Vitruvius wrote: ↑Sat Aug 21, 2021 12:08 am
It would probably be easier on both of us if you just said what you think - rather than harking on about what you think I thought you think. You seemed to be defending the whole reality is inaccessible, subjectivist viewpoint.
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Aug 21, 2021 12:15 pmI don't at all think that reality is inaccessible. I'm a direct realist.
I'm a subjectivist on
some things, but that's limited to things that are purely mental phenomena, like desires or tastes or daydreams, say. What I'm saying by saying that something is subjective is that it's mental phenomena--that is, it's a factor of a subset of brain states, and that's all I'm saying by that. Saying that "x is subjective" is saying that x is a phenomenon that only occurs in brains functioning in a mental way. There are some such phenomena. But that's not most phenomena, and as a direct realist, I obviously think that we can access or know objective phenomena.
Veritas asked for proof that reality isn't inaccessible. I pointed out to him that he should know by now not to ask for proof of any empirical claims, because empirical claims are not provable. Asking for proof of empirical claims suggests that he never even took phil of science or science methodology 101--which I'm sure he hasn't; as with most people on these boards, he probably has something like a computer science background and he's probably purely self-taught otherwise, including re philosophy, and unfortunately, folks who do that tend to take "things people type on these boards" as sufficient fodder for a significant part of their "education" . . . meanwhile if almost everyone else is self-taught (and has a computer science or engineering etc. background) and is doing the same thing, so that explains how we end up with such a "Hey, we recreated the wheel!" sort of mess. Of course, he could have taken phil of science or science methodology 101 and wound up philosophically disagreeing with falsificationism, but in that case he'd at least be familiar with the idea and he'd have some sort of argument against it or criticism of it. (Though of course, most criticism of it, such as the Duhem-Quine thesis, which I think has a lot of merit, still doesn't wind up saying that we prove empirical claims.)
At any rate, we believe empirical claims on what we consider good reasons in favor of them, including empirical evidence. We don't believe empirical claims because they've been proven, since they can't be.
Certainty is something that's very silly to worry about in my view. What we should worry about are good reasons to believe one claim over another. That has nothing at all to do with certainty.
Then I must apologise, for it seems I misunderstood the context of your criticism of empiricism. You seemed to be arguing from a subjectivist viewpoint, but talking to Veritas, I appreciate, you had to explain his argument for him. The point I was trying to make, is beyond the epistemic basics - something along the lines of what RC Saunders says below:
'Do you really believe that the formula for water, H2O, is subject to revision?'
According to basic epistemology, yes - but that's because the corpus of epistemology is biased against science by an over-emphasis on subjectivism to the exclusion of objectivism. It's clearly unsatisfactory that science is not considered truth, proof or reality - and so I took issue with your explanation of empiricism. Even while you explained the basics accurately, I still disagree, as confirmation by an independent observer is a form of proof inherent to empiricism.
In my view, the only reason one would consider empirical claims unprovable is subjectivist assumption that perception is - most basically, a source of error - rather than a source of knowledge. I'm glad we agree the pursuit of certainty beyond reason is folly. But if you accept that, then you cannot construe empiricism in terms of a subjectivist "reality gap". Mutual confirmation in empirical method assumes a common ability to perceive reality - as it really is, and that it is the same reality existing independently of us both. Clearly, the philosophy of science is woefully under-developed, and biased unfairly in relation to subjectivism - unless, as RC astutely asks, you really do maintain H2O is subject to revision?
I accept entirely that there were very good reasons at the time for adopting that position, and maintaining that perspective, but there's an existential threat and an opportunity to overcome it convincingly, that exists on the other side of that coin. Had science been welcomed, and developed, honoured and centralised - rather than denied and abused, we would apply the technology to harness magma energy, sequester carbon, desalinate, irrigate, produce hydrogen fuel, recycle - because, most basically, it's true, and we could continue to survive and prosper long term. That would be ideal. That's not who we are, or where we are. We have to get there from here - but setting out the philosophical ideal is necessary to illustrate a lesson we might learn from consideration of the ideal, and apply to our real world situation.
One must look past the subjectivist interest in obscurantism to see it, but common recognition of scientific truth offers a level playing field upon which all can meet to address this existential threat, and an authoritative rationale for common action to address it; specifically, I have suggested developing magma energy as a global good. I think, hope, pray it ticks a lot of boxes, and I'm sure that on paper, its scientifically and morally right; that we need massive amounts of clean energy to balance human welfare and environmental sustainability, and magma is a close and massive source of such energy. In this way we could secure a future without great human suffering of one sort or another, but it requires admitting science is true.
