How Moral Responsibility arises from Consciousness

[RCSaunders]

Your consciousness and my spirit aren't the same thing, I reckon. Yours extends out of matter; mine coexists with matter.

Where the hell did I ever say consciousness extends out of matter? I don't even know what that would mean. Consciousness does not emerge out of anything else. I only say consciousness is not a thing or a substance or an entity that can exist independently of a conscious being. Do you think it is or can?

Just curious. I'm on your side, in this, Henry. We just may have a slightly different way of looking at it.

Obviously, I don't know what you mean by consciousness. Can you gimme a plain language definition? in a coupla short paragraphs, please.

Simple enough. Consciousness itself is the direct awareness of existense, that is, seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling and tasting as well as our internal awareness called interoception. That much of consciousness, with variations, we share with all the higher animals, because they also see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, sometimes better sometimes more poorly then humans.

Human consciousness is unique, however, in that it is volitional, intellectual, and rational, which only means, human behavior is determined by their conscious choice, (volition), which requires knowledge (intellect), and the ability to think and make judgements (rationality).

It is that volitional, intellectual, rational consciousness which is referred to as the mind, or one's self, or ego, or soul as the that which is what one lives for and to which anything matters.

That's as brief as I can make it. If your really interested I've addressed the question in more detail:

The Nature of Consciousness


The Nature of the Mind

[henry quirk]

It is that volitional, intellectual, rational consciousness which is referred to as the mind, or one's self, or ego, or soul as the that which is what one lives for and to which anything matters.

How does this come to be? Is it reliant on a certain kind of material or biological complexity? What is consciousness's origin? Is it a property? Is it action (in the sense that walking is action, it's what legs do, and has no existence as anything other than action)?

I'm tryin' to understand -- if it doesn't extend from or have its roots in the workings of the brain/body -- what a man's consciousness is to you.

[henry quirk]

I only say consciousness is not a thing or a substance or an entity that can exist independently of a conscious being. Do you think it is or can?

I believe, as I say up-thread, man is a composite of spirit and substance. I believe in the here & now neither can function fully without the other. A man with no spirit is an ape. A man with no substance is ???.

My religion (if you can call it that) along with havin' no holy men, no holy book, no holy place (and no coffers) has no instruction as to what a man is without his substance. Nuthin' but a memory? Sumthin' that lives on?

Hell if I know. And I'm too busy keepin' spirit and substance together, and the slavers offa my back, to worry about it.

[RCSaunders]

I have no idea what you mean by, "identical." If by identical you mean, "static," without any change whatsoever, who would ever think that.

Yes, logically or ontologically identical refers to it being _exactly_ the same.

I'm not sure what that means. To me, "exactly," the same would meaan no change or difference at all, which would logically eliminate everything that exists at any moment unless the universe is static. Nothing is in exactly the same place, in exactly the same relationship with all other things, and most thing are not even in the same state from moment to moment--no atom's electrons are in exactly the same state moment to moment and nothing with heat is either.

If by identical you mean an entity with the very same attributes that identify it as that entity at different times and places why would it not be the very same entity?

The attributes can't be _exactly_ the same, either, because the attributes obtain via the particular dynamic relations of matter. That's what attributes ARE, unless you're going to posit some sort of real abstract or real universal, which insofar as I know you, I don't think you'd want to do.

I also do not understand what you mean here. Do you mean an atom's atomic weight or valence does not or cannot stay the same? As far as I know no, "dynamic relationship," is responsible for an atom's mass or number of electrons and protons.

"Logically identical" means that we're not equivocating. When we have two occurrences of the same variable in logic, for example, they refer to exactly the same thing, in the same respect, at the same time, etc.

OK. I would have called it an epistemological or linguistic fallacy, but I'll not quibble over semantics.

"Ontologically identical" means that we're referring to exactly the same thing as an existent--there can be nothing different about it as an existent.

I think I agree exactly here. Ontologically there are only individual (particular) entities, which is what I think you mean by, "exactly the same thing." Classes and categories (universals) are strictly epistemological. Universals are only valid, however, if the entities subsumed under that universal concept really do have (ontologically) the common attributes by which the referent entities of the concept are identified.

