Is morality objective or subjective?

[bahman]

Bodies - including the bodies of single-cell organisms - are substances with the ability to experience and cause.

If any single cell experiences then why do you have a single coherent experience?

So your description doesn't distinguish minds from bodies.

The body is physical and subject to change therefore there is a mind involved in this change.

And, as usual, 'the mind ... does not have a location'. A bit like a god? Pure, unevidenced, mystical twaddle.

There is a fact for it, the mind is not due to the body.

And your answers are incoherent.

Did you change your mind? Now you say that each cell, experiences, and causes. So change, experience and causation are not transcendent?

No, I'm saying your syllogism supposedly demonstrating the necessity of 'mind' uses those words in a metaphysical way. And I said even single-cell organisms experience and cause, so your description of mind fails to differentiate mind from body. Please read carefully.

I also mean a physical change when I talk about a change. And again, why do you have a single coherent experience if all cells in your body experience?

[Peter Holmes]

If any single cell experiences then why do you have a single coherent experience?


The body is physical and subject to change therefore there is a mind involved in this change.


There is a fact for it, the mind is not due to the body.


Did you change your mind? Now you say that each cell, experiences, and causes. So change, experience and causation are not transcendent?

No, I'm saying your syllogism supposedly demonstrating the necessity of 'mind' uses those words in a metaphysical way. And I said even single-cell organisms experience and cause, so your description of mind fails to differentiate mind from body. Please read carefully.

I also mean a physical change when I talk about a change. And again, why do you have a single coherent experience if all cells in your body experience?

I don't think, and didn't say, that all cells in a body 'experience'. I said even a single-cell organism - the simplest kind of 'body', experiences and causes things.

If you're trying to argue that only a mind can have a single, coherent experience - so that 'having an experience' means 'having a mind' - do you think a single-cell organism has a mind? Or do you think it is a mind, in the way you think that humans are minds?

But - this is really beside the point. Your claim is that the existence of change necessitates the existence of minds. And I think that claim is ridiculous.

[Skepdick]

And I said even single-cell organisms experience and cause, so your description of mind fails to differentiate mind from body. Please read carefully.

But we aren't talking about single-cell organisms. We are talking about multi-cellular, complex organisms.

So, do you, Peter Holmes, correspond in your entirety to your body?

Are you still Peter Holmes if you lost a toe?
Are you still Peter Holmes if you lost your legs?
Are you still Peter Holmes if you got an artificial heart, lungs and kidneys?
Are you still Peter Holmes if you lost parts of your brain?

What are the necessary conditions for "Peter Holmes" to exist?

That's the mind.

[Terrapin Station]

It is very related.

Then you'd need to flesh it out so that it follows from a set of premises.

So I repeat myself. I was basically trying to say that the brain cannot be conscious: "The brain is a substance that carries information. Information is only a formation in a substance. You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information.".

Lol --repeating yourself doesn't help. "You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information" doesn't follow from the sentences that precede it.

[Atla]

So you are talking about block universe. Is everything in this universe is decided or it is open? What is the use of consciousness in the decided block universe?

What makes you think that consciousness should have such a use?

[bahman]

No, I'm saying your syllogism supposedly demonstrating the necessity of 'mind' uses those words in a metaphysical way. And I said even single-cell organisms experience and cause, so your description of mind fails to differentiate mind from body. Please read carefully.

I also mean a physical change when I talk about a change. And again, why do you have a single coherent experience if all cells in your body experience?

I don't think, and didn't say, that all cells in a body 'experience'. I said even a single-cell organism - the simplest kind of 'body', experiences and causes things.

Then why do you say single-cell organism?

If you're trying to argue that only a mind can have a single, coherent experience - so that 'having an experience' means 'having a mind' - do you think a single-cell organism has a mind?

How about the smaller size? Electron for example? The reality is that there is no electron. What is there is simply information so-called wave function. The wave function takes a form when it is disturbed by the mind.

Or do you think it is a mind, in the way you think that humans are minds?

Human is mind and body. I think there are at least two minds in charge of controlling a human body, the so-called conscious and subconscious mind. The subject of experience and activity is different in these two minds.

But - this is really beside the point. Your claim is that the existence of change necessitates the existence of minds. And I think that claim is ridiculous.

No, that is a serious argument bounded to physics. It is the base of metaphysics. We are interacting minds.

[bahman]

Then you'd need to flesh it out so that it follows from a set of premises.

So I repeat myself. I was basically trying to say that the brain cannot be conscious: "The brain is a substance that carries information. Information is only a formation in a substance. You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information.".

