Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

That sounds to me like you couldn't even choose to believe that someone else's beliefs might work differently than yours.

I am making the exact choice you insist I can't make!

Your beliefs do work very differently to mine.

I know that my "beliefs" are subservient to my desires/goals.
Your "beliefs" don't seem to be related to your desires/goals at all.

Which is pretty weird, since I would have no use for belief if I had no desires/goals.

[Terrapin Station]

That sounds to me like you couldn't even choose to believe that someone else's beliefs might work differently than yours.

I am making the exact choice you insist I can't make!

Your beliefs do work very differently to mine.

I know that my "beliefs" are subservient to my desires/goals.
Your "beliefs" don't seem to be related to your desires/goals at all.

Which is pretty weird, since I would have no use for belief if I had no desires/goals.

I wouldn't say that they're never related. It's just that I can't choose beliefs, I have some beliefs that have nothing to do with desires/goals, and I can make choices that have nothing to do with beliefs (well, at least aside from believing that the choice is possible).

[Skepdick]

I wouldn't say that they're never related. It's just that I can't choose beliefs

So you can't choose your moral beliefs either. Which makes them objective.

Or is now the time where you do the special pleading where you can't choose beliefs, but you can choose moral beliefs?

[Terrapin Station]

I wouldn't say that they're never related. It's just that I can't choose beliefs

So you can't choose your moral beliefs either.

I can't choose my moral dispositions, correct. (I wouldn't call them beliefs, because on my view morality is noncognitive--moral utterances can't be true or false. Beliefs are cognitive--they can be true or false. But at any rate, whatever we call them, I can't choose my moral whatevers.)

Which makes them objective.

Well, or no, because the subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with whether we're talking about something that's a choice. It has to do with whether we're talking about mental phenomena or not.

[Terrapin Station]

I also don't choose whether I like a particular donut or not, or whether I like some music or not, or a film, etc. I report my reaction whether I liked it or not, and then I can try to analyze why, I can try to find commonalities in my judgments, etc., so that I can better learn my taste and steer my choices toward my tastes.

[Skepdick]

Well, or no, because the subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with whether we're talking about something that's a choice. It has to do with whether we're talking about mental phenomena or not.

Do you even believe the bullshit that you speak?

The connotation/dichotomy between "truth" and "falsity" is precisely that truth is better than falsity.

A moral claim.

And so the entire notion of "truth" hinges upon the kindergarten "na! na! na! na! I told you so". It's true whether you choose to believe it or not.

Truth implies objectivity in the absence of choice/interpretation.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, or no, because the subjective/objective distinction has nothing to do with whether we're talking about something that's a choice. It has to do with whether we're talking about mental phenomena or not.

Do you even believe the bullshit that you speak?

The connotation/dichotomy between "truth" and "falsity" is precisely that truth is better than falsity.

A moral claim.

And so the entire notion of "truth" hinges upon the kindergarten "na! na! na! na! I told you so".

It's true whether you choose to believe it or not.

Whether P (a proposition) is true is a matter of (actually a judgment about) P's relation to something else.

The "something else" depends on what truth theory one uses. You appear to use some combo of the pragmatic theory of truth and some sort of "moral theory of truth."

I use correspondence theory. On correspondence theory, there's no inherent value judgment to a proposition corresponding or not with some state of affairs, although of course most people will make value judgments about it, where they prefer truth to falsehood (it's just that that's not a moral preference)

[Skepdick]

Whether P is true is a matter of (actually a judgment about) P's (a proposition's) relation to something else.

Who cares if the truth/falsity distinction is irrelevant?

The "something else" depends on what truth theory one uses. You appear to use some combo of the pragmatic theory of truth and some sort of "moral theory of truth."

That couldn't be further from the truth. There's nothing to be said about Truth precisely in the same way there's nothing to be said about God.

All human activities, even the pursuit of a "Truth-theory" is always subservient to our moral goals.

I use correspondence theory. On correspondence theory, there's no inherent value judgment to a proposition corresponding or not with some state of affairs, although of course most people will make value judgments about it, where they prefer truth to falsehood (it's just that that's not a moral preference)

All preferences are moral preferences.

Otherwise the distinction wouldn't exist.

[Terrapin Station]

Who cares . . .

That couldn't be further from the truth . . .

All preferences are moral preferences, otherwise the distinction wouldn't exist.

Oy vey.

[Skepdick]

Oy vey.

Sounds like I violated some moral norm of yours.

[Terrapin Station]

Oy vey.

Sounds like I violated some moral norm of yours.

I don't know. Is "being able to learn" a moral norm?

[Skepdick]

I don't know. Is "being able to learn" a moral norm?

Sounds like you think it is.

Skepdick ought to learn.
Skepdick ought not learn.

Skepdick ought to choose to learn.
Skepdick ought to choose not to learn.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't know. Is "being able to learn" a moral norm?

Sounds like you think it is.

Skepdick ought to learn.
Skepdick ought not learn.

Is "being able to learn" an interpersonal action?

[Skepdick]

Is "being able to learn" an interpersonal action?

In this dynamic - absolutely.

You are teaching me whatever it is you are attempting to teach me.

I am refusing to learn it.

[Terrapin Station]

Is "being able to learn" an interpersonal action?

In this dynamic - absolutely.

Sure, so it's an action by ______ on _______?