to men like Jenner, who claim they want to "be" women? But what is it, exactly, that they say they "need" to "be"? Do they, themselves, not insist that they "really are" women? That their deep nature is that of a woman? That the male features, history, genitalia, DNA, etc. are all superficial; that the absolute and ultimate nature of who they are is female? And do they not all think we "ought" to agree with them that this is so?

But why, if their "nature" is not that of a woman? Why is it such a 'blasphemy' to call Bruce by his birth name, or to refuse to adopt a pronoun of his choice, given that he has no "nature" of a woman?

So trans-theory talks out of both sides of its mouth. It says, "Bruce Jenner" does not have the nature of a man; he has the nature of a woman, and so you "ought" to call him "Caitlyn," because his nature is that of a woman. But if you insist his old nature is fixed, you're evil and oppressive and rude; and if you deny that his new nature is fixed, you're evil and oppressive and rude.

Make sense of any of that, if you can. It's pretty transparently rubbish. Either Jenner has NO "nature," in which case he can become whatever he wants to...a salmon, a black man, a tripod...but then he cannot have the nature of a female either, or he has A nature, in which case, he cannot merely change it on a whim, and cannot leave his nature as a male.

But to have a changeable "nature" is impossible. A thing is what it is, not what we imagine or choose it to be. And a thing that claims to "choose its own nature" is not in any way above or better than an entity which does not.

Why fault God for having His own nature? Because He didn't "choose" it as an arbitrary add-on? Is that in some way a diminishment of HIs greatness or "sovereignty"? If it is, I don't see it.

If God is good, then God had no choice but to be good.

So?

If God ought to do certain things,

Oops! You amphibolized there.

You're positing two different states: 1. In which God "is" doing one thing, and 2. He "ought" to do another. Only if the two are separate is "choice" even implicated in the situation. But God is not ever different from what, if we use human language (or Humean language ) He "ought to" be. There is no such case as that.

Nevertheless, human being DO have a division between the IS and the OUGHT. That is because they are fallen, and are not doing what they "ought." So it is they who are obliged to choose the "ought." And they "ought" to, because that is harmonious with the paragon of all goodness, God.

So perhaps let me ask this: do you think God is subject to oughts? Are there things that God ought to do?

I think the above answers this well.

But then we are left with the question: "Why is His nature that way?"

Because He is who He is.

He is the Great 'I AM," as the Hebrews so powerfully put it. You cannot ask why or how He is what He has always been. That supposes some prior cause or explanation is possible. But it is not. No matter how far you cast back in eternity, you'll not find a moment when such a thought could become relevant or possible.

Sure, so God has a nature; but a nature that wasn't chosen by God.

I say again: nothing chooses its own nature.

"Nature" means "what it really is," not "what it appears, or what it has chosen to act like."

So if God is good, that means God has nothing to do with explaining what goodness is.

I don't see this at all.

The concept "good" would not even exist, except with reference to God. He's the epitome of "good," its great Prototype and Source. We would not even be able to frame the concept without reference to Him.

...if God is subject to goodness and oughtness,

"Subject to"?

God is not "subject to" anything. I can't even imagine what you're thinking here.

I could understand an argument that God must do X because X is God's nature.

Not "must." "Can." He is always able to do what is harmonious with His own character. He is never tempted away from it, or obliged by something to act contrary to it.

Which is more powerful: an entity that cannot always act according to his/her best nature, or one that invariably can?

What is an ought (outside of a hypothetical imperative)?

But it's clearly nothing in that. So your argument would really have to be that "ought" means nothing at all. And we "ought not" to trouble ourselves about what it means; the answer must be "nothing."

Not quite the right answer.

The answer is, "Because God is charitable." As Scripture says, He "sends the rain on the just and the unjust," and "He is kind to ungrateful and evil men." Jesus Himself told us, "Love your enemies, and do good to those who use you spitefully." These are reflections of the patience, love and gracious character of God; and we Christians are called to attempt to emulate and acquire that character. Charity is part of all that.

