What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

I figure that reason is more "real" because of my psychological attachment to reality. This attachment is practical and does not integrate with my philosophical belief in non-realism. I pick and choose my ontology according to what problem I want to solve.

Just a sidebar. My understanding was that the analytic/synthetic distinction applies to factual assertions (some propositions), not features of reality, with regard to which the distinction is meaningless.

Yes. Analytic / synthetic or deductive/inductive are to do with how we know , but not what sorts of stuff there is.
However if reality is mind-dependent , and what we know is protean, then reality is unstable. It is therefore wise to regard all synthetic statements such as "killing people is wrong" or " metal sinks in water" as provisional.

I think your comment demonstrates how we mistake what we say about things for what we know about them.

My assertion was that 'the analytic/synthetic distinction applies to factual assertions (some propositions)'.

And you expressed your agreement by saying 'Yes. Analytic / synthetic or deductive/inductive are to do with how we know ...'

But that's not what I said.

My starting point is that there are three separate and fundamentally different things: features of reality; what we believe and know about them, such as that they are or were the case; and what we say about them, which (classically) may be true or false. And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning, rather than rules for the use of language in deductive or inductive arguments - what can be said consistently without contradiction, which is what logicians actually study - is a startling example of the confusion. It's probably the most amazing and unremarked example of the myth of propositions at work.

[Skepdick]

My starting point is that there are three separate and fundamentally different things: features of reality ; what we believe and know about them

Your "starting point" assumes too much.

There's reality - all there is. To claim that reality has "features" requires knowing that.

How do you know that reality has features?

[Terrapin Station]

And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

[Veritas Aequitas]

"A credible FSK" is the product of reasoning.
However much as I agree with what you have written there is survival value in a positive attitude towards realism. It is one credible attitude to be anti-realist when wearing the philosopher's cloak, and another credible attitude when garbed as a scientist exploring the things of nature which of course include human beings.

The problem with "Philosophical Realism" [especially those of Analytic Philosophy] is that it is an ideology which is dogmatic, political, emotional and uncompromising. Look at how people like PantFlasher, Sculptor and PH [where unable to give sound arguments] go in a frenzy [due to dissonance] when the views of others do not reconcile with their ideological thoughts.

In philosophy-proper what is more relevant is, whether whatever the view, the question is whether it is realistic/pragmatic or not?
This is why we need to fall back of various credible FSKs which is a produce of reasoning and critical thinking plus wisdom.

Philosophical realism is as you say. However when a scientist tries to explain an event he needs to use language that implies there is real truth to be discovered.

Science is leveraged on empirical evidences and induction.
Science starts with an abductive hypothesis which is based on empirical evidence and used induction to arrive at its scientific truth which is not the real truth but a truth relative to the scientific FSK.

However within the scientific FSK, science merely ASSUMES there are real things to be discovered. Whether these ASSUMED real things are independent of humans is debatable within scientists; whatever it is, it is ultimately ASSUMED.
Science, without empirical evidences, would not be that dogmatic [like the ideological philosophical realism] in insisting there are really real things categorically and independent of its FSK.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My starting point is that there are three separate and fundamentally different things: features of reality ; what we believe and know about them

Your "starting point" assumes too much.
There's reality - all there is. To claim that reality has "features" requires knowing that.
How do you know that reality has features?

You are right on this.
It is not only that PH assumed too much, he is in fact ignorant of "what is reality".

To know reality - all-there-is has features, the most effective way is to rely on some kind of FSK [scientific FSK - the most credible], or the often mentioned, Model-dependent realism,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism

Model-dependent realism is a view of scientific inquiry that focuses on the role of scientific models of phenomena.[1] It claims reality should be interpreted based upon these models, and where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist.

It claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model.[2]

The term "model-dependent realism" was coined by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow in their 2010 book, The Grand Design.

It is most effective to rely on Model-Dependent Realism to understand feature of realities related to moral realities, thus objective moral facts justified upon the moral framework and system or the model-dependent moral realism.
It is effective because it is useful for morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

Russell admitted 'knowledge by acquaintance' has critical limitations.
Note his doubt and exclamation, "Perhaps there is no table at all".

As for proposition knowledge, it is a philosophical-salad of mixed views by various philosophers that is not reality per se.

