What is P and -P?

[Terrapin Station]

Obviously to refer, we have to use our minds. Why would you think that would be in dispute?
When we refer to something, we're doing something mentally. But referring to something can involve pointing at something that's not itself mental, right? Or no, and you disagree with that. We can't point at something that's not mental in your view?

I'll try saying this in the language of epistemology.

Referents are necessary, but insufficient for referencing.
References are necessary, but insufficient for referencing.
Minds are necessary, but insufficient for referencing.

All three together may be sufficient.

I'm not interested in that, though. I'm interested in your answering the question I'm asking you. I don't care about your avoidance of answering that question for whatever reason you're trying so hard to avoid it.

[Skepdick]

(It's like you have a weird mental block about this where you can't focus on what we're pointing at, but can only focus on the pointing itself/how the pointing works, etc.--"you're pointing at a finger!" "You have to use your finger to point!" etc.)

I don't have a mental block.

I am asking the same damn question.

Why are you pointing at the thing you are pointing at?

I understand the point. I don't understand the point of the point.

[Terrapin Station]

Why are you pointing at the thing you are pointing at?

Do you mean re objectivity in the context of talking about morality? (If so, you should have specifically asked that. I'm guessing that's what you want to ask, but if it isn't, can you be more specific?) If that's what you want to ask, because I think it's worth pointing out that moral stances don't occur in the extra-mental world. We can't get right or wrong whether some moral stance is instantiated in the extra-mental world. We simply have the moral stances that we do as mental phenomena (that is, as dispositions that we have). If we want to argue why we should match particular other persons' moral-stances-as-mental-phenomena we should actually present that argument.

[Skepdick]

I'm not interested in that, though. I'm interested in your answering the question I'm asking you. I don't care about your avoidance of answering that question for whatever reason you're trying so hard to avoid it.

I am not at all avoiding it. From where I am looking I have answered it.

But perhaps I am understanding your question way differently than the way you are asking it?

I'll say it in (yet) another way, explain it from (yet) another perspective. My words will always fall short of hitting their mark, but you can probably see what I am aiming at.

The tradition in Western philosophy is Logocentrism, thus: Logocentrism regards words and language as a fundamental expression of an external reality.

I don't regard language as a fundamental expression of an external reality. I regard language as a fundamental expression of internal reality.

I don't have any access to "external reality". Nobody does, short of transcending their senses.

[Terrapin Station]

Logocentrism regards words and language as a fundamental expression of an external reality.

That's nothing like my view. It's probably better not to assume that someone has a view without just asking them if they do.

[Skepdick]

That's nothing like my view. It's probably better not to assume that someone has a view without just asking them if they do.

Asking doesn't work... As you've worked out.

I told you communication is hard

[Skepdick]

That's nothing like my view. It's probably better not to assume that someone has a view without just asking them if they do.

BUT, if that's "nothing like your view" then I can only assume that your view is like my view (since my categorisation schema is all-exhaustive).

If words and language always refer to an internal reality, then you are never referring to a referent, you are always referring to your experience of a referent.

I should hope so, since you can't refer to anything you aren't experiencing.

Either way, the mind is on the critical path on the act of "referencing".

[Terrapin Station]

That's nothing like my view. It's probably better not to assume that someone has a view without just asking them if they do.

BUT, if that's "nothing like your view" then I can only assume that your view is like my view (since my categorisation schema is all-exhaustive).

If words and language always refer to an internal reality, then you are never referring to a referent, you are always referring to your experience of a referent.

I should hope so, since you can't refer to anything you aren't experiencing.

Either way, the mind is on the critical path on the act of "referencing".

That's a false dichotomy--that my view is either that words and language are either a "fundamental expression" of an external reality or that I'd think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality.

If you think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality, then what do you do when you, say, go to McDonald's and want a Big Mac? Do you think that they're giving you "internal reality" only?

[Skepdick]

That's a false dichotomy--that my view is either that words and language are either a "fundamental expression" of an external reality or that I'd think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality.

It's not a false dichotomy. How do I know? I constructed it that way!

If you think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality, then what do you do when you, say, go to McDonald's and want a Big Mac? Do you think that they're giving you "internal reality" only?

And you are also conflating reference and expression.

