compatibilism

[henry quirk]

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.

You really believe that, B?

[Belinda]

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.

You really believe that, B?

Good question! Yes, I do believe it when I think very carefully. Same as most non-philosophers, I usually assume I am a self and everyone else is a self. I have to be very sceptical to see there are no enduring selves.

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

[iambiguous]

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.

You really believe that, B?

Click.

More to the point for the compatibilists as I understand them, she was never able not to believe what she does...yet she is still responsible for believing it.

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Either in the only possible reality in the only possible world or of their own volition.

Which one?

Your own wild-ass guess here is as good as mine.

[henry quirk]

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

Cuz crazy folks lose track of themselves, I is an illusion, yeah?

[bobmax]

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.

You really believe that, B?

Good question! Yes, I do believe it when I think very carefully. Same as most non-philosophers, I usually assume I am a self and everyone else is a self. I have to be very sceptical to see there are no enduring selves.

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

But this is not the end of the journey. It is only a possible beginning of the homecoming.

That is, if I want to continue not to be or to finally be.

The very observation of being an illusion has something paradoxical: who is it that realizes that he does not exist?
I am an illusion that realizes it is...

At this point, in my opinion, a radical change of perspective is needed.
Because it is no longer a question of logic, but of ethics.
And ethics is nothing but love.

When love intervenes, the only begotten son sets off for home.

[Belinda]

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

Cuz crazy folks lose track of themselves, I is an illusion, yeah?

If the criterion for what's real is ability to thrive physically and mentally, then yes; craziness is an illusion.The usual first principle aims for therapists are maintenance of life and alleviation of pain. Illusions and delusions cause people to suffer and die.

[Belinda]

You really believe that, B?

Good question! Yes, I do believe it when I think very carefully. Same as most non-philosophers, I usually assume I am a self and everyone else is a self. I have to be very sceptical to see there are no enduring selves.

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

But this is not the end of the journey. It is only a possible beginning of the homecoming.

That is, if I want to continue not to be or to finally be.

The very observation of being an illusion has something paradoxical: who is it that realizes that he does not exist?
I am an illusion that realizes it is...

At this point, in my opinion, a radical change of perspective is needed.
Because it is no longer a question of logic, but of ethics.
And ethics is nothing but love.

When love intervenes, the only begotten son sets off for home.

There is no "who" or if there is a 'who' that is yet to be determined. The existence of a 'who' is the substance of this debate. Bobmax, you make the same error as Descartes.

Philosophy always boils down to ethics. Love and truth are aspects of the same fact.

[bobmax]

Good question! Yes, I do believe it when I think very carefully. Same as most non-philosophers, I usually assume I am a self and everyone else is a self. I have to be very sceptical to see there are no enduring selves.

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

But this is not the end of the journey. It is only a possible beginning of the homecoming.

That is, if I want to continue not to be or to finally be.

The very observation of being an illusion has something paradoxical: who is it that realizes that he does not exist?
I am an illusion that realizes it is...

At this point, in my opinion, a radical change of perspective is needed.
Because it is no longer a question of logic, but of ethics.
And ethics is nothing but love.

When love intervenes, the only begotten son sets off for home.

There is no "who" or if there is a 'who' that is yet to be determined. The existence of a 'who' is the substance of this debate. Bobmax, you make the same error as Descartes.

Philosophy always boils down to ethics. Love and truth are aspects of the same fact.

Which error?

For me Descartes was not correct with his "I think therefore I am".

Which should instead be understood as "I think therefore I am there".

Because it proves to be there not to be.

It is not at all the same.

[Harbal]

For me Descartes was not correct with his "I think therefore I am".

Which should instead be understood as "I think therefore I am there".

Because it proves to be there not to be.

It is not at all the same.

But you first have to be before you can be "there", surely.

[Belinda]

But this is not the end of the journey. It is only a possible beginning of the homecoming.

That is, if I want to continue not to be or to finally be.

The very observation of being an illusion has something paradoxical: who is it that realizes that he does not exist?
I am an illusion that realizes it is...

At this point, in my opinion, a radical change of perspective is needed.
Because it is no longer a question of logic, but of ethics.
And ethics is nothing but love.

When love intervenes, the only begotten son sets off for home.

There is no "who" or if there is a 'who' that is yet to be determined. The existence of a 'who' is the substance of this debate. Bobmax, you make the same error as Descartes.

Philosophy always boils down to ethics. Love and truth are aspects of the same fact.

Which error?

For me Descartes was not correct with his "I think therefore I am".

Which should instead be understood as "I think therefore I am there".

