Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

[Peter Holmes]

I am not into arguing re abortion in this case but on the principle in general.

Re your last statement,
'this behaviour won't achieve this goal'.

Within a moral framework and system, in principle it meant,
'this moral behavior won't achieve the moral goal'.

For the above to be effective, we will need to establish a Moral Framework and System.
The moral goal must be supported by Justified True Moral Facts within the moral framework and system.

You keep making the same mistake. There's no such thing as a 'moral behaviour'. There's only behaviour that we judge morally rignt or wrong, proper or improper. The expression 'moral behaviour' is a grammatical misattribution. And the expression 'moral goal' just means a goal adopted because it's believed to be morally right. It's another, though more disguised, misattribution. Your confusion is linguistic.

In itself, the claim 'this behaviour won't achieve this goal' may be empirically verifiable. But it has no moral implication - it makes no moral claim. For example, the claim 'elective abortion is inconsistent with the goal of maximum population increase' says nothing about morality.

The assertion 'maximum population increase is morally right' is completely separate and, anyway, non-factual - like all moral assertions, such as 'elective abortion is morally wrong'. Those assertions don't magically become factual just because 'elective abortion is inconsistent with the goal of maximum population increase'.

Moral realists and objectivists obtusely miss out a step, how ever clearly and repeatedly the step is explained to them.

Morality is not an external thing to be referenced, the behavior IS the morality. If a type of behaviour tends to lead to acceptable results for all involved, it's moral behaviour.

'The behaviour IS the morality'? Incoherent codswallop.

The expression 'moral behaviour' just means 'behaviour judged to be morally acceptable by {me/us}. The words 'moral' and 'immoral' express judgements about the behaviour. Propriety and impropriety aren't objectively independent properties. That's why an action can rationally be judged moral and immoral by different judges.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484826 time=1607966436 user_id=15099]
The expression 'moral behaviour' just means 'behaviour judged to be morally acceptable by {me/us}. The words 'moral' and 'immoral' express judgements [i]about[/i] the behaviour. Propriety and impropriety aren't objectively independent properties. That's why an action can rationally be judged moral and immoral by different judges.
[/quote]

The judgements are not arbitrary, only contingent. Moral facts exist to the extent people want the same things, because there are better and worse ways to get it, whatever it is.

[Peter Holmes]

The expression 'moral behaviour' just means 'behaviour judged to be morally acceptable by {me/us}. The words 'moral' and 'immoral' express judgements about the behaviour. Propriety and impropriety aren't objectively independent properties. That's why an action can rationally be judged moral and immoral by different judges.

The judgements are not arbitrary, only contingent. Moral facts exist to the extent people want the same things, because there are better and worse ways to get it, whatever it is.

I didn't say moral judgements are arbitrary. But they can rationally conflict. And that's because there are no moral facts. If there were, we couldn't disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on.

The claim 'what people want is morally right' is obviously ridiculous.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484829 time=1607967149 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=484827 time=1607966541 user_id=15238]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484826 time=1607966436 user_id=15099]
The expression 'moral behaviour' just means 'behaviour judged to be morally acceptable by {me/us}. The words 'moral' and 'immoral' express judgements [i]about[/i] the behaviour. Propriety and impropriety aren't objectively independent properties. That's why an action can rationally be judged moral and immoral by different judges.
[/quote]

The judgements are not arbitrary, only contingent. Moral facts exist to the extent people want the same things, because there are better and worse ways to get it, whatever it is.
[/quote]
I didn't say moral judgements are arbitrary. But they can rationally conflict. And that's because there are no moral facts. If there were, we couldn't disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on.

The claim 'what people want is morally right' is obviously ridiculous.
[/quote]

Where are you grounding morality if not in persons desiring to make the world behave a certain way? What people want explicitly doesn't necessarily represent morality, but what we collectively and intrinsically need to get our individual wants must. If people can be wrong about Why they value what they value, then the fact that they disagree says nothing about morality. And people usually are. Those who can express a reasonable understanding of why they value what they value in relation to other things can help us narrow down which of the implicit requirements are most helpful for universal prerequisites, and that's the functional root of what we use the words moral and ethical to do.

