Is morality objective or subjective?

[Terrapin Station]

So circular arguments are problematics, but circular definitions aren't?

Sounds like a double standard.

Arguments are different than things that aren't arguments. The very idea of fallacies doesn't even make any sense outside of the context of an argument.

At any rate, circularity isn't even a cut and dried fallacy when it comes to arguments. See the post I copy-pasted above.

So you don't think it's a problem that you can't effectively communicate any of your classification rules to me?

Aside from the fact that I have no "classification rules," no.

You'd need to have a completely delusional notion of my opinion of you to this point to think that I'd feel it's a problem that something can't be (apparently) communicated to you, where I should be worrying about defining terms like "significance" etc.

This is peculiar to me. Do you think A and А are the same sort of thing?

A and A? No idea what you'd even be talking about there. Are you talking about that stupid thread from Eoh-whatever his name is?

So in your view, there's something more important than the necessary conditions for X.

lol that that's what you would have gotten from what I wrote above.

You don't even believe that.

lol

If living is not necessarily more important than Philosophy, then go kill yourself and come back and lets do some Philosophy.

Someone doesn't get the idea of subjective dispositions. That I think that importance is subjective doesn't imply that I don't think that particular things are important. It's just that it's subjective. It's something I think, a way I feel, a disposition I have. It's not something external to me that I'm perceiving etc.

So if a non-causal disposition changes what are the consequences of that change?

There may be no other consquences of note other than a disposition changing. (And the fact that the person tells us that it changed if we ask about it, etc.)

Then how the fuck could your notion of morality ever work?!?!

I didn't at all say that people do not act on their dispositions. Obviously sometimes they do. But they don't NECESSARILY act on them. You can have dispositions that you don't act on. I certainly have some that I don't act on. A good example of this is an alcoholic who is currently on the wagon. They're not acting on their disposition to drink, but they definitely have the disposition to drink/to be an alcoholic.

And people can obviously act in ways that are contrary to their dispositions, where they feel guilt later, where they have cognitive dissonance about their actions, etc.--all sorts of complicated situations can occur.

The way that morality actually works is that there are all sorts of competing views and interests and it's very complicated and messy, etc.

The point is that the morality part is the stuff about behavioral assessments and recommendations. Whether anyone is murdering anyone else isn't in itself morality. If we're talking about animals--let's say something like spiders, where (a) they have no mental phenomena, but (b) they sometimes kill other animals (of the same species), then we could say that they're "murdering" each other, but there's no morality involved in any of that for them, because they have no mental phenomena re judgments of the behavior or recommendations about it. The way that morality works is that people make these value judgments and recommendations and so on. The behavior in question is what morality is about, but morality isn't identical to the behavior. It's identical to judgments, recommendations/normatives about the behavior. (And just because I think there was some confusion about this before, this is the case whether we're talking about a duty-oriented approach, a consequentialist approach, or whatever--it's still judgments etc. about behavior, just there can be focuses on consequences versus obligations, etc.).

[Terrapin Station]

The requirements that:
(a) We're talking about an argument that actually has premises and a conclusion, where the premises are intended to imply the conclusion,
(b) We're talking about an argument where the conclusion actually is in the premises (and not just via the interpretation of a particular listener), and
(c) We're talking about an argument where there needs to be a doxastic justification for the both the conclusion and one or more premises
Are all necessary.

This is a normative view-point.

And? Again, what of it?

As I had pointed out elsewhere.

Starting with premises and arriving at conclusions is one way to construct arguments.

Another way to construct arguments is starting at conclusions and arriving at sufficient premises.
This is the method commonly used in Reverse Mathematics.

Both of those are modes of argumentation. Why are you prescribing your way?

What I wrote said nothing about what we start with. Simply that arguments require premises and conclusions where premises are intended to imply conclusions. You can start wherever you like.

[Skepdick]

Arguments are different than things that aren't arguments. The very idea of fallacies doesn't even make any sense outside of the context of an argument.

It doesn't even make sense in the context of arguments. Fallacies contradict each other.

The fallacy fallacy contradicts the Petitio Principii fallacy.

The set of fallacies undermine every argument. This is the implication of the Munchhausen Trillema.

