Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Mon Nov 15, 2021 9:30 pm
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Nov 15, 2021 8:54 pmThat's a BIG step. Are you sure you're ready for what it means? It would mean Torah's first claim is correct. And that would mean a whole lot of other things that might have seemed difficult to believe before lose all justification for skepticism. So are you declaring that as a definite position? Or are you even admitting it as a possibility? Because when we push our thinking farther, either one's going to turn out to end up at essentially the same place.
‘What it means’ is, and you are inferring this, something like intelligent design.
Yes, I thought that might be it. But I didn't want to jump to any conclusions without asking.
Intelligent Design is Theism, of course. So that would accord with
Torah; but it would also be a denial of the Materialist-Evolutionary story.
So, to say En Arche hos logos (In the beginning was the Word) seems to me to refer to that. It is a basic and I think inescapable notion: How could it possibly be? Everything that happened had to be intelligently expressed, if only as potential, prior to it happening.
Yes, I see that. "Logos" is, of course, not merely "word" but "logic" and also a sort of divine guarantee, as we use the term "word" in a phrase like, "I want you to give me
your word that you will..." As such, it definitely implicates not only intelligence (which it does, of course, but rationality and a personal level of investment in what is "worded."
That's pretty thorough Theism.
So, while it is extremely easy in my view to accept the premises of ‘intelligent design’, what was designed, and what it all means, and the situation we find ourselves in (as fragile, mortal beings with awareness that must face death and annihilation, as well as all the ills that are attendant to our biological condition, including our limitations and ignorance in interpreting what we *see*)(which in truth means what we are not seeing since all perception is contingent to extremely imperfect *tools*), none of this is necessarily explained by either the Christian mythos nor any other mythic, metaphysical, speculative model.
Well, that's the next step...but I wanted to see if we had the first step right, before I presumed we'd go to that question.
In other words, the question,
"Is there a God?" comes before "
What kind of God?" which comes before
"Why did that God make what He made?" There's a logical progression there, for sure.
Or to put it another way: any description can only be a sort of interpretive guess.
Christians and Jews have long recognized just that fact. And it accounts for the proliferation of myths and stories around the world...lots of guesses. But Judaism and Christianity deal with that through another postulate, also implied in the use of the word "Word" in John 1 -- that is, the implication of
communication. For one does not issue "words" to nothing. One speaks TO somebody...a recipient, a hearer, a receiver, somebody who benefits from the "word" communicated.
So Judaism and Christianity say, "Not only does God exist, but He communicates." His first "communication" was Creation itself; but beyond that, God Himself communicates in propositions and language. The nature of the Creator God is such that He makes Himself known. He
reveals Himself in His Word.
If God does speak, then we are no longer only dealing with guesses. We have the propositional revelation of God. And all the human "guesses" that don't conform to that "word" are not worth any more than any other guess...only if to whatever extent they're lucky enough to capture, by accident or intuition, some element of the truth are they valuable; and to the extent they depart from God's self-revelation, they are not truth at all.
However, the most important thing in my own view, which I claim only as my own, is that the specific Story of Torah, or any other explanatory model, even if any one of them arrives at correct conclusions about existential, moral and ethical questions, is still only a model, only a Story.
That's taking an assumption that all stories are equal, and no story can be history.
Do we have any reason to think either is true?
This is why I have, in a sense, a certain luxury: the sense of the Story, or what remains behind the Story, has not necessarily changed.
Let's test that theory. We should be able to find it in two works as influential as the
Torah and
Gita, no?
What elements of the
Gita do you think "remain" in
Torah, and "remain" in "the meaning" behind both "stories"? What's that larger "meaning" that transcends the particulars of both
Torah and
Gita?
This: “And that would mean a whole lot of other things that might have seemed difficult to believe before” does not follow. So, for example, if I say that the Story of a primeval garden, if I am to take it as *reality*, is absurd, does not mean however that the notion of a Fall is not therefore real, or consequent in what it in fact indicates. What it actually indicates, therefore, is more important than the vehicle through which the meaning is conveyed.
