Peter Holmes: What is Fact.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

"why races which are rooted in tribal societies have lower IQs. "

Not at all . Doing well in IQ tests shows nothing but how good you are at doing IQ tests.

That is technically inaccurate. IQ tests were developed explicitly to find the most common central features of good thinking, and since have been well vetted to remove possible bias. It's the most real, most measurable thing in all of psychology.

Just to clarify - I didn't write that crap about tribal societies and IQs.

Well said Peter. If I misquoted you I apologise.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Think about your #1 above: 'Verify empirically and philosophically, abortion is a moral fact and is morally wrong.'

How do we empirically verify that abortion is morally wrong? Please explain the empirical process. And don't just say it's morally wrong within a moral FSK. That isn't an empirical demonstration.

There are loads of moral facts and each must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.
In the meantime my focus is there are moral facts related to humans killing humans and humans enslaving humans which I had discussed in details.

You are the one who raised the point about increase in abortion.
My focus is on the process applicable to verify all claims of moral facts.
In general I stated any decrease in number of immoral acts is moral progress and vice-versa.
I have discussed why abortion is immoral in general in other post but I will not go into the details of verifying abortion is immoral here which warrant more efforts and time.

Btw, that abortion is immoral as a moral fact is to be used a merely a guide, morality should not be imposed on individuals by laws [legal] or other pressures, etc.

Don't dodge. How do we empirically verify that X (eg, humans killing humans) is or isn't morally wrong?

Non-answer: there are loads of moral facts and each must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.
Non-answer: there are moral facts related to humans killing humans.
Non-answer: a decrease in humans killing humans is moral progress.

Note my response to the above in this post,
viewtopic.php?p=484392#p484392

[Peter Holmes]

There are loads of moral facts and each must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.
In the meantime my focus is there are moral facts related to humans killing humans and humans enslaving humans which I had discussed in details.

You are the one who raised the point about increase in abortion.
My focus is on the process applicable to verify all claims of moral facts.
In general I stated any decrease in number of immoral acts is moral progress and vice-versa.
I have discussed why abortion is immoral in general in other post but I will not go into the details of verifying abortion is immoral here which warrant more efforts and time.

Btw, that abortion is immoral as a moral fact is to be used a merely a guide, morality should not be imposed on individuals by laws [legal] or other pressures, etc.

Don't dodge. How do we empirically verify that X (eg, humans killing humans) is or isn't morally wrong?

Non-answer: there are loads of moral facts and each must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.
Non-answer: there are moral facts related to humans killing humans.
Non-answer: a decrease in humans killing humans is moral progress.

Note my response to the above in this post,
viewtopic.php?p=484392#p484392

Note my question.

How can we empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion, such as 'humans killing humans is morally wrong'?

Answer: the question is incoherent, because a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim about reality with a truth-value independent from opinion.

So a moral assertion can't be verified or falsified. All we can do is agree or disagree with it. And whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral opinion, it remains an opinion and can never be a fact.

There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions held by people, some of whom think their own moral opinions are facts. And that's our inescapable moral predicament. Moral realists and objectivists are simply deluded.

[Belinda]

Don't dodge. How do we empirically verify that X (eg, humans killing humans) is or isn't morally wrong?

Non-answer: there are loads of moral facts and each must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically.
Non-answer: there are moral facts related to humans killing humans.
Non-answer: a decrease in humans killing humans is moral progress.

Note my response to the above in this post,
viewtopic.php?p=484392#p484392

Note my question.

How can we empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion, such as 'humans killing humans is morally wrong'?

Answer: the question is incoherent, because a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim about reality with a truth-value independent from opinion.

So a moral assertion can't be verified or falsified. All we can do is agree or disagree with it. And whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral opinion, it remains an opinion and can never be a fact.

There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions held by people, some of whom think their own moral opinions are facts. And that's our inescapable moral predicament. Moral realists and objectivists are simply deluded.

But what if someone said "Murder is wrong because we need all the able bodied men for defending the town"? or "Murder is wrong because it makes the murderer feel unhappy"? Or "Murder is wrong because society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business" ? Or even "murder is wrong because the priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope etc)said so" ?

[Peter Holmes]

Note my response to the above in this post,
viewtopic.php?p=484392#p484392

Note my question.

