Free Will and Determinism Necessitate Eachother

[Terrapin Station]

Let's consider just a proton, A, say, moving with velocity x.

The proton strikes another proton, B.

As a physicalist, one thinks that both protons are physical existents, obviously, and one thinks that the motion is physical, and so on.

Now, on your view, is it necessary that the physicalist believes (let's call this belief d) that when A strikes B, B can ONLY react with velocity y, and no other velocity is possible?

Unless the physicalist wants to introduce some new factor to that barebones mix, I'd say he has no choice but to believe exactly that.

So, why on your view, couldn't they just as well believe that B could react with velocity y or at least slightly different velocity z?

[henry quirk]

Let's consider just a proton, A, say, moving with velocity x.

The proton strikes another proton, B.

As a physicalist, one thinks that both protons are physical existents, obviously, and one thinks that the motion is physical, and so on.

Now, on your view, is it necessary that the physicalist believes (let's call this belief d) that when A strikes B, B can ONLY react with velocity y, and no other velocity is possible?

Unless the physicalist wants to introduce some new factor to that barebones mix, I'd say he has no choice but to believe exactly that.

So, why on your view, couldn't they just as well believe that B could react with velocity y or at least slightly different velocity z?

Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result, so -- barrin' the inclusion of some new factor -- the physicalist ought not believe the same conditions will result in a different outcome.

[Terrapin Station]

Let's consider just a proton, A, say, moving with velocity x.

The proton strikes another proton, B.

As a physicalist, one thinks that both protons are physical existents, obviously, and one thinks that the motion is physical, and so on.

Now, on your view, is it necessary that the physicalist believes (let's call this belief d) that when A strikes B, B can ONLY react with velocity y, and no other velocity is possible?

Unless the physicalist wants to introduce some new factor to that barebones mix, I'd say he has no choice but to believe exactly that.

So, why on your view, couldn't they just as well believe that B could react with velocity y or at least slightly different velocity z?

Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Add some new factor and the result will differ.

You're not saying that someone else would have to believe what seems intuitively reasonable to you, are you? (Because it's intuitively reasonable to you and you expect others to think more or less the same?)

[henry quirk]

So, why on your view, couldn't they just as well believe that B could react with velocity y or at least slightly different velocity z?

Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Add some new factor and the result will differ.

You're not saying that someone else would have to believe what seems intuitively reasonable to you, are you? (Because it's intuitively reasonable to you and you expect others to think more or less the same?)

Yeah, I gave you my view. Proceed from there. Don't assume I'm sayin' anything 'cept what I said.

Again: Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result, so -- barrin' the inclusion of some new factor -- the physicalist ought not believe the same conditions will result in a different outcome.

More bluntly, without belief (you brought belief up, not me): A strikes B resulting in C every time unless some new factor is introduced.

[Immanuel Can]

You understanding what I'm explaining is certainly about your views.

Not at all.

I'm personally not a Physicalist, and I'm not a Determinist either. But either way, this is your view, not mine. And if you can't explain how Physicalism can be Non-deterministic, then I guess nobody's going to do it.

You need to address the scenario I presented and answer the question I asked or we'll be unable to progress.

Henry's given you an answer. Let's take his, and roll.

[Terrapin Station]

Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Add some new factor and the result will differ.

You're not saying that someone else would have to believe what seems intuitively reasonable to you, are you? (Because it's intuitively reasonable to you and you expect others to think more or less the same?)

Yeah, I gave you my view. Proceed from there. Don't assume I'm sayin' anything 'cept what I said.

Again: Seems reasonable that if A strikes B it will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result, so -- barrin' the inclusion of some new factor -- the physicalist ought not believe the same conditions will result in a different outcome.

More bluntly, without belief (you brought belief up, not me): A strikes B resulting in C every time unless some new factor is introduced.

So, remember is that the question is whether it's necessary for a physicalist to believe d (at least so that their views are consistent under a physicalist ontology), and if it's necessary, why?

You suggested "yes," because it seems reasonable to you. So I was trying to figure why d seeming reasonable to you amounts to d being necessary (for anyone else) to believe (and I'm guessing that you're not thinking it has anything in particular to do with physicalism--it seems like maybe you'd say it's necessary to believe period, whatever one's ontology).

To me, it doesn't seem intuitively clear or obvious that d would be the case, and I don't at all see why a belief in d would be necessary (from a physicalist ontology or otherwise). It certainly doesn't seem to me like a belief in d would be necessary just because some people intuitively think that d is the case (and maybe they can't imagine otherwise).

Also, I'm asking in terms of belief because (i) that was the issue--whether physicalists would (have to) believe d, but also (ii) we can't really escape epistemology when we're talking about this sort of stuff; we're always talking about what we believe to be the case or not.

[Terrapin Station]

You understanding what I'm explaining is certainly about your views.

Not at all.

That wasn't something I was asking you about. It's my view, and that view isn't going to change.

Henry's given you an answer. Let's take his, and roll.

I'm not going to be discussing anything further with YOU, period, until YOU address it and answer the question. If you want to continue being uncooperative, that's fine. I don't need to cooperate either in that case. <shrug>

[henry quirk]

it seems like...you'd say it's necessary to believe period

Yep, and it's not an unfounded belief either.

[henry quirk]

I'm personally not a Physicalist

Me neither.


and I'm not a Determinist either.

Me neither, even though Reality is deterministic (determined) a person is not.


if you can't explain how Physicalism can be Non-deterministic, then I guess nobody's going to do it.

Yeah, I keep comin' back to the thread expectn' sumthin' from him, some explanation or theory, but it's the same old bupkis.

[Terrapin Station]

it seems like...you'd say it's necessary to believe period

Yep, and it's not an unfounded belief either.

Okay, but it's necessary to believe because it seems reasonable to you/because it's intuitively clear to you?

Is that really the reason that it would be necessary for others to believe?

[henry quirk]

*sigh*

No, TS, it's not necessary for anyone to believe that if A strikes B, A will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

[henry quirk]

But, Henry, first you said it was necessary, and now you say it's not...what gives?

It's not that complicated: I just recast necessary in my head and removed all elements of common sense and sanity that I'd attached to the word.

[RCSaunders]

... Reality is deterministic (determined) a person is not.

I don't think you mean that unless you exclude persons from reality. Perhaps you mean the physical aspects of reality or just physical existence is determined. Persons are certainly part of reality.

[Terrapin Station]

*sigh*

No, TS, it's not necessary for anyone to believe that if A strikes B, A will impart momentum to B, and should one repeat the event -- A striking B in the same way as before and imparting momentum to B in the same way as before -- one will get the same result.

Okay, but that's all I was asking: if it's necessary for a physicalist to believe d (at least necessary to be consistent with their physicalist ontology).

So if you don't think it's necessary (for consistency's sake), you should be able to understand how it would be possible to be a physicalist but not a determinist.

[henry quirk]

... Reality is deterministic (determined) a person is not.

I don't think you mean that unless you exclude persons from reality. Perhaps you mean the physical aspects of reality or just physical existence is determined. Persons are certainly part of reality.

*sigh*

Yes, persons are part of Reality and are the only parts of Reality not wholly deterministic (determined).

Better?

like I give a fuck