I don't think "garden" is a problematic concept at all. It just means a collocation of plants...we see those every day. Are we to think that the God who we have already postulated created everything would have some difficulty with that? I can't see why.
But the Fall is interesting. For if there was no initial disobedience, then there was no Fall. If, for example, Evolutionism is posited, then there was never an event in which mankind chose to disobey God. The present conditions are, instead, merely the gradual outcome of billions of years of the movements of nature, and are neither more "good" nor more "evil" than that...and if man is out of step with his Creator now, there is no explanation for that fact in Evolutionism.
In short, Evolutionism offers no basis at all for a concept of sin.
But I cannot necessarily know, that is factually, what Fall means. There are different ideas and they have been expressed by different peoples at various times. The soul that ‘falls’ into a material entanglement, a biological/material entanglement, is a useful explanatory picture.
That's kind of the Vedas angle. But it doesn't work with
Torah.
Remember that
Torah is very definite about saying, reapeatedly in the opening chapters of Genesis, that the Creation was "good' and "very good." And that human embodiment, far from being a curse or a prison for the soul, was a gift from God, an instrument of action for man and an instrument of obedience and co-creativity with God Himself.
For Hindus, the "fall" is the "entanglement with the material world," (
samsara,
kharma, dharma, reincarnation, caste, and so on). But for
Torah, mankind was unfallen and in relationship to God in the beginning. It was his act of disobeience that changed that. For Hindus, the "fall" is something that
was done to us. In Judeo-Christian thought, it's something
we did against God, and thus also against ourselves.
But it also must entail something, if indeed, as the story goes, the Fall is a punishment, which indeed it is.
It isn't that in Hinduism. And even in Judaism and Christianity, punishment is only one aspect of a complex thing. Yes, the Fall was a punishment; but it was also a natural consequence, since man had severed himself/herself from the only Source of life, health, goodness, light, and so on. And in a strange way, it had some positive sides as well. For in that God allowed man the choice, it was an affirmation of the human right-to-choose. And man was, as
Torah says, going to "know good and evil" from then on; he would have means to choose his moral actions: autonomy was then affirmed, even at the cost of allowing evil. And the Fall also forms the backdrop of the story of salvation; for one does not need to be "saved" from that which is not a "fall" at all.
If "punishment" were the whole story, I think
Torah would have ended at chapter 3. It wasn't, obviously.
...the Vedic people could only see Jesus Christ as a manifestation of Vishnu....
That's what happens when people try not to give up their myth in order to face the truth...they end up having to mash the truth to fit the narrative; they want to retain; and often, as in this case, they mash so hard they effectivley destroy the thing they were at pains to integrate and explain.
No Jew or Christian is going to recognize HaShem or Jesus in Vishnu, anymore than they would ever recognize Him in Allah or Ahura Mazda. And that's sensible: because you can tell who somebody's talking about by their descriptions, can't you?
So, for example, if somebody were to ask you, "Do you know IC?" You might say, "Yes: he's tall, male, middle-aged..." But if you said instead, "He's a five-foot, teenage trans-woman with one leg, then anybody sane is going to think one of two things: either...
A. You don't know IC at all, or
B. You know somebody named "IC," but it's certainly not the same IC they know.
Obviously, those are the logical conclusions from that sort of difference in the two accounts.
And if God is also real, and has a real identity and character of HIs own, and is not something we simply make up to please ourselves, and God is described one way in
Torah and the New Testament, but differently in other accounts that talk about a "god," then a reasonable person is drawn to the same two possibilities: either the second speaker does not know God at all, or it's a very different "god" they're thinking of.
That's pretty common-sensical, isn't it?
In my view Eastern metaphysics can offer a great deal to Western metaphysics (if only in this realm of religious models, ethics, etc.)
"A great deal," you say?
Specifically, what? I'd be interested in knowing what specifics have struck you on that point: I'm assuming you must have something in mind...
My point though is that other peoples, in other times, have confronted exactly the same problem.
The "problem" being...what?