Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

Why couldn't someone put A and A, as two different things, in the same category? It would just depend on how they want to group things, no?

So now your classification rule is like this then?

if A != А and I want to group them together -> 1 category.
if A != А and I don't to group them together -> 2 categories.
If A = А and I want to group them together -> 1 category.
If A = А and I don't want to group them together -> 2 categories.

I am also curious. If you are implying that grouping/classification is a function of "want" then why do you want to categorise things as "moral" and "immoral"? Also... how do you detect category errors in your classification?

What might a category error even be if all of your categories are a function of want?

[Terrapin Station]

Your entire framing suffers from problems of determination.

Who decides what's permissible and what isn't? Who decides what's obligatory and what isn't?

Morality is the collective effort of ensuring the continued human survival and improved human wellbeing. Morality is about constructing a hospitable environment - a socio-economic system to ensure our on-going welfare. Avoid going the way of the dinosaurs.

The scale of the problem requires cooperation, division of labour, specialisation etc. Cooperative work requires trust. Trust requires predictable behaviour/lack of nasty surprises. To this end we have rules/norms.

What's the value in asking "Is X moral or immoral? Am I obliged to do X". What's the value in asking any such questions when you know you have free will.

The paradox of morality is the question OUGHT I be moral? No, you don't have to - you have free will.

Isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival, improved human well-being and constructing a hospitable environment? And aren't there "embedded" "should/oughts" in what counts as human well-being?

Look like you are supporting my point.

I have been arguing these "embedded" "should/ought" in ALL humans are real facts of neural combinations and sets of algorithm within the human brain via the DNA. These are biological facts of the biology FSK.
When processed through the moral FSK, they are moral facts.

The problems are that:

(1) Being mental phenomena, they're not objective in the sense of being person/mind/belief/bias/etc.-independent.
(2) The contents of the normatives are not universal. Different people feel that different things ought to be the case.
(3) The normatives in question are only facts in the respect that particular individuals hold particular normatives.
(4) The fact that an individual holds a normative implies no normative (not even the normative that the individual holds).
(5) That any normatives are statistically normal, and even if any were universal, this wouldn't imply any normatives (not even the normatives in question).

[Terrapin Station]

Why couldn't someone put A and A, as two different things, in the same category? It would just depend on how they want to group things, no?

So now your classification rule is like this then?

if A != А and I want to group them together -> 1 category.
if A != А and I don't to group them together -> 2 categories.
If A = А and I want to group them together -> 1 category.
If A = А and I don't want to group them together -> 2 categories.

Would it make sense to call that a "rule" if it's consistently variable and it's not prescriptive? What would "rule" refer to in that case?

I am also curious. If you are implying that grouping/classification is a function of "want" then why do you want to categorise things as "moral" and "immoral"?

"Moral"/"immoral" isn't a distinction I care very much about philosophically (because (a) of its relativity to individuals, and (b) it's such a simple and not very interesting distinction in my opinion--it's just what S approves versus disapproves of (re interpersonal behavior etc.)). I'm more concerned with "moral" and "phenomena other than morality."

Why do I want to categorize anything that way? Because I want to talk about how people seem to use the terms. Not per their own definitions of them, but per how they seem to function, where I want to capture a generalized conception of them that fits most normal behavior involving the usage of those terms, with respect to what's really going on ontologically.

Not that the issues I've been bringing up are solely due to classification. As I've continually pointed out to Veritas, there are upshots to what is the case ontologically, regardless of what we name anything.

But insofar as calling some things "moral" versus "phenomena other than morality," it's solely out of a desire to talk about behavior in a way that coheres especially with a range of normal usage of the terms.

Also... how do you detect category errors in your classification?

That would be a case of a conception of the terms that posits ontological suppositions that don't fit the normal range of behavior (again, from a functional perspective) involving and surrounding the terms.

All it amounts to saying is that relative to a functional analysis of a range of normal behavior, the ontological assumptions in the given instance (re the category error), don't make sense. That in no way suggests that "a functional analysis of a range of normal behavior (re the terms)" is the correct or true approach or anything like that. It's just what I'd be concerned with, what I'd want to look at, etc.

