What could make morality objective?

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

1 Features of reality that are or were the case. (The branch of philosophy that deals with these is ontology.)

Philosophy: Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that deals with being.

"Features of reality" depend on the theory of being that is espoused.

Okay. But a so-called theory of being or existence can only be an explanation of how we do or could use the words being and existence, their cognates and related words. And there's nothing metaphysical about that explanation.

To understand a theory of existence is more than usage of sophisticated language or philosophical terminology; it's also ability to apply the theory in question to questions about life experiences, and ethics. A theory of existence is a metaphysical explanation of being as being.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Yes. Even if all that science can produce is 'polished opinions', they are opinions about something. And that something is what we call reality. The reason why natural science is our most credible or reliable inquiry method is that it gives us verfiable information about that reality.

That is why I have been asking you, what is that-something that we call reality?

Don't you realize that ever since rational philosophy emerged within human consciousness [since >2,000 to 10,000 years ago], the mainstream philosophers had failed to determine what that-something-called-Reality is.

This is what prompted the wiser Russell after very in depth rational exploration of what is reality, to exclaim the truth, i.e.
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Long before that Kant had already realized the futility of determining what that-something-called-Reality independent of human conditions, is. Thus he introduced his Copernican Revolution.

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our Knowledge must conform to Objects.
But all attempts to extend our Knowledge of Objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of Concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in Failure.
We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of Metaphysics, if we suppose that Objects must conform to our Knowledge.

We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary Hypothesis. 1
Failing of satisfactory progress of explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest.

A similar experiment can be tried in Metaphysics, as regards the Intuition of Objects.

CPR B-xvi-ii

Long [>2000 years] before Kant, the Buddhists were already realizing the impossibility of establishing and determining what that-something-called-Reality is. They also hypothesis the pursuit of such an illusory that-something-called-Reality is due to human psychology and desperation.

Some of the ancients Greeks philosophers also realized this truth that there is NO such something-called-Reality which is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Like I say, you are like the Flat-Earthers who just don't have the ability to understand the reality of a Round Earth like the Round-Earthers do.

(And, btw, natural science says absolutely nothing about moral rightness and wrongness, simply because those aren't features of the reality that science studies.)

I have already explained, the Moral FSK borrowed scientific facts to process and output objective moral principles. I have already explained that process but I believed it just passed tru you due to your incompetence to grasp the point.

What you are doing is projecting our (necessarily human) way of perceiving, 'knowing' - and therefore describing - reality onto reality itself. But such things as the big bang, and the chemical composition of water, have nothing to do with 'the human conditions' or our ways of describing those features of reality. That idea demonstrates a blindingly obvious and fundamental confusion.

The above is a strawman.
You are merely projecting and imposing your limited knowledge of reality onto what I intended to explain.
In this case, analogically and relatively you are like a kindergarten kid trying to teach Einstein on what is Physics about.

The way out to reconcile the above two opposing points is tracing the root cause to psychology & biology then only philosophy [metaphysics, ontology, epistemology].

No, the way out is to understand the following.

1 If there is no reality-as-it-really-is - if there are no things-in-themselves -
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is, or things-in-themselves, is redundant. It is to invent an impossibility, and then deny its possibility. Kant got it terribly wrong.

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

That's a Strawman. You got it wrong again.

Point is people who are Philosophical Realists [you for example] are the ones who claim that there are things-in-themselves, i.e. things existing absolutely independent of the human conditions.
What Kant and the likes stated there is no such things as things-in-themselves or a thing-in-itself and to reify it as really existing is an illusion.


Note I mentioned thing-in-itself [things-in-themselves] as ILLUSIONS many times [didn't you read & get it?].
Since it is an illusion, it implied it is not real so there is nothing to be know about it as real nor can it [an illusion] be described in the real sense. You missed out a lot of relevant nuances on the issue.


There is no way, Kant and likes would claim,
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is,
in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

The point is people like you are naturally [evolutionarily] driven by desperate psychology to insist upon the existence of thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves as real and thus grasping at illusory things that are not real in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

I have NEVER claim scientific facts by themselves as [is-es] directly entail a moral 'ought'.

What you should counter is,
Scientific facts by themselves cannot entail moral oughts, even when processed via a Moral FSK?
Give your justification 'why not' if processed via a Moral FSK, note 'Moral FSK'?