I really am trying to understand your view here and my questions are only for clarification, not meant to be arguments.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm not sure what that means. To me, "exactly," the same would meaan no change or difference at all, which would logically eliminate everything that exists at any moment unless the universe is static. Nothing is in exactly the same place, in exactly the same relationship with all other things, and most thing are not even in the same state from moment to moment--no atom's electrons are in exactly the same state moment to moment and nothing with heat is either.

Correct. Nothing is logically or ontologically identical to anything else or even to itself at two different moments in time.

I also do not understand what you mean here. Do you mean an atom's atomic weight or valence does not or cannot stay the same? As far as I know no, "dynamic relationship," is responsible for an atom's mass or number of electrons and protons.

Mass is thought to be a factor of interaction with things like the Higgs field (whether that's the case or not--I have some issues with things like Higgs bosons and physical fields in general, but it's plausible to me that mass would be affected by interactions), which is obviously dynamic, and valence is a factor of the dynamic relation between particles in an atom. Re the number question, obviously dynamic relations are necessary for there to be atoms in the first place. (Also, I'm not a realist on numbers or any mathematical objects, though, yes, I am a realist on relations.)

Universals are only valid, however, if the entities subsumed under that universal concept really do have (ontologically) the common attributes by which the referent entities of the concept are identified.

You'd need to be careful that you're not saying that they really do have identical attributes, because that's what (real) universals are.

[RCSaunders]

I'm not sure what that means. To me, "exactly," the same would meaan no change or difference at all, which would logically eliminate everything that exists at any moment unless the universe is static. Nothing is in exactly the same place, in exactly the same relationship with all other things, and most thing are not even in the same state from moment to moment--no atom's electrons are in exactly the same state moment to moment and nothing with heat is either.

Correct. Nothing is logically or ontologically identical to anything else or even to itself at two different moments in time.

Actually that makes it clear what you seem to mean. I cannot agree with it, but I see no good reason to debate it.

I do have one question, because it nags me. If there is some entity with a specific attribute, a certain mass, for example, are you saying that the mass is not the same mass a moment later? If that is what you are saying, did the first mass go away and become replaced by a new mass. If the mass is not the same, "identical," mass, it must be a different mass. What changed and how did it change?

Now that may not be what you are saying, I understand. But I think you can understand what nags me. I'm also not quite sure what you mean by the word, "identical." That may be what I'm not understanding.

[Belinda]

There is an unchanging, irreducible sumthin' in my composition. I call it spirit, you can call it information.

Well, he sure as heck can't say it's "information," because "information" changes. "Spirit," or "identity," if one prefers, is always the same, regardless of shifts in "information."

Is its spirit, or identity, a quality that defines a foetus, a dog, a cup of tea, a demented man, or a human corpse?

Is its spirit - or -identity, the defining quality of itself, for itself, or is spirit -or- identity defined by others, or both?

[Immanuel Can]

Is its spirit, or identity, a quality that defines a foetus, a dog, a cup of tea, a demented man, or a human corpse?

No. "Identity" refers to a particular thing.

"A foetus" is a general term, as is "a dog," "a cup of tea..."

"Identity" would be "the foetus Michael McReady," or "Bonzo, my poodle," or "the cup of tea I left on the sideboard last night."

[Belinda]

Is its spirit, or identity, a quality that defines a foetus, a dog, a cup of tea, a demented man, or a human corpse?

No. "Identity" refers to a particular thing.

"A foetus" is a general term, as is "a dog," "a cup of tea..."

"Identity" would be "the foetus Michael McReady," or "Bonzo, my poodle," or "the cup of tea I left on the sideboard last night."

I see. Its identity is what makes an individual unique. Candidates for positively identifying an individual are DNA profile, dental records, thumb prints, iris recognition and possession of identity documents. However these are physical not spiritual.How might spirit identify a particular dog, a particular sane adult man, a particular foetus, a particular cup of tea, or a particular corpse?

To feel that one has one's own continuous identity one needs long term memory at least. If one loses one's memory does one also lose one's spirit?

[Immanuel Can]

Is its spirit, or identity, a quality that defines a foetus, a dog, a cup of tea, a demented man, or a human corpse?

No. "Identity" refers to a particular thing.

"A foetus" is a general term, as is "a dog," "a cup of tea..."

"Identity" would be "the foetus Michael McReady," or "Bonzo, my poodle," or "the cup of tea I left on the sideboard last night."

