What is P and -P?

[Skepdick]

A pet peeve of mine is people taking "physicalism" to be in any way subservient to, or a cheerleading section for, etc. physics. In my view there's a lot of garbage as conventional wisdom in the discipline of physics, including that there are so many mathematical platonists among physicists.

Do you get to be anything other than a platonist when the only way you can ever imagine/understand what a "quark" is and how it behaves; is via mathematics?

Perhaps you have some better way of representing such things.

"First language" conventionally refers to the language one spoke before all others.

Where I come from it conventionally means the language you speak most frequently; or the language you are most comfortable expressing yourself in.

I do not practice the language I spoke before all others - I have a hard time ordering a drink in it.

At any rate, computers are incapable of "doing" meaning. You're speaking metaphorically above, which is fine, but it's metaphorical.

OK. What experiment did you perform to distinguish the two cases? e.g being capable vs being incapable of "doing" meaning.

How much money would you put on that, and will we put it in escrow so I can definitely get the money if you're wrong?

The money is not a problem. I'll throw $500 your way.

Is just that... what criteria for "wrongness" do you have in mind?

Or to remain consistent with my phrasing... what experiment do you plan on performing to distinguish the four cases...

wrong from not-wrong; and understanding from not-understanding

Weird.

Equivalent outcomes of empirical experiments are "weird" to you?

No, they don't understand anything. They can produce the "same" results for arithmetic, sure. That doesn't imply understanding.

It doesn't imply non-understanding either.

You mean re energy occurring on its own? The task would be to make intelligible, to make some sense, of how that would be possible--just how it could obtain ontologically, etc.

What sort of empirical experiments did they teach you in the Philosophy school to distinguish the two case: something that obtains from something that doesn't?

[Skepdick]

By the way, if you believe that meaning is identical to syntax, why wouldn't you believe that the meaning of terms like "true," "physicalism," "coherent" etc. are identical to some expression of syntax

Because none of those things have anything to do with formal languages.

, so that if you then don't read that syntax correctly, you've gotten the meaning wrong?

That entirely depends on what you think it means to "get the meaning wrong".

If I give you the formal expression P = P and you evaluate it to True, but I evaluate it to False then we have interpreted the expressions differently.

Which interpretation is "wrong" ?

[Terrapin Station]

Do you get to be anything other than a platonist when the only way you can ever imagine/understand what a "quark" is and how it behaves; is via mathematics?

Perhaps you have some better way of representing such things.

So as you might be able to imagine if you'd thought about it a bit more, I have a problem with physics claims that are sourced purely in mathematics, where the simple fact that we are manipulating mathematical figures in some manner is taken to imply something about what the world is really like. That's especially the case where we wind up positing unique sorts of ontological entities as a result of this.

Where I come from it conventionally means the language you speak most frequently; or the language you are most comfortable expressing yourself in.

Reference for that usage?

OK. What experiment did you perform to distinguish the two cases? e.g being capable vs being incapable of "doing" meaning.

No experiment can literally show any mental activity. That's a problem with the way the sciences have been conceived.

The money is not a problem. I'll throw $500 your way.

Okay but it literally needs to be put in escrow so I can collect, and we need to be clear about the terms.

What sort of empirical experiments did they teach you in the Philosophy school to distinguish the two case: something that obtains from something that doesn't?

You're aware that philosophy isn't a science and isn't focused on experiments, right?

[Skepdick]

So as you might be able to imagine if you'd thought about it a bit more, I have a problem with physics claims that are sourced purely in mathematics, where the simple fact that we are manipulating mathematical figures in some manner is taken to imply something about what the world is really like. That's especially the case where we wind up positing unique sorts of ontological entities as a result of this.

They are not sourced "purely in mathematics".

Your regular sensory inputs don't function at the quark scale. There is no other way for you to experience, understand or examine what a "quark is really like"; there is no way to develop any intuition whatsoever except to understand the properties and behaviour of the equations which describe it given how it interacts with the measurement equipment.

That doesn't mean quarks are sourced "purely in mathematics" - it just means that in order to understand anything you have to go via mathematics.