Aside from the fact that I have no "classification rules," no.

None that you are aware of, apparently.

Yet you keep classifying things.

You'd need to have a completely delusional notion of my opinion of you to this point to think that I'd feel it's a problem that something can't be (apparently) communicated to you, where I should be worrying about defining terms like "significance" etc.

One of us is certainly delusional. Seeming as you are able to classify things as significant and insignificant.... but you don't have a classification rule.

I bet you don't make Type I and Type II errors either.

A and A? No idea what you'd even be talking about there. Are you talking about that stupid thread from Eoh-whatever his name is?

I am asking you if this -> А
is the same thing as this -> A

if A is the same as А then they go in the same category; and if A is not the same as А they go into different categories.

Classification rules. Or as kids do.. sorting.

In order to sort you must equate and differentiate, no?

Someone doesn't get the idea of subjective dispositions.

Somebody doesn't get the idea of reification of dispositions.

That I think that importance is subjective doesn't imply that I don't think that particular things are important. It's just that it's subjective. It's something I think, a way I feel, a disposition I have. It's not something external to me that I'm perceiving etc.

So your disposition of "importance" is not causal? Your disposition of "importance" is not reified in your actions? Your claim of "import" is inconsequential and therefore untestable by anybody.

There may be no other consquences of note other than a disposition changing. (And the fact that the person tells us that it changed if we ask about it, etc.)

Do you think morality is one of those inconsequential dispositions?

I didn't at all say that people do not act on their dispositions. Obviously sometimes they do. But they don't NECESSARILY act on them.

They don't NECESSARILY not act on them either. So we have ourselves a modal dilemma.

And people can obviously act in ways that are contrary to their dispositions, where they feel guilt later, where they have cognitive dissonance about their actions, etc.--all sorts of complicated situations can occur.

So when you act contrary to your dispositions, what conclusions should I draw about your commitment to them?

The way that morality actually works is that there are all sorts of competing views and interests and it's very complicated and messy, etc.

It is. That's why I am describing the nett effects without unpacking the messy details.

The point is that the morality part is the stuff about behavioral assessments and recommendations.

Which are inconsequential unless reified. Somehow.

Whether anyone is murdering anyone else isn't in itself morality. If we're talking about animals--let's say something like spiders, where (a) they have no mental phenomena, but (b) they sometimes kill other animals (of the same species), then we could say that they're "murdering" each other, but there's no morality involved in any of that for them, because they have no mental phenomena re judgments of the behavior or recommendations about it.
The way that morality works is that people make these value judgments and recommendations and so on. The behavior in question is what morality is about, but morality isn't identical to the behavior. It's identical to judgments, recommendations/normatives about the behavior. (And just because I think there was some confusion about this before, this is the case whether we're talking about a duty-oriented approach, a consequentialist approach, or whatever--it's still judgments etc. about behavior, just there can be focuses on consequences versus obligations, etc.).

Judgments are a posteriori.

If there is an extinction event, a posteriori moral judgments about our extinction event are going to be.... Impossible?

Philosophers have slight misunderstanding about the way time works.

“We know the past but cannot control it. We control the future but cannot know it.”
— Claude Shannon

[Skepdick]

What I wrote said nothing about what we start with. Simply that arguments require premises and conclusions where premises are intended to imply conclusions. You can start wherever you like.

But you did imply it.

You were explicitly speaking about the Petitio Principii fallacy which is a "fallacy" precisely because one has assumes the truth of the conclusion.

Assuming the truth of the conclusion before one has found any premises is precisely the starting point of Reverse Mathematics.

But then.... if my conclusion is true, why do I even have to bother with premises, arguments, justifications and such? Is justified truth somehow better than unjustified truth?

And the entire activity of argumentation/justification becomes even more moronic given the Fallacy Fallacy - just because the premises are false it doesn't mean the conclusion is not true.

[Terrapin Station]

Yet you keep classifying things.

This doesn't amount to rules.

One of us is certainly delusional. Seeming as you are able to classify things as significant and insignificant.... but you don't have a classification rule.

Again, the idea there is that the individual in question is telling you how they FEEL about something.

