Is the Thing-in-Itself Imperative for Science?

[Veritas Aequitas]

That goes directly to the point of addressing the challenge in the OP: the existence of things in themselves is a transcendental condition for the possibility of science.

You can still always deny access to objects independent of our minds, but in doing so, you are necessarily committed to rejecting science.

You cannot understand this because you're still stuck with Kant's account of realism (the one that was possible at his time).

In the above Conde Lucanor argued denial of access to objects independent of our minds [things-in-themselves], tantamount to "you are necessarily committed to rejecting science."

Do you agree with the above?

[Veritas Aequitas]

You can still always deny access to objects independent of our minds, but in doing so, you are necessarily committed to rejecting science.

Note Kant in rejecting mind-independent thing-in-itself claimed science is still a possibility as presented in his CPR and the Prolegomena.
Example: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/
Denying access to objects independent of minds do not necessary reject science.
If you still insist, show proof instead of making noises about it.

The main leverage of Science is on empirical evidences not on the thing-in-itself.
The thing-in-itself is merely assumed by certain aspects of science, i.e. Newtonian Physicists and not by all physicists.
Anyone can still proceed with science without accepting the assumption of the thing-in-itself.

Even theists like Newton who grounded his theories on God can still produce scientific theories which are acceptable by scientists and others.
Non-theists just cut off the God grounding and stick with what is required by the Scientific Framework, System and Methods.
The same cut off can be done to the Realist's assumption in Science re an independent thing-in-itself and the scientific theories are still valid.

As such the things-in-themselves i.e. things absolutely independent of human conditions [mind] are not imperative to the truths of scientific theories.

[FlashDangerpants]

That goes directly to the point of addressing the challenge in the OP: the existence of things in themselves is a transcendental condition for the possibility of science.

You can still always deny access to objects independent of our minds, but in doing so, you are necessarily committed to rejecting science.

You cannot understand this because you're still stuck with Kant's account of realism (the one that was possible at his time).

In the above Conde Lucanor argued denial of access to objects independent of our minds [things-in-themselves], tantamount to "you are necessarily committed to rejecting science."

Do you agree with the above?

If the realism/antirealism thing were meaningful, something would rest on the matter such as the standing of science.

But nothing at all rests on it, because you are all idiots who can't tell that you are just having a lame debate about how to describe perception and language, and you're still dumb enough to be doing that with talk of 'things in themselves' as controversial objects beyond perception and description.

I can't believe you've fired up so many threads for such nonsense.