Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

Take it up with the dictionary.

Appeal to authority.

No. I'm not going to start defining a bunch of different terms. You'd have to at least provide a list of terms that I wouldn't have to define for you before I'd start that.

Well, what bloody good is it defining terms using other undefined terms?

It's just distinctions upon distinctions upon distinctions without any practical difference.

Depends on who you ask, obviously. Importance always does.

I'll bet that anybody who answers isn't dead!

Huh? Why are we talking about reifying dispositions?

Because abstract non-causal dispositions are lip service.

If two people make the exact same choice under the exact same circumstances, despite their difference in dispositions.

Then the "difference" is what exactly?

[Skepdick]

My position wasn't anything about that.

Sure it is. Indirectly and a few leaps of intuition away.

You are stating that the two options are (or could be?) equivalent. If the one is morality, then the other could be morality too.
All the better because that's just like any regular choice. A or B.

So I am making you commit to your position. Because words and Philosophical contrarianism are cheap.

All sophistry disappears when you have skin in the game.

If you are going to argue that shortening human life is not immoral, I expect commitment. Murder somebody and youtube it.

[Terrapin Station]

Take it up with the dictionary.

Appeal to authority.

Appeal to authority is a fallacy, thus it's pertinent to arguments (claiming that something is correct or true). Dictionary definitions aren't correct or true. No one claimed that. If you have a problem with the fact that a definition is "circular," take it up with the dictionary. I'm not interested.

Well, what bloody good is it defining terms using other undefined terms?

If you need them all defined buy a dictionary and have fun flipping pages.

I'll bet that anybody who answers isn't dead!

There's one thing we agree on.

Because abstract non-causal dispositions are lip service.

Ah, you don't literally mean reifying a disposition. You mean "putting the sentiment into practice." Sometimes that's just having a disposition, though, because not all dispositions are about what oneself should do, obviously.

If two people make the exact same choice under the exact same circumstances, despite their difference in dispositions.

Then the "difference" is what exactly?

I don't know. I'm not sure what sort of thing you're looking for there.

[Terrapin Station]

You are stating that the two options are (or could be?) equivalent.

No, I didn't say anything like that. I'm asking you to explain, if there's not an implied normative in your characterization of morality, why is that what you're attaching to the term rather than the alternative?

If you are going to argue that shortening human life is not immoral,

What I'd argue is that (a) it's not objectively moral/immoral, (b) it can't be true/false that it's moral/immoral, and (c) I wouldn't subjectively say that it's immoral without specifying qualifications better. For example, subjectively, I wouldn't say that shortening someone's life via self-defense is immoral. But subjectively, I'd say that shortening their life not in self-defense, where the shortening isn't consensual, but where it's intentional on the shortener's part is immoral.

[Skepdick]

If you have a problem with the fact that a definition is "circular," take it up with the dictionary. I'm not interested.

Why would I take it up with a dictionary? The dictionary didn't make you define it in a circular fashion.

You did that.

If you need them all defined buy a dictionary and have fun flipping pages.

I don't need them defined by a dictionary. Dictionaries are circular.

I would like you to give me a word whose meaning can be inferred some way other than through circular definition.

And I need you to tell me what that way of inferring the word's meaning might be.

There's one thing we agree on.

Then I don't understand why you think being alive is not a pre-requisite for having any dispositions about import.

Ah, you don't literally mean reifying a disposition. You mean "putting the sentiment into practice." Sometimes that's just having a disposition, though, because not all dispositions are about what oneself should do, obviously.

Yes. I literally mean reifying a disposition.

If I am of the disposition that you ought to make me a cup of tea and you don't -> my disposition is not reified.
If I am of the disposition that you ought to make me a cup of tea and you don -> my disposition is reified.

I don't know. I'm not sure what sort of thing you're looking for there.

I am looking for an observable difference in action that accompanies a difference in abstract disposition.

There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere - no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen. --William James

[Skepdick]

No, I didn't say anything like that. I'm asking you to explain, if there's not an implied normative in your characterization of morality, why is that what you're attaching to the term rather than the alternative?