How can we empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion, such as 'humans killing humans is morally wrong'?

Answer: the question is incoherent, because a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim about reality with a truth-value independent from opinion.

So a moral assertion can't be verified or falsified. All we can do is agree or disagree with it. And whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral opinion, it remains an opinion and can never be a fact.

There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions held by people, some of whom think their own moral opinions are facts. And that's our inescapable moral predicament. Moral realists and objectivists are simply deluded.

But what if someone said "Murder is wrong because we need all the able bodied men for defending the town"? or "Murder is wrong because it makes the murderer feel unhappy"? Or "Murder is wrong because society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business" ? Or even "murder is wrong because the priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope etc)said so" ?

Reverse each of your assertions, as follows. It makes the first claim a factual premise. And I think 'murder' muddies the issue. Isn't it just 'killing people'? (All of your reasons may be false, and that still wouldn't mean murder isn't wrong.)

1 We need all the able bodied men for defending the town; therefore killing people is wrong.
2 Killing people makes the killer unhappy; therefore killing people is wrong.
3 Society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business; therefore killing people is wrong.
4 The priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope, [a god]) said killing people is wrong; therefore killing people is wrong.

(I don't believe you think #4 is conceivably true!)

The point is, the moral conclusion doesn't follow unless it assumes a moral judgement about the factual premise. For example, why should society prosper? Why not not just a few people in society - such as the rich and powerful? The moral conclusion is assumed in the premise, which begs the question. No factual assertion entails a moral assertion.

[Sculptor]

Zardoz: The penis is evil. The penis shoots seeds, and makes new life, and poisons the earth with a plague of men, as once it was. But the gun shoots death, and purifies the earth of the filth of brutals. Go forth and kill!
The gun is good.

[Belinda]

Note my question.

How can we empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion, such as 'humans killing humans is morally wrong'?

Answer: the question is incoherent, because a moral assertion doesn't make a factual claim about reality with a truth-value independent from opinion.

So a moral assertion can't be verified or falsified. All we can do is agree or disagree with it. And whatever facts we deploy to justify a moral opinion, it remains an opinion and can never be a fact.

There are no moral facts, but only moral opinions held by people, some of whom think their own moral opinions are facts. And that's our inescapable moral predicament. Moral realists and objectivists are simply deluded.

But what if someone said "Murder is wrong because we need all the able bodied men for defending the town"? or "Murder is wrong because it makes the murderer feel unhappy"? Or "Murder is wrong because society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business" ? Or even "murder is wrong because the priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope etc)said so" ?

Reverse each of your assertions, as follows. It makes the first claim a factual premise. And I think 'murder' muddies the issue. Isn't it just 'killing people'? (All of your reasons may be false, and that still wouldn't mean murder isn't wrong.)

1 We need all the able bodied men for defending the town; therefore killing people is wrong.
2 Killing people makes the killer unhappy; therefore killing people is wrong.
3 Society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business; therefore killing people is wrong.
4 The priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope, [a god]) said killing people is wrong; therefore killing people is wrong.

(I don't believe you think #4 is conceivably true!)

The point is, the moral conclusion doesn't follow unless it assumes a moral judgement about the factual premise. For example, why should society prosper? Why not not just a few people in society - such as the rich and powerful? The moral conclusion is assumed in the premise, which begs the question. No factual assertion entails a moral assertion.

Those who justify their claim by reference to the claims of social superiors are either young children or more deferential than is normal for 2020.However there are such people, probably among the older generation.

We can substitute 'killing' for 'murdering' but it does not alter the case that (chains of ) moral criteria end with with facts that society holds to be reality.

[Peter Holmes]

But what if someone said "Murder is wrong because we need all the able bodied men for defending the town"? or "Murder is wrong because it makes the murderer feel unhappy"? Or "Murder is wrong because society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business" ? Or even "murder is wrong because the priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope etc)said so" ?

Reverse each of your assertions, as follows. It makes the first claim a factual premise. And I think 'murder' muddies the issue. Isn't it just 'killing people'? (All of your reasons may be false, and that still wouldn't mean murder isn't wrong.)

1 We need all the able bodied men for defending the town; therefore killing people is wrong.
2 Killing people makes the killer unhappy; therefore killing people is wrong.
3 Society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business; therefore killing people is wrong.
4 The priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope, [a god]) said killing people is wrong; therefore killing people is wrong.

