How Moral Responsibility arises from Consciousness

[bahman]

I am puzzled that so many writers assume – usually with no attempt at justification – that moral responsibility has something to do with determinism, or more specifically with being an “ultimate cause”. What makes this puzzling is that it seems to be almost universally accepted in common usage that the possibility of being morally responsible is confined to conscious beings. An earthquake, for example, may be “responsible” (in another sense) for much suffering, but (aside from animism) the earth is never held responsible in a moral sense. So a sound theory of moral responsibility has to be founded on the role of consciousness.

How would that work? Firstly, let us clear up an obvious source of confusion here, because “responsibility” is used in two different senses, a binary (yes/no) sense and a sense that is a matter of degree. For convenience I will confine the term “responsibility” to the former sense, and refer to the “how much?” sense as "culpability" (or “praiseworthiness” as the case may be). The courts have long distinguished between the verdict and the sentence, so philosophers should have no problem distinguishing the fact of responsibility for a bad act, from the degree of culpability for it. A person may be clearly responsible for an act but with such strong mitigating circumstances that they can hardly be regarded as culpable.

Initially, the fact of responsibility has to be defined in the first person, since that is where consciousness is first identified. If I am conscious of choosing an act, from among other acts that would be possible given that I chose them, then I have a relationship to that act, and that is the relationship that we call “responsibility”. So networks of causes do not have to be traced back any further than the point at which consciousness of this relationship entered into the process by which the act was chosen.

Once we have a concept of moral responsibility in the first-person, the third-person meaning can be derived from it, by virtue of our ability to recognize and thus to identify with consciousness in others. I hold another person responsible for an act if I believe that he chose it while conscious that he was making a choice.

So now let us briefly look at “culpability”: the fact of responsibility but with mitigation taken into account. Without going into further detail, we can acknowledge that mitigation typically stems from any of three things: lack of competence to make the choice, psychological pressures of many kinds, and genuine repentance. What is relevant here is that all of these involve consciousness. If we could read a perpetrator’s mind perfectly, there would be no need to enquire further. However, psychological identification is not the same as being psychologically identical: I can mentally step into another’s shoes, but not see life through her eyes, so to speak. Hence we have to use proxies to provide pointers to the relevant features of another person’s mind, namely the objective circumstances which gave rise to her conscious experience. Nothing in this, however, provides any grounds for metaphysical enquiries into original causation or the like.

This is necessarily an extremely compressed account of the theory I am advocating: for example, the social construction of responsibility has to be added to the picture. (Chapter 8 of my e-book “New Thoughts on Free Will” provides a more comprehensive account.)

Some accept a divine principle, Evil, others accept another divine principle, Good. Some accept to abuse, Divine Beings, some accept to be abused, us. It is all a matter of choice.

[RogerSH]

I am puzzled that so many writers assume – usually with no attempt at justification – that moral responsibility has something to do with determinism, or more specifically with being an “ultimate cause”. What makes this puzzling is that it seems to be almost universally accepted in common usage that the possibility of being morally responsible is confined to conscious beings. An earthquake, for example, may be “responsible” (in another sense) for much suffering, but (aside from animism) the earth is never held responsible in a moral sense. So a sound theory of moral responsibility has to be founded on the role of consciousness.

How would that work? Firstly, let us clear up an obvious source of confusion here, because “responsibility” is used in two different senses, a binary (yes/no) sense and a sense that is a matter of degree. For convenience I will confine the term “responsibility” to the former sense, and refer to the “how much?” sense as "culpability" (or “praiseworthiness” as the case may be). The courts have long distinguished between the verdict and the sentence, so philosophers should have no problem distinguishing the fact of responsibility for a bad act, from the degree of culpability for it. A person may be clearly responsible for an act but with such strong mitigating circumstances that they can hardly be regarded as culpable.

Initially, the fact of responsibility has to be defined in the first person, since that is where consciousness is first identified. If I am conscious of choosing an act, from among other acts that would be possible given that I chose them, then I have a relationship to that act, and that is the relationship that we call “responsibility”. So networks of causes do not have to be traced back any further than the point at which consciousness of this relationship entered into the process by which the act was chosen.

Once we have a concept of moral responsibility in the first-person, the third-person meaning can be derived from it, by virtue of our ability to recognize and thus to identify with consciousness in others. I hold another person responsible for an act if I believe that he chose it while conscious that he was making a choice.