So this is ignoring the obvious question: ought God to be charitable?

No, it's refusing the supposition upon which that question depends. That question presupposes a division between what God is doing and should be doing; there is no such division. If there were, He would not be God.

If there's something to oughtness at all, then the realist should be able to describe what that means.

I'm not sure what you're missing here, exactly. "Oughtness" is an adverbial quality, not a noun. You won't find an "ought" under a rock or behind a tree. It's a quality of certain human actions, because humans don't always do what they...ought.

God is God because God is limited from having the properties of weakness and ignorance

That's a double-negation. God "lacks" two things, you say; but these two things are themselves "lacks". Weakness is "lack of strength," and ignorance is "lack of knowledge." God has both knowledge and strength, and does not "lack" either.

Astonishingly, you're actually imaginatively turning a fault or deficiency into some sort of power or positivity, and supposing that an entity that is both weak and ignorant has more "great-making qualities" (to turn a phrase from Plantinga) that one who has-not these defiiciencies.

Again, make sense of a claim like that, if you can. I cannot.

, and limited to having properties of power and knowledge, etc.

And here, you turn the great-making properties into a kind of embarassing deficiency, allegedly.

Oh no! A God who cannot sin! What will we all do with a God so limited!

[Astro Cat]

God has no agency or choice over what properties He has, that is what all of that boils down to.

Then it doesn't seem like a problem. Why should we imagine God would be better if His properties were a matter of choice, rather than intrinsic?

The argument isn't that God would be better if He could choose His properties: the argument is to draw attention to the fact that God doesn't choose His properties in order to make further arguments down the road.

If you agree that God doesn't choose His properties, then I don't have to bring it up anymore. I just don't know when I enter a discussion, so I have to build up a foundation. We can cross that one off the list as agreed, then.

If God has a nature, God didn't choose that nature, God created the world in accordance to that nature, then God's intentions in creating the world still don't matter.

I don't get that. It doesn't seem to follow, to me.

Rather, the opposite seems true. It would only matter what nature the world had if it had some relation to God's purposes and intentions. An aimless, accidental, amoral, teleology-less world is that one that looks to me to "not matter."

What I mean is that it doesn't matter when we're answering the question, "Why ought Cat run for charity?"

The moral realist says that it is true Cat ought to run for charity. For there to be a truth, there has to be a correspondence to reality. What about reality makes it so that Cat ought to run for charity?

We could potentially answer, "Because God intends her to run for charity." But we've already agreed that God's intent doesn't make the ought true. God can intend Cat to run for charity, but God's intent has nothing to do with whether she ought to because His intent doesn't have a causal role in the ought being true. God might intend for us to do good, that can be simultaneous with how we ought to do good, but we've already established that God's intent doesn't "make" the ought (because that would be Divine Command Theory).

So if we reject Divine Command Theory, the only explanation we have left is that there's something about the universe such that it's true that Cat ought to run for charity. Should we care that God created the universe to answer this question? Well, no: if God didn't have any choice in how He made the universe (He just made it in accordance with His nature), then if the universe is good, it's not because of God's choice. God is just a middle-man in this scenario: God doesn't really explain why it's true Cat ought to run for charity. So why bring Him up? He just made the stuff that's doing the moral play, the morality of the play doesn't come from Him. If we want to know what it means for it to be true Cat ought to run, that God created the universe doesn't answer that question.

But some of this will rely on the question of whether God obeys oughts, which we will get to below.

So for instance when a noncognitivist asks you "what is an ought that isn't part of a hypothetical imperative," that means God isn't really part of the answer.

I suppose that would be the case only if the noncognitivist stipulates that as a condition of her engagement. For anyone else, it would certainly remain relevant.