No, there isn't. Because I am describing what happened and what has been happening for centuries. I am not prescribing what should happen.

Murder decreased.
Human longevity increased.
Bunch of other things improved.

What I'd argue is that (a) it's not objectively moral/immoral

OK. Do you have a criterion for "objectivity" that's not unattainable in theory and in practice?

, (b) it can't be true/false that it's moral/immoral

Truth/falsify are philosophical constructs - I am not even remotely interested.

If your truth drives you to extinction and my my lies drive me to survival. I prefer my lies to your truth.

As it goes in engineering circles: If it's stupid and it works, then it's not stupid.

, and (c) I wouldn't subjectively say that it's immoral without specifying qualifications better. For example, subjectively, I wouldn't say that shortening someone's life via self-defense is immoral. But subjectively, I'd say that shortening their life not in self-defense, where the shortening isn't consensual, but where it's intentional on the shortener's part is immoral.

Are you hunting for absolute truths? Ones without exceptions that hold in every context?

Because that sure seems normative. But more than that - it sure seems like an impossible task and I wonder if you know that it's impossible.

I am curious whether you knowingly engage in self-sabotage and setting yourself up for failure; or do you just enjoy trolling?

[Terrapin Station]

If you have a problem with the fact that a definition is "circular," take it up with the dictionary. I'm not interested.

Why would I take it up with a dictionary? The dictionary didn't make you define it in a circular fashion.

Because I merely quoted a dictionary. If you think it's circular and you think that's a problem, then it's circular and a problem because of what the dictionary did.

If you need them all defined buy a dictionary and have fun flipping pages.

I don't need them defined by a dictionary. Dictionaries are circular.

Yes. Necessarily.

I would like you to give me a word whose meaning can be inferred some way other than through circular definition.

What in the world would you have in mind there? Definitions are going to be circular, unless you're talking about ostensive definitions or something, but we can't do those on a message board. Any way, I've no interest in defining terms for you that I take it to be a prerequisite for you to be familiar with to be worth chatting about this sort of stuff with.

Then I don't understand why you think being alive is not a pre-requisite for having any dispositions about import.

No idea why you'd think that I think that. <shrug>

Ah, you don't literally mean reifying a disposition. You mean "putting the sentiment into practice." Sometimes that's just having a disposition, though, because not all dispositions are about what oneself should do, obviously.

Yes. I literally mean reifying a disposition.

Literally reifying a disposition means that one thinks that the disposition isn't a mental state, but a property of something or other that is found in the extramental world.

I am looking for an observable difference in action that accompanies a difference in abstract disposition.

There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere - no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen. --William James

James is wrong there. There can be a difference in mental content only that has no observable difference elsewhere.

[Terrapin Station]

No, I didn't say anything like that. I'm asking you to explain, if there's not an implied normative in your characterization of morality, why is that what you're attaching to the term rather than the alternative?

No, there isn't.

What? That makes no grammatical sense to me as a response to what I typed above.

Because I am describing what happened and what has been happening for centuries.

But lots of things happened, including stuff like genocide, etc.

I am not prescribing what should happen.

That we're not talking about prescriptions means we're not talking about morality then.

Murder decreased.
Human longevity increased.
Bunch of other things improved.

"Improved" isn't a fact but a subjective assessment. But sure, murder could have decreased, etc. It's just what does that fact have to do with morality?

OK. Do you have a criterion for "objectivity" that's not unattainable in theory and in practice?

For morality specifically? Sure. Morality would be objective if we could point out moral edicts that occur in the extra-mental world.

Are you hunting for absolute truths?

No. I don't think there is any such thing. At any rate, again, on my view, no moral stance is true/false. So no moral stance I say is true in any regard, I wouldn't be searching for that, etc.

Because that sure seems normative.

What of normatives? In other words, what would that matter? No one said anything like, "There aren't/shouldn't be/etc. any normatives." It's just that normatives, of which there are tons, are dispositions that individuals have. They're not something other than that.