So now let us briefly look at “culpability”: the fact of responsibility but with mitigation taken into account. Without going into further detail, we can acknowledge that mitigation typically stems from any of three things: lack of competence to make the choice, psychological pressures of many kinds, and genuine repentance. What is relevant here is that all of these involve consciousness. If we could read a perpetrator’s mind perfectly, there would be no need to enquire further. However, psychological identification is not the same as being psychologically identical: I can mentally step into another’s shoes, but not see life through her eyes, so to speak. Hence we have to use proxies to provide pointers to the relevant features of another person’s mind, namely the objective circumstances which gave rise to her conscious experience. Nothing in this, however, provides any grounds for metaphysical enquiries into original causation or the like.

This is necessarily an extremely compressed account of the theory I am advocating: for example, the social construction of responsibility has to be added to the picture. (Chapter 8 of my e-book “New Thoughts on Free Will” provides a more comprehensive account.)

I'm a bit confused by the gist of this post. It seems like you're wanting to dispute something about standard views of moral culpability, but it's not at all clear to me what you're disputing. Your post reads mostly like a summary of standard views.

The essential point is the difference between moral responsibility, which applies to conscious beings with an awareness of making choices, and "general" responsibility, for want of a better term, which seems to be a particular cause or chain of causes picked out from a web of joint causes as departing from expectations in some way. It's among other things a response to the book review by Stuart Jeffries in the current PN. The "alarming" implications of determinism (or its denial) that he talks about fade away if the review of a chain of preceding causes is focussed only on points where a conscious choice is made.

[Belinda]

I am puzzled that so many writers assume – usually with no attempt at justification – that moral responsibility has something to do with determinism, or more specifically with being an “ultimate cause”. What makes this puzzling is that it seems to be almost universally accepted in common usage that the possibility of being morally responsible is confined to conscious beings. An earthquake, for example, may be “responsible” (in another sense) for much suffering, but (aside from animism) the earth is never held responsible in a moral sense. So a sound theory of moral responsibility has to be founded on the role of consciousness.

How would that work? Firstly, let us clear up an obvious source of confusion here, because “responsibility” is used in two different senses, a binary (yes/no) sense and a sense that is a matter of degree. For convenience I will confine the term “responsibility” to the former sense, and refer to the “how much?” sense as "culpability" (or “praiseworthiness” as the case may be). The courts have long distinguished between the verdict and the sentence, so philosophers should have no problem distinguishing the fact of responsibility for a bad act, from the degree of culpability for it. A person may be clearly responsible for an act but with such strong mitigating circumstances that they can hardly be regarded as culpable.

Initially, the fact of responsibility has to be defined in the first person, since that is where consciousness is first identified. If I am conscious of choosing an act, from among other acts that would be possible given that I chose them, then I have a relationship to that act, and that is the relationship that we call “responsibility”. So networks of causes do not have to be traced back any further than the point at which consciousness of this relationship entered into the process by which the act was chosen.

Once we have a concept of moral responsibility in the first-person, the third-person meaning can be derived from it, by virtue of our ability to recognize and thus to identify with consciousness in others. I hold another person responsible for an act if I believe that he chose it while conscious that he was making a choice.

So now let us briefly look at “culpability”: the fact of responsibility but with mitigation taken into account. Without going into further detail, we can acknowledge that mitigation typically stems from any of three things: lack of competence to make the choice, psychological pressures of many kinds, and genuine repentance. What is relevant here is that all of these involve consciousness. If we could read a perpetrator’s mind perfectly, there would be no need to enquire further. However, psychological identification is not the same as being psychologically identical: I can mentally step into another’s shoes, but not see life through her eyes, so to speak. Hence we have to use proxies to provide pointers to the relevant features of another person’s mind, namely the objective circumstances which gave rise to her conscious experience. Nothing in this, however, provides any grounds for metaphysical enquiries into original causation or the like.

This is necessarily an extremely compressed account of the theory I am advocating: for example, the social construction of responsibility has to be added to the picture. (Chapter 8 of my e-book “New Thoughts on Free Will” provides a more comprehensive account.)

I'm a bit confused by the gist of this post. It seems like you're wanting to dispute something about standard views of moral culpability, but it's not at all clear to me what you're disputing. Your post reads mostly like a summary of standard views.

The essential point is the difference between moral responsibility, which applies to conscious beings with an awareness of making choices, and "general" responsibility, for want of a better term, which seems to be a particular cause or chain of causes picked out from a web of joint causes as departing from expectations in some way. It's among other things a response to the book review by Stuart Jeffries in the current PN. The "alarming" implications of determinism (or its denial) that he talks about fade away if the review of a chain of preceding causes is focussed only on points where a conscious choice is made.

I mostly agree Roger.
But when denying determinism means accepting Free Will I don't agree. Free Will is a universal catalyst that changes all choices, and Free Will does not come in degrees of strength but comes as an all or nothing force. It is mistake to conflate human will power with Free Will. In Free Will , 'Free' means utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes , causal circumstances including human consciousness , or law of science or nature. To the contrary, Free Will miraculously intervenes in nature .