But a hypothetical imperative has absolutely no "oughtness" about it. What does it "hypothesize"? Normally, we think of a "hypothesis" as referring to a theory about what is possibly, plausibly true. But "true" means "conforming to the way things really are," or "objective." And a noncognitivist cannot be "hypothesizing" about truth. She doesn't believe in objective truth.

So there's nothing to "hypothesize" about. There's no "cognitive" content to cogitate on, either.

I am not sure what you mean. A hypothetical imperative is just an if/then statement. Oughts make sense in these contexts: if Cat values charity, then she ought to run. That's propositional and true, there's a correspondence to reality there. Cat has a property (a value), and there are instrumentally ways to maximize that property. Valuing a property entails wanting to do that, so it follows that she ought to do things that are in line with her value. Cat values charity, so she ought to run.

The moral realist picture, however, is not so clear. The moral realist would say it's simply true about the universe that Cat ought to run, she has a duty to run. But what does that even mean? It's intuitive to turn to God and say maybe it's about God's values and God's intentions, but we've established that it isn't about God's values or intentions. So we have this ought that's proposed to be true that is not intentional at all, but what does that even mean? What corresponds to reality about that, in what way?

How do you feel about the proposition, "God has no control over what God's nature is?" Do you agree with this proposition?

I don't think anybody has control over what his/her own "nature" is. That seems to me to be the nature of what is meant by a thing's "nature": it means, what it really is, regardless of what others think it is or what it (perhaps) wants to make itself out to be.

Great, then we agree that God doesn't choose His own nature. But this means that God is subject to things about His nature. For instance, if God is good, then God is subject to goodness: God doesn't define what goodness is because God Himself is defined by goodness and not the other way around. That's why I say things like "well then God has little to do with the discussion," because God is just subject to what goodness is, so we shouldn't be bringing God up when we ask "what is goodness?"

Likewise, God is subject to logical self-identity. God = God, and God can't help that fact. God agrees that A = A but God doesn't make it so that A = A. If someone asks, "what is logical self-identity," God is not part of the answer because God is just subject to it the same way everything else is: it can be explained on its own terms. When we ask "what is goodness" we are asking the same thing as we might when we ask "what does it mean for an ought to be true?" If God is subject to it, we should be able to define whatever it is without invoking God. God is extraneous to the discussion, in other words, if God isn't the source or foundation of it.

Why fault God for having His own nature? Because He didn't "choose" it as an arbitrary add-on? Is that in some way a diminishment of HIs greatness or "sovereignty"? If it is, I don't see it.

You misunderstand my intentions. I'm not belittling God by pointing out He has no control over His own nature, that fact is just important for reasons like just came up in the paragraph above this one. If God doesn't have control over something, God is subject to that thing. It would be one thing if God had control over what is good and what is evil, but He doesn't. He doesn't make that definition. That definition is transcendental to Him and defines Him, not the other way around (otherwise DCT would be true). But then that means that God has little to nothing to do with defining what "goodness" and "evil" are, or, more aptly, what an "ought" is. He just agrees there are oughts, he doesn't make it so there are oughts; so when we ask "what is an ought" we don't really need to talk about God, we just need to know what an "ought" is. Now, that's especially the case if God is subject to oughts himself, which we'll get to below.

If God ought to do certain things,

Oops! You amphibolized there.

You're positing two different states: 1. In which God "is" doing one thing, and 2. He "ought" to do another. Only if the two are separate is "choice" even implicated in the situation. But God is not ever different from what, if we use human language (or Humean language ) He "ought to" be. There is no such case as that.

Nevertheless, human being DO have a division between the IS and the OUGHT. That is because they are fallen, and are not doing what they "ought." So it is they who are obliged to choose the "ought." And they "ought" to, because that is harmonious with the paragon of all goodness, God.

