What is P and -P?

[Terrapin Station]

Again, the terms represent extramental and not-extramental (or mental if we have mental phenomena in our ontology).

This is not diifficult unless you're back to playing stupid.

I understand perfectly, is just that your metaphysic is completely incoherent.

Everything is physical.

Some physical things are real.

Some physical things are not real.

In the conventional meaning of those words, that's some... What do you call it? Bullshit.

As mentioned above, the only conventional "meaning" of those words intended is the philosophical convention where it's an extramental/not-extramental distinction.

Is it confusing or incoherent to you to say that some physical things are extramental and some are not (namely, they're mental, or a subset of brain states)?

We could use "Shpadoodle and Anti-Shpadoodle" instead of "Real/Anti-Real." They're just sets of letters.

[Skepdick]

You didn't by any chance used to chat on Undernet #philosophy, did you? Sometimes you remind me of JohnGuru from there. (And interestingly, the channel owner was known as Skept)

Nope. I hung out on Undernet, but I only took interest in philosophy 2 years ago.

[Terrapin Station]

You didn't by any chance used to chat on Undernet #philosophy, did you? Sometimes you remind me of JohnGuru from there. (And interestingly, the channel owner was known as Skept)

Nope. I hung out on Undernet, but I only took interest in philosophy 2 years ago.

Ah, okay . . . yeah, and this is going back a good 15-25 years. Undernet #philosophy ceased being very active by the later 2000s, unfortunately. The prime era was the later 90s. I started chatting there in late 1994.

[Skepdick]

As mentioned above, the only conventional meaning of those words intended is the philosophical convention where it's an extramental/not-extramental distinction.

Is it confusing or incoherent to you to say that some physical things are extramental and some are not (namely, they're mental, or a subset of brain states)?

OK, but how is this any different from Cartesian dualism?

It's the exact same distinction. You've still split everything into two categories. You've just put different labels on them.

[Terrapin Station]

The quotation marks were not there for use/mention purposes.

You can determine the purpose for which I use language without asking me?

Say what?? You made a comment about "picking out" "pointing" etc. I asked if you knew why I used quotation marks in what I wrote.

[Terrapin Station]

As mentioned above, the only conventional meaning of those words intended is the philosophical convention where it's an extramental/not-extramental distinction.

Is it confusing or incoherent to you to say that some physical things are extramental and some are not (namely, they're mental, or a subset of brain states)?

OK, but how is this any different from Cartesian dualism?

It's the exact same distinction. Bar the labels.

Cartesian dualism believes that mind is not physical, it's something fundamentally different than physical stuff. Physicalism doesn't believe this. As I mentioned to you earlier, this doesn't imply that physicalism thinks that there aren't shoes and cabbages, inside of refrigerators and outside of them, etc.

[Skepdick]

Cartesian dualism believes that mind is not physical,

Sure. Which produces an ontology with exactly as many categories as your distinction.

Cartesian dualists split the world up like this:

Category 1 (physical) (external to mind)
Category 2 (non-physical) (internal to mind)

Physicalist splits the world up like this:

Category 1 (real) (external to mind)
Category 2 (antireal) (internal to mind)

And when you populate these categories with particular instances of things, you end up with exactly the same mental state/world-views.

it's something fundamentally different than physical stuff.

Is that "different" literally different? Because your "same" was not literally the same.

Physicalism doesn't believe this. As I mentioned to you earlier, this doesn't imply that physicalism thinks that there aren't shoes and cabbages, inside of refrigerators and outside of them, etc.

Sure, but physicalism does imply that all different things are ultimately the same.

So we are back to my original question: why do you draw the distinctions that you draw?

[Skepdick]

Say what?? You made a comment about "picking out" "pointing" etc.

I didn't make that comment. You did.

The denotation of a term is what it "picks out" or "points to"--in other words, as we were discussing before, it's the referent of the term. In other words, if the term is "toaster,"

And in that sentence your use of "toaster" is you mentioning (but not using) the term "toaster".

The quotes around "picks out" and "points to" were precisely the anthropomorphism I was pointing to. You were describing what terms DO (even if just metaphorically).

Metaphor or not, terms DO nothing. You are nominalist - terms (which are nothing but abstract linguistic objects) are casually inert.

[Terrapin Station]

Category 1 (physical) (external to mind)
Category 2 (non-physical) (internal to mind)

Physicalist splits the world up like this:

Category 1 (real) (external to mind)
Category 2 (antireal) (internal to mind)

It's the same in that there's a mind/not-mind distinction. It's not the same in saying that mind and not mind are comprised of fundamentally different sorts of ontological stuff.

It's like saying that two distinctions are both saying that there's an inside of a refrigerator and an outside of a refrigerator. But if one side says that the inside of a refrigerator is not at all comprised as the same sort of stuff as the outside of the refrigerator, while the other side says that they are the same sort of stuff, there's a difference.

Is that "different" literally different?