I am curious whether you knowingly engage in self-sabotage and setting yourself up for failure; or do you just enjoy trolling?

No idea what you're talking about here.

[Skepdick]

Because I merely quoted a dictionary. If you think it's circular and you think that's a problem, then it's circular and a problem because of what the dictionary did.

You reached for a dictionary to determine how you are using the words that you are using?

That's weird. Did the dictionary read your mind?

What in the world would you have in mind there? Definitions are going to be circular, unless you're talking about ostensive definitions or something, but we can't do those on a message board. Any way, I've no interest in defining terms for you that I take it to be a prerequisite for you to be familiar with to be worth chatting about this sort of stuff with.

I am well familiar with the insufficiency of all language towards solving the symbol-grounding problem.

So if you can't tell me HOW to distinguish ostensively and empirically distinguish A from non-A you are necessarily stuck in a vicious circularity of your own making.

No idea why you'd think that I think that. <shrug>

Because you defined morality in terms of importance?

What, in your view, is more important than morality?

Literally reifying a disposition means that one thinks that the disposition isn't a mental state, but a property of something or other that is found in the extramental world.

Isn't that what I said?

If I am of the disposition that you ought to make me tea, and you actually make me tea then my predisposition is reified.
And if you don't make me tea, then no reification took place.

James is wrong there. There can be a difference in mental content only that has no observable difference elsewhere.

How are you asserting "wrongness" if you keep refusing to define "wrong" ?

Perhaps you mean that he's not absolutely correct? But so what.

He's simply pointing out that mental differences that cannot be reified are inconsequential.

You are welcome to draw infinitely many mental distinctions, but if you reify none of those - why should anyone care?

[Terrapin Station]

You reached for a dictionary to determine how you are using the words that you are using?

I said I wasn't using the term in any sort of unusual way. I was using it in the same sense as standard dictionary definitions, so I quoted one.

So if you can't tell me HOW to distinguish ostensively . ..

Not when I can only type at you, no.

Because you defined morality in terms of importance?

Which is supposed to have what to do with thinking that "being alive is not a pre-requisite"?

Isn't that what I said?

If I am of the disposition that you ought to make me tea, and you actually make me tea then my predisposition is reified.
And if you don't make me tea, then no reification took place.

The disposition isn't the same thing as an action. Dispositons are mental. Actions are not.

Define "wrong".

Sure, as soon as you provide a list of words I wouldn't have to define for you.

[Skepdick]

I said I wasn't using the term in any sort of unusual way. I was using it in the same sense as standard dictionary definitions, so I quoted one.

And you also agreed that the standard way is circular.

So break the circularity.

Not when I can only type at you, no.

Sure you can. Use imperative language. Describe an experiment of sort to distinguish the two cases.

You are not limited to typing. You have video, pictures.

Surely the medium of communication can't be what's limiting you.

Which is supposed to have what to do with thinking that "being alive is not a pre-requisite"?

If X depends on Y, then Y is more important than X. Isn't that how necessity works?

You don't need Philosophy to be alive, but you need to be alive to do Philosophy.

Life is more important than Philosophy. Necessarily so.

The disposition isn't the same thing as an action. Dispositons are mental. Actions are not.

So what? Are dispositions causal or not? Do dispositions cause reification or not?

Sure, as soon as you provide a list of words I wouldn't have to define for you.

Well, you keep telling me that words refer to things. Do it ostensively.

Describe the referent.

[Terrapin Station]

And you also agreed that the standard way is circular.

Yes, definitions are circular. That's not a problem with them, it's a feature of them.

So break the circularity.

You can't via typing, if you can period (which is debatable).

Sure you can. Use imperative language.

Let's see you demonstrate this if you think it's possible. Again, I don't at all agree that it's a problem, even. That's your view.

If X depends on Y, then Y is more important than X. Isn't that how necessity works?

???? LOL, no, that's not how necessity works.

You don't need Philosophy to be alive, but you need to be alive to do Philosophy.

