What are the Benefits of Theism?

[Skepdick]

I can't put to the test my 'belief' about what sorts of ontological substances exist, but I can put to the test my 'belief' about gravity. I can explain neither. There you have the advantage of me as you can explain gravity in a selection of ways.

Empirical beliefs can have explanations :ontological beliefs can't be explained. Does this draw a line between that turtle we stand upon, and all the other turtles?

Aye, we are on the same page. Ontological beliefs ARE explanations. They are beliefs ABOUT ontology, but they are NOT ontology.

My point is trivially that Gravity is just a word. You can't prove or observe gravity, you can only observe the consequences of Gravity.
In this regard Gravity no different to the Christian God.

[tillingborn]

I still haven't said that I think any theory is right

Yes, but you implied that people work towards determining whether theories are right or wrong.

No, you inferred it.

Which implies that a theory that is not right today could be right tomorrow.

Which is what I implied here:

Beyond the capabilities of current technology and off into the forever metaphysical, there are ideas about what causes gravity that are compatible with all of the data: spacetime topology, gravitons, quantum loops, strings etc.

First you infer something I didn't imply, then you fail to infer something I did imply. Communication is sometimes difficult, but it is a two way thing and I try my best to be clear. If you keep insisting that I mean something I have told you I don't mean, unless that gives you some worthwhile experience, you are wasting your time.

So I will rephrase my question: Do you believe in "forces"?

It's the same argument. I think it is simpler to say I know that forces exist, because they are measurable.

[tillingborn]

Tillingborn in effect is saying he is a physicalist(materialist).

I'm actually saying that whether one is a materialist or idealist is determined by how much you like one or other idea, because all the available evidence can support either belief.

[Skepdick]

No, you inferred it.

I inferred it from your implication.

Beyond the capabilities of current technology and off into the forever metaphysical, there are ideas about what causes gravity that are compatible with all of the data: spacetime topology, gravitons, quantum loops, strings etc.

Yes. For the 1000th time now.

Any available theories TODAY are compatible with all of the data available TODAY.
Any available theories TOMORROW may or may not be compatible with all of the data available TOMORROW.

So when you are talking about "ALL of the data" you are being vague to the point of obscurantism. All of the data WHEN?

Last year? Today? Tomorrow?

First you infer something I didn't imply, then you fail to infer something I did imply. Communication is sometimes difficult, but it is a two way thing and I try my best to be clear.

It's most definitely you. You suck at communicating.

I am happy to discuss the mathematical theory of communication with you, and unpack all the nitty gritty details of forward error correction.

If you keep insisting that I mean something I have told you I don't mean

I am not insisting anything of that sort. I am trying to understand what it was THAT you meant in using the adjectives "right" and "wrong" when speaking about a scientific theory.

And you did use those adjectives to qualify a scientific theory. Or are you going to deny that also?

It's the same argument. I think it is simpler to say I know that forces exist, because they are measurable.

Well, I'll be damned! You do know something that I don't. You know how to measure forces. Please tell me how.

Because I only know how to measure the consequences/effects of forces.

[Skepdick]

Tillingborn in effect is saying he is a physicalist(materialist).

I'm actually saying that whether one is a materialist or idealist is determined by how much you like one or other idea, because all the available evidence can support either belief.

If all the available evidence can support ALL beliefs, then surely that is clear evidence for believing in the undecidability?

Where does it say that you have to believe in one? Why can't you believe in all?

[tillingborn]

No, you inferred it.

I inferred it from your implication.

Which is what I implied here:

You can infer whatever you like from anything that anyone writes or says. If you refuse to accept them at their word when they tell you that your inference is not what was implied, all conversation on that point is pantomime. That you can believe what you like is precisely my point.

[Skepdick]

You can infer whatever you like from anything that anyone writes or says.

Yes I can. AT A POINT IN TIME

But then FUTURE DATA agrees with my PAST INFERENCE.

If you refuse to accept them at their word when they tell you that your inference is not what was implied, all conversation on that point is pantomime.

Idiot. I am NOT refusing to accept what you think I am refusing to accept. You only believe that I am refusing to accept it. You keep preaching this exact point (choosing your belief given the evidence) but then you don't navigate around it in practice! Why? That's how confirmation bias works.

What I am refusing to accept is that your words DIDN'T carry an implication. ANY implication.

And so what you are doing right now amounts to you falsifying my last remaining theory of "What was Tillingborn trying to imply when using the words right and wrong in relation to scientific theories?"

You are shooting my theory down (because it's wrong) AND you are refusing to give me an alternative/correct theory.

So you know what a scientist does? He keeps his theory! A wrong theory is better than no-theory.

So if your actual goal is to get me to reject my current theory you have to offer me a new theory. And you aren't doing that! All you are doing is you insist that I reject my current theory (which I am NOT going to do, until I have an alternative).

