What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Me: To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of any non-physical thing.
VA: Are you saying you don't have a mind?

Phew. The rapier-cut and thrust of philosophical conversation.

In your own words;

• 'Minds surely by definition are not physical.'
  But we can't define things into or out of existence.
  They either do or don't exist.
  And there's no evidence, to my knowledge, for the existence of non-physical things.

(I suggest you stop referring to Wittgenstein, because your misunderstanding of his ideas is embarrassing.)

How so?

Have a look at these two claims.

1 To my knowledge, there's no evidence for the existence of any non-physical thing.

2 Minds surely by definition are not physical.

I assume you can see the problem. We can't name, define, describe or argue things into or out of existence. They either do or don't exist, regardless of the ways we describe them. [In VA speak - regardless of the FSK within which they are asserted.]

So we can't define the mind into existence. What we call the mind either does or doesn't exist. And, as for any existence-claim, empirical evidence is required. None so far, to my knowledge. Just the claim endlessly repeated - as for all other non-physical or abstract things.

Btw, we cannot define a thing or anything into existence.

The existence of 'the mind' is inferred from empirical evidences, thus defined as follows;

• The mind is the set of faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, intelligence, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion and instinct.
  Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is produced at least in part by the brain.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

The empirical-mind emerges from the activities of the brain.
What is wrong with this definition.
Why can you accept this definition from inference of empirical evidences.

Note I am not arguing for a mind that is independent of the brain or body like that of Descartes.
You keep insisting I am referring to this sort of Descartes' mind and ask me for empirical evidence.
It is like asking me to produce evidence for a God when it is confirmed I am a non-theist.

[Terrapin Station]

2 Minds surely by definition are not physical.

It would be silly to say that mind by definition is nonphysical, but there are no nonphysical existents, therefore we have no minds.

Obviously we have minds. We just need to correct the nonsensical notion that they're nonphysical.

It's like if we were alive in 3000 BCE or so and we were to say, "By definition, lightning is energy sent to Earth by the gods. But there are no gods; therefore there is no lightning." Instead we correct the misunderstanding of what lightning is.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes, if you deny that minds exist , either your use of English terminology is not the same as mine, or you are a robot.

[Sculptor]

Peter Holmes, if you deny that minds exist , either your use of English terminology is not the same as mine, or you are a robot.

Does Gandalf exist?

[Skepdick]

Peter Holmes, if you deny that minds exist , either your use of English terminology is not the same as mine, or you are a robot.

Does Gandalf exist?

Yes. At least in minds.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes, if you deny that minds exist , either your use of English terminology is not the same as mine, or you are a robot.

I ask for evidence for the existence of any non-physical things. So far, none has been forthcoming. And while that may not mean the claim that non-physical things exist is false, it does mean that to believe the claim is true is irrational. So I don't believe it, just as I don't believe supernatural things exist, such as fairies, ghosts, devils, angels and gods - evidence for the existence of which is equally lacking, to my knowledge.

If you think what we call the mind is a non-physical thing 'containing' non-physical things, then what evidence do you have for the existence of that thing 'containing' those things? Just repeating the claim is pointless.

[Peter Holmes]

2 Minds surely by definition are not physical.

It would be silly to say that mind by definition is nonphysical, but there are no nonphysical existents, therefore we have no minds.

Obviously we have minds. We just need to correct the nonsensical notion that they're nonphysical.

It's like if we were alive in 3000 BCE or so and we were to say, "By definition, lightning is energy sent to Earth by the gods. But there are no gods; therefore there is no lightning." Instead we correct the misunderstanding of what lightning is.

Agreed. Trouble is the dualist baggage that comes with talk about minds and mental things. For example: 'Gandalf exists in the mind'. Given a correspondence theory of truth, with what could that assertion be said to correspond in order for it to be true? A state-of-affairs somewhere? Perhaps in the brain?

When we abandon a belief, perhaps in the end we have to abandon the language associated with it. For example, do we need to carry on talking about souls and things happening 'in' them?

[Terrapin Station]

Agreed. Trouble is the dualist baggage that comes with talk about minds and mental things. For example: 'Gandalf exists in the mind'. Given a correspondence theory of truth, with what could that assertion be said to correspond in order for it to be true? A state-of-affairs somewhere? Perhaps in the brain?

Yes, it corresponds with a set of dynamic brain states.

When we abandon a belief, perhaps in the end we have to abandon the language associated with it. For example, do we need to carry on talking about souls and thinking happening 'in' them?

Sure with something like "souls" because it was always murky what that was supposed to refer to. But "mind" is like "lightning." The phenomena in question obviously occur. We just need to more accurate account of what the phenomena are ontologically.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes, if you deny that minds exist , either your use of English terminology is not the same as mine, or you are a robot.

I ask for evidence for the existence of any non-physical things. So far, none has been forthcoming. And while that may not mean the claim that non-physical things exist is false, it does mean that to believe the claim is true is irrational. So I don't believe it, just as I don't believe supernatural things exist, such as fairies, ghosts, devils, angels and gods - evidence for the existence of which is equally lacking, to my knowledge.

If you think what we call the mind is a non-physical thing 'containing' non-physical things, then what evidence do you have for the existence of that thing 'containing' those things? Just repeating the claim is pointless.

Your evidence for the existence of your mind is your immediate experience to which you yourself have privileged access.

[Veritas Aequitas]

2 Minds surely by definition are not physical.

It would be silly to say that mind by definition is nonphysical, but there are no nonphysical existents, therefore we have no minds.

Obviously we have minds. We just need to correct the nonsensical notion that they're nonphysical.

It's like if we were alive in 3000 BCE or so and we were to say, "By definition, lightning is energy sent to Earth by the gods. But there are no gods; therefore there is no lightning." Instead we correct the misunderstanding of what lightning is.