I see. Its identity is what makes an individual unique. Candidates for positively identifying an individual are DNA profile, dental records, thumb prints, iris recognition and possession of identity documents.

No, it's deeper than that.

The question is not merely how one identifies a thing: it's how that thing even has such a thing as an 'identity,"whether you happen to discover it or not. That is, what makes one thing not-another.

And it gets espeically interesting over time: what makes Belinda at 8 years old still Belinda at 26 or at 56? What is the thread of continuity there? And it's not Belinda's memory, because Belinda will forget what 8 year old Belinda was like, or will misremember her, or perhaps will sustain an injury or senility, and not remember her at all...and yet, Belinda will still be the same person, in a very profound sense, even though she's changed, and even if she can't remember.

How does that work? That's the question.

[Belinda]

No. "Identity" refers to a particular thing.

"A foetus" is a general term, as is "a dog," "a cup of tea..."

"Identity" would be "the foetus Michael McReady," or "Bonzo, my poodle," or "the cup of tea I left on the sideboard last night."

I see. Its identity is what makes an individual unique. Candidates for positively identifying an individual are DNA profile, dental records, thumb prints, iris recognition and possession of identity documents.

No, it's deeper than that.

The question is not merely how one identifies a thing: it's how that thing even has such a thing as an 'identity,"whether you happen to discover it or not. That is, what makes one thing not-another.

And it gets espeically interesting over time: what makes Belinda at 8 years old still Belinda at 26 or at 56? What is the thread of continuity there? And it's not Belinda's memory, because Belinda will forget what 8 year old Belinda was like, or will misremember her, or perhaps will sustain an injury or senility, and not remember her at all...and yet, Belinda will still be the same person, in a very profound sense, even though she's changed, and even if she can't remember.

How does that work? That's the question.

I assure you that if I were found dead and nobody knew who I was, I'd be identifiable not by anything more "profound" than DNA. dental records, or papers etc. that were on my person.

As for the feeling I have that I am the same person I was when I was eight years old, I am no more special than anyone who loses their memory and with their memory goes their feeling of continuity.

[Immanuel Can]

I'd be identifiable...

"Identifiable" is an epistemological concern.

"Identity," as we are talking about it, is an ontological one.

There's a difference: because what a thing is, remains what it is, regardless of whether or not anybody presently knows what it is.

It's not about how we know who's who: it's about how anybody or anything is what it is, and not another thing.

[henry quirk]

B,

Upthread, I wrote to RC...

I believe...man is a composite of spirit and substance. I believe in the here & now neither can function fully without the other. A man with no spirit is an ape. A man with no substance is ???.

My religion (if you can call it that) along with havin' no holy men, no holy book, no holy place (and no coffers) has no instruction as to what a man is without his substance. Nuthin' but a memory? Sumthin' that lives on?

...bear it in mind as you consider my responses below.

You wrote: I assure you that if I were found dead and nobody knew who I was, I'd be identifiable not by anything more "profound" than DNA. dental records, or papers etc. that were on my person.

The authorities would be identifyin' your remains, the substance that used to be part of you. Your spirit? Flown the coop for better climes or faded away into oblivion.

You wrote: As for the feeling I have that I am the same person I was when I was eight years old, I am no more special than anyone who loses their memory and with their memory goes their feeling of continuity.

Memory is not the continuity or coherence of you. As I say elsewhere: in the few authentic cases of true amnesia the amnesiac lacked history but was still himself, sumthin' verified by family and friends. His memory was gone, but he was not a blank slate; he was instead a very confused person, the same person he was before amnesia.

Man is not just substance or matter. You are not your brain only.

Wilder Penfield's work with epileptics; split brain surgeries; and surgeries where significant portions of the brain are removed all point toward you, not bein' solely the result of workings of a brain.

[Dubious]

The whole story of identity, the awareness of oneself and everything surrounding, is completely brain centered. Only in humans does it extend itself beyond the physical into a soul or spirit concept as if it were a separate ontology. All of these non-substances is what the brain substance produces. There isn't anything else to provide for it. Everything which exists in the universe, from planets to people have one thing in common: they're all produced by quantum fields of which the brain, human or not, is only ONE manifestation.

[Dontaskme]

How does that work? That's the question.

Answer: Nonduality the one question to all our answers.