Because it proves to be there not to be.

It is not at all the same.

Not at all! Descartes' error was he failed to claim simply "Thinking is happening". That's to say Descartes presumed the existence of first person singular despite first person singular was what he set out to prove.

[bobmax]

For me Descartes was not correct with his "I think therefore I am".

Which should instead be understood as "I think therefore I am there".

Because it proves to be there not to be.

It is not at all the same.

But you first have to be before you can be "there", surely.

Not me, but being must necessarily be.

My being there, that is, my existence, refers to being.

Being is the foundation of my being there, that is, of my existence.

As the foundation of existence, that is, of being there, being cannot in turn exist

[henry quirk]

I think you misunderstood, B.

Upthread you say:

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.

You went on to say:

For instance someone who becomes demented eventually forgets so much that the poor sufferer can't even identify themself. The feeling of being a self depends on coherent memories and when these go so does the feeling of self.

I, seekin' age-patented clarity, asked:

Cuz crazy folks lose track of themselves, I is an illusion, yeah?

Let me rephrase: Becuz some folks lose track of themselves -- as you say, become demented and forget so much they can't self-identify -- this is an evidence the enduring self is just ephemeral memories, yeah?

I think the self, the person, endures but is only temporarily ungrounded or unanchored.

[bobmax]

Not at all! Descartes' error was he failed to claim simply "Thinking is happening". That's to say Descartes presumed the existence of first person singular despite first person singular was what he set out to prove.

Does "Thinking is happening" mean the recomposition of the original subject-object split?

I don't think this is possible.

Because happening is already splitting, it is the coexistence of the subject and the object that happens.

The subject cannot be eliminated through reasoning.

However, I believe that the split can still be overcome.

But not with reasoning, which inevitably implies the self.

The split can be overcome, temporarily, through love.

[Belinda]

Not at all! Descartes' error was he failed to claim simply "Thinking is happening". That's to say Descartes presumed the existence of first person singular despite first person singular was what he set out to prove.

Does "Thinking is happening" mean the recomposition of the original subject-object split?

I don't think this is possible.

Because happening is already splitting, it is the coexistence of the subject and the object that happens.

The subject cannot be eliminated through reasoning.

However, I believe that the split can still be overcome.

But not with reasoning, which inevitably implies the self.

The split can be overcome, temporarily, through love.

Descartes had imagined himself to be completely fooled by a demon so that nothing D was experiencing really existed. Did D himself exist? Was there something that was undeniably Descartes or was he himself an illusion? Thinking was happening and the demon could not deny that thinking existed. That thinking exists is not the same as that a thinker exists and even less that there exists a thinker named I or me.

In a relative world an experiencer has to experience in a relative context. But that's not the same as that the experiencer endures from one moment to the next. You are not the same Bobmax as you were one second ago but experience that you attribute to Bobmax endures even after Bobmax is deceased.

[bobmax]

Descartes had imagined himself to be completely fooled by a demon so that nothing D was experiencing really existed. Did D himself exist? Was there something that was undeniably Descartes or was he himself an illusion? Thinking was happening and the demon could not deny that thinking existed. That thinking exists is not the same as that a thinker exists and even less that there exists a thinker named I or me.

In a relative world an experiencer has to experience in a relative context. But that's not the same as that the experiencer endures from one moment to the next. You are not the same Bobmax as you were one second ago but experience that you attribute to Bobmax endures even after Bobmax is deceased.

Yes, I'm not the Bobmax of a second ago.

But what does it mean to be Bobmax?
Doesn't that mean having Bobmax specific attributes?

And since these attributes are never stable but constantly evolving, then the Bobmax of now is inexorably different from the Bobmax of a second ago.

This mutability doesn't just affect Bobmax, but everything in the world.
Nothing is ever the same as it was.

But here we should consider two important aspects:

1) What identifies Bobmax, as well as everything else, is not actually Bobmax, but something that Bobmax has.
What is never identical to itself are precisely these attributes that constantly change, not Bobmax's being!
Bobmax's being is only supposed.
Bobmax is a nothing with so many attributes stuck to it.
And this being nothing is also valid for anything else.
Including Bobmax's thoughts.

2) From the previous point it follows that there is a fundamental difference between being and existing.
Because existence consists in the experience of attributes that are supposed to belong to a being, which, however, is only hypothesized.
There is no attribute that can identify the being.

So that being does not exist, being is equivalent to nothing.

Now, experience is the same existence.
Assuming its endurance regardless of that moment in which it occurred, means wanting to base it on a being that is however nothing.