When I express the phrase "There is a cow in my garden" I intend for you to de-reference my reference like this:

cow.jpg

[Terrapin Station]

That's a false dichotomy--that my view is either that words and language are either a "fundamental expression" of an external reality or that I'd think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality.

It's not a false dichotomy. How do I know? I constructed it that way!

If I don't have either view, but a third view, how would it fit your construction? It fits via ____?

If you think that words can't refer to anything other than internal reality, then what do you do when you, say, go to McDonald's and want a Big Mac? Do you think that they're giving you "internal reality" only?

And you are also conflating reference and expression.

When I express the phrase "There is a cow in my garden" I intend for you to de-reference my reference like this:

cow.jpg

This part makes zero sense to me. You'd have to explain it another way. If you're simply pointing out that they might hand you a spatula or Filet of Fish instead (or that you'd want them to), that's irrelevant to what I'm asking you. No one is making an argument that everyone has the same thing in mind. That's not the idea at all. What I'm asking you is that whatever they hand you, is it internal reality only in your view?

[Skepdick]

If I don't have either view, but a third view, how would it fit your construction? It fits via ____?

It doesn't fit my construction because if you are not expressing an internal reality, and you are not expressing an external reality,

Then I have no idea what you are expressing.

This part makes zero sense to me. You'd have to explain it another way.

I am experiencing what looks like a cow. In my garden.

I am referencing the cow and my garden with the English expression "there is a cow in my garden".

In my mind's eye (my internal reality) this is what the experience looks like

cow.jpg

When you de-reference all the references in the expression "There is a cow in my garden", I expect that an experience (similar to the one in the picture) will take place in your internal reality - in your mind's eye.

[Terrapin Station]

If I don't have either view, but a third view, how would it fit your construction? It fits via ____?

It doesn't fit my construction because if you are not expressing an internal reality, and you are not expressing an external reality,

Then I have no idea what you are expressing.

??? It would be some third option that doesn't fit the construction, hence that would be a false dichotomy.

At any rate, it wasn't put into terms of "expressing an external reality" versus "expressing an internal reality." I'm not sure what "expressing an external reality" would amount, to, exactly. I'd say that reality has both an internal and external aspects, a la mind/not mind or body/self and not body/self, and we can express things ABOUT both obviously.

This part makes zero sense to me. You'd have to explain it another way.

I am experiencing what looks like a cow. In my garden.

I am referencing the cow and my garden in expressing the English sentence "there is a cow in my garden".

In my mind's eye (the internal reality) this is what the experience looks like:

cow.jpg

When you de-reference my expression "There is a cow in my garden", I expect that an experience (similar to the one above) will take place in your internal reality - in your mind's eye.

What the F--- is "dereference"??

Are you of the view that you can't actually observe anything external to yourself? (In other words, you're a(t least an epistemological) solipsist?)

[Skepdick]

??? It would be some third option that doesn't fit the construction, hence that would be a false dichotomy.

There is no third option to a construction that was DESIGNED with only two options!

I know because I constructed it!

To appeal to some "third option" is to insinuate that the designer of the construction is hiding an option from you.

At any rate, it wasn't put into terms of "expressing an external reality" versus "expressing an internal reality." I'm not sure what "expressing an external reality" would amount, to, exactly.

it would amount to talking about cows (external reality) rather than talking about your experience of cows (internal reality).

The former being impossible in my view.

I'd say that reality has both an internal and external aspects, a la mind/not mind or body/self and not body/self, and we can express things ABOUT both obviously.

That's a really weird thing to say as a physicalist. Physicalism is a monist metaphysic, but you are reaching for a dualist justification.

What the F--- is "dereference"??

It's the reverse of reference!

if the word "cow" points to a referent, dereferencing the pointer "cow" means determining what it's referring to!

Are you of the view that you can't actually observe anything external to yourself? (In other words, you're a(t least an epistemological) solipsist?)

I have no idea what an "epistemological solipsist" is, let alone knowing how to decide if I am one of those.

Like I told you - most of this stuff is undecidable. What I am is undecidable! If I categorise myself in any way, it's only to expedite communication.

I am of the view that you can't actually observe anything WITHOUT THE MIND, so "objectivity" as "mind-independence" is horseshit!

