How Moral Responsibility arises from Consciousness

[Belinda]

The essential point is the difference between moral responsibility, which applies to conscious beings with an awareness of making choices, and "general" responsibility, for want of a better term, which seems to be a particular cause or chain of causes picked out from a web of joint causes as departing from expectations in some way. It's among other things a response to the book review by Stuart Jeffries in the current PN. The "alarming" implications of determinism (or its denial) that he talks about fade away if the review of a chain of preceding causes is focussed only on points where a conscious choice is made.

I mostly agree Roger.
But when denying determinism means accepting Free Will I don't agree. Free Will is a universal catalyst that changes all choices, and Free Will does not come in degrees of strength but comes as an all or nothing force. It is mistake to conflate human will power with Free Will. In Free Will , 'Free' means utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes , causal circumstances including human consciousness , or law of science or nature. To the contrary, Free Will miraculously intervenes in nature .

This looks like a historic, theological version of free will that bears little relation to the subject of all the 20th century papers in Gary Watson's "Free Will" anthology, for example. Obviously, Belinda, as a Humanist I'm not qualified to argue with you about theistic claims! I agree free will isn't the same as "will power" - see my OP on "the difference between formal & psychological free will" - the latter depending, among other things, on will power. But for an action or decision to be "utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes, causal circumstances including human consciousness, or law of science or nature" is to have no grounds for claiming it to be one's own, that I can see. I am the outcome of my genetic and experiential inputs, to be chosen by me is to be chosen by the integration at some moment of all those inputs, it is the experience of that integration that constitutes the experience of being me, deciding. But as I say, that is a Humanist perspective, all I can do is make it as clear as possible: religious conversion is unlikely to happen on a philosophical forum!

Because Free Will is a theological doctrine is why I give it capital letters. I would not credit this doctrine with the certainty it demands. As uncertain, the theistic doctrine of Free Will is as incredible as any doctrine that includes that God salted man with the savour of His supernatural Self.

As a Humanist myself I feel free to explore ideas and history of God.

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?
I have found active participation in a philosophical forums like this one and the other one do in fact help me to put my ideas in order, together with my reading. So Henry's idea of freedom makes me think.

As a Humanist, I am not a very pure one because I am devoted to Spinoza not least because the ethical conclusion of his reasoning is politically left.

I

am the outcome of my genetic and experiential inputs, to be chosen by me is to be chosen by the integration at some moment of all those inputs, it is the experience of that integration that constitutes the experience of being me, deciding.

That is existentialists' freedom. It does sound quite like (Heidegger) Dasein or Being-there. in other words you and I and Henry Quirk et al are unique centres of experience. Albeit we are caused to experience what we do, we are each of us centres of experience and centrality makes experiences to be more than amorphous masses.

[henry quirk]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

[Terrapin Station]

I am puzzled that so many writers assume – usually with no attempt at justification – that moral responsibility has something to do with determinism, or more specifically with being an “ultimate cause”. What makes this puzzling is that it seems to be almost universally accepted in common usage that the possibility of being morally responsible is confined to conscious beings. An earthquake, for example, may be “responsible” (in another sense) for much suffering, but (aside from animism) the earth is never held responsible in a moral sense. So a sound theory of moral responsibility has to be founded on the role of consciousness.

How would that work? Firstly, let us clear up an obvious source of confusion here, because “responsibility” is used in two different senses, a binary (yes/no) sense and a sense that is a matter of degree. For convenience I will confine the term “responsibility” to the former sense, and refer to the “how much?” sense as "culpability" (or “praiseworthiness” as the case may be). The courts have long distinguished between the verdict and the sentence, so philosophers should have no problem distinguishing the fact of responsibility for a bad act, from the degree of culpability for it. A person may be clearly responsible for an act but with such strong mitigating circumstances that they can hardly be regarded as culpable.

Initially, the fact of responsibility has to be defined in the first person, since that is where consciousness is first identified. If I am conscious of choosing an act, from among other acts that would be possible given that I chose them, then I have a relationship to that act, and that is the relationship that we call “responsibility”. So networks of causes do not have to be traced back any further than the point at which consciousness of this relationship entered into the process by which the act was chosen.