[Skepdick]

Would it make sense to call that a "rule" if it's consistently variable and it's not prescriptive? What would "rule" refer to in that case?

It's just a word. Call it what you like. It's not variable in any sense: Is A the same as А is a yes/no question.

You are working over-time to dodge it. We both know why, lets see how long you can keep up appearances.

"Moral"/"immoral" isn't a distinction I care very much about, by the way. I'm more concerned with "moral" and "phenomena other than morality."

It's the same distinction. It results in a taxonomy with a total of two categories.

Why do I want to categorize anything that way? Because I want to talk about how people seem to use the terms. Not per their own definitions of them, but per how they seem to function, where I want to capture a generalized conception of them that fits most normal behavior involving the usage of those terms, with respect to what's really going on ontologically.

And why do you want to do all of that?

Not that the issues I've been bringing up are solely due to classification. As I've continually pointed out to Veritas, there are upshots to what is the case ontologically, regardless of what we name anything.

Ontologies are the product of classification/grouping...

But insofar as calling some things moral versus "phenomena other than morality," it's solely out of a desire to talk about behavior in a way that coheres especially with a range of normal usage of the terms.

You seem rather obsessed with normatives...

That would be a case of a conception of the terms that posits ontological suppositions that don't fit the normal range of behavior (again, from a functional perspective) involving and surrounding the terms.

All it amounts to saying is that relative to a functional analysis of a range of normal behavior, the ontological assumptions in the given instance (re the category error), don't make sense. That in no way suggests that "a functional analysis of a range of normal behavior (re the terms)" is the correct or true approach or anything like that. It's just what I'd be concerned with, what I'd want to look at, etc.

That's a lot of words to say nothing. All taxonomies/ontologies are subjective. Even those you've deemed normal vs non-normal.

You are the one who insists that norms are not prescriptive. So what the hell is a "category error" if you simply choose to categorise the world differently to everybody else?

And so, what happens if your moral is my immoral and vice versa?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival, improved human well-being and constructing a hospitable environment? And aren't there "embedded" "should/oughts" in what counts as human well-being?

Look like you are supporting my point.

I have been arguing these "embedded" "should/ought" in ALL humans are real facts of neural combinations and sets of algorithm within the human brain via the DNA. These are biological facts of the biology FSK.
When processed through the moral FSK, they are moral facts.

The problems are that:

(1) Being mental phenomena, they're not objective in the sense of being person/mind/belief/bias/etc.-independent.
(2) The contents of the normatives are not universal. Different people feel that different things ought to be the case.
(3) The normatives in question are only facts in the respect that particular individuals hold particular normatives.
(4) The fact that an individual holds a normative implies no normative (not even the normative that the individual holds).
(5) That any normatives are statistically normal, and even if any were universal, this wouldn't imply any normatives (not even the normatives in question).

Different people??

You stated, "isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival .."
Do all normal people with various differences feel differently in ensuring to survive?
In this case, the striving to survive is represented by its corresponding physical referent and mental processes.
In this case, it is so evident ALL normal human will strive to survive to avoid premature death.
This ought_ness is obviously a fact of human nature.

I have argued the moral fact 'ought-not-to-kill' [with its physical referent] justified from a moral FSK is as fundamental as the 'ought to breathe' to ensure human survival.

Just in case you forgot;
Judgments and Decisions are not Morality Per se. plus feelings, emotional responses labelled as 'moral'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

[Peter Holmes]

Any claim of moral rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness, propriety and impropriety - whether with reference to intentions/purposes, or to consequences - or to programming supposedly hard-wired into the human brain - and so on - any such claim can only ever express a moral opinion, even if everyone holds that opinion.

There are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions. Whatever facts we use to explain a moral opinion, it remains an opinion. And others can use the same facts differently, or different facts, to explain a different moral opinion.

I think the quasi-religious determination (desperation?) of moral realists and objectivists to demonstrate the existence of moral facts has at least four related sources: we value what we call objectivity; we associate subjectivity with selfishness and irrationality; we care deeply about our moral values and judgements; and, to be consistent, we apply our moral values and judgements universally - not limited to time and place - so they feel objective. It's an understandable misunderstanding.