(I don't believe you think #4 is conceivably true!)

The point is, the moral conclusion doesn't follow unless it assumes a moral judgement about the factual premise. For example, why should society prosper? Why not not just a few people in society - such as the rich and powerful? The moral conclusion is assumed in the premise, which begs the question. No factual assertion entails a moral assertion.

Those who justify their claim by reference to the claims of social superiors are either young children or more deferential than is normal for 2020.However there are such people, probably among the older generation.

We can substitute 'killing' for 'murdering' but it does not alter the case that (chains of ) moral criteria end with with facts that society holds to be reality.

I agree it's rational to appeal to facts when we make moral assertions. But that doesn't mean those moral assertions are facts, or that facts can entail moral conclusions. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484437 time=1607778880 user_id=15099]
[quote=Belinda post_id=484435 time=1607775694 user_id=12709]
[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484426 time=1607768795 user_id=15099]

Reverse each of your assertions, as follows. It makes the first claim a factual premise. And I think 'murder' muddies the issue. Isn't it just 'killing people'? (All of your reasons may be false, and that still wouldn't mean murder isn't wrong.)

1 We need all the able bodied men for defending the town; therefore killing people is wrong.
2 Killing people makes the killer unhappy; therefore killing people is wrong.
3 Society will not prosper unless people feel safe going about their business; therefore killing people is wrong.
4 The priest (Dear Leader, King, Pope, [a god]) said killing people is wrong; therefore killing people is wrong.

(I don't believe you think #4 is conceivably true!)

The point is, the moral conclusion doesn't follow unless it assumes a moral judgement about the factual premise. For example, why [i]should[/i] society prosper? Why not not just a few people in society - such as the rich and powerful? The moral conclusion is assumed in the premise, which begs the question. No factual assertion entails a moral assertion.
[/quote]
Those who justify their claim by reference to the claims of social superiors are either young children or more deferential than is normal for 2020.However there are such people, probably among the older generation.

We can substitute 'killing' for 'murdering' but it does not alter the case that (chains of ) moral criteria end with with facts that society holds to be reality.
[/quote]
I agree it's rational to appeal to facts when we make moral assertions. But that doesn't mean those moral assertions are facts, or that facts can entail moral conclusions. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective.
[/quote]

All moral propositions are logical ones. "IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than Z (other contentions or the way things already are)." That can be an evidence based or a logical proposition depending on other variables.

[Peter Holmes]

All moral propositions are logical ones. "IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than Z (other contentions or the way things already are)." That can be an evidence based or a logical proposition depending on other variables.

But look at your assertion: 'IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than [behaviour] Z'.

That isn't a moral assertion at all. It says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of behaviour.

Maybe you're alluding to Harris's 'subjective goal / objective means' argument - one that Dillahunty also favours. It doesn't show that morality is objective - that there are moral facts.

The argument is this: Action A is consistent/inconsistent with goal G; therefore action A is morally right/wrong. And the conclusion doesn't follow.

[Advocate]

[quote="Peter Holmes" post_id=484452 time=1607786638 user_id=15099]
[quote=Advocate post_id=484449 time=1607785422 user_id=15238]

All moral propositions are logical ones. "IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than Z (other contentions or the way things already are)." That can be an evidence based or a logical proposition depending on other variables.
[/quote]
But look at your assertion: 'IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than [behaviour] Z'.

That isn't a moral assertion at all. It says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of behaviour.

Maybe you're alluding to Harris's 'subjective goal / objective means' argument - one that Dillahunty also favours. It doesn't show that morality is objective - that there are moral facts.

The argument is this: Action A is consistent/inconsistent with goal G; therefore action A is morally right/wrong. And the conclusion doesn't follow.
[/quote]

But that's why such moral questions never get answered, by not understanding that morality IS empirical.

Good and bad are effects based, good and evil are intent based.

There is no IS/OUGHT gap, because all Oughts can only come from Ises.

Ethics is the formalized version of morality.

Morality is that behavior which leads to a better world. The question is which world, and which behaviour. In your formulation, the question is only, what is G? Morality for a society that primarily values individual pleasure, like ours, is going to have a completely different set of morals than one that values truth or sustainability, for example.