If you have better ideas you might just earn yourself a Nobel prize, since the above is the very view of the guy who just won it.

Reference for that usage?

You are observing me use it. Call it direct evidence.

No experiment can literally show any mental activity. That's a problem with the way the sciences have been conceived.

I don't want you to show any mental activity. I just want you to design an experiment which can help us distinguish understanding from non-understanding.

I gave you my experiment design.

If I tell my coffee cup to turn on the lights - nothing happens. The coffee cup doesn't understand what I mean.
If I tell Alexa to turn on the lights - the lights come on. Alexa understands what I mean.

This is par for the course for physicalism, no? Any physical process (even minds) can be simulated by a universal computing device.

Alexa simulates at least some aspects of a physical mind.

Okay but it literally needs to be put in escrow so I can collect, and we need to be clear about the terms.

It's precisely because you can't clarify your terms is why we have a betting predicament in the first place.

You're aware that philosophy isn't a science and isn't focused on experiments, right?

You are aware that this is precisely why it's entirely vacuous, right? Experiments/experience/empiricism is all we got!

My science concerns with one problem in particular. Metalinguistic abstraction.

In computer science, metalinguistic abstraction is the process of solving complex problems by creating a new language or vocabulary to better understand the problem space.

What do Philosophers do?

[Terrapin Station]

They are not sourced "purely in mathematics".

Some things are, such as strings. I wasn't just talking about quarks. I made a general statement.

Reference for that usage?

You claimed conventional usage. One person doesn't make a convention.

I don't want you to show any mental activity. I just want you to design an experiment which can help us distinguish understanding from non-understanding.

Oy vey. Understanding IS a mental state. Behaviorism is nonsense.

This is par for the course for physicalism, no?

No.

Any physical process (even minds) can be simulated by a universal computing device.

I'm also a nominalist by the way.

It's precisely because you can't clarify your terms is why we have a betting predicament in the first place.

We'll do that, but what escrow service are you going to use first?

You are aware that this is precisely why it's entirely vacuous, right?

"Empirical experiments are necessary for any claim, otherwise the claim is vacuous" is a philosophical view. It's not a view supported by empirical experiments.

[Eodnhoj7]

If you're doing logic, you can't do that, though, or you're committing the fallacy of equivocation.

This regress results in variation, variation is definition. All phenomenon regress to different contexts, it is through this regress definition occurs.

"This regress"--what "regress"?

One context regresses to another until two seemingly equal things result in differences.

For example:

1. The cats lived in january.
2. The cats lived in the 3rd week of january.
3. The cats lived in the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.
4. One cat lived to the 3rd hour the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january, the other cat lived to the 2nd hour of the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.

[Eodnhoj7]

If (P=P)=(-P=-P) then P=-P through the law of identity which both P and -P share.

If (P=P)≠(-P=-P) then the law of identity is not equal to itself given both P and -P exist through the law of identity.

I think Terrapin gave some great examples of the problem when he used addition operation in place of your choice of the '=' within the brackets. You are confusing the meaning of the parts to the wholes and vice versa. The whole expression, "(P=P)=(-P=-P) means that the '=' sign between the two parts as wholes are LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT by the bolded versions of '=', not to whatever P or -P refers to. The truth of the bracketed '=' signs are what the unbolded '=' refers to. You are incorrectly presuming the '=' in both cases to mean the same. This is why most systems use alternate symbols when expressing this, such as....

(P = P) ≡ (-P = -P)

The ONLY concern for referencing the "Law of identity" with respect to logic, though, is to assert that for WHICHEVER system you are using or defining, SOMETHING has to remain 'consistent'. The law is the reference to WHATEVER 'consistency' is needed in ANY system. The other two universal laws are rephrasing this by different perspectives. For instance, the "Law of the Excluded Middle" refers to expressing what is 'not consistent' as one may define something in the given system by contrast:

P ≢ -P ...says that wherever P is assumed, -P cannot be assumed also.