The definition is wrong even though we use the term "objectivity" all the damn time. And no, I don't know how to define it - I just know how to use it.

[Scott Mayers]

If (P=P)=(-P=-P) then P=-P through the law of identity which both P and -P share.

If (P=P)≠(-P=-P) then the law of identity is not equal to itself given both P and -P exist through the law of identity.

I think Terrapin gave some great examples of the problem when he used addition operation in place of your choice of the '=' within the brackets. You are confusing the meaning of the parts to the wholes and vice versa. The whole expression, "(P=P)=(-P=-P) means that the '=' sign between the two parts as wholes are LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT by the bolded versions of '=', not to whatever P or -P refers to. The truth of the bracketed '=' signs are what the unbolded '=' refers to. You are incorrectly presuming the '=' in both cases to mean the same. This is why most systems use alternate symbols when expressing this, such as....

(P = P) ≡ (-P = -P)

The ONLY concern for referencing the "Law of identity" with respect to logic, though, is to assert that for WHICHEVER system you are using or defining, SOMETHING has to remain 'consistent'. The law is the reference to WHATEVER 'consistency' is needed in ANY system. The other two universal laws are rephrasing this by different perspectives. For instance, the "Law of the Excluded Middle" refers to expressing what is 'not consistent' as one may define something in the given system by contrast:

P ≢ -P ...says that wherever P is assumed, -P cannot be assumed also.

That is, there has to be some rule(s) in any system of logic that discriminates between what it means for something to be 'inconsistent' so that the system can decide what to eliminate. If there is no elimination rule, then the system is not defined as 'logical' because it cannot be used to 'consistently' decide anything. You don't want a calculator, for instance, that has a 'logic' that has different answers for the same inputs, otherwise, it lacks any usefulness. [Well, perhaps one could use such a possible inconsistent machine, if it were possible, to find 'random' numbers. But this too still requires at least some meaning of 'consistency', such as the use of such a particular machine to be used 'consistently' to find random numbers.]

The third law of any 'logic' is just another extension of the other two that asserts one must decide whether to accept (or reject) contradictions in some 'consistent' manner. The last law defines what is 'inconsistent' with respect to the first law's defining of what is 'consistent'; then the third asserts that the first two rules in essence have to evaluate ONE of the two as what one expects of the system. In essence, if one wants to deny contradictions, then it says we toss out things that match to the second law. If you wanted a machine to favor 'inconsistency', like to find a machine that seeks random things, you might want such a mechanism to keep 'contradictions' as a means for an output.

Either way, the Law of Identity is not about the symbols specifically but to the agreement in the MEANING of the symbols you choose. You have to have something that is defining of "the same", something that clarifies "the difference", and whether you accept only one or both. Selecting both is the same as asserting that you accept contradictions for some practical purpose.

Note that selecting to keep contradiction is more about an 'open' system, such as what you might think of a sense organ to do: it doesn't necessarily require DENYING input because it is not the COMPLETE closed system of logic that the sense-to-brain-to-motor system of the whole deals with. So you can have a PARTIAL 'logic' system that is OPEN to accepting information without actually eliminating input values.

[Skepdick]

(blah blah blah)

Either way, the Law of Identity is not about the symbols specifically but to the agreement in the MEANING of the symbols you choose.

(blah blah blah)

Higher up in your post you pointed out that "=" can (and does) mean multiple things. So, you are recognising that one symbol can mean two things which is the definition of equivocation. Or the definition of "polymorphism" - depending on which camp of understanding you are in.

But you've pointed out the main reason why every logical system blows up. The tokenizer is the thing which assigns meaning to symbols, and in particular - the tokenizer assigns meaning to operators.

And if I simply come up with some new operation/operator (that is not representable/expressible in your current notation) ... well. Unexpected things happen.

Example: The LNC is often codified as ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False, but does ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False imply or necessitate P ∧ ¬P ⇔ False ? Could there be a system such that P ∧ ¬P ⇔ True but ¬P ∧ P ⇔ False ? Of course! Because nowhere in the LNC does it specify that the "∧" operator must commute.

ruby.png

And I should hope to learn what it means for a mechanically realizable and realised logical system to be "inconsistent".

It's defined as "inconsistent" even though it's consistent with reality. So now what?