So here I go again, asking (probably in vein) for you to help me synthesise a new "theory of meaning" (since apparently my current theory is wrong).
If my current theory is wrong (and you keep insisting that it is), then TELL ME what did you mean by the adjectives "right" and "wrong" in relation to scientific theories?

That you can believe what you like is precisely my point.

You express it poorly, but you sure exemplify it.

[Skepdick]

Beyond the capabilities of current technology and off into the forever metaphysical, there are ideas about what causes gravity that are compatible with all of the data: spacetime topology, gravitons, quantum loops, strings etc.

Yes. For the 1000th time now.

Any available theories TODAY are compatible with all of the data available TODAY.
Any available theories TOMORROW may or may not be compatible with all of the data available TOMORROW.

So when you are talking about "ALL of the data" you are being vague to the point of obscurantism. All of the data WHEN?

First you infer something I didn't imply, then you fail to infer something I did imply. Communication is sometimes difficult, but it is a two way thing and I try my best to be clear.

It's most definitely you. You suck at communicating.

I am happy to discuss the mathematical theory of communication with you, and unpack all the nitty gritty details of forward error correction.

If you keep insisting that I mean something I have told you I don't mean

I am not insisting anything of that sort. I am trying to understand what it was THAT you used the adjectives "right" and "wrong" when speaking about a scientific theory.

And you did use those adjectives to qualify a scientific theory. Or are you going to deny that also?

It's the same argument. I think it is simpler to say I know that forces exist, because they are measurable.

Well, I'll be damned! You do know something that I don't. You know how to measure forces. Please tell me how.

Because I only know how to measure the consequences/effects of forces.

[Immanuel Can]

Here is what I have said:

There isn't one piece of evidence I know of that is specific to one idea, and one idea only. All evidence, in my view, can be interpreted in different ways and used to support different ideas.

One piece of data, for example a falling apple, is compatible with Newton's Law, Modified Newtonian Dynamics and Loop Quantum Gravity. Another piece of data, for example the Mercury anomalies, falsifies Newton. Anyone who believes the Newton's Law of universal gravitation is true, is wrong, but you can believe any of the other theories of gravity which haven't been ruled out if you like.

"If you like..." And, of course, by following what you "like," i.e. the aesthetic, you are almost guaranteed to be wrong -- and will be right only by accident, if you are. That's the cost of abandoning better standards.

But you don't believe what you're saying. I can tell, because you insist my view is not correct, or sometimes doesn't represent quite what you said, or is not as good as yours. But you and I cannot even debate the merely "aesthetic." "I like," and "you like" are not intelligible terms of debate. You are free to "like" anything you wish, because in the aesthetic there are no fixed criteria. There is only personal taste. And in that realm, I can no more be wrong for holding my view, or representing the "data" of your remarks, in any way I "like," than you can be wrong for liking vanilla ice cream while I like chocolate. In the merely aesthetic, there is no advantage in difference, or in precision, or whatever. And there is no such thing as "false" liking, nor any such thing as an unjust or unwarranted interpretation of the available data. There is only the feeling of "liking."

Yet you continue to debate.

If you don't believe your own theory. Why should I?

[tillingborn]

"If you like..." And, of course, by following what you "like," i.e. the aesthetic, you are almost guaranteed to be wrong -- and will be right only by accident, if you are. That's the cost of abandoning better standards.

I really am not suggesting that we abandon better standards for belief, instead I am arguing that even the most exacting standards of data collection and analysis are not guaranteed to lead to a belief that is right. I don't know if you have been following the exchanges between Skepdick and myself, but in those, using the example of gravity, I have tried to explain that I don't think 'belief' really describes how I think about apples falling. I think it can be fairly said that I know that apples fall. I think I can similarly say that I know that something makes apples fall, and whatever that something is, we call gravity. We can measure the mass and acceleration of falling apples and model the collected data mathematically. I don't think it is controversial to say I know that much either, because the "better standards" of theory development tell me as much. Up to this point, I completely agree with you. Beyond this point is where I think we differ. My belief is that there is no way to distinguish between some theories using the better standards. For instance, I don't think any standards can distinguish between materialism, dualism or idealism. In contemporary science, there are different ways to interpret the double slit experiment. Anyone can look at the results of experiments and know what happens, and there are any numbers of ways to interpret those results: many worlds, hidden variables and so on. My point in this example would be that anybody who believes one of the alternative hypotheses can appeal to the better standards, but those exact standards can support other theories precisely as well. Therefore, if someone has such a belief, it is not ultimately because of the better standards. Literally, they believe what they like.

[Skepdick]

I really am not suggesting that we abandon better standards for belief, instead I am arguing that even the most exacting standards of data collection and analysis are not guaranteed to lead to a belief that is right.

That's because the problem is not with the standards for data collection and analysis.

The problem is with the very thing I've been nagging you for hours.

What do you think it means for a scientific theory to be "right" ? And if you have absolutely no idea what it would mean then how could you possibly use "rightness" as a selection criterion for the quality of theories?