I have already explained with examples and analogies, objective moral principles 'ought' are derived as 'output' from a credible Moral FSK [like a Moral Factory] with inputs from scientific facts, other evidences and philosophical reasoning. Note, such moral oughts are never enforceable but merely used as guides for moral progress.

Here is Kant with more severe warnings on how you and the likes get deluded with the illusion that there are things and reality that is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

• And secondly, both it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial Illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection,
  but a natural and unavoidable Illusion,
  which even after it has ceased to beguile still continues to delude though not to deceive us,
  and which though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be eradicated. B449
  
  Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
  After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
  
  ..the Ideas produce what, though a mere Illusion,
  is nonetheless irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralizing even by means of the severest criticism. B670
  
  But there is no end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the True Cause of the Illusion by which even the wisest are deceived.B731

Kant is very serious and thorough on how people like you are deluded [ultimate senses, not conventional sense].
The problem here is you don't even have the competence to understand [not necessary agree] what Kant is talking about to begin to contribute any rational counter to his claims.
What you have always done is merely throwing childish jabs without any sound counter arguments.

[Peter Holmes]

That is why I have been asking you, what is that-something that we call reality?

Don't you realize that ever since rational philosophy emerged within human consciousness [since >2,000 to 10,000 years ago], the mainstream philosophers had failed to determine what that-something-called-Reality is.

This is what prompted the wiser Russell after very in depth rational exploration of what is reality, to exclaim the truth, i.e.
Russell: "Perhaps There is No Table At ALL?"
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32814

Long before that Kant had already realized the futility of determining what that-something-called-Reality independent of human conditions, is. Thus he introduced his Copernican Revolution.



Long [>2000 years] before Kant, the Buddhists were already realizing the impossibility of establishing and determining what that-something-called-Reality is. They also hypothesis the pursuit of such an illusory that-something-called-Reality is due to human psychology and desperation.

Some of the ancients Greeks philosophers also realized this truth that there is NO such something-called-Reality which is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Like I say, you are like the Flat-Earthers who just don't have the ability to understand the reality of a Round Earth like the Round-Earthers do.



I have already explained, the Moral FSK borrowed scientific facts to process and output objective moral principles. I have already explained that process but I believed it just passed tru you due to your incompetence to grasp the point.


The above is a strawman.
You are merely projecting and imposing your limited knowledge of reality onto what I intended to explain.
In this case, analogically and relatively you are like a kindergarten kid trying to teach Einstein on what is Physics about.

The way out to reconcile the above two opposing points is tracing the root cause to psychology & biology then only philosophy [metaphysics, ontology, epistemology].

No, the way out is to understand the following.

1 If there is no reality-as-it-really-is - if there are no things-in-themselves -
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is, or things-in-themselves, is redundant. It is to invent an impossibility, and then deny its possibility. Kant got it terribly wrong.

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

That's a Strawman. You got it wrong again.

Point is people who are Philosophical Realists [you for example] are the ones who claim that there are things-in-themselves, i.e. things existing absolutely independent of the human conditions.
What Kant and the likes stated there is no such things as things-in-themselves or a thing-in-itself and to reify it as really existing is an illusion.


Note I mentioned thing-in-itself [things-in-themselves] as ILLUSIONS many times [didn't you read & get it?].
Since it is an illusion, it implied it is not real so there is nothing to be know about it as real nor can it [an illusion] be described in the real sense. You missed out a lot of relevant nuances on the issue.


There is no way, Kant and likes would claim,
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is,
in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

The point is people like you are naturally [evolutionarily] driven by desperate psychology to insist upon the existence of thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves as real and thus grasping at illusory things that are not real in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

I have NEVER claim scientific facts by themselves as [is-es] directly entail a moral 'ought'.

What you should counter is,
Scientific facts by themselves cannot entail moral oughts, even when processed via a Moral FSK?
Give your justification 'why not' if processed via a Moral FSK, note 'Moral FSK'?

I have already explained with examples and analogies, objective moral principles 'ought' are derived as 'output' from a credible Moral FSK [like a Moral Factory] with inputs from scientific facts, other evidences and philosophical reasoning. Note, such moral oughts are never enforceable but merely used as guides for moral progress.