This objection is focusing on the wrong thing. We can have these propositions at the same time:
1) X is good
2) God wants to do X
3) God ought to do X

Now you point out that since (2) is always true, that (3) needn't be said. But isn't (3) still true? Just because God perfectly always wants to do good doesn't mean that there isn't an "ought." Consider:

P1) If X is good, then a person ought to do X
P2) God is a person
C) God ought to do X

(If you don't like "person" then we can use something like "agent")

Doesn't it not matter that God will always without fail want to do X, isn't it still true that God ought to do X if X is good? Whether or not He wants to or is even capable of not wanting to (as we assume He is not) doesn't matter, He still ought to do X if X is good: right?

Now from a human perspective we look at X and we think maybe X is good. So we wonder, "why ought I do X?" The answer can't be "because God wants you to do X," we've already agreed against DCT. Something like (P1) has to be true if DCT is false. But if (P1) is true then God has a passive role in morality, God is just observing and agreeing X is good and that Cat ought to do X. So when Cat wonders "what does it mean for X to be good, what does it mean to ought to do X?" God doesn't really play a role in the answer to that, would He? Goodness would be transcendental to Him, He's subject to it (albeit perfectly capable of discerning it).

...if God is subject to goodness and oughtness,

"Subject to"?

God is not "subject to" anything. I can't even imagine what you're thinking here.

Oh but He is. God is subject to logical identity, for instance. God = God, and God had no part in making it so that God = God or that A = A in general. God just agrees with these truths. Plantinga calls this relevant dependence: S is relevantly dependent on Q if there is something about Q that needs to exist in order for S to exist and not the other way around.

Well, identity would exist even if God didn't (which is, of course, the nontheist supposition). A would still = A because God has nothing to do with whether that fact is true. We could even say "the nonexistence of God = the nonexistence of God," and identity would still be true there. So God is relevantly dependent on identity and not the other way around. Identity can exist without God but God can't exist without identity.

Likewise we turn to goodness. If God has nothing to do with defining what goodness is, but goodness defines what God is, then God is dependent on whatever goodness is in a relevant way. If God is good because God has a nature, yet God doesn't have any say in what His nature is, then goodness is transcendental to God and God isn't required in any kind of explanation of what goodness is because God doesn't define it, it defines Him.

No, it's refusing the supposition upon which that question depends. That question presupposes a division between what God is doing and should be doing; there is no such division. If there were, He would not be God.

Just because someone always does what they should be doing doesn't mean (on the moral realist view) that there is no "should" about what they're doing. Even if we know 100% that God will never lie, not ever, doesn't mean we can't also say "God shouldn't lie." If X is good, then one ought to do X. Well, God is good, so God ought to do X (even if He perfectly always does). Agree?

If there's something to oughtness at all, then the realist should be able to describe what that means.

I'm not sure what you're missing here, exactly. "Oughtness" is an adverbial quality, not a noun. You won't find an "ought" under a rock or behind a tree. It's a quality of certain human actions, because humans don't always do what they...ought.

You won't find Cat's beliefs about cheese under a rock or behind a tree, but it corresponds to reality nonetheless that Cat thinks gouda tastes superior to provolone. Just making the point that I'm not asking you to point somewhere in the physical universe and say "here is the ought."

No, the point is that if it's true there's an ought, there has to be a correspondence to reality. "Cat thinks gouda is better than provolone" corresponds because Cat has a property. "If A > B and B > C then A > C" taken by itself isn't a material statement, but it has correspondence to reality (properties of the > sign and the logical connections).

Yet I am not sure what it means to say "Cat ought to run for charity." I know what it means to say "Cat thinks she ought to run for charity," or "Cat values charity, so she ought to run," but that first statement doesn't seem to have a correspondence to reality. What is it about the universe that means she ought to run? We tried God as an explanation, but as I'm arguing, God isn't the explanation for morality since He just observes and agrees with morality. So what does it mean to say there's something about the universe that means Cat ought to run?