That is, there has to be some rule(s) in any system of logic that discriminates between what it means for something to be 'inconsistent' so that the system can decide what to eliminate. If there is no elimination rule, then the system is not defined as 'logical' because it cannot be used to 'consistently' decide anything. You don't want a calculator, for instance, that has a 'logic' that has different answers for the same inputs, otherwise, it lacks any usefulness. [Well, perhaps one could use such a possible inconsistent machine, if it were possible, to find 'random' numbers. But this too still requires at least some meaning of 'consistency', such as the use of such a particular machine to be used 'consistently' to find random numbers.]

The third law of any 'logic' is just another extension of the other two that asserts one must decide whether to accept (or reject) contradictions in some 'consistent' manner. The last law defines what is 'inconsistent' with respect to the first law's defining of what is 'consistent'; then the third asserts that the first two rules in essence have to evaluate ONE of the two as what one expects of the system. In essence, if one wants to deny contradictions, then it says we toss out things that match to the second law. If you wanted a machine to favor 'inconsistency', like to find a machine that seeks random things, you might want such a mechanism to keep 'contradictions' as a means for an output.

Either way, the Law of Identity is not about the symbols specifically but to the agreement in the MEANING of the symbols you choose. You have to have something that is defining of "the same", something that clarifies "the difference", and whether you accept only one or both. Selecting both is the same as asserting that you accept contradictions for some practical purpose.

Note that selecting to keep contradiction is more about an 'open' system, such as what you might think of a sense organ to do: it doesn't necessarily require DENYING input because it is not the COMPLETE closed system of logic that the sense-to-brain-to-motor system of the whole deals with. So you can have a PARTIAL 'logic' system that is OPEN to accepting information without actually eliminating input values.

And I addressed the addition example, 1+3 and 2+2 are variations of the same thing. They are the same thing expressed in different ways. 1+3 and 2+2 equivocate through a third assertion of 4, yet they are not the same thing. Applying letters to the numbers, where each letter is a variable, observes the equations appearing differently as (a+c) and (b+b).


If the "=" symbol has multiple meanings then by default it is subject to equivocation. Simply being able to seperate one "=" from another, and replacing it with another symbol results in equivocation occuring. Dually to necessitate the symbols as subject to the meaning assigned necessitates logic as subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. If truth is derived from meaning and meaning is ground in the symbols assigned, multiple symbols for the same thing result in multiple meanings.


(P=P) = (-P=-P) observes both P and -P equivocate through the law of identity, both P and -P are subject to the law of identity as P=P and -P=-P. To say "P=P" is to say "P". To say "-P=-P" is to say -P. The law of identity is not seperate from P and -P respectively.

The law of identity is subject to the law of identity: (P=P)=(P=P) thus showing identity as merely repetition of symbols. Both P and -P equivocate through the law of identity thus necessitating P=-P because both share the same foundations.

An example of this can be shown in a glass half full of water and half empty, both the emptiness and water share the same form through the glass. They equivocate through a common median. It is the median which allows for equivocation.

You are ignoring the bolded and underlined.

[Eodnhoj7]

(blah blah blah)

Either way, the Law of Identity is not about the symbols specifically but to the agreement in the MEANING of the symbols you choose.

(blah blah blah)

Higher up in your post you pointed out that "=" can (and does) mean multiple things. So, you are recognising that one symbol can mean two things which is the definition of equivocation. Or the definition of "polymorphism" - depending on which camp of understanding you are in.

But you've pointed out the main reason why every logical system blows up. The tokenizer is the thing which assigns meaning to symbols, and in particular - the tokenizer assigns meaning to operators.

And if I simply come up with some new operation/operator (that is not representable/expressible in your current notation) ... well. Unexpected things happen.

Example: The LNC is often codified as ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False, but does ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False imply or necessitate P ∧ ¬P ⇔ False ? Could there be a system such that P ∧ ¬P ⇔ True but ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False ? Of course! Because nowhere in the LNC does it specify that the "∧" operator must commute.


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And I should hope to learn what it means for a mechanically realizable and realised logical system to be "inconsistent".

It's defined as "inconsistent" even though it's consistent with reality. So now what?

Totality is 'inconsistent' consistently in that it is not 'closed'.