Lol --repeating yourself doesn't help. "You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information" doesn't follow from the sentences that precede it.

There is no emergence my friend. We discussed it in another thread. The behavior of the whole is a function of the properties of parts. The wave function is believed to be unconscious. You cannot possibly have consciousness out of something where its parts do not have consciousness as a property.

[bahman]

So you are talking about block universe. Is everything in this universe is decided or it is open? What is the use of consciousness in the decided block universe?

What makes you think that consciousness should have such a use?

You cannot deny consciousness. It affects what we experience too. Our experiences change since there is causation after the experience. You can even experience a decision in such a reality. The point is there is a fantastic correlation between what you experience, the decision you make, and then causation. There is a mind that experiences and causes. What is "you" in your opinion?

[Terrapin Station]

So I repeat myself. I was basically trying to say that the brain cannot be conscious: "The brain is a substance that carries information. Information is only a formation in a substance. You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information.".

Lol --repeating yourself doesn't help. "You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information" doesn't follow from the sentences that precede it.

There is no emergence my friend. We discussed it in another thread. The behavior of the whole is a function of the properties of parts. The wave function is believed to be unconscious. You cannot possibly have consciousness out of something where its parts do not have consciousness as a property.

What you wrote above has nothing to do with emergence. And how many times do I have to explain to you that I'm not saying anything about emergence?

At any rate, do either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation have the same properties as when an electron is orbiting a proton?

[bahman]

Lol --repeating yourself doesn't help. "You cannot therefore have consciousness because of the flows of information" doesn't follow from the sentences that precede it.

There is no emergence my friend. We discussed it in another thread. The behavior of the whole is a function of the properties of parts. The wave function is believed to be unconscious. You cannot possibly have consciousness out of something where its parts do not have consciousness as a property.

What you wrote above has nothing to do with emergence. And how many times do I have to explain to you that I'm not saying anything about emergence?

What I describe is the strong emergence.

At any rate, do either an electron in isolation or a proton in isolation have the same properties as when an electron is orbiting a proton?

They are different. Electron for example has a different probability distribution.

[Terrapin Station]

They are different. Electron for example has a different probability distribution.

Right, so "complexes" of substances, relations and processes have different properties than the parts that comprise the complexes.

[bahman]

They are different. Electron for example has a different probability distribution.

Right, so "complexes" of substances, relations and processes have different properties than the parts that comprise the complexes.

The point is that the properties of the whole are the functions of the properties of parts. In fact, in both above-mentioned cases, you could obtain the probability distribution theoretically which matches with what you observe.

[Terrapin Station]

They are different. Electron for example has a different probability distribution.

Right, so "complexes" of substances, relations and processes have different properties than the parts that comprise the complexes.

The point is that the properties of the whole are the functions of the properties of parts. In fact, in both above-mentioned cases, you could obtain the probability distribution theoretically which matches with what you observe.

"Functions of the properties of parts" is fine, as long as we remember that relations and processes are parts. It's just that the properties of the whole aren't the same as properties of parts in isolation, or in different contexts. Hence why large sections of brains are the wholes necessary for consciousness, but those mental properties are not found in isolation, or in different contexts, when we're talking about the materials, relations and processes that comprise brains. As far as we know, it has to be those particular materials, in those particular relations, undergoing those particular processes. There's no good reason yet to believe that the mental properties in question occur in any other materials/relations/processes.

[Terrapin Station]

1. Facts of reality - all-there-is are justified by its respective FSK.
2. FSKs are constructed by humans.
3. Therefore facts cannot be independent of the FSK and humans.

That's just the old conflation of how we know something with what we know.

Facts do not hinge on justifications. Facts are ontic. Justifications are epistemic. The only facts that require epistemology are facts about what particular people know, how they know it/how they justify it, etc. And the only facts that require talking about minds are facts about psychologies/psychological phenomena. The two are a very, very small subset of facts.

Moral/ethical facts are only in the vein of "So and so has a disposition that m is morally permissible." "M is morally permissible" isn't a fact (unless it's clear from the context that it simply amounts to saying something like, "In conventional Christianity, m is morally permissible." Then that's a fact, if it's correct, about the conventional instantiation of Christianity. It would in no way imply that m is morally permissible, or even that it's a fact or true that m is morally permissible for Christians. The only fact would be that statistically and historically, a significant number of Christians feel (or have felt) that m is morally permissible.

[Skepdick]

Facts do not hinge on justifications. Facts are ontic.

Yes. That's what we SAY about facts, but they aren't really ontic.

Because everything that you deem ontological is at best epistemic.

Ontologies are subset of

Ontology is a subset of epistemology.