Life is more important than Philosophy. Necessarily so.

There's nothing that's necessarily more important than anything else. "Importance" is a subjective designation that no one can be wrong (or right) about. It's someone telling us how they feel about something, how much they care about it, etc.

So what? Are dispositions causal or not?

In a loose manner of speaking, at least, they can be, but they're not always.

Do dispositions cause reification or not?

??? No. Dispositions wouldn't cause reification. (Well, I guess unless we want to talk about someone having a disposition to reify abstracts.)

Well, you keep telling me that words refer to things. Do it ostensively.

<points>

[Skepdick]

Yes, definitions are circular. That's not a problem with them, it's a feature of them.

So circular arguments are problematics, but circular definitions aren't?

Sounds like a double standard.

Let's see you demonstrate this if you think it's possible. Again, I don't at all agree that it's a problem, even. That's your view.

So you don't think it's a problem that you can't effectively communicate any of your classification rules to me?

Even though you keep classifying things into more and more categories (distinctions).

This is peculiar to me. Do you think A and А are the same sort of thing? Do you classify them into one or two categories?

???? LOL, no, that's not how necessity works.

So in your view, there's something more important than the necessary conditions for X.

Ok. What might that be?

There's nothing that's necessarily more important than anything else. "Importance" is a subjective designation that no one can be wrong (or right) about. It's someone telling us how they feel about something, how much they care about it, etc.

You don't even believe that.

If living is not necessarily more important than Philosophy, then go kill yourself and come back and lets do some Philosophy.

In a loose manner of speaking, at least, they can be, but they're not always.

So if a non-causal disposition changes what are the consequences of that change?

??? No. Dispositions wouldn't cause reification. (Well, I guess unless we want to talk about someone having a disposition to reify abstracts.)

Then how the fuck could your notion of morality ever work?!?!

We have dispositions about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour that we can't reify. Woopty dooo!

Without reification your dispositions are just impotent elevated emotional states that cause nothing.

<points>

What are you pointing at? You could start with a location in spacetime.

[Terrapin Station]

Here's something I wrote about circularity on another board, by the way:

Begging the question (or petitio principii) is one of the least-understood fallacies . . . including by a lot of academic sources that discuss it.

I agree more or less with Daniele Sgaravatti's approach:

"an argument will be circular relative to an evidential state if and only if having doxastic justification for the conclusion is necessary, for a subject in that evidential state, to have doxastic justification for the premises . . . This account seems to shed new light on the old problem of characterizing petitio principii. It avoids the two obvious problems which any account of this phenomenon must face: being too narrow, for example by leaving out all arguments in which the conclusion does not appear among the premisses, and being too wide, making all valid arguments circular."

The first problem she cites is rampant in academic examples of petitio principii--not to mention that it's not uncommon for examples to not even be arguments per se, and the second problem tends to go unacknowledged, even though it should be plain to see. A simple example is that P-->P is not an fallacious/invalid argument, even though it certainly fits most definitions given of petitio principii.

The requirements that:
(a) We're talking about an argument that actually has premises and a conclusion, where the premises are intended to imply the conclusion,
(b) We're talking about an argument where the conclusion actually is in the premises (and not just via the interpretation of a particular listener), and
(c) We're talking about an argument where there needs to be a doxastic justification for the both the conclusion and one or more premises
Are all necessary.

[Skepdick]

The requirements that:
(a) We're talking about an argument that actually has premises and a conclusion, where the premises are intended to imply the conclusion,
(b) We're talking about an argument where the conclusion actually is in the premises (and not just via the interpretation of a particular listener), and
(c) We're talking about an argument where there needs to be a doxastic justification for the both the conclusion and one or more premises
Are all necessary.

This is a normative view-point.

As I had pointed out elsewhere.

Starting with premises and arriving at conclusions is one way to construct arguments.

Another way to construct arguments is starting at conclusions and arriving at sufficient premises.
This is the method commonly used in Reverse Mathematics.

Both of those are modes of argumentation. Why are you prescribing your way?