It can generally be used to refer to some or all of the following:
1. The primary bearers of truth values (such as "true" and "false");
2. the objects of belief and other propositional attitudes (i.e. what is believed, doubted, etc.);
3. the referents of "that"-clauses (e.g. "It is true that the sky is blue" and "I believe that the sky is blue" both involve the proposition the sky is blue); and
4. the meanings of declarative sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

Note objections to 'propositions',
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositi ... opositions

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

According to Kant, the advantage and usefulness of logic is due to its recognized intrinsic limitations, i.e. logic relies of abstractions of reality.
Thus whatever is claimed using logic, the claims are always limited and fall short of what is reality.

And there are many types of logic ranging from classical, modern, deviant, fuzzy to paraconsistent logic where none can claim absolute superiority.
As such whatever is claimed must be qualified to the above types of logic.

[Terrapin Station]

And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

Russell admitted 'knowledge by acquaintance' has critical limitations.

What would you say your comment has to do with the clarification comment I had made?

[Skepdick]

What would you say your comment has to do with the clarification comment I had made?

Do you not understand or is your question rhetorical?

[Peter Holmes]

And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

It follows that claims about kinds of knowledge - such as the acquaintance/description distinction, and the distinction of 'how-to' knowledge - are always-already down the rabbit hole. And the expressions 'propositional knowledge' and 'propositional belief' are nice examples of how deep the confusion goes. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions - which are themselves nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions. The absurdity of talk about 'assertional knowledge' would expose how muddled 'propositional knowledge' really is as an idea.

Propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. The so-called logical form of a declarative is just another declarative - a linguistic expression - in a special code. And propositions have grammatical subjects and predicates, and some but not all have factual truth-value - so they're nothing more than declaratives: such-and-such is the case - as Wittgenstein put it.

As for logic, the idea that it's 'a subset of thinking' demonstrates the extraordinary power of the myth of propositions: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Logic deals with linguistic expressions - the clue's in the name - what can be said consistently, without contradiction. The delusion that logic deals with thought on the one hand, or on the other reality, shows the depth of our bewitchment by the devices of our language.

[Terrapin Station]

And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

It follows that claims about kinds of knowledge - such as the acquaintance/description distinction, and the distinction of 'how-to' knowledge - are always-already down the rabbit hole. And the expressions 'propositional knowledge' and 'propositional belief' are nice examples of how deep the confusion goes. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions - which are themselves nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions. The absurdity of talk about 'assertional knowledge' would expose how muddled 'propositional knowledge' really is as an idea.

Propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. The so-called logical form of a declarative is just another declarative - a linguistic expression - in a special code. And propositions have grammatical subjects and predicates, and some but not all have factual truth-value - so they're nothing more than declaratives: such-and-such is the case - as Wittgenstein put it.

As for logic, the idea that it's 'a subset of thinking' demonstrates the extraordinary power of the myth of propositions: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Logic deals with linguistic expressions - the clue's in the name - what can be said consistently, without contradiction. The delusion that logic deals with thought on the one hand, or on the other reality, shows the depth of our bewitchment by the devices of our language.

On my view, propositions and logic are both ways that we think, and they're only ways that we think--propositional thinking being meanings we assign to certain sorts of sentences, and logical thinking being generalized thinking about the implications of relations (and then extrapolations about those sorts of relations). Again, they're just ways that we think. Would you say that that view is problematic?

[Skepdick]

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

Is it a delusion or is it a way from protecting your religion from the question "How do you know reality has any features?"

This question has nothing to do with abstractions. It has everything to do with the lack of a "sound and valid argument" to justify the conclusion that reality has features.

What did you start with to get there?

Apparently that's what matters in philosophy. Your words. Not mine.

[Peter Holmes]

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)



Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

It follows that claims about kinds of knowledge - such as the acquaintance/description distinction, and the distinction of 'how-to' knowledge - are always-already down the rabbit hole. And the expressions 'propositional knowledge' and 'propositional belief' are nice examples of how deep the confusion goes. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions - which are themselves nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions. The absurdity of talk about 'assertional knowledge' would expose how muddled 'propositional knowledge' really is as an idea.

Propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. The so-called logical form of a declarative is just another declarative - a linguistic expression - in a special code. And propositions have grammatical subjects and predicates, and some but not all have factual truth-value - so they're nothing more than declaratives: such-and-such is the case - as Wittgenstein put it.

As for logic, the idea that it's 'a subset of thinking' demonstrates the extraordinary power of the myth of propositions: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Logic deals with linguistic expressions - the clue's in the name - what can be said consistently, without contradiction. The delusion that logic deals with thought on the one hand, or on the other reality, shows the depth of our bewitchment by the devices of our language.

On my view, propositions and logic are both ways that we think, and they're only ways that we think--propositional thinking being meanings we assign to certain sorts of sentences, and logical thinking being generalized thinking about the implications of relations (and then extrapolations about those sorts of relations). Again, they're just ways that we think. Would you say that that view is problematic?

I reckon that as long as we remember that 'ways of putting it' - such as talk about minds and mental things and events - are just that - and that the meanings of words can only be in the ways we use them - there should be few conceptual problems.

But I think a sharp distinction between features of reality, what we believe and know about them, and what we say about them is methodologically essential - for example, in clarifying what we call truth, facts and objectivity - and showing why there can be no moral facts.

[Skepdick]

I reckon that as long as we remember that 'ways of putting it' - such as talk about minds and mental things and events - are just that - and that the meanings of words can only be in the ways we use them - there should be few conceptual problems.

The way we use them depends on why we use them.

But I think a sharp distinction between features of reality, what we believe and know about them, and what we say about them is methodologically essential - for example, in clarifying what we call truth, facts and objectivity - and showing why there can be no moral facts.

Do you believe or know that reality has features?

Why?

[Veritas Aequitas]

But I think a sharp distinction between
features of reality,
what we believe and
know about them,
and what we say about them
is methodologically essential
- for example, in clarifying what we call truth, facts and objectivity
- and showing why there can be no moral facts.

You are begging the question,
you assumed there are pre-existing feature of reality without proofs and justifications they exists as real,
then
go about talking about believing, knowing and saying about them.

As me and Skeptic has asked [perhaps from different perspectives],
how do you demonstrate that feature of reality exists as really-real?

If you think moral facts are to be like your assumed features-of-reality, then such moral facts do not exists as real, so as your assumed features-of-reality as facts also do not exists are real.

Before you denounced moral facts [whatever is your interpretation] you have to prove and demonstrate your features-of-reality, i.e. facts exist in the first place?

Point is you are relying on elements of bastardized philosophies [the genre of logical positivism, analytic philosophy] that are taking you no where.

My philosophical stance [empirical realism] of what are moral facts [realities] is totally different from your view of 'what is fact' and what is reality. As such you are shooting blank bullets at me [in countering my views].

[Belinda]

The problem with "Philosophical Realism" [especially those of Analytic Philosophy] is that it is an ideology which is dogmatic, political, emotional and uncompromising. Look at how people like PantFlasher, Sculptor and PH [where unable to give sound arguments] go in a frenzy [due to dissonance] when the views of others do not reconcile with their ideological thoughts.

In philosophy-proper what is more relevant is, whether whatever the view, the question is whether it is realistic/pragmatic or not?
This is why we need to fall back of various credible FSKs which is a produce of reasoning and critical thinking plus wisdom.

Philosophical realism is as you say. However when a scientist tries to explain an event he needs to use language that implies there is real truth to be discovered.

Science is leveraged on empirical evidences and induction.
Science starts with an abductive hypothesis which is based on empirical evidence and used induction to arrive at its scientific truth which is not the real truth but a truth relative to the scientific FSK.

However within the scientific FSK, science merely ASSUMES there are real things to be discovered. Whether these ASSUMED real things are independent of humans is debatable within scientists; whatever it is, it is ultimately ASSUMED.
Science, without empirical evidences, would not be that dogmatic [like the ideological philosophical realism] in insisting there are really real things categorically and independent of its FSK.

"However within the scientific FSK, science merely ASSUMES there are real things to be discovered." wrote Veritas Aequitas. If he were to lose the "merely" then I'd agree. All men's activities , barring one presumption of some daft metaphysicians*** , are accompanied by some attitude.

*** I refer to the attitude, common to some metaphysics language, that it is possible for an exploring and curious mind to float around reality as if it were disembodied and purified of all subjectivity.