[henry quirk]

it is mistake to conflate human will power with Free Will

Yes, it is. A person is a free will; he doesn't have free will.

In Free Will , 'Free' means utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes

Yes, a free will (a person) sits outside cause & effect when it comes to being and choice. He chooses, for reasons (what he imagines will be), not from history (what presses on him from yesterday); he is or isn't becuz of the of those choices

causal circumstances including human consciousness , or law of science or nature.

The free will (person) is a cause, an agent, in his own right. He is not caused; he causes.

To the contrary, Free Will miraculously intervenes in nature .

The free will (person) is a marvelous thing, yes.

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk wrote:

The free will (person) is a cause, an agent, in his own right. He is not caused; he causes.

That is true as follows. The person is a centre of consciousness unlike say a cup of tea or even a nice dog. So the person is free to choose in ways that a cup of tea or even a good dog cannot do. Some people are more conscious than others so some are more free than others.

[henry quirk]

Henry Quirk wrote:

The free will (person) is a cause, an agent, in his own right. He is not caused; he causes.

That is true as follows. The person is a centre of consciousness unlike say a cup of tea or even a nice dog. So the person is free to choose in ways that a cup of tea or even a good dog cannot do. Some people are more conscious than others so some are more free than others.

If cause & effect is the rule for a person (where he's pushed from behind as just another domino in a line-up of dominoes),then even the brightest, the most conscious, of us -- the one you might is say is most free -- is just an event. What you conceive of as freedom isn't.

[Belinda]

Henry Quirk wrote:

The free will (person) is a cause, an agent, in his own right. He is not caused; he causes.

That is true as follows. The person is a centre of consciousness unlike say a cup of tea or even a nice dog. So the person is free to choose in ways that a cup of tea or even a good dog cannot do. Some people are more conscious than others so some are more free than others.

If cause & effect is the rule for a person (where he's pushed from behind as just another domino in a line-up of dominoes),then even the brightest, the most conscious, of us -- the one you might is say is most free -- is just an event. What you conceive of as freedom isn't.

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

[henry quirk]

Henry Quirk wrote:



That is true as follows. The person is a centre of consciousness unlike say a cup of tea or even a nice dog. So the person is free to choose in ways that a cup of tea or even a good dog cannot do. Some people are more conscious than others so some are more free than others.

If cause & effect is the rule for a person (where he's pushed from behind as just another domino in a line-up of dominoes),then even the brightest, the most conscious, of us -- the one you might is say is most free -- is just an event. What you conceive of as freedom isn't.

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

Human freedom (a free will) is absolute. I can choose to do just about anything I can conceive. Doesn't mean I'll be successful. But I can, to be hackneyed, dream the impossible dream and devote myself to it. I do that. I'm not compelled by the past to do it. As I choose, I can ignore all influences and pressures that may naysay or attempt to direct me away from it. The inertia of what was doesn't determine me or my choices. I'm the eight ball that, when struck by the white ball, doesn't move or moves in the direction I choose. As a free will, yeah, I am absolute. There are no gradations to consider, there's no greater or lesser degrees of freedom. I self-direct, am self-responsible all the time, across all circumstances. My choices aren't necessarily wise or good, but there always mine, caused by me, for my reasons.

[Belinda]

If cause & effect is the rule for a person (where he's pushed from behind as just another domino in a line-up of dominoes),then even the brightest, the most conscious, of us -- the one you might is say is most free -- is just an event. What you conceive of as freedom isn't.

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

Human freedom (a free will) is absolute. I can choose to do just about anything I can conceive. Doesn't mean I'll be successful. But I can, to be hackneyed, dream the impossible dream and devote myself to it. I do that. I'm not compelled by the past to do it. As I choose, I can ignore all influences and pressures that may naysay or attempt to direct me away from it. The inertia of what was doesn't determine me or my choices. I'm the eight ball that, when struck by the white ball, doesn't move or moves in the direction I choose. As a free will, yeah, I am absolute. There are no gradations to consider, there's no greater or lesser degrees of freedom. I self-direct, am self-responsible all the time, across all circumstances. My choices aren't necessarily wise or good, but there always mine, caused by me, for my reasons.

You describe freedom, not absolute Free Will which by definition is absolute.

[Belinda]

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

Human freedom (a free will) is absolute. I can choose to do just about anything I can conceive. Doesn't mean I'll be successful. But I can, to be hackneyed, dream the impossible dream and devote myself to it. I do that. I'm not compelled by the past to do it. As I choose, I can ignore all influences and pressures that may naysay or attempt to direct me away from it. The inertia of what was doesn't determine me or my choices. I'm the eight ball that, when struck by the white ball, doesn't move or moves in the direction I choose. As a free will, yeah, I am absolute. There are no gradations to consider, there's no greater or lesser degrees of freedom. I self-direct, am self-responsible all the time, across all circumstances. My choices aren't necessarily wise or good, but there always mine, caused by me, for my reasons.