--------

Snipped the last bit about limitation because I think we're focusing on the wrong things there. Limitation isn't a negative word. It's just a logical thing. All things have logical limitation because they have identity, and to have an identity is to have properties. To have properties is to have some properties but not others. You can't have all properties because then you'd get contradictions. So all things are limited in this context, and "limited" does not have a negative context, you're the one assigning any negative context to the word. This is purely descriptive. A basketball is limited because it is not a horse, but that's not saying anything "negative" about the basketball. It's just literally saying the basketball does not have horse properties, just as the horse is limited because it does not have basketball properties. They might share some properties, but you hopefully understand what I'm saying.

[Astro Cat]

IC, a question that you might tack on to the above post that might be illuminating is this:

If God didn’t create people, like if it’s just God chilling with His bad self, would murder be wrong?

Or is murder only wrong when people exist to be murdered?

If murder is wrong regardless of whether there are people to be murdered, then it means something about reality makes it that way in the same way that something about reality makes it so that A=A (even God=God). But if so, God isn’t responsible for that being the case, it just IS the case. But what does that mean?

[Immanuel Can]

God has no agency or choice over what properties He has, that is what all of that boils down to.

Then it doesn't seem like a problem. Why should we imagine God would be better if His properties were a matter of choice, rather than intrinsic?

The argument isn't that God would be better if He could choose His properties: the argument is to draw attention to the fact that God doesn't choose His properties in order to make further arguments down the road.

Well, if "doesn't choose his own nature" is some sort of critique, I can't imagine what it is. And if it's not a critique, I don't think it's very helpful to the case.

If you agree that God doesn't choose His properties, then I don't have to bring it up anymore. I just don't know when I enter a discussion, so I have to build up a foundation. We can cross that one off the list as agreed, then.

Sure.

If God has a nature, God didn't choose that nature, God created the world in accordance to that nature, then God's intentions in creating the world still don't matter.

I don't get that. It doesn't seem to follow, to me.

Rather, the opposite seems true. It would only matter what nature the world had if it had some relation to God's purposes and intentions. An aimless, accidental, amoral, teleology-less world is that one that looks to me to "not matter."

What I mean is that it doesn't matter when we're answering the question, "Why ought Cat run for charity?"

The moral realist says that it is true Cat ought to run for charity. For there to be a truth, there has to be a correspondence to reality. What about reality makes it so that Cat ought to run for charity?

I did answer this.

It's because God is charitable, and made Cat for the purpose of her being a charitable person...like He is.

So if we reject Divine Command Theory, the only explanation we have left is that there's something about the universe such that it's true that Cat ought to run for charity.

What about what I actually said, above? Why are you dismissing that sort of answer?

So for instance when a noncognitivist asks you "what is an ought that isn't part of a hypothetical imperative," that means God isn't really part of the answer.

I suppose that would be the case only if the noncognitivist stipulates that as a condition of her engagement. For anyone else, it would certainly remain relevant.

But a hypothetical imperative has absolutely no "oughtness" about it. What does it "hypothesize"? Normally, we think of a "hypothesis" as referring to a theory about what is possibly, plausibly true. But "true" means "conforming to the way things really are," or "objective." And a noncognitivist cannot be "hypothesizing" about truth. She doesn't believe in objective truth.

So there's nothing to "hypothesize" about. There's no "cognitive" content to cogitate on, either.

I am not sure what you mean. A hypothetical imperative is just an if/then statement.

But the "then" has no "imperative" force in a noncognitivist universe. One cannot "ought" to do anything at all, there. It's all "is's". That's what Hume pointed out, really.

The moral realist picture, however, is not so clear. The moral realist would say it's simply true about the universe that Cat ought to run, she has a duty to run. But what does that even mean?

Jsut what I said, above. But I should wait until you've had a chance to respond to that answer, of course, so I'll desist any objecting at this point, and give you the floor, shall I?

...then we agree that God doesn't choose His own nature. But this means that God is subject to things about His nature.

This is only to say, "God is 'subject' (poor word) to Himself."

"Subject's" a very misleading coinage. How can a person be "subject" to the very thing they, themselves, most want to do? That seems more like volition than subjection.