[Skepdick]

Any claim of moral rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness, propriety and impropriety - whether with reference to intentions/purposes, or to consequences - or to programming supposedly hard-wired into the human brain - and so on - any such claim can only ever express a moral opinion, even if everyone holds that opinion.

So if you define all expressions as opinions then everything anyone ever expresses is an opinion?

Well that's easy!

And if we define Peter Holmes as fucking retard, then anywhen anywhere Peter Holmes is a fucking retard.

There are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions. Whatever facts we use to explain a moral opinion, it remains an opinion. And others can use the same facts differently, or different facts, to explain a different moral opinion.

Indeed. It's my opinion that we should punch Peter Holmes in the face and kick him in the balls.

Fear not, Peter Holmes, opinions can and do hurt, but pain is subjective.

[Terrapin Station]

Different people??

What is the question or confusion there?

You stated, "isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival .."

Say what? I never said any such thing.

Do all normal people with various differences feel differently in ensuring to survive?

I also didn't write anything like "all (x) people feel differently." It seems like you're not understanding what I'm writing and that you're even getting confused over what I'm writing versus what I'm quoting to respond to.

In this case, the striving to survive is represented by its corresponding physical referent and mental processes.

That seems gobbledygooky to me.

In this case, it is so evident ALL normal human will strive to survive to avoid premature death.

What you're ignoring is that "normal humans strive to survive" HAS NO IMPLICATION FOR ANYTHING.

This ought_ness is obviously a fact of human nature.

Again, that has no implication for anything, even that normative itself.

[Terrapin Station]

And so, what happens if your moral is my immoral and vice versa?

What happens is exactly what we have as things are, because different people consider different things moral/immoral. My approach to this explains why this is the case.

[Terrapin Station]

You seem rather obsessed with normatives...

I was talking about statistical norms, not normatives. There's a difference, and statistical norms do not imply normatives.

In general I'm not a fan of normatives (if you haven't figured that out yet . . .I don't think you have, because you seem to think that I have very different views than I actually have).

[Skepdick]

What happens is exactly what we have as things are, because different people consider different things moral/immoral. My approach to this explains why this is the case.

What happens as things are is there's still a downward trend in murder rates.

And so the "sum of human choices" seems to have a surplus towards one predisposition.

[Skepdick]

I was talking about statistical norms, not normatives. There's a difference, and statistical norms do not imply normatives.

Statistical norms don't imply normatives.
Statistical trends which violate statistical norms imply normatives.

The norm predicts X. If Y happens - then something changed.

In general I'm not a fan of normatives (if you haven't figured that out yet . . .I don't think you have, because you seem to think that I have very different views than I actually have).

In case you haven't figured this out... I am not measuring your views not the basis of your account of them. I am measuring your views by your actions.

But also, this is precisely my point. Even if your views are as you report them to be, then the notion of morality (as you report it) is sterile.

If your moral predispositions are not causal (not normative) then it's by pure luck that your moral desires reify.
Unless, of course you are trying to convince me that you are not a fan of the normatives we call "murder laws".

[Terrapin Station]

What happens is exactly what we have as things are, because different people consider different things moral/immoral. My approach to this explains why this is the case.

What happens as things are is there's still a downward trend in murder rates.

. .. okay, now if this would just have something to do with anything we're talking about re morality.

[Terrapin Station]

Statistical trends which violate statistical norms imply normatives.

No, they don't.

The norm predicts X.

This is off topic, but we have to make a whole host of other assumptions for a given statistical norm to fuel a prediction.

If Y happens - then something changed.

Ignoring the the comment immediately above, what the heck is this supposed to have to do with a normative? lol

If your moral predispositions are not causal (not normative)

What? It looks like we're not even talking about the same thing at all.

[Terrapin Station]

Just to reiterate, normatives are oughts/shoulds. They're prescriptions.

It doesn't appear that you're talking about this when you're using the word "normative." Which is fine--you can use a word differently if you want to, but then we're just not talking about the same thing.