Once we have a concept of moral responsibility in the first-person, the third-person meaning can be derived from it, by virtue of our ability to recognize and thus to identify with consciousness in others. I hold another person responsible for an act if I believe that he chose it while conscious that he was making a choice.

So now let us briefly look at “culpability”: the fact of responsibility but with mitigation taken into account. Without going into further detail, we can acknowledge that mitigation typically stems from any of three things: lack of competence to make the choice, psychological pressures of many kinds, and genuine repentance. What is relevant here is that all of these involve consciousness. If we could read a perpetrator’s mind perfectly, there would be no need to enquire further. However, psychological identification is not the same as being psychologically identical: I can mentally step into another’s shoes, but not see life through her eyes, so to speak. Hence we have to use proxies to provide pointers to the relevant features of another person’s mind, namely the objective circumstances which gave rise to her conscious experience. Nothing in this, however, provides any grounds for metaphysical enquiries into original causation or the like.

This is necessarily an extremely compressed account of the theory I am advocating: for example, the social construction of responsibility has to be added to the picture. (Chapter 8 of my e-book “New Thoughts on Free Will” provides a more comprehensive account.)

I'm a bit confused by the gist of this post. It seems like you're wanting to dispute something about standard views of moral culpability, but it's not at all clear to me what you're disputing. Your post reads mostly like a summary of standard views.

The essential point is the difference between moral responsibility, which applies to conscious beings with an awareness of making choices, and "general" responsibility, for want of a better term, which seems to be a particular cause or chain of causes picked out from a web of joint causes as departing from expectations in some way. It's among other things a response to the book review by Stuart Jeffries in the current PN. The "alarming" implications of determinism (or its denial) that he talks about fade away if the review of a chain of preceding causes is focussed only on points where a conscious choice is made.

Ah--okay, after reading your response to my post and rereading your first post again in light of that, it makes more sense.

The whole gist of this is the issue that most people would say that you can only hold x morally responsible for an action, A, if x chose to do A, where x had the possibility of doing otherwise. If x was forced to do A--by causal determinism, for example--then x can't be held morally responsible for doing A.

As long as we're assuming that x is metaphysically capable of making a decision, which we normally do, legal systems and cultural mores do generally take into account factors such as competence, coercion, and negligence versus competent intent to execute wrongdoing.

[Terrapin Station]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

You're not something unchanging that's unaffected by your choices, though.

[henry quirk]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

*You're not something unchanging that's unaffected by your choices, though.

Yeah, I am. I grow, become more complex (get old), but I remain me. There's a continuity, a coherence, to me. When I woke up this morning, I was the same man who went to bed (too late) last night.

I'm havin' déjà vu: we had this conversation before, you and me.

And: my choices (the consequences) affect me, perhaps inform or educate me, but I'm not changed by those choices.

[Terrapin Station]

Yeah, I am. I grow, become more complex (get old), but I remain me. There's a continuity, a coherence, to me.

Growing and becoming more complex are certainly changes.

No one is saying that it's "not you." But you change. You're not identical to what you were previously. There's a continuity to it, but continuity is different than logical identity.

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

I mean are you sure you have not been unduly influenced by what some of the people around you choose to believe?

[henry quirk]

Yeah, I am. I grow, become more complex (get old), but I remain me. There's a continuity, a coherence, to me.

Growing and becoming more complex are certainly changes.

No one is saying that it's "not you." But you change. You're not identical to what you were previously. There's a continuity to it, but continuity is different than logical identity.

And the man who woke up this early morning is still the same man who went to bed late last night. No matter what changes there are, over the course of a day/night, a week, a month, a year, years: I am always me, never someone else. I do not slowly or rapidly become another man.

A is A and I am me.

[Impenitent]

"Ooh la la-
I wish that I knew what I know now
When I was younger.
I wish that I knew what I know now
When I was stronger." - Rod Stewart

flux is fun

-Imp

[henry quirk]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

I mean are you sure you have not been unduly influenced by what some of the people around you choose to believe?

I'm not much of a joiner or follower, B. And, I'm one to do it myself. I change my own oil, wash my own clothes, think my own thoughts.