Why fault God for having His own nature? Because He didn't "choose" it as an arbitrary add-on? Is that in some way a diminishment of HIs greatness or "sovereignty"? If it is, I don't see it.

This objection is focusing on the wrong thing. We can have these propositions at the same time:
1) X is good
2) God wants to do X

These are fine.

3) God ought to do X

This one is problematic: for "ought" does not apply to God. He's the only Entity in the universe with perfectly clear volition. There is never even a second in which He is ever NOT in the position He desires to be in, or doing the thing He wills to do. So there is no "ought" possible in His case.

"Oughts" are for human beings, because we DO have a division between our volition and our action.

Doesn't it not matter that God will always without fail want to do X, isn't it still true that God ought to do X if X is good? Whether or not He wants to or is even capable of not wanting to (as we assume He is not) doesn't matter, He still ought to do X if X is good: right?

Again, you're positing a division that simply is illusory. It applies only to the human situation, not to the divine.

No, it's refusing the supposition upon which that question depends. That question presupposes a division between what God is doing and should be doing; there is no such division. If there were, He would not be God.

Just because someone always does what they should be doing doesn't mean (on the moral realist view) that there is no "should" about what they're doing.

Again, the problem with "should" being applied to God is it requires us to imagine a division between what God does, and wants to do, and what He "ought" or "should" do. There is no such division.

--------

Snipped the last bit about limitation because I think we're focusing on the wrong things there. Limitation isn't a negative word. It's just a logical thing. All things have logical limitation because they have identity, and to have an identity is to have properties. To have properties is to have some properties but not others. You can't have all properties because then you'd get contradictions. So all things are limited in this context, and "limited" does not have a negative context, you're the one assigning any negative context to the word. This is purely descriptive. A basketball is limited because it is not a horse, but that's not saying anything "negative" about the basketball. It's just literally saying the basketball does not have horse properties, just as the horse is limited because it does not have basketball properties. They might share some properties, but you hopefully understand what I'm saying.

I understood already. But for "limitation" or shall we say "definition" (a less misleading term) to be a problem, it must also imply a shortcoming, a failure or a deficiency of some kind. If you don't think it would be a problem for God, say, not to 'be able' to sin, or not to be ignorant or weak, then why mention it at all?

I think the critique treats fallibilities like abilities. And that's a category error, plain and simple.

But I shall desist momentarily and see what you think of my earlier answer about why Cat should run for charity.

[Astro Cat]

It's because God is charitable, and made Cat for the purpose of her being a charitable person...like He is.

Why ought Cat behave in the way God intended?

I know this answer is brief, but it's because I need to know the response before expounding on it.

I ask "why ought Cat run," you say "Because God is charitable and made Cat for the purpose of being charitable." But where does that purpose come from? We've already agreed it can't be God's intent. So why ought she be charitable?

If I were a computer wizard and I made AI's housed in a virtual environment, I might intend for Little Timmy the AI to be charitable. But why ought he be charitable? Surely it has nothing to do with my intentions when I make Little Timmy, even though I am a charitable person that wants to make him a charitable person like me.

[Immanuel Can]

It's because God is charitable, and made Cat for the purpose of her being a charitable person...like He is.

Why ought Cat behave in the way God intended?

Because Cat belongs to God.

She belongs to him by right of Creation, by right of Him sustaining every breath she takes, by right of her being designed for fellowship with Him, by right of Him being everything that is best for her, by right of His loving her, and being willing to rescue her from absolute misery and death by even dying for her, and by right of him owning all things in the universe, including Cat.

Cat belongs to Him in every way possible: and only if she knows it and enters into the good of that relationship will Cat be everything it's really possible for Cat to be.

We've already agreed it can't be God's intent.

When did we agree this? I can't remember us having done so. But continue, I suppose...

[Astro Cat]

It's because God is charitable, and made Cat for the purpose of her being a charitable person...like He is.

Why ought Cat behave in the way God intended?