As for symbol assignment, the laws of (all) logics are only about the meaning, not the particlar symbols they are FORCED to use when attempting to express anything.

Note that "inconsistency" means "inconsistency AND consistency" simultaneously of the same universe of discourse. A 'logic' addressing such would be "induction" as an example, to which science applies to. Our conscious existence is another example given we are a machine that is not 'complete'; contradictions are what MOTIVATES or redirects one towards some other direction. A 'closed' system simply rejects the contradiction. But an 'open' system (some define as 'informal logic') can be PARTIALLY closed with respect to a subset of its rules but permit non-closure, such as a command to act might represent when we use real human languages. For instance, normal propositional logic deals with closed sentences, where some particular grammar of human language uses but EXTENDS to open-ended communications, like, "Hey you, come here," can represent as being meaningful. The logic of such a sample command is open in that it the SATISFACTION of such an input statement is only 'closed' when you accept both the possiblity that the person one is asking to come to them OR doesn't come to them.

The difference relates to 'functions' versus 'relations'. We treat formal logics as 'functions' (one expected unique outcome per any set of inputs) versus, for example, a 'relation' that permits multiple outputs (any number more than one). You CAN define a partial or open system within a closed system but then would have to discretely separate the outputs such that the whole is a set of functions instead. We define a circle 'functionally' first in math as two functions combined. The top half, and the bottom half, when we use the Cartesian plane to define. The whole circle is no longer a 'function' yet still CLOSED in meaning by allowing for inclusion of 'relations' and not just 'functions'. As such, this shows a relative use of keeping those three universal laws to describe any system of reasoning, consistent or inconsistent. Notice that oddly here, 'functions', though 'complete' in form, is 'incomplete in that these are just one KIND of 'relation(ship)'. The 'relations', by contrast are normally treated as 'unsatisfactory' in that they have more than one outputs that can represent whole outputs that are MULTIVARIABLE in essence. Math in these cases utilizes both consistency and inconsistency by merely expressing things BY perspective consistencies that get combined.

I'm not sure I'm helping given your different background. But the laws of logic are sufficient to describe any system. The confusion I think that you and the OP may be having is to confuse how different languages opt to use different symbols. But that is mistaking the issue of 'spelling' conventions (or syntax) to the comprehension of the underlying logic that is universal. You can express the same MEANING of something using different languages (where equally complete or incomplete). The meaning is what the logic refers to but is forced to use some arbitrary convention of symbols. That arbitrariness of symbols is NOT what the laws of logic refer to. Those laws are 'semantic' laws, not 'syntax'.

Edit: Note that your given, (P=P)=(-P=-P) using the same sign HAPPENS to coincidentally be also true, by the way. But this is because it the MAIN comparitive (=) is true when it mean EITHER "evaluatively true" OR "logically true". But normally, logic expressions of the laws don't mix the two and so would always use different symbols for the middle term that I illustrated. When ONLY expressing the law with ONE comparative symbol, there is no confusion: P=P if stated for Identity, means the '=' is undertood to be the "logical equivalence".

Meaning is definition with multiple definitions resulting in multiple meanings. Given the fallacy of equivocation has multiple definitions necessitates it as having multiple meanings.

[Terrapin Station]

This regress results in variation, variation is definition. All phenomenon regress to different contexts, it is through this regress definition occurs.

"This regress"--what "regress"?

One context regresses to another until two seemingly equal things result in differences.

For example:

1. The cats lived in january.
2. The cats lived in the 3rd week of january.
3. The cats lived in the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.
4. One cat lived to the 3rd hour the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january, the other cat lived to the 2nd hour of the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.

What is the definition of "regress" that you're employing?

[Eodnhoj7]

"This regress"--what "regress"?

One context regresses to another until two seemingly equal things result in differences.

For example:

1. The cats lived in january.
2. The cats lived in the 3rd week of january.
3. The cats lived in the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.
4. One cat lived to the 3rd hour the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january, the other cat lived to the 2nd hour of the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.

What is the definition of "regress" that you're employing?

The breakdown of one assertion resulting in another. This "other" is a variation of the original assertion.