I am asking you if this -> А
is the same thing as this -> A

The same in what respect? A variable they're referring to where we're assuming we're not equivocating? Are the instances of the letters the same? What?

if A is the same as А then they go in the same category; and if A is not the same as А they go into different categories.

Depends on how someone is classifying/categorizing things, etc. How is this relevant to anything we're talking about?

So your disposition of "importance" is not causal?

Depends on just what we're talking about.

Your disposition of "importance" is not reified in your actions?

No. Not re how I use the term "reification." Re how you're using the term "reification," it depends on the exact scenario.

Your claim of "import" is inconsequential and therefore untestable by anybody.

It's definitely not testable. Hence why one can't be right or wrong about it. All we can go by are verbal reports someone gives us (and then they could be honest or not, but we can't know whether they are.)

They don't NECESSARILY not act on them either.

Of course, which is obvious from saying that people sometimes act on them.

So when you act contrary to your dispositions, what conclusions should I draw about your commitment to them?

None. You'd have insufficient info for that.

It is. That's why I am describing the nett effects without unpacking the messy details.

That's useless if we're trying to pretend that it's only behavioral.

Which are inconsequential unless reified. Somehow.

And so what? From where are you getting a requirement that it has to be "consequential"?

All judgments are a posteriori.

What would lead you to believe this?

[Terrapin Station]

You were explicitly speaking about the Petitio Principii fallacy which is a "fallacy" precisely because one has assumes the truth of the conclusion.

That shows zero understanding of what that post actually said.

[Skepdick]

This doesn't amount to rules.

It literally does.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary_classification

Binary classification is the task of classifying the elements of a set into two groups on the basis of a classification rule. Typical binary classification problems include:

Medical testing to determine if a patient has certain disease or not;
Quality control in industry, deciding whether a specification has been met;
In information retrieval, deciding whether a page should be in the result set of a search or not.

Again, the idea there is that the individual in question is telling you how they FEEL about something.

FEELINGS require detection. FEELINGS require ability to distinguish hunger from a fart.

If you can recognize 16 distinct feelings -> 4 bits of information.
If you can recognize 65536 distinct feelings -> 16 bits of information.

How many feelings are you capable of recognising?

The same in what respect? A variable they're referring to where we're assuming we're not equivocating? Are the instances of the letters the same? What?

I am asking you in the most literal and direct way. Can you perceive/feel/detect ANY difference between A and А?

Do you FEEL (detect!) any difference? Qualitatively!

Depends on how someone is classifying/categorizing things, etc. How is this relevant to anything we're talking about?

It's relevant because thats how classification works!

I am asking you to classify A and А. Either they belong to the same category of things, or they belong to two different category of things.

1 distinction = 1 bit of information.

Depends on just what we're talking about.

Morality.

No. Not re how I use the term "reification.

Are you using it to mean something other than materialise, realise, turning opinions into facts?
Preventing people from murdering in line with your moral dispositions. Moral enforcement.

It's definitely not testable. Hence why one can't be right or wrong about it.

So then you are affirming that your moral dispositions are not causal.

Because that's the only way for them to be untestable.

And you are affirming that your morality is only subjective. Because it has zero effect on objective reality.

All we can go by are verbal reports someone gives us (and then they could be honest or not, but we can't know whether they are.)

Which is precisely why I don't care about your verbal reports of your non-causal moral predispositions.

Of course, which is obvious from saying that people sometimes act on them.

It's also obvious that if people some times act on them then they are testable.

None. You'd have insufficient info for that.

What would be sufficient info if your moral predispositions are not causal?

That's useless if we're trying to pretend that it's only behavioral.

It's nowhere near as useless as non-causal moral predispositions.

And so what? From where are you getting a requirement that it has to be "consequential"?

So you don't want to prevent immoral acts, you just want to have moral opinions/predispositions about them?

What would lead you to believe this?

The fact that your moral dispositions are not causal. They are only caused. By events. I imagine.

[Skepdick]

That shows zero understanding of what that post actually said.

The post didn't say anything of import.

If you have true conclusions, you have no use for premises, so the entire notion of argumentation seems superfluous.

[Terrapin Station]

This doesn't amount to rules.

It literally does.