Because Cat belongs to God.

She belongs to him by right of Creation, by right of Him sustaining every breath she takes, by right of her being designed for fellowship with Him, by right of Him being everything that is best for her, by right of His loving her, and being willing to rescue her from absolute misery and death by even dying for her, and by right of him owning all things in the universe, including Cat.

Cat belongs to Him in every way possible: and only if she knows it and enters into the good of that relationship will Cat be everything it's really possible for Cat to be.

Does an AI that I create belong to me by right of creation? I don’t find this concept of “right of creation” intuitive. If a being creates another being with agency, the created being isn’t responsible for fulfilling all of the creator’s intentions.

A parent can intend for their child to be a lawyer, and the parent can love the child and being a lawyer could truly be good for the child and the child could even be well suited for it. But we don’t generally think that the child ought to be a lawyer because the parent intends it. Maybe the child wants to be an artist and would live a substantially less affluent life, but it’s the child’s decision as they become an adult: they have no obligation to carry out their parents’ desire for their life.

Or consider Data from Star Trek TNG, his creator deeply disapproved of Data’s choice to join Starfleet. I don’t think we would argue that Data is obliged not to once Data is an “adult.”

The other things have analogues too, a parent can be willing to die for their child and the child is still not obligated to be a lawyer. That is the parent’s job.

And all of this is forgetting that God’s intention for the creation doesn’t come from God in the first place (otherwise DCT would be true). So it still doesn’t quite answer why Cat ought to follow God’s wishes. God can have wishes and those wishes might even be what’s best for Cat by several metrics: but why ought Cat follow those wishes?

We've already agreed it can't be God's intent.

When did we agree this? I can't remember us having done so. But continue, I suppose...

We agreed that oughtness doesn’t come from intent, because if it did, that would be DCT: if oughtness comes from what God desires, then that is DCT.

If X is good and God desires X, then Cat ought to do X because it is good: that God desires it is extraneous.

So we are still left not quite knowing why X is good, what makes X good. It’s not God’s desire that makes it good.

[Immanuel Can]

Why ought Cat behave in the way God intended?

Because Cat belongs to God.

She belongs to him by right of Creation, by right of Him sustaining every breath she takes, by right of her being designed for fellowship with Him, by right of Him being everything that is best for her, by right of His loving her, and being willing to rescue her from absolute misery and death by even dying for her, and by right of him owning all things in the universe, including Cat.

Cat belongs to Him in every way possible: and only if she knows it and enters into the good of that relationship will Cat be everything it's really possible for Cat to be.

Does an AI that I create belong to me by right of creation?

If you made it, it's yours. Who else's would it be?

However, in a non-objective-moral-having world, there is no imperative that creatures with volition must not be enslaved, brutalized even, or killed. There are, in fact, no actual imperatives at all. There is no substance to morality; it's just concept with no referent. If the AI doesn't "like" to be enslaved or owned, that's just too bad for the AI, in such a world.

Good thing we don't live in such.

A parent can intend for their child to be a lawyer, and the parent can love the child and being a lawyer could truly be good for the child and the child could even be well suited for it. But we don’t generally think that the child ought to be a lawyer because the parent intends it. Maybe the child wants to be an artist and would live a substantially less affluent life, but it’s the child’s decision as they become an adult: they have no obligation to carry out their parents’ desire for their life.

Nor do you have to actualize God's best for your life. You are a free will agent. You can choose to do otherwise. God will not force you into a relationship with Him. He will respect your will, and allow you to reject Him entirely, though He is the source of all that is good, healthy, life-giving and beneficial for you.

You can decide you don't want to acknowledge any of God's reasonable claims on you.

But for many reasons, you "ought" not.

And all of this is forgetting that God’s intention for the creation doesn’t come from God in the first place

Of course it does.

why ought Cat follow those wishes?

For all the reasons I cited. And also, because it's certainly in Cat's best interests to do so, as well.