[Peter Holmes]

The judgements are not arbitrary, only contingent. Moral facts exist to the extent people want the same things, because there are better and worse ways to get it, whatever it is.

I didn't say moral judgements are arbitrary. But they can rationally conflict. And that's because there are no moral facts. If there were, we couldn't disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on.

The claim 'what people want is morally right' is obviously ridiculous.

Where are you grounding morality if not in persons desiring to make the world behave a certain way? What people want explicitly doesn't necessarily represent morality, but what we collectively and intrinsically need to get our individual wants must. If people can be wrong about Why they value what they value, then the fact that they disagree says nothing about morality. And people usually are. Those who can express a reasonable understanding of why they value what they value in relation to other things can help us narrow down which of the implicit requirements are most helpful for universal prerequisites, and that's the functional root of what we use the words moral and ethical to do.

I'm saying that no fact entails or induces a moral conclusion, so that negating the conclusion never produces a contradiction. For example: 'people want this; therefore this is morally right / wrong' is not a contradiction. And that's because there are no moral facts, but only moral opinions. The 'grounding' you want - something that makes moral assertions true or false - is a realist and objectivist delusion.

[Veritas Aequitas]

2 This conditional premise about population is not probabilistic at all. And the moral conclusion isn't probabilistic, and doesn't follow anyway. All that can be said is that elective abortions are inconsistent with the goal of increasing or sustaining population, which anyway is false, and anyway has no moral implication. The 'wrong' in your conclusion isn't 'morally wrong'.

It just mean 'this behaviour won't achieve this goal'.

I am not into arguing re abortion in this case but on the principle in general.

Re your last statement,
'this behaviour won't achieve this goal'.

Within a moral framework and system, in principle it meant,
'this moral behavior won't achieve the moral goal'.

For the above to be effective, we will need to establish a Moral Framework and System.
The moral goal must be supported by Justified True Moral Facts within the moral framework and system.

You keep making the same mistake. There's no such thing as a 'moral behaviour'. There's only behaviour that we judge morally rignt or wrong, proper or improper. The expression 'moral behaviour' is a grammatical misattribution. And the expression 'moral goal' just means a goal adopted because it's believed to be morally right. It's another, though more disguised, misattribution. Your confusion is linguistic.

In itself, the claim 'this behaviour won't achieve this goal' may be empirically verifiable. But it has no moral implication - it makes no moral claim. For example, the claim 'elective abortion is inconsistent with the goal of maximum population increase' says nothing about morality.

The assertion 'maximum population increase is morally right' is completely separate and, anyway, non-factual - like all moral assertions, such as 'elective abortion is morally wrong'. Those assertions don't magically become factual just because 'elective abortion is inconsistent with the goal of maximum population increase'.

Moral realists and objectivists obtusely miss out a step, how ever clearly and repeatedly the step is explained to them.

I say you are very intellectually stupid to argue there are no such thing as 'moral behavior'.

If you google specifically "moral behavior" you get,
About 1,060,000 results (0.65 seconds)

Here is two academic papers on 'moral behavior'
https://link.springer.com/referencework ... 061-9_1829#:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/ps ... l-behavior

There are obviously many more because the term 'moral behavior' is so self-evident.

You ought to do more research on what is morality.
I won't be wasting my time on educating you on the above.

[Belinda]

1 But you said all conditional (if-then) propositions are probabilistic, which is false. And none of your proposals is probabilistic anyway. Sorry, but you seem to be confused. A probability is a calculation of how likely an event is to occur. If any premise, including a conditional, is to express a probability, then it must do so explicitly. If you're alluding to the probabilistic nature of an inductive conclusion, that's a different matter.

2 This conditional premise about population is not probabilistic at all. And the moral conclusion isn't probabilistic, and doesn't follow anyway. All that can be said is that elective abortions are inconsistent with the goal of increasing or sustaining population, which anyway is false, and anyway has no moral implication. The 'wrong' in your conclusion isn't 'morally wrong'. It just mean 'this behaviour won't achieve this goal'.