No, it doesn't. "Rule" has a prescriptive connotation.

I'm not going on and on like this in post after post. So I'm going to start truncating this crap after the first issue in each post.

[Terrapin Station]

That shows zero understanding of what that post actually said.

The post didn't say anything of import.

You didn't seem very interested in it at any rate. <shrug>

[Skepdick]

No, it doesn't. "Rule" has a prescriptive connotation.

Then drop the connotation.

Classification is a correct description of what you are DOING when you are classifying things.

Whether you are conscious or unconscious of the classification is another matter.

Logical rules describe precisely the behaviour of a binary classifier.

[Terrapin Station]

No, it doesn't. "Rule" has a prescriptive connotation.

Then drop the connotation.

We could do that, but why? Just so we can use a certain word . .. because we like that word or something?

Classification is a correct description of what you are DOING when you are classifying things.

I wouldn't say "correct," but sure, I'd agree with describing classification as classification, lol.

Logical rules describe precisely the behaviour of a binary classifier.

Why would we be framing it in terms of logical rules? And just what sort of thing would we have in mind as a "logical rule"?

[Skepdick]

We could do that, but why? Just so we can use a certain word . .. because we like that word or something?

Because the meaning I intend was not the meaning you parsed.

I wouldn't say "correct," but sure, I'd agree with describing classification as classification, lol.

Classification rules are necessary components of classification.

Why would we be framing it in terms of logical rules? And just what sort of thing would we have in mind as a "logical rule"?

Because classification reduces trivially to determining which scenario is true.

If A = А then you have two instances of the same thing. They go into one category.
If A != A then you have an instance of two difference things. They go into two categories.

[Terrapin Station]

We could do that, but why? Just so we can use a certain word . .. because we like that word or something?

Because the meaning I intend was not the meaning you parsed.

I wouldn't say "correct," but sure, I'd agree with describing classification as classification, lol.

Classification rules are necessary components of classification.

Why would we be framing it in terms of logical rules? And just what sort of thing would we have in mind as a "logical rule"?

Because classification reduces trivially to determining which scenario is true.

If A = А then you have two instances of the same thing. They go into one category.
If A != A then you have an instance of two difference things. They go into two categories.

Why couldn't someone put A and A, as two different things, in the same category? It would just depend on how they want to group things, no?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Let me clarify why I asked you "Doesn't morality have anything to do with normatives in your view?"

On most accounts of morality, morality has to do with assessments and recommendations of conduct. Regarding recommendations, we're talking about whether a behavior is morally permissible, morally prohibited, morally obligatory, and so on. Re assessments, it's saying that a behavior is good, bad, benevolent, evil, altruistic, selfish, etc. with an implication that behavior that is good is permissible if not obligatory, behavior that is bad is to be avoided, and so on. So the assessments have implied recommendations.

Would you not say that morality has something to do with this?

If you wouldn't say that morality has something to do with this, then how would you characterize morality, and what would you say are (at least some of) the features that make an utterance a moral utterance rather than some other kind of utterance?

Your entire framing suffers from problems of determination.

Who decides what's permissible and what isn't? Who decides what's obligatory and what isn't?

Morality is the collective effort of ensuring the continued human survival and improved human wellbeing. Morality is about constructing a hospitable environment - a socio-economic system to ensure our on-going welfare. Avoid going the way of the dinosaurs.

The scale of the problem requires cooperation, division of labour, specialisation etc. Cooperative work requires trust. Trust requires predictable behaviour/lack of nasty surprises. To this end we have rules/norms.

What's the value in asking "Is X moral or immoral? Am I obliged to do X". What's the value in asking any such questions when you know you have free will.

The paradox of morality is the question OUGHT I be moral? No, you don't have to - you have free will.

Isn't there an "embedded" "should/ought" in ensuring human survival, improved human well-being and constructing a hospitable environment? And aren't there "embedded" "should/oughts" in what counts as human well-being?

Look like you are supporting my point.

I have been arguing these "embedded" "should/ought" in ALL humans are real facts of neural combinations and sets of algorithm within the human brain via the DNA. These are biological facts of the biology FSK.
When processed through the moral FSK, they are moral facts.