Here is Kant with more severe warnings on how you and the likes get deluded with the illusion that there are things and reality that is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

• And secondly, both it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial Illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection,
  but a natural and unavoidable Illusion,
  which even after it has ceased to beguile still continues to delude though not to deceive us,
  and which though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be eradicated. B449
  
  Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
  After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
  
  ..the Ideas produce what, though a mere Illusion,
  is nonetheless irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralizing even by means of the severest criticism. B670
  
  But there is no end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the True Cause of the Illusion by which even the wisest are deceived.B731

Kant is very serious and thorough on how people like you are deluded [ultimate senses, not conventional sense].
The problem here is you don't even have the competence to understand [not necessary agree] what Kant is talking about to begin to contribute any rational counter to his claims.
What you have always done is merely throwing childish jabs without any sound counter arguments.

1 I don't claim there are things-in-themselves. I have no idea what a thing-in-itself could be. So you've invented that straw man.

2 The very name 'Morality framework and system of knowledge (FSK)' begs the question. It merely assumes morality is a thing that can be known - that moral rightness and wrongness are things in reality that can be known. Just inventing an FSK doesn't work.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

1 I don't claim there are things-in-themseleves. I have no idea what a thing-in-itself could be. So you've invented that straw man.

There are no things in themselves. The unknown is not made of differentiated things. Differentiation is what the subject does in his attempt to deal with his future environment.

2 The very name 'Morality framework and system of knowledge (FSK)' begs the question. It merely assumes morality is a thing that can be known - that moral rightness and wrongness are things in reality that can be known. Just inventing an FSK doesn't work.

A frame is as subjective as any other item. An item of knowledge or belief is justified and legitimated by paradigms that are protected by authorities to whom society has given the power to justify and legitimate.

[FlashDangerpants]

2 The very name 'Morality framework and system of knowledge (FSK)' begs the question. It merely assumes morality is a thing that can be known - that moral rightness and wrongness are things in reality that can be known. Just inventing an FSK doesn't work.

A frame is as subjective as any other item. An item of knowledge or belief is justified and legitimated by paradigms that are protected by authorities to whom society has given the power to justify and legitimate.

Is it your contention that you are right, that Pete disagrees with you, and thereefore Pete must be wrong?
Or is your contention that you are right, Pete disagrees, therefore Pete is right too because he knows different things to you because he chose a different framework of knowledge?

[Skepdick]

Is it your contention that you are right, that Pete disagrees with you, and thereefore Pete must be wrong?
Or is your contention that you are right, Pete disagrees, therefore Pete is right too because he knows different things to you because he chose a different framework of knowledge?

Is your contention that any room for disagreement implies subjectivity?

Surely you understand that agreement; or disagreement is a function of will.

If I want to - I will agree with you.
If I want to - I will disagree with you.

So if judgment of who's "right" and "wrong" is also subject to our agreement/disagreement then that's wee bit circular.

[Belinda]

2 The very name 'Morality framework and system of knowledge (FSK)' begs the question. It merely assumes morality is a thing that can be known - that moral rightness and wrongness are things in reality that can be known. Just inventing an FSK doesn't work.

A frame is as subjective as any other item. An item of knowledge or belief is justified and legitimated by paradigms that are protected by authorities to whom society has given the power to justify and legitimate.

Is it your contention that you are right, that Pete disagrees with you, and thereefore Pete must be wrong?
Or is your contention that you are right, Pete disagrees, therefore Pete is right too because he knows different things to you because he chose a different framework of knowledge?

There are standards for knowledge, and frames for knowledge with which I personally, and others who share my cultural values , agree. But this very general agreement does not make the standards absolutely true. The standards are true for me and for you and probably for Peter, but they are not 'objectively' true. So to answer your question I disagree with Peter's implication that morality may be objective, so Peter is wrong and his frame is wrong.

Some cultural values are better than others by virtue of better, more comprehensive, reasoning and reason is the only criterion we have to stand between us and chaos.

[Peter Holmes]

Just to deal with Kant's ridiculous argument.

P1 There's a distinction between noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena (things-as-they-appear).
P2 There are no noumena.
C Therefore, there are only phenomena.

Any torment here is of Kant's own making. It's the torment of thinking this argument is valid and sound - which has afflicted some philosophers ever since. (In my opinion, it's just Platonic dualism recycled, renamed and disguised.)

Meanwhile, civilians have never given a toss about philosophical lucubrations down the rabbit hole.