[Terrapin Station]

One context regresses to another until two seemingly equal things result in differences.

For example:

1. The cats lived in january.
2. The cats lived in the 3rd week of january.
3. The cats lived in the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.
4. One cat lived to the 3rd hour the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january, the other cat lived to the 2nd hour of the 3rd day of the 3rd week of january.

What is the definition of "regress" that you're employing?

The breakdown of one assertion resulting in another. This "other" is a variation of the original assertion.

What the heck is the "breakdown" of an assertion? Could you quote an academic source using the terminology you're using?

[Eodnhoj7]

What is the definition of "regress" that you're employing?

The breakdown of one assertion resulting in another. This "other" is a variation of the original assertion.

What the heck is the "breakdown" of an assertion? Could you quote an academic source using the terminology you're using?

No, and a breakdown of an assertion is an accurate manner of describing it.

For example the assertions of:

Month breaks down to x number of days.
X number of days breaks down to y number of hours.
Y number of hours breaks down to z number of minutes.
Etc.

[Skepdick]

Some things are, such as strings. I wasn't just talking about quarks. I made a general statement.

My statement was also general.

Anything that we call "understanding" when it comes to fundamental particles goes via Mathematics.
Even if strings were "ontological" your understanding OF strings would still be via Mathematics.

So it seems to me that language is necessary for understanding. But it's not sufficient.

You claimed conventional usage. One person doesn't make a convention.

One person, using a term in the same way, all the time does. So, conventionally, this is how I use the phrase...

My first language for communicating with other humans is English, even though the first language I learned to speak isn't.

My first language for communicating with computers isn't English.

Oy vey. Understanding IS a mental state. Behaviorism is nonsense.

Obviously it's a mental state, but that doesn't get you any closer to solving the epistemic problem. How do you know that you understand?

To claim that you understand is to make a claim about reality. Could you be mistaken in your claim? What experiment design would you suggest to test; or falsify your own understanding?

e.g I understand how to ride a bicycle. But then I get on one and I keep falling. My behaviour demonstrates that I do not possess a mental state of "understanding".

No.

Then you are going to have to explain your position to me. Or don't, but do address the question.

How do you know you have a mind?

I'm also a nominalist by the way.

Good for you. How did you determine that? Because I don't know what I am.

We'll do that, but what escrow service are you going to use first?

You sure seem to be over-indexing on the escrow service, even though it's the easiest decision of all. Almost as if you are testing my commitment.

But really, Google "escrow service" and randomly choose any one - it doesn't matter. While we are at it - I'll up the ante. $1000.

Because both of us know that there's no way to agree on whose notion of "understanding" the contest will be adjudicated on;
or who will do the adjudication.

I propose we use my notion of "understanding"; and since I best understand what I mean by "understanding" then I should adjudicate the contest. But I think you'll disagree...

"Empirical experiments are necessary for any claim, otherwise the claim is vacuous" is a philosophical view. It's not a view supported by empirical experiments.

It's may or may not be a claim. It's may or may not be a position. It's certainly not something I said.

Because I don't make any claims and I don't know what my "position" is. All I am doing is playing a language game, a game in which we compete for control over the interpretative frame of reference.

[Terrapin Station]

Obviously it's a mental state, but that doesn't get you any closer to solving the epistemic problem. How do you know that you understand?

Because you experience the mental state in question, just like you'd experience the mental state of desiring something or having an itch.

To claim that you understand is to make a claim about reality.

It's to report that you're in a particular mental state.

[Skepdick]

Because you experience the mental state in question, just like you'd experience the mental state of desiring something or having an itch.

The difference, of course is that no evidence could possibly convince you that you aren't having an itch. There's no alternative experience that could falsify your itch other than the itch going away.

Falling off a bycicle the first time you climb onto one would sure falsify you "understanding" how to ride it.

Of course, in this vocabulary you could also say that scratching falsifies itching.

It's to report that you're in a particular mental state.

You don't have to report to anybody but yourself that you "understand" how to ride a bicycle.

You claim it to yourself about yourself that you "understand".
You falsify it to yourself about yourself. The critical moment is when you understand that you don't understand.