As for those around me: I've spent 58 years at odds with most of 'em. Family, friends know me as prickly. Strangers in a short time come to the same conclusion.

I belong to no clubs or organizations. When I register to vote, it's as no party.

Influences? Sure. Writers, both low and high. Role models? Not a one, yesterday or today. Teachers? Yep, I've had both formal and informal instruction across a variety of subjects.

Indoctrination (and let's be honest here, B, that's what your really askin' about)? Nope. There is no cult of mind-controllin' deistic, natural rights-proclaimin', Free Enterprise-lovin', minarchists/anarchists, stealin' my money, takin' up my time, and turnin' my mind into mush.

If my mind is deficient: I did it to myself.

I work alone, play alone. My most significant relationship is with my 15 year old (and, in some half-assed way, you folks [and you can see how that's goin': half of you are on my ignore list and half of you I'm in some form of war with]).

Face it, B: I am what I am becuz I am what I am, not becuz I was shaped.

[henry quirk]

"Ooh la la-
I wish that I knew what I know now
When I was younger.
I wish that I knew what I know now
When I was stronger." - Rod Stewart

flux is fun

-Imp

The water fluxes and flows...and remains water.

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk , is your thinking truly authentic in the Sartrean sense of 'authentic'?

You mean do my choices define who I am?

Nope. Who and what I am defines my choices.

I precede the choice.

Or do you mean sumthin' else?

I mean are you sure you have not been unduly influenced by what some of the people around you choose to believe?

I'm not much of a joiner or follower, B. And, I'm one to do it myself. I change my own oil, wash my own clothes, think my own thoughts.

As for those around me: I've spent 58 years at odds with most of 'em. Family, friends know me as prickly. Strangers in a short time come to the same conclusion.

I belong to no clubs or organizations. When I register to vote, it's as no party.

Influences? Sure. Writers, both low and high. Role models? Not a one, yesterday or today. Teachers? Yep, I've had both formal and informal instruction across a variety of subjects.

Indoctrination (and let's be honest here, B, that's what your really askin' about)? Nope. There is no cult of mind-controllin' deistic, natural rights-proclaimin', Free Enterprise-lovin', minarchists/anarchists, stealin' my money, takin' up my time, and turnin' my mind into mush.

If my mind is deficient: I did it to myself.

I work alone, play alone. My most significant relationship is with my 15 year old (and, in some half-assed way, you folks [and you can see how that's goin': half of you are on my ignore list and half of you I'm in some form of war with]).

Face it, B: I am what I am becuz I am what I am, not becuz I was shaped.

You do seem to have the courage of your convictions. But you are not what you are either because you were shaped , nor because you always, from conception, are what you are. You are what you are because you made you what you are.

And what is it that made you? It is not some unchanging essence of Henry , but Henry that is a centre of experience.

[Terrapin Station]

Yeah, I am. I grow, become more complex (get old), but I remain me. There's a continuity, a coherence, to me.

Growing and becoming more complex are certainly changes.

No one is saying that it's "not you." But you change. You're not identical to what you were previously. There's a continuity to it, but continuity is different than logical identity.

And the man who woke up this early morning is still the same man who went to bed late last night. No matter what changes there are, over the course of a day/night, a week, a month, a year, years: I am always me, never someone else. I do not slowly or rapidly become another man.

A is A and I am me.

Yeah, you're same in the sense of being causally, contiguously connected to what you were, but that's not (onto)logical identity, which means that nothing differs at all (onto)logically.

[henry quirk]

You do seem to have the courage of your convictions. But you are not what you are either because you were shaped , nor because you always, from conception, are what you are. You are what you are because you made you what you are.

And what is it that made you? *It is not some unchanging essence of Henry , but Henry that is a centre of experience.

That's exactly what it is, what I am.

Man is a composite being: spirit and substance *irrevocably mixed. Part of me (and you) is irreducible and unchanging.




*'cept, mebbe, at death

[henry quirk]

Yeah, you're same in the sense of being causally, contiguously connected to what you were, but that's not (onto)logical identity, which means that nothing differs at all (onto)logically.

See my response to B, above.