To repeat, a moral assertion isn't and can't be probabilistic - can't express a probability - because it makes no factual claim at all. Talk about the probability of X being morally right or wrong is completely incoherent. Surely you can see that?

All what people claim are facts are probably true, unless the facts are tautologies.

Probability is sometimes intuitive and sometimes statistical. There are people who cannot think of any justification for a right or wrong claim however this does no imply there is no possible justification for their claim. I challenge you to name a moral (right or wrong, good or evil) claim that nobody can trace to an inductive i.e. probilistic claim.

Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. How can a fact - a feature of reality - be a tautology, which is a linguistic expression?

I have no idea what intuitive probability could be. If you mean we can know by intuition that a probability claim is true, the case against intuition tout court applies. What we need is evidence and sound argument, not intuition, which is as useless as personal experience or revelation. Come to think of it, an appeal to intuition is the secular version of that irrationality.

I challenge you to produce a moral assertion that is induced probabilistically - without question-begging - from a factual premise. The burden of proof is yours.

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

How can a fact - a feature of reality - be a tautology, which is a linguistic expression?

(Peter)

Well, maybe I should not call a tautology "a fact". So let us set aside discussion of 'tautology' for the time being, if you will.

Example 1: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example 2:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Example 3: men are social animals and solitary individuals cannot survive. Men organise themselves into societies for mutual benefit, as bare aggregates of men will not be able to benefit each other. Therefore socialism is good and Trumpism is evil.

Your thesis , Peter, is correct in the ultimate sense that my examples 1,2,and 3, and all possible examples of morals often if not usually omit a meta-ethic on which all other ethics depend. Life is better than death. This ethic is a matter of faith. Man is the measure, and some say God is the measure.

[Peter Holmes]

All what people claim are facts are probably true, unless the facts are tautologies.

Probability is sometimes intuitive and sometimes statistical. There are people who cannot think of any justification for a right or wrong claim however this does no imply there is no possible justification for their claim. I challenge you to name a moral (right or wrong, good or evil) claim that nobody can trace to an inductive i.e. probilistic claim.

Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. How can a fact - a feature of reality - be a tautology, which is a linguistic expression?

I have no idea what intuitive probability could be. If you mean we can know by intuition that a probability claim is true, the case against intuition tout court applies. What we need is evidence and sound argument, not intuition, which is as useless as personal experience or revelation. Come to think of it, an appeal to intuition is the secular version of that irrationality.

I challenge you to produce a moral assertion that is induced probabilistically - without question-begging - from a factual premise. The burden of proof is yours.

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Your examples demonstrate my argument. In the first, you jump from a factual assertion to moral assertions as though there's no step in between. Why 'should' we avoid upper respiratory infection, keep our feet dry, get enough sleep, maintain our health, and fulfill our duty to ourselves and society? We could do so by getting ill and dying, thus reducing the burden on society. Calling moral assertions 'common sense' doesn't turn them into facts.

And your second example is this: children need protection and comfort; therefore we should protect and comfort them. The factual premise doesn't logically entail the moral conclusion. And anyway, perhaps we should abandon them to danger so that they learn self-reliance, as the Spartans did.

It's rational to have good reasons for our moral values and rules - to base them on facts - but that doesn't mean those moral values and rules ARE facts. To think that is to make a fundamental category error.

(And, meanwhile, neither of your arguments expresses a probability. They're both determinate: this will lead to that.)

[Belinda]

Sorry, but I think this is nonsense. How can a fact - a feature of reality - be a tautology, which is a linguistic expression?

I have no idea what intuitive probability could be. If you mean we can know by intuition that a probability claim is true, the case against intuition tout court applies. What we need is evidence and sound argument, not intuition, which is as useless as personal experience or revelation. Come to think of it, an appeal to intuition is the secular version of that irrationality.

I challenge you to produce a moral assertion that is induced probabilistically - without question-begging - from a factual premise. The burden of proof is yours.

