Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Eachother

[henry quirk]

*sigh*

No, TS, it's not necessary for anyone to believe that if A strikes B, A will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Okay, but that's all I was asking: if it's necessary for a physicalist to believe d (at least necessary to be consistent with their physicalist ontology).

So if you don't think it's necessary (for consistency's sake), you should be able to understand how it would be possible to be a physicalist but not a determinist.

Okay, guy: I answered. Move on.

[Immanuel Can]

You understanding what I'm explaining is certainly about your views.

Not at all.

That wasn't something I was asking you about. It's my view, and that view isn't going to change.

Yes, I can see that. And I'm not asking you to change your view...just to explain it...which you seem to be having a lot of difficulty doing.

Henry's given you an answer. Let's take his, and roll.

I'm not going to be discussing anything further with YOU, period, until YOU address it and answer the question.

This isn't a socratic lesson, and I''m not your student, so really, you can dispense with the histrionics.

This is a philosophy discussion thread, where people examine the rationale behind your idea that Physicalism can be understood non-deterministically. If you can't explain it in such a way that it stands or falls on its own two feet, then I don't know what to tell you, other than that it has nothing to stand on.

[Terrapin Station]

*sigh*

No, TS, it's not necessary for anyone to believe that if A strikes B, A will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Okay, but that's all I was asking: if it's necessary for a physicalist to believe d (at least necessary to be consistent with their physicalist ontology).

So if you don't think it's necessary (for consistency's sake), you should be able to understand how it would be possible to be a physicalist but not a determinist.

Okay, guy: I answered. Move on.

Move on to? The whole point was to get whoever to realize that physicalists aren't necessarily determinists.

[Terrapin Station]

This isn't a socratic lesson, and I''m not your student,

There's something you don't understand and you requested that I explain it to you.

This is a philosophy discussion thread,

People have to cooperate to have a discussion.

where people examine the rationale behind your idea that Physicalism can be understood non-deterministically. If you can't explain it in such a way that it stands or falls on its own two feet, then I don't know what to tell you, other than that it has nothing to stand on.

It's not "how physicalism can be understood non-deterministically." Physicalism has nothing to do with determinism, just like atheism has nothing to do with evolution. I can't explain that to you in a way that you can understand, which is the goal here--your understanding, especially given comments you've made so far, without going through it systematically, where we work on your understanding of various prerequisite concepts along the way. If you won't cooperate with that, then you'll never understand it. (And I'm not asking your opinion about that; I'm telling you something.)

[RCSaunders]

... Reality is deterministic (determined) a person is not.

I don't think you mean that unless you exclude persons from reality. Perhaps you mean the physical aspects of reality or just physical existence is determined. Persons are certainly part of reality.

*sigh*

Yes, persons are part of Reality and are the only parts of Reality not wholly deterministic (determined).

Better?

like I give a fuck

Yes. I knew that's what you meant, but I know how other's would interpret what you wrote.

[henry quirk]

Okay, but that's all I was asking: if it's necessary for a physicalist to believe d (at least necessary to be consistent with their physicalist ontology).

So if you don't think it's necessary (for consistency's sake), you should be able to understand how it would be possible to be a physicalist but not a determinist.

Okay, guy: I answered. Move on.

Move on to? The whole point was to get whoever to realize that physicalists aren't necessarily determinists.

No, the whole point (of the thread) was Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Each other.

You got triggered when I posted...

Total determinism and total free will do not contradict given in contrast to void all being is free as existing.

I'm not sure what the above means, so I'll translate (probably wrongly)...

Determinism and free will do not contradict one another.

Yeah, they do. If *cause and effect holds then **libertarian agent causation cannot exist.

Thing is: I know I'm an agent (not an event); I also know cause and effect holds.

A conundrum.

There's no way for the strict materialist to square the circle.




*the heart of determinism...a domino universe

**the only free will worth havin'

...and hijacked it.

But, not just you.

Mannie let this play out waaaay too long.

