Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Eachother

[Terrapin Station]

You're missing the point. I've already told you what I think, in answer to your question. I've answered. Repeatedly. You just don't like my answer, apparently.

I must have missed it. I apologize if that's the case. In the vein of being cooperative, and since this is very easy to relay, did you answer that physicalists would have to believe d in the scenario I presented (in order to be consistent as physicalists), or could they believe otherwise?

I answered that "outcome" was not the issue: that the Physicalist could believe in randomness of outcomes, and still his view would entail Determinism logically.

Your move.

Ah, okay, thanks, but did you catch where I clarified that we're talking about A causing B's velocity? Would you still say that a physicalist could believe something other than d where you understand that we're talking about A causing B's velocity?

[Skepdick]

In terms of causality, it's about A being able to cause only one possible outcome versus it being the case that A could cause at least either one option or another, right?

This framing is utterly devoid of the contextuality principle.

In context 0 A is unable to cause B (their light/causality cones do not intersect)
In context 1 A is able to cause only B.
In context 2 A is able to cause one of two options (B or C).
In context 3 A is able to cause any one of N options.
In context 4 A is able to cause any one of M options (where M > N)
In context 5 A is able to cause any one of P options (where P > M > N )
In context 6 A is able to cause any one of Q options (where Q> P > M > N )
etc etc etc.

When you tell us which context you have in mind the answer manufactures itself.

When you recognize that no epistemologist can't determine which context they are in Philosophy ends.

[henry quirk]

TS,

Billiards: 1 collides with 2 which collides with 3 which collides with 4 which drops into a corner pocket. All things bein' the same: 1 will again collide with 2 which again will collide with 3 which again will collide with 4 which again will drop into the same corner pocket.

Agree? Disagree?

[Skepdick]

TS,

Billiards: 1 collides with 2 which collides with 3 which collides with 4 which drops into a corner pocket. All things bein' the same: 1 will again collide with 2 which again will collide with 3 which again will collide with 4 which again will drop into the same corner pocket.

Agree? Disagree?

"All things being the same".

How would you identify/verify "quantum sameness" in order to do the "again" thing?

How do you navigate around the Complementarity?

[henry quirk]

Hi, skep...long time, no see...as the mood strikes, I'll be glad to talk to you, but, right now: my question is for TS, so, please, don't screw my pooch.

[Skepdick]

Hi, skep...long time, no see...as the mood strikes, I'll be glad to talk to you, but, right now: my question is for TS, so, please, don't screw my pooch.

Sure, but like... your question is ambiguous.

TWO scenarios being "THE SAME beggs the question.

Are the scenarios assumed as being "the same"; or asserted as being "the same"?

[henry quirk]

I asked nice, skep.

[Terrapin Station]

TS,

Billiards: 1 collides with 2 which collides with 3 which collides with 4 which drops into a corner pocket. All things bein' the same: 1 will again collide with 2 which again will collide with 3 which again will collide with 4 which again will drop into the same corner pocket.

Agree? Disagree?

Ah. No, I don't think there's any reason to assume that that would necessarily be the case, so I disagree, at least as something categorical. I buy that ontological freedom is possible and likely occurs at least occasionally aside from volition.

[henry quirk]

TS,

Billiards: 1 collides with 2 which collides with 3 which collides with 4 which drops into a corner pocket. All things bein' the same: 1 will again collide with 2 which again will collide with 3 which again will collide with 4 which again will drop into the same corner pocket.

Agree? Disagree?

Ah. No, I don't think there's any reason to assume that that would necessarily be the case, so I disagree, at least as something categorical. I buy that ontological freedom is possible and likely occurs at least occasionally aside from volition.

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

[Terrapin Station]

TS,

Billiards: 1 collides with 2 which collides with 3 which collides with 4 which drops into a corner pocket. All things bein' the same: 1 will again collide with 2 which again will collide with 3 which again will collide with 4 which again will drop into the same corner pocket.

Agree? Disagree?

Ah. No, I don't think there's any reason to assume that that would necessarily be the case, so I disagree, at least as something categorical. I buy that ontological freedom is possible and likely occurs at least occasionally aside from volition.

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.

[Skepdick]

Ah. No, I don't think there's any reason to assume that that would necessarily be the case, so I disagree, at least as something categorical. I buy that ontological freedom is possible and likely occurs at least occasionally aside from volition.

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.

So "all things being the same" velocities might be different?

Idiot Philosophers.

All things are the same. Except for their difference.
All thing are different. Except for their sameness.

[henry quirk]

Ah. No, I don't think there's any reason to assume that that would necessarily be the case, so I disagree, at least as something categorical. I buy that ontological freedom is possible and likely occurs at least occasionally aside from volition.

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.

If all things are the same in both sequences: why would there be different velocities?

[henry quirk]

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.a

So "all things being the same" velocities might be different?

Idiot Philosophers.

All things are the same. Except for their difference.
All thing are different. Except for their sameness.

Skep, please, butt out.

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, good, thanks.

Can you describe how, all things bein' the same in both sequences, ball 4 in the second sequence might end up somewhere other than the same corner pocket as ball 4 did in the first sequence?

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.

If all things are the same in both sequences: why would there be different velocities?

I just explained why. For one, there are no real physical laws. So what would keep the velocities the same?

[Terrapin Station]

Sure, when ball 3 strikes ball 4 there would be different velocities (speed + direction) that could obtain in response, as a brute fact of how things react, and because there would be nothing to prohibit this, including that there are no real physical laws per se.a

So "all things being the same" velocities might be different?

Idiot Philosophers.

All things are the same. Except for their difference.
All thing are different. Except for their sameness.

Skep, please, butt out.

It doesn't matter, I have him on ignore anyway. He's repeatedly shown that he's incapable of reading a single post so that he doesn't seriously misunderstand it. This stuff is way over his head/his comprehension and reasoning abilities. Meanwhile, he's ridiculously arrogant and condescending despite this fact. So he's not at all worth the time to attempt to interact with.