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Your examples demonstrate my argument. In the first, you jump from a factual assertion to moral assertions as though there's no step in between. Why 'should' we avoid upper respiratory infection, keep our feet dry, get enough sleep, maintain our health, and fulfill our duty to ourselves and society? We could do so by getting ill and dying, thus reducing the burden on society. Calling moral assertions 'common sense' doesn't turn them into facts.

And your second example is this: children need protection and comfort; therefore we should protect and comfort them. The factual premise doesn't logically entail the moral conclusion. And anyway, perhaps we should abandon them to danger so that they learn self-reliance, as the Spartans did.

It's rational to have good reasons for our moral values and rules - to base them on facts - but that doesn't mean those moral values and rules ARE facts. To think that is to make a fundamental category error.

(And, meanwhile, neither of your arguments expresses a probability. They're both determinate: this will lead to that.)

Did you read my edited version in which I wrote about the objective meta-ethic life is better than death ?

[Peter Holmes]

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Your examples demonstrate my argument. In the first, you jump from a factual assertion to moral assertions as though there's no step in between. Why 'should' we avoid upper respiratory infection, keep our feet dry, get enough sleep, maintain our health, and fulfill our duty to ourselves and society? We could do so by getting ill and dying, thus reducing the burden on society. Calling moral assertions 'common sense' doesn't turn them into facts.

And your second example is this: children need protection and comfort; therefore we should protect and comfort them. The factual premise doesn't logically entail the moral conclusion. And anyway, perhaps we should abandon them to danger so that they learn self-reliance, as the Spartans did.

It's rational to have good reasons for our moral values and rules - to base them on facts - but that doesn't mean those moral values and rules ARE facts. To think that is to make a fundamental category error.

(And, meanwhile, neither of your arguments expresses a probability. They're both determinate: this will lead to that.)

Did you read my edited version in which I wrote about the objective meta-ethic life is better than death ?

Sorry, I missed it. But anyway, why is life better than death? And is that a fact or a matter of opinion? (And anyway, as you know, there are situations in which it's rational to think death is better than life. Painful and humiliating terminal illness is an example. Gross and life-limiting foetal abnormality is another.)

[Veritas Aequitas]

I challenge you to produce a moral assertion that is induced probabilistically - without question-begging - from a factual premise. The burden of proof is yours.

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example 1: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example 2:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Example 3: men are social animals and solitary individuals cannot survive. Men organise themselves into societies for mutual benefit, as bare aggregates of men will not be able to benefit each other. Therefore socialism is good and Trumpism is evil.

Your thesis , Peter, is correct in the ultimate sense that my examples 1,2,and 3, and all possible examples of morals often if not usually omit a meta-ethic on which all other ethics depend. Life is better than death. This ethic is a matter of faith. Man is the measure, and some say God is the measure.

I believe you are on the right track on the belief of the high probability of the reality of moral facts.
What you are relying upon is based on Moral Intuitionism - a category within Ethics and MetaEthics.

A Moral Intuitionist like you [Henry and others] relies of the very obvious experiences, evidences, wisdom, internal moral compass that there is a high probability of a moral fact, e.g.
'humans ought-not-to kill humans'.
Such high probabilistic intuitive insight of the above moral fact is adopted in most religions and the legislature of all sovereign nations, 'humans killing humans' is condemnable or is a crime with serious punishments [capital in many cases].

Frankly any normal person with common moral sense will agree with the above moral fact from intuitive insight. Based on common moral sense, it is not likely for the moral intuitionists like you to be wrong with the above case.
It is only a person like Peter Holmes who has a moral deficit who cannot sense this intuitive insight of a very probable moral fact.

However in my case, being an Empirical-Moral-Realist, I am not satisfied with merely an intuitive insight of the above highly probable moral fact.
As an Empirical Moral Realist I must ensure whatever is claimed as a moral fact, e.g. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans' must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible Moral Framework and System.

I have done the necessary verification and justification within a moral framework to confirm what I had abduced from my intuitive insight [as a hypothesis] is a Justified True Moral Fact, i.e. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans.'

[Belinda]

I challenge you to produce a moral assertion that is induced probabilistically - without question-begging - from a factual premise. The burden of proof is yours.