(And meanwhile, the claim that Kant's nonsensical distinction lends any credence to the claim that there are moral facts is ... well ... farcical.)

[FlashDangerpants]

A frame is as subjective as any other item. An item of knowledge or belief is justified and legitimated by paradigms that are protected by authorities to whom society has given the power to justify and legitimate.

Is it your contention that you are right, that Pete disagrees with you, and thereefore Pete must be wrong?
Or is your contention that you are right, Pete disagrees, therefore Pete is right too because he knows different things to you because he chose a different framework of knowledge?

There are standards for knowledge, and frames for knowledge with which I personally, and others who share my cultural values , agree. But this very general agreement does not make the standards absolutely true. The standards are true for me and for you and probably for Peter, but they are not 'objectively' true. So to answer your question I disagree with Peter's implication that morality may be objective, so Peter is wrong and his frame is wrong.

Some cultural values are better than others by virtue of better, more comprehensive, reasoning and reason is the only criterion we have to stand between us and chaos.

And these cultural values that are better than others, are subjectively better as agreed within one of these frameworks, or objectively better?

If one society organises its moral landscape around personal freedom, but another organises theirs around harmony, while a third uses concepts of natural order, what is the thing that makes one of those good and the other two less good? The people who built their entire moral language around peaceful harmony will surely all agree with each other that this is much more harmonious that the anarchical freedom thing and therefore better reasoned.

I genuinely can't distinguish between your description of moral fact and everyone else's description of relativism, and that's because you have downgraded the concept of fact to be relativistic. It would surely have been easier to just enter moral relativism through the front door.

[Belinda]

Is it your contention that you are right, that Pete disagrees with you, and thereefore Pete must be wrong?
Or is your contention that you are right, Pete disagrees, therefore Pete is right too because he knows different things to you because he chose a different framework of knowledge?

There are standards for knowledge, and frames for knowledge with which I personally, and others who share my cultural values , agree. But this very general agreement does not make the standards absolutely true. The standards are true for me and for you and probably for Peter, but they are not 'objectively' true. So to answer your question I disagree with Peter's implication that morality may be objective, so Peter is wrong and his frame is wrong.

Some cultural values are better than others by virtue of better, more comprehensive, reasoning and reason is the only criterion we have to stand between us and chaos.

And these cultural values that are better than others, are subjectively better as agreed within one of these frameworks, or objectively better?

If one society organises its moral landscape around personal freedom, but another organises theirs around harmony, while a third uses concepts of natural order, what is the thing that makes one of those good and the other two less good? The people who built their entire moral language around peaceful harmony will surely all agree with each other that this is much more harmonious that the anarchical freedom thing and therefore better reasoned.

I genuinely can't distinguish between your description of moral fact and everyone else's description of relativism, and that's because you have downgraded the concept of fact to be relativistic. It would surely have been easier to just enter moral relativism through the front door.

Personal freedom is the best of the three you select. But personal freedom is not anarchical because personal freedom is relative to physical and moral constraints such as they are on the occasion of choosing. Within these necessary constraints the more choices the better.
My description is relativistic. I thought you asked me to explain and justify my stance.

[FlashDangerpants]

There are standards for knowledge, and frames for knowledge with which I personally, and others who share my cultural values , agree. But this very general agreement does not make the standards absolutely true. The standards are true for me and for you and probably for Peter, but they are not 'objectively' true. So to answer your question I disagree with Peter's implication that morality may be objective, so Peter is wrong and his frame is wrong.

Some cultural values are better than others by virtue of better, more comprehensive, reasoning and reason is the only criterion we have to stand between us and chaos.

And these cultural values that are better than others, are subjectively better as agreed within one of these frameworks, or objectively better?

If one society organises its moral landscape around personal freedom, but another organises theirs around harmony, while a third uses concepts of natural order, what is the thing that makes one of those good and the other two less good? The people who built their entire moral language around peaceful harmony will surely all agree with each other that this is much more harmonious that the anarchical freedom thing and therefore better reasoned.

I genuinely can't distinguish between your description of moral fact and everyone else's description of relativism, and that's because you have downgraded the concept of fact to be relativistic. It would surely have been easier to just enter moral relativism through the front door.