Agreed. Trouble is the dualist baggage that comes with talk about minds and mental things. For example: 'Gandalf exists in the mind'. Given a correspondence theory of truth, with what could that assertion be said to correspond in order for it to be true? A state-of-affairs somewhere? Perhaps in the brain?

When we abandon a belief, perhaps in the end we have to abandon the language associated with it. For example, do we need to carry on talking about souls and things happening 'in' them?

Your thinking is very rigid and dogmatic as usual.

What is "thing" is this case is a very loose term, not confined to purely solid physical things.

A 'mind' is a thing that exists in the living person.
Note the critical term here is 'living,' in relation to mind, not a 'dead' person.
The mind corresponds to the state-of-affairs within a living person.
That state-of-affairs is at the minimal the systematic activities of the brain in terms of thinking and acting.

The mind in this case has truth-values.
That the mind exists as true is verifiable and justifiable with the empirical features [mental] of that is attributable to what is mind in a living person.
It is false to claim a mind exists in a dead person.

Emotions [noun] are also 'things' in the loosest definition of thing.
Emotions are non-physical things which exist a state-of-affairs in the mind and brain of a living person.

The main concern here is whatever is defined as a thing - physical or non-physical, etc. - what is critical is whether that 'thing' is verifiable and justifiable empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK with the scientific FSK as the standard bearer.

Your problem is you are relying upon a bastardized FSK inherited from the logical positivists and classical analytic philosophers which is very dogmatic and ideological but not realistic at all.

[Skepdick]

I ask for evidence for the existence of any non-physical things. So far, none has been forthcoming.

Translation in non-retard: I ask for evidence for the existence of non-existing things. So far, none has been forthcoming.

If you think what we call the mind is a non-physical thing 'containing' non-physical things, then what evidence do you have for the existence of that thing 'containing' those things? Just repeating the claim is pointless.

If you think that your brain contains a non-physical thing called "you", what evidence do you have for your existence?

If you don't have any evidence, then it's irrational to believe that you exist.

[Peter Holmes]

Agreed. Trouble is the dualist baggage that comes with talk about minds and mental things. For example: 'Gandalf exists in the mind'. Given a correspondence theory of truth, with what could that assertion be said to correspond in order for it to be true? A state-of-affairs somewhere? Perhaps in the brain?

Yes, it corresponds with a set of dynamic brain states.

When we abandon a belief, perhaps in the end we have to abandon the language associated with it. For example, do we need to carry on talking about souls and thinking happening 'in' them?

Sure with something like "souls" because it was always murky what that was supposed to refer to. But "mind" is like "lightning." The phenomena in question obviously occur. We just need to more accurate account of what the phenomena are ontologically.

So, a thing we think about, such as Gandalf, exists physically in the brain in the form of electrochemical processes or 'dynamic brain states' - which factual assertions can describe correctly?

This is magical thinking, rather like the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood: no accidental change occurs.

The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes - because the only things that exist are physical things, both inside and outside the brain. Any other use of 'exist' is metaphorical and likely equivocatory.

'Mind' is nothing like 'lightning', which is a measurable and explicable physical phenomenon. That claim just begs the question. Explaining lightning is like explaining the brain, not the mind.

[Skepdick]

So, a thing we think about, such as Gandalf, exists physically in the brain in the form of electrochemical processes or 'dynamic brain states' - which factual assertions can describe correctly?

This is magical thinking, rather like the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood: no accidental change occurs.

The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes - because the only things that exist are physical things, both inside and outside the brain. Any other use of 'exist' is metaphorical and likely equivocatory.

'Mind' is nothing like 'lightning', which is a measurable and explicable physical phenomenon. That claim just begs the question. Explaining lightning is like explaining the brain, not the mind.

So, uuuuh.... If "The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes", then what and where is "thinking" ?

Also, what or where are "explanations"? I would love it if you could explain explanations.

[Terrapin Station]

So, a thing we think about, such as Gandalf, exists physically in the brain in the form of electrochemical processes or 'dynamic brain states' - which factual assertions can describe correctly?

Correct. That's the case with mentality in general, so it's going to be the case for fictions/things we imagine or fantasize about, too.

This is magical thinking, rather like the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood: no accidental change occurs.

I don't understand "no accidental change occurs" (I don't get the context etc.)

There's nothing "magical" about this: see below.

The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes - because the only things that exist are physical things, both inside and outside the brain. Any other use of 'exist' is metaphorical and likely equivocatory.

Again, mind is physical. So saying that there are facts about a particular instantiation of "Gandalf" is saying something about physical stuff. Mind is identical to a subset of brain states. It's what those states are like (it's their properties) from the spatiotemporal frame of being the brain states in question.

'Mind' is nothing like 'lightning', which is a measurable and explicable physical phenomenon. That claim just begs the question. Explaining lightning is like explaining the brain, not the mind.

Mind is identical to a subset of brain states.

[Terrapin Station]

So, a thing we think about, such as Gandalf, exists physically in the brain in the form of electrochemical processes or 'dynamic brain states' - which factual assertions can describe correctly?

This is magical thinking, rather like the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood: no accidental change occurs.

The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes - because the only things that exist are physical things, both inside and outside the brain. Any other use of 'exist' is metaphorical and likely equivocatory.

'Mind' is nothing like 'lightning', which is a measurable and explicable physical phenomenon. That claim just begs the question. Explaining lightning is like explaining the brain, not the mind.

So, uuuuh.... If "The only things that exist in the brain are organic material and electrochemical processes", then what and where is "thinking" ?

Also, what or where are "explanations"? I would love it if you could explain explanations.

Re your post above, too, I'm guessing that Peter is, or at least has been significantly influenced by, eliminative materialism.