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example 1: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example 2:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Example 3: men are social animals and solitary individuals cannot survive. Men organise themselves into societies for mutual benefit, as bare aggregates of men will not be able to benefit each other. Therefore socialism is good and Trumpism is evil.

Your thesis , Peter, is correct in the ultimate sense that my examples 1,2,and 3, and all possible examples of morals often if not usually omit a meta-ethic on which all other ethics depend. Life is better than death. This ethic is a matter of faith. Man is the measure, and some say God is the measure.

I believe you are on the right track on the belief of the high probability of the reality of moral facts.
What you are relying upon is based on Moral Intuitionism - a category within Ethics and MetaEthics.

A Moral Intuitionist like you [Henry and others] relies of the very obvious experiences, evidences, wisdom, internal moral compass that there is a high probability of a moral fact, e.g.
'humans ought-not-to kill humans'.
Such high probabilistic intuitive insight of the above moral fact is adopted in most religions and the legislature of all sovereign nations, 'humans killing humans' is condemnable or is a crime with serious punishments [capital in many cases].

Frankly any normal person with common moral sense will agree with the above moral fact from intuitive insight. Based on common moral sense, it is not likely for the moral intuitionists like you to be wrong with the above case.
It is only a person like Peter Holmes who has a moral deficit who cannot sense this intuitive insight of a very probable moral fact.

However in my case, being an Empirical-Moral-Realist, I am not satisfied with merely an intuitive insight of the above highly probable moral fact.
As an Empirical Moral Realist I must ensure whatever is claimed as a moral fact, e.g. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans' must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible Moral Framework and System.

I have done the necessary verification and justification within a moral framework to confirm what I had abduced from my intuitive insight [as a hypothesis] is a Justified True Moral Fact, i.e. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans.'

I am sorry to say, despite all your efforts, I don't understand any further than what you say is moral intuitionism. I wish I could. I present my excuse that much of what you write is to rebut Peter, and I have not extracted the kernel from the husk.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Intuitive probability is usually called common sense.Common sense is founded upon the same reasoning as experimental science except experimental science is more explicit and more rigorous.

Example 1: people who become wet, tired, and cold are more likely to succumb to upper respiratory infection. Therefore you should keep your feet dry and get enough sleep. Maintaining your health is your duty to yourself and to society in general. It is wrong to neglect your health.

Example 2:young children need adults to protect and comfort them, and we feel sympathy and pity for children, so our feelings guide us to protect and comfort children. Society needs the up and coming generation to be healthy and socialised. These are two factual and sufficient reasons why it is wrong to abuse or be cruel to children, and right to protect and nurture them.

Example 3: men are social animals and solitary individuals cannot survive. Men organise themselves into societies for mutual benefit, as bare aggregates of men will not be able to benefit each other. Therefore socialism is good and Trumpism is evil.

Your thesis , Peter, is correct in the ultimate sense that my examples 1,2,and 3, and all possible examples of morals often if not usually omit a meta-ethic on which all other ethics depend. Life is better than death. This ethic is a matter of faith. Man is the measure, and some say God is the measure.

I believe you are on the right track on the belief of the high probability of the reality of moral facts.
What you are relying upon is based on Moral Intuitionism - a category within Ethics and MetaEthics.

A Moral Intuitionist like you [Henry and others] relies of the very obvious experiences, evidences, wisdom, internal moral compass that there is a high probability of a moral fact, e.g.
'humans ought-not-to kill humans'.
Such high probabilistic intuitive insight of the above moral fact is adopted in most religions and the legislature of all sovereign nations, 'humans killing humans' is condemnable or is a crime with serious punishments [capital in many cases].

Frankly any normal person with common moral sense will agree with the above moral fact from intuitive insight. Based on common moral sense, it is not likely for the moral intuitionists like you to be wrong with the above case.
It is only a person like Peter Holmes who has a moral deficit who cannot sense this intuitive insight of a very probable moral fact.

However in my case, being an Empirical-Moral-Realist, I am not satisfied with merely an intuitive insight of the above highly probable moral fact.
As an Empirical Moral Realist I must ensure whatever is claimed as a moral fact, e.g. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans' must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible Moral Framework and System.

