finding the best philosophy

[Advocate]

There are two reasons a philosophy is considered insufficient; it's insufficiency, or the insufficiency of the judge.

[Impenitent]

ignorance is bliss...

-Imp

[Terrapin Station]

Here's something that actual philosophers almost never talk about: "a philosophy."

"A philosophy" comes from colloquial misconceptions about what philosophy is.

[Advocate]

[quote="Terrapin Station" post_id=494738 time=1612624781 user_id=12582]
Here's something that actual philosophers almost never talk about: "[i][b]a[/b][/i] philosophy."

"A philosophy" comes from colloquial misconceptions about what philosophy is.
[/quote]

Science is used to refer both to the method and the body of knowledge thereby obtained. Why should the word philosophy not be used likewise?

A philosophy is a set of understandings within the larger set known as philosophy generally. It's also legit to say someone has their own truth, which simply means they're an embodied being with a unique perspective.

[Terrapin Station]

A philosophy is a set of understandings within the larger set known as philosophy generally.

It's just that no one actually calls that "a philosophy." They instead say things like "Kuhn's philosophy of science" or "Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion" or "Transcendental idealism posits that such and such" or whatever.

It's also legit to say someone has their own truth

No philosopher actually says that, either, even if they're subjectivists on truth (as I am, for example).

[Skepdick]

A philosophy is a set of understandings within the larger set known as philosophy generally.

It's just that no one actually calls that "a philosophy." They instead say things like "Kuhn's philosophy of science" or "Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion" or "Transcendental idealism posits that such and such" or whatever.

It's also legit to say someone has their own truth

No philosopher actually says that, either, even if they're subjectivists on truth (as I am, for example).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman

If it takes just one philosopher to say it, then I'd gladly call myself a philosopher and I'd gladly say the things you say that no philosopher says.

[Advocate]

>...even if they're subjectivists on truth (as I am, for example).

In what sense?

[Terrapin Station]

>...even if they're subjectivists on truth (as I am, for example).

In what sense?

In what sense am I a subjectivist on truth? If that's what you're asking, here's what that amounts to:

It's a conventional view in analytic philosophy, at least, that truth value is a "property of propositions." I agree with that view.

It's also a conventional view in analytic philosophy that propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences. I agree with this, too.

And a conventional definition of the objective/subjective distinction is that it has to do with whether something occurs in the person (or more specifically the mind)-independent world (that's the objective side) or whether it occurs only with persons (or only "in" minds) (that's the subjective side). This is the distinction I use, too.

So, more unusually on my part:
(a) I believe that meanings are something that only occur mentally. This has an upshot that propositions are mental phenomena, since propositions are meanings.
(b) I believe that the property of propositions that amounts to truth value is that individuals are making judgments about the relation of propositions to other things (such as facts in the world, or consensuses, or consistency with other propositions, etc.--the difference hinges on just what truth theory someone is using--personally I use correspondence).
(c) judgments are also mental phenomena. So truth value is a mental activity. Hence, per the conventional definition of objective/subjective, truth value is subjective.

[Skepdick]

In what sense am I a subjectivist on truth? If that's what you're asking, here's what that amounts to:

It's a conventional view in analytic philosophy, at least, that truth value is a "property of propositions." I agree with that view.

It's also a conventional view in analytic philosophy that propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences. I agree with this, too.

It's also a conventional view (since Quine's two Dogmas of Empiricism) that the notion of analyticity is circular.

And a conventional definition of the objective/subjective distinction is that it has to do with whether something occurs in the person (or more specifically the mind)-independent world (that's the objective side) or whether it occurs only with persons (or only "in" minds) (that's the subjective side). This is the distinction I use, too.

And it's conventionally understood by philosophers that conventions are bandwagon fallacies.

So, more unusually on my part:
(a) I believe that meanings are something that only occur mentally. This has an upshot that propositions are mental phenomena, since propositions are meanings.
(b) I believe that the property of propositions that amounts to truth value is that individuals are making judgments about the relation of propositions to other things (such as facts in the world, or consensuses, or consistency with other propositions, etc.--the difference hinges on just what truth theory someone is using--personally I use correspondence).
(c) judgments are also mental phenomena. So truth value is a mental activity. Hence, per the conventional definition of objective/subjective, truth value is subjective.

Is it not peculiar that absolutely everything you call a "meaningful proposition" could be trivially re-stated as a yes/no question.

Which certainly tells us that there are such things are meaningful questions, but does it imply that there could also be meaningless questions?

What is a meaningless question?
How does it differ from a meaningful question?

Those sure seem like good questions...