You describe freedom,and personal reponsibility, not absolute Free Will which by definition is absolute.

[Belinda]

Sorr,y I forget how to delete duplicates or near-duplicates.

[henry quirk]

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

Human freedom (a free will) is absolute. I can choose to do just about anything I can conceive. Doesn't mean I'll be successful. But I can, to be hackneyed, dream the impossible dream and devote myself to it. I do that. I'm not compelled by the past to do it. As I choose, I can ignore all influences and pressures that may naysay or attempt to direct me away from it. The inertia of what was doesn't determine me or my choices. I'm the eight ball that, when struck by the white ball, doesn't move or moves in the direction I choose. As a free will, yeah, I am absolute. There are no gradations to consider, there's no greater or lesser degrees of freedom. I self-direct, am self-responsible all the time, across all circumstances. My choices aren't necessarily wise or good, but there always mine, caused by me, for my reasons.

You describe freedom, not absolute Free Will which by definition is absolute.

I describe, roundaboutly, the free man, the free will, the agent, a cause, and he is (you are, I am) absolute.

[RogerSH]

I'm a bit confused by the gist of this post. It seems like you're wanting to dispute something about standard views of moral culpability, but it's not at all clear to me what you're disputing. Your post reads mostly like a summary of standard views.

The essential point is the difference between moral responsibility, which applies to conscious beings with an awareness of making choices, and "general" responsibility, for want of a better term, which seems to be a particular cause or chain of causes picked out from a web of joint causes as departing from expectations in some way. It's among other things a response to the book review by Stuart Jeffries in the current PN. The "alarming" implications of determinism (or its denial) that he talks about fade away if the review of a chain of preceding causes is focussed only on points where a conscious choice is made.

I mostly agree Roger.
But when denying determinism means accepting Free Will I don't agree. Free Will is a universal catalyst that changes all choices, and Free Will does not come in degrees of strength but comes as an all or nothing force. It is mistake to conflate human will power with Free Will. In Free Will , 'Free' means utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes , causal circumstances including human consciousness , or law of science or nature. To the contrary, Free Will miraculously intervenes in nature .

This looks like a historic, theological version of free will that bears little relation to the subject of all the 20th century papers in Gary Watson's "Free Will" anthology, for example. Obviously, Belinda, as a Humanist I'm not qualified to argue with you about theistic claims! I agree free will isn't the same as "will power" - see my OP on "the difference between formal & psychological free will" - the latter depending, among other things, on will power. But for an action or decision to be "utterly uncaused by any natural causal chain of preceding causes, causal circumstances including human consciousness, or law of science or nature" is to have no grounds for claiming it to be one's own, that I can see. I am the outcome of my genetic and experiential inputs, to be chosen by me is to be chosen by the integration at some moment of all those inputs, it is the experience of that integration that constitutes the experience of being me, deciding. But as I say, that is a Humanist perspective, all I can do is make it as clear as possible: religious conversion is unlikely to happen on a philosophical forum!

[RogerSH]

If cause & effect is the rule for a person (where he's pushed from behind as just another domino in a line-up of dominoes),then even the brightest, the most conscious, of us -- the one you might is say is most free -- is just an event. What you conceive of as freedom isn't.

There is no such thing as absolute freedom. At least not in this world.

Human freedom (a free will) is absolute. I can choose to do just about anything I can conceive.

Yes, you can "choose" to start speaking Sanskrit instantly, if choosing just means adopting a mental position of volition. Viktor Frankl, the Auschwitz survivor, wrote that whatever happens, the attitude one takes to it is still free, or something like that. But you can't choose to be anything that you can conceive! So it is still the will of an unchosen being that is acting. This is sort of what Sartre was driving at in speaking of being "thrown into the world".

[henry quirk]

Yes, you can "choose" to start speaking Sanskrit instantly

Well, I can choose to learn it, yes. I can't become fluent instantly, but I can become fluent and nuthin' or no one can stop me. No causal chain behind me can deter me. My anticipation of fluency is my reason.


if choosing just means adopting a mental position of volition

No adopting of attitude is required. Just recognize yourself as what you are, a free will.


But you can't choose to be anything that you can conceive!

This is true: I can't be other than what I am, a free will, a free man.


So it is still the will of an unchosen being that is acting.

Not at all: I, a discrete agent in the world, am well-known, to myself. I am not a mystery to myself.