Beyond this point is where I think we differ. My belief is that there is no way to distinguish between some theories using the better standards.

Certainly, if there's nothing better than "aesthetics" to break the deadlock then that's what we'll use to select from "otherwise-equivalent options",
but if there's something better than aesthetics, even if it's marginal, then we should use THAT.

For instance, I don't think any standards can distinguish between materialism, dualism or idealism.

That's because those aren't scientific theories. They are philosophical/metaphysical theories. Philosophical theories make no testable predictions and they are not empirically falsifiable.

They are not even wrong.

But, that's just the other side of the same coin.. You can't tell me what it would mean for a scientific theory to be "right", and Philosophers can't tell us what it would mean for a philosophical theory to be "wrong".

[Immanuel Can]

I am arguing that even the most exacting standards of data collection and analysis are not guaranteed to lead to a belief that is right.

I don't know why you'd be arguing that.

After all, a broken clock is right twice a day...but it's totally by accident. Likewise, somebody could stumble on a true belief by aesthetics...but it's not a sensible way to do business, nor likely to produce truth.

Anyway, you don't believe in "right" answers...only "aesthetic" ones.

I don't know if you have been following the exchanges between Skepdick and myself,

Not really.

My belief is that there is no way to distinguish between some theories using the better standards.

Yeah, that's not true.

Anyone can look at the results of experiments and know what happens, and there are any numbers of ways to interpret those results: many worlds, hidden variables and so on.

There are different ways to interpret the variables. Not all of those ways are equally sensible. One may, if you wish to be aesthetic, interpret that experiment as evidence for phrenology or unicorns. But I think that neither of us is going to be willing to say that those interpretations are warranted by the data, or that somebody who takes them is in an equal situation with somebody who takes a rational interpretation.

Meanwhile, you do continue to argue for aesthetics. But that is impossible: if your own argument is aesthetic, it cannot be compelled by reasons. One cannot argue for that which has no objective criteria, and is only a matter of "liking."

I marvel that your last response doesn't address that fact. It seems to me decisive.

[tillingborn]

Anyway, you don't believe in "right" answers...only "aesthetic" ones.

The irony is that I have made it clear on several occasions that isn't true, most recently in the opening line of my previous post, the one to which you have responded:

I really am not suggesting that we abandon better standards for belief

I goes to show that people can believe things they like, even when it is demonstrably untrue. Frankly, you are making my case for me.

My belief is that there is no way to distinguish between some theories using the better standards.

Yeah, that's not true.

It is true. Again, there is no way to distinguish between idealism and materialism.

There are different ways to interpret the variables. Not all of those ways are equally sensible. One may, if you wish to be aesthetic, interpret that experiment as evidence for phrenology or unicorns. But I think that neither of us is going to be willing to say that those interpretations are warranted by the data, or that somebody who takes them is in an equal situation with somebody who takes a rational interpretation.

You don't have to think that, you should know it, because I have already said that up to point where there are better standards we are in complete agreement.

Meanwhile, you do continue to argue for aesthetics. But that is impossible: if your own argument is aesthetic, it cannot be compelled by reasons. One cannot argue for that which has no objective criteria, and is only a matter of "liking."

In essence, that is the Wittgensteinian whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent. It puts you into bed with the logical positivists. I don't think you would be comfortable there.

I marvel that your last response doesn't address that fact. It seems to me decisive.

One of the things that undermined logical positivism was its reliance on the verification principle. Loosely put, it means that any sentence that isn't empirically verifiable is meaningless. The flaw being that that sentence isn't empirically verifiable. What you call "that fact" simply isn't a fact.

[Immanuel Can]

Anyway, you don't believe in "right" answers...only "aesthetic" ones.

The irony is that I have made it clear on several occasions that isn't true, most recently in the opening line of my previous post,

Funny, you object to having your decision-making process characterized exactly the way you characterize everybody else's.

And then you go on, and try to give reasons why people make decisions aesthetically. But there are no reasons for aesthetic decisions.

Honestly, you seem so mixed up you don't know what you're advocating.

there is no way to distinguish between idealism and materialism.

Funny that we have two words for them, and other people think we can define them, and you just used both of those terms.

Meanwhile, you do continue to argue for aesthetics. But that is impossible: if your own argument is aesthetic, it cannot be compelled by reasons. One cannot argue for that which has no objective criteria, and is only a matter of "liking."

In essence, that is the Wittgensteinian whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.

No, that is the horse-manure we can speak, when we should have stayed silent.

[Belinda]

Tillingborn in effect is saying he is a physicalist(materialist).

I'm actually saying that whether one is a materialist or idealist is determined by how much you like one or other idea, because all the available evidence can support either belief.

If all the available evidence can support ALL beliefs, then surely that is clear evidence for believing in the undecidability?

Where does it say that you have to believe in one? Why can't you believe in all?

There is practical advantage in neutral monism(supports science), and practical disadvantage in Cartesian dualism(cruel to animals).