I have done the necessary verification and justification within a moral framework to confirm what I had abduced from my intuitive insight [as a hypothesis] is a Justified True Moral Fact, i.e. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans.'

I am sorry to say, despite all your efforts, I don't understand any further than what you say is moral intuitionism. I wish I could. I present my excuse that much of what you write is to rebut Peter, and I have not extracted the kernel from the husk.

In a way it is to expose Peter's ignorance.
If you have the time to research on
Moral Intuitionism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29996
you may get an idea of what it represents.

[Peter Holmes]

I believe you are on the right track on the belief of the high probability of the reality of moral facts.
What you are relying upon is based on Moral Intuitionism - a category within Ethics and MetaEthics.

A Moral Intuitionist like you [Henry and others] relies of the very obvious experiences, evidences, wisdom, internal moral compass that there is a high probability of a moral fact, e.g.
'humans ought-not-to kill humans'.
Such high probabilistic intuitive insight of the above moral fact is adopted in most religions and the legislature of all sovereign nations, 'humans killing humans' is condemnable or is a crime with serious punishments [capital in many cases].

Frankly any normal person with common moral sense will agree with the above moral fact from intuitive insight. Based on common moral sense, it is not likely for the moral intuitionists like you to be wrong with the above case.
It is only a person like Peter Holmes who has a moral deficit who cannot sense this intuitive insight of a very probable moral fact.

However in my case, being an Empirical-Moral-Realist, I am not satisfied with merely an intuitive insight of the above highly probable moral fact.
As an Empirical Moral Realist I must ensure whatever is claimed as a moral fact, e.g. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans' must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible Moral Framework and System.

I have done the necessary verification and justification within a moral framework to confirm what I had abduced from my intuitive insight [as a hypothesis] is a Justified True Moral Fact, i.e. 'humans ought-not-to kill humans.'

I am sorry to say, despite all your efforts, I don't understand any further than what you say is moral intuitionism. I wish I could. I present my excuse that much of what you write is to rebut Peter, and I have not extracted the kernel from the husk.

In a way it is to expose Peter's ignorance.
If you have the time to research on
Moral Intuitionism
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29996
you may get an idea of what it represents.

So, we can have an intuition that there's a high probability that moral facts exist. But just to be sure, we can empirically test and verify - and so falsify - a moral assertion, such as 'humans ought not to kill humans'. And we can calculate its probability.

What complete and utter bollocks.

Now, that Trump won the election - well, that's a plain, unadulterated fact.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484848 time=1607973855 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=484830 time=1607967669 user_id=15238]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484829 time=1607967149 user_id=15099]

I didn't say moral judgements are arbitrary. But they can rationally conflict. And that's because there are no moral facts. If there were, we couldn't disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on.

The claim 'what people want is morally right' is obviously ridiculous.
[/quote]

Where are you grounding morality if not in persons desiring to make the world behave a certain way? What people want explicitly doesn't necessarily represent morality, but what we collectively and intrinsically need to get our individual wants must. If people can be wrong about Why they value what they value, then the fact that they disagree says nothing about morality. And people usually are. Those who can express a reasonable understanding of why they value what they value in relation to other things can help us narrow down which of the implicit requirements are most helpful for universal prerequisites, and that's the functional root of what we use the words moral and ethical to do.
[/quote]
I'm saying that no fact entails or induces a moral conclusion, so that negating the conclusion never produces a contradiction. For example: 'people want this; therefore this is morally right / wrong' is not a contradiction. And that's because there are no moral facts, but only moral opinions. The 'grounding' you want - something that makes moral assertions true or false - is a realist and objectivist delusion.
[/quote]

All words have meaning. They refer to sets of attributes and boundary conditions. Morality is a word that has deep meaning in that it does deeply useful work for us, and therefore, any idea of what it is that deconstructs to pure subjectivity must be discarded immediately. Morality MUST be defined in such a way that we can get a handle on it, and i offer an answer (framework of understanding) which does that work effectively.