Me: I just wanna talk about the topic (or, I did...now, I just wanna douse the thread in gasoline and light it up...I just wanna force-feed it Drano and watch it get et up from the inside...I wanna shoot it in the head).

All Hail Non-Deterministic Physicalism!

'nuff said.

[henry quirk]

I don't think you mean that unless you exclude persons from reality. Perhaps you mean the physical aspects of reality or just physical existence is determined. Persons are certainly part of reality.

*sigh*

Yes, persons are part of Reality and are the only parts of Reality not wholly deterministic (determined).

Better?

like I give a fuck

Yes. I knew that's what you meant, but I know how other's would interpret what you wrote.

You assume anyone gives enough of a flip to call me out on a poor construct.

They don't, as evidenced by the conspicuous lack of correction from anyone ('cept you).

[Immanuel Can]

This isn't a socratic lesson, and I''m not your student,

There's something you don't understand and you requested that I explain it to you.

So explain. What's the problem?

This is a philosophy discussion thread,

People have to cooperate to have a discussion.

Well, only like this: one puts forward an idea, and another listens to it, and decides what to say afterward. I'm listening: your turn to talk.

It's not "how physicalism can be understood non-deterministically."

Yeah, it is. It's "How is it possible to be a Physicalist and a Non-determinist without creating a logical contradiction?"

That's what I want to know. If you've got no answer, just say that.

[RCSaunders]

*sigh*

Yes, persons are part of Reality and are the only parts of Reality not wholly deterministic (determined).

Better?

like I give a fuck

Yes. I knew that's what you meant, but I know how other's would interpret what you wrote.

You assume anyone gives enough of a flip to call me out on a poor construct.

They don't, as evidenced by the conspicuous lack of correction from anyone ('cept you).

That's only because no one else loves you like I do.

[henry quirk]

Yes. I knew that's what you meant, but I know how other's would interpret what you wrote.

You assume anyone gives enough of a flip to call me out on a poor construct.

They don't, as evidenced by the conspicuous lack of correction from anyone ('cept you).

That's only because no one else loves you like I do.

HA!

[Terrapin Station]

No, the whole point (of the thread) was Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Each other.

The point of my post in question.

You got triggered when I posted...

I posted a different point of view, which is usually what I concentrate on. (Otherwise I tend not to post because I think it's not very interesting if I'm not posting a different point of view.)

[Terrapin Station]

So explain. What's the problem?

That was the start of the explanation. You need to address it and answer the question I asked for it to continue.

[Immanuel Can]

That's only because no one else loves you like I do.

HA!

I have a creeping affection for you both.

But I'm seeing a therapist, and hoping to get it under control.

[Immanuel Can]

So explain. What's the problem?

That was the start of the explanation.

I see you already have "hedged your bets" or "cooked the books" by positing that Determinism is only about outcome instead of causality. And (to mix metaphors) I see a guy desperate to get me to bite on the bait.

So I think I see something of how the path is supposed to go...

I don't see any explaining going on.

Going to explain? Or are you helpless without the "cooked books"?

[Terrapin Station]

I see you already have "hedged your bets" or "cooked the books" by positing that Determinism is only about outcome instead of causality. And (to mix metaphors) I see a guy desperate to get me to bite on the bait.

In terms of causality, it's about A being able to cause only one possible outcome versus it being the case that A could cause at least either one option or another, right? Which is what I asked you about. Whether a physicalist must believe that only one possible consequent state can follow A (we can say causally), or whether they can believe that more than one consequent state is possible from A (causally). (By the way, there's not really any need to specify that we're talking about A causing something in the scenario I presented; that should be clear from the fact that we're talking about A interacting with B (where B has a reaction, and thus that is the effect of A's cause) . . . but I don't mind making that explicit if you need me to in order to be able to answer the question I'm asking.)

If we're going to talk about causality, we need to talk about what's caused, exactly. That's what makes the difference in terms of causality with respect to whether we're talking about determinism.

So can you answer now?