Yes. Aren't you aware that Cartesian dualism is positing that mind is a fundamentally different sort of stuff than the rest of the world? Physicalism doesn't posit this.

Sure, but physicalism does imply that all different things are ultimately the same.

Only in that it says that everything is physical. (At which point we need to figure out just what someone has in mind by that, because there's not just one thing that everyone has in mind by it. For me, it's saying that everything is matter/properties/dynamic-relations-of-matter.) It doesn't amount to saying that things are the same aside from some aspect of their underlying ontological nature.

So we are back to my original question: why do you draw the distinctions that you draw?

Because obviously the inside of a refrigerator is different than the outside.

[Terrapin Station]

Say what?? You made a comment about "picking out" "pointing" etc.

I didn't make that comment. You did.

Oy vey. In other words, you made a comment about my comment.

The denotation of a term is what it "picks out" or "points to"--in other words, as we were discussing before, it's the referent of the term. In other words, if the term is "toaster,"

The quotes around "picks out" and "points to" were precisely the anthropomorphism I was pointing to. You were describing what terms DO (even if just metaphorically).

Metaphor or not, terms DO nothing. You are nominalist - terms (which are nothing but abstract linguistic objects) are casually inert.

The quotation marks are there in that case to denote an abbreviated "manner of speaking"--which means that, yes, we're not saying that the terms LITERALLY do that, it's a common way of speaking about what's really going on.

[Skepdick]

It's the same in that there's a mind/not-mind distinction. It's not the same in saying that mind and not mind are comprised of fundamentally different sorts of ontological stuff.

Obviously it's not the same. You are literally saying different things.

But there is absolutely no logical implication given the distinction. It's a distinction without a difference.

Sophistry.

It's like saying that two distinctions are both saying that there's an inside of a refrigerator and an outside of a refrigerator. But if one side says that the inside of a refrigerator is not at all comprised as the same sort of stuff as the outside of the refrigerator, while the other side says that they are the same sort of stuff, there's a difference.

It's nothing like that.

But it is exactly like saying If everything is physical then everything is fundamentally the same.

So how are the hell are you distinguishing between things which are fundamentally the same?

Yes. Aren't you aware that Cartesian dualism is positing that mind is a fundamentally different sort of stuff than the rest of the world? Physicalism doesn't posit this.

I am well aware of it. Which is precisely why I am asking you the question.

How are you drawing ANY distinctions between things which are FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME.

Only in that it says that everything is physical.

Great! And the logical implication of everything being physical is that everything is the same!

(At which point we need to figure out just what someone has in mind by that, because there's not just one thing that everyone has in mind by it. For me, it's saying that everything is matter/properties/dynamic-relations-of-matter.) It doesn't amount to saying that things are the same aside from some aspect of their underlying ontological nature.

It's really really really trivial to test this: How many categories are there in your ontology?

One, right? You are a physicalist. Or are you going to contradict yourself again?

Because obviously the inside of a refrigerator is different than the outside.

How is that possible?!? Everything is FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME!

[Skepdick]

The quotation marks are there in that case to denote an abbreviated "manner of speaking"--which means that, yes, we're not saying that the terms LITERALLY do that, it's a common way of speaking about what's really going on.

Then why don't you say what the terms actually DO?

Why are you using metaphorical language on a philosophy forum? Speak truth or shut up.

[Terrapin Station]

How are you drawing ANY distinctions between things which are FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME.

Look at it this way. It's commonly believed that both oxygen and carbon are comprised of electrons, protons, neutrons, as well as relations, forces, etc. between those particles (and if we wanted to we could talk about leptons, etc. instead).

Well, how are we making any distinctions between them if we're saying that they're composed of the same sort of stuff?

Does that stump you?

Can you stop playing stupid now?

We could keep it even simpler: you take a piece of PlayDoh. You make an airplane out of it, then you make coffee cup out of it. How can we possibly draw a distinction between the two since they're both made from PlayDoh! Curses! How could that possibly work? It's a stumper.

[Terrapin Station]

The quotation marks are there in that case to denote an abbreviated "manner of speaking"--which means that, yes, we're not saying that the terms LITERALLY do that, it's a common way of speaking about what's really going on.

Then why don't you say what the terms actually DO?

Why don't you stop playing stupid/acting like an Aspie? You keep asking stuff/asking me to explain stuff to you that I shouldn't need to explain if you're not retarded . . . although even that wouldn't be such a problem if you weren't so argumentative about it/weren't such an A-hole about it.

[Skepdick]

Look at it this way. It's commonly believed that both oxygen and carbon are comprised of electrons, protons, neutrons, as well as relations, forces, etc. between those particles (and if we wanted to we could talk about leptons, etc. instead).

Well, how are we making any distinctions between them if we're saying that they're composed of the same sort of stuff?

Does that stump you?

Can you stop playing stupid now?

That is precisely what stumps me!

You are discerning things which are, supposedly, fundamentally the same.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_ ... scernibles