Personal freedom is the best of the three you select. But personal freedom is not anarchical because personal freedom is relative to physical and moral constraints such as they are on the occasion of choosing. Within these necessary constraints the more choices the better.
My description is relativistic. I thought you asked me to explain and justify my stance.

Did you not recently accuse Pete of being on the fence?

You are working some seriously self contradictory notion of facts that are true for some and false for others but still 'facts', moral objectivity that is dependent for that objectivity on these FSK things that are only objective on some bandwagon basis of shared subjectivity. Nobody can tell what your position is. And now you are being relatvist as well, but the relativism thing isn't a dilemma you can fix by just grabbing the bull by the horns, it's incoherent to be a relativist moral objectivist.

Nothing about it makes any sense. You have your own fences to get off.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, the way out is to understand the following.

1 If there is no reality-as-it-really-is - if there are no things-in-themselves -
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is, or things-in-themselves, is redundant. It is to invent an impossibility, and then deny its possibility. Kant got it terribly wrong.

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

That's a Strawman. You got it wrong again.

Point is people who are Philosophical Realists [you for example] are the ones who claim that there are things-in-themselves, i.e. things existing absolutely independent of the human conditions.
What Kant and the likes stated there is no such things as things-in-themselves or a thing-in-itself and to reify it as really existing is an illusion.


Note I mentioned thing-in-itself [things-in-themselves] as ILLUSIONS many times [didn't you read & get it?].
Since it is an illusion, it implied it is not real so there is nothing to be know about it as real nor can it [an illusion] be described in the real sense. You missed out a lot of relevant nuances on the issue.


There is no way, Kant and likes would claim,
then the claim that we cannot perceive, know or describe reality-as-it-really-is,
in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

The point is people like you are naturally [evolutionarily] driven by desperate psychology to insist upon the existence of thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves as real and thus grasping at illusory things that are not real in the ultimate sense [not conventional sense].

2 There is no way for a scientific (or factual) 'is' to entail a moral 'ought'. It just can't be done, without begging the question.

I have NEVER claim scientific facts by themselves as [is-es] directly entail a moral 'ought'.

What you should counter is,
Scientific facts by themselves cannot entail moral oughts, even when processed via a Moral FSK?
Give your justification 'why not' if processed via a Moral FSK, note 'Moral FSK'?

I have already explained with examples and analogies, objective moral principles 'ought' are derived as 'output' from a credible Moral FSK [like a Moral Factory] with inputs from scientific facts, other evidences and philosophical reasoning. Note, such moral oughts are never enforceable but merely used as guides for moral progress.

Here is Kant with more severe warnings on how you and the likes get deluded with the illusion that there are things and reality that is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

• And secondly, both it and its opposite must involve no mere artificial Illusion such as at once vanishes upon detection,
  but a natural and unavoidable Illusion,
  which even after it has ceased to beguile still continues to delude though not to deceive us,
  and which though thus capable of being rendered harmless can never be eradicated. B449
  
  Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
  After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397
  
  ..the Ideas produce what, though a mere Illusion,
  is nonetheless irresistible, and the harmful influence of which we can barely succeed in neutralizing even by means of the severest criticism. B670
  
  But there is no end to such discussions, unless we can penetrate to the True Cause of the Illusion by which even the wisest are deceived.B731

Kant is very serious and thorough on how people like you are deluded [ultimate senses, not conventional sense].
The problem here is you don't even have the competence to understand [not necessary agree] what Kant is talking about to begin to contribute any rational counter to his claims.
What you have always done is merely throwing childish jabs without any sound counter arguments.

1 I don't claim there are things-in-themselves. I have no idea what a thing-in-itself could be. So you've invented that straw man.

Note your post where it is implied you are claiming for things-in-themselves or reality-in-itself;

Veritas Aequitas

Here's my diagnosis of our disagreement. My starting point is what could be called a methodological taxonomy. I think there are three separate and different things, which it's a mistake to muddle up, as follows.

1 Features of reality that are or were the case. (The branch of philosophy that deals with these is ontology.)

2 What we believe or know about these features of reality. (The branch of philosophy that deals with this is epistemology.)

3 What we say about features of reality, which (in classical logic) may be true or false, given the way we use the words of other signs involved, in context. (Logic deals with what can be said consistently, without contradiction, in context.)

When you claim there are features of reality, which you can describe only, you are implying there exists a thing or reality which is absolutely independent of humans' opinions and beliefs.
That reality which is described is your so-called reality-in-itself, thing-in-itself or things-in-themselves which exists independent of the human conditions.

The thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is a concept introduced by Immanuel Kant. Things-in-themselves would be objects as they are, independent of observation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

The above statement is insufficient, rather it is
objects as they are, independent of observation, descriptions, opinions and beliefs.
This is exactly the same as your 'reality' which has features, that is the case and can be described, etc. which is independent of human descriptions, opinions and beliefs.

You still deny your reality not reality-in-itself and the things therein are things-in-themselves?

[Veritas Aequitas]

2 The very name 'Morality framework and system of knowledge (FSK)' begs the question. It merely assumes morality is a thing that can be known - that moral rightness and wrongness are things in reality that can be known. Just inventing an FSK doesn't work.

I had claimed the Morality FSK is the same and had a near credibility to the Scientific FSK.
Does the scientific FSK begs the question?

What you meant by 'known' is merely 'knowledge' which is justified true beliefs [Gettier aside] which is what scientific knowledge [mere polished conjectures /opinions] from the scientific FKS is about.

Thus moral knowledge can be known which is merely 'knowledge' which is justified true beliefs [Gettier aside] which is what moral knowledge [mere polished conjectures /opinions] from the moral FSK [same the scientific FSK].

If you undermine moral knowledge [credible] then you are also undermining credible scientific knowledge.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Just to deal with Kant's ridiculous argument.

P1 There's a distinction between noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena (things-as-they-appear).
P2 There are no noumena.
C Therefore, there are only phenomena.

Any torment here is of Kant's own making. It's the torment of thinking this argument is valid and sound - which has afflicted some philosophers ever since. (In my opinion, it's just Platonic dualism recycled, renamed and disguised.)

Meanwhile, civilians have never given a toss about philosophical lucubrations down the rabbit hole.

(And meanwhile, the claim that Kant's nonsensical distinction lends any credence to the claim that there are moral facts is ... well ... farcical.)

Your thinking is very immature in this case and thus insulting your own intelligence with the above short-sighted syllogism.
I'll accept your crude syllogism as a starting point but there are critical details you missed out either ignorantly or deliberately for rhetorical purpose.

• P1 There's a distinction between noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena (things-as-they-appear). [in the conventional sense and crude logic (Kant called that Pure, Raw Reason)]
  
  P2 There are no noumena. [as justified and reasoned]
  
  C Therefore, there are only phenomena. [as verified, justified based on empirical evidences and reinforced with philosophical reasoning within a credible FSK, e.g. scientific FSK]

So what is wrong with C as detailed above?
Point is we take reality [an Emergence] which we are entangled with as far as our empirical evidences and philosophical reasonings can soundly and rationally support it with no addition of your mystical tripes.

OTOH, your claim would be

• P1 There's a distinction between noumena (things-in-themselves) and phenomena (things-as-they-appear).[in the conventional sense and crude logic]
  P2 There are noumena. [based on crude primal logic]
  C Therefore, there are phenomena [as justified via the specific FSK] and noumena.

Obviously my detailed syllogism is more solid that yours.
Do you have a counter for my above claims?

In your case, you argument ended up with a claim of the noumena, noumenon which as the ultimate sense is a thing-in-itself and that is reasoned out to be an illusion.
In your case, that is philosophical realism while the theism will claim God [thing-in-itself as Father of all things-in-themselves] exists as real.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are working some seriously self contradictory notion of facts that are true for some and false for others but still 'facts', moral objectivity that is dependent for that objectivity on these FSK things that are only objective on some bandwagon basis of shared subjectivity. Nobody can tell what your position is. And now you are being relatvist as well, but the relativism thing isn't a dilemma you can fix by just grabbing the bull by the horns, it's incoherent to be a relativist moral objectivist.

Nothing about it makes any sense. You have your own fences to get off.

In principle [evolutionarily] ALL normal [not the mental cases] human beings are inherently "programmed" to breathe or take in oxygen which is universal and objective.
There is nothing subjective about the above scientific fact and therefrom the practical 'ought' imposed on the person's freedom to do so.

In my case, i.e. my moral FSK, the objective moral principles abstracted therefrom is something like the above but not exactly.

The above is falsifiable and it can perhaps be a relativist moral objectivity when say in 1 million years time, humans has evolved differently from the present time.