[Belinda]

Peter Holmes wrote:

I agree it's rational to appeal to facts when we make moral assertions. But that doesn't mean those moral assertions are facts, or that facts can entail moral conclusions. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective.

All conditional propositions are probabilistic, including propositions that contain 'should', 'have a duty to' and 'ought to'. Plus of course translations of 'should', 'ought to' , and 'have a duty to' into languages other than English.

A proposition of the form “if p then q” or “p implies q”, represented “p → q” is called a conditional proposition. For instance: “if John is from Chicago then John is from Illinois”. The proposition p is called hypothesis or antecedent, and the proposition q is the conclusion or consequent.

E.g." If you are a good boy and work hard at school then you can go to Disneyland".

E.g. " If little Tommy Thin put poor Pussy in the well then he is a naughty boy to try to drown poor PussyCat. "

E.g. " If you kill people then you are a wicked murderer , unless you are a fighting soldier on the battlefield".

E.g. "If you steal Jack's property then Jack will not be happy".

All of those examples of conditional propositions are exactly the same form as

"If you plant the potatoes in good time then you will have a decent crop"
Each of the examples implies effect from antecedent cause.

NB Not to plant in time with the season is a sin against your family who depend for their lives on your labour.

[Peter Holmes]

All moral propositions are logical ones. "IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than Z (other contentions or the way things already are)." That can be an evidence based or a logical proposition depending on other variables.

But look at your assertion: 'IF we want world X, THEN behavior Y is more likely to get us there than [behaviour] Z'.

That isn't a moral assertion at all. It says nothing about the moral rightness or wrongness of behaviour.

Maybe you're alluding to Harris's 'subjective goal / objective means' argument - one that Dillahunty also favours. It doesn't show that morality is objective - that there are moral facts.

The argument is this: Action A is consistent/inconsistent with goal G; therefore action A is morally right/wrong. And the conclusion doesn't follow.

But that's why such moral questions never get answered, by not understanding that morality IS empirical.

We can't empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion such as 'eating animals is wrong', because it doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value independent from opinion. If our goal is not to harm sentient creatures, eating them is inconsistent with that goal. And that's the only fact involved. It doesn't mean that eating animals is morally wrong. That's a separate and subjective moral judgement - one that informed the choice of goal. It doesn't make 'eating animals is morally wrong' a factual assertion, let alone a true one. In this sense, morality is not empirical.

Good and bad are effects based, good and evil are intent based.

But judgement as to what counts as good and evil intents and effects is subjective.

There is no IS/OUGHT gap, because all Oughts can only come from Ises.

If by 'come from' you mean facts can entail moral conclusions, that's simply false - which is why negating a moral conclusion doesn't produce a logical contradiction unless the inference is question-begging.

Ethics is the formalized version of morality.

Morality is that behavior which leads to a better world. The question is which world, and which behaviour. In your formulation, the question is only, what is G? Morality for a society that primarily values individual pleasure, like ours, is going to have a completely different set of morals than one that values truth or sustainability, for example.

Okay - and that makes my point. If there were moral facts, the nature of the goal would be irrelevant. You're arguing that morality isn't objective.

[Advocate]

>We can't empirically verify or falsify a moral assertion such as 'eating animals is wrong', because it doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value independent from opinion. If our goal is not to harm sentient creatures, eating them is inconsistent with that goal. And that's the only fact involved. It doesn't mean that eating animals is morally wrong. That's a separate and subjective moral judgement - one that informed the choice of goal. It doesn't make 'eating animals is morally wrong' a factual assertion, let alone a true one. In this sense, morality is not empirical.[quote]

You've got to have the if. But eating a creature isn't inherently harmful. The intended result isn't empirical, but how to get there always is. It's a matter of priority. IF we have the right priorities, THEN we can find the empirical solutions to get us there.

>>Good and bad are effects based, good and evil are intent based.[/quote]
>But judgement as to what counts as good and evil intents and effects is subjective.[quote]

That's it.

>>There is no IS/OUGHT gap, because all Oughts can only come from Ises.[/quote]
>If by 'come from' you mean facts can entail moral conclusions, that's simply false - which is why negating a moral conclusion doesn't produce a logical contradiction unless the inference is question-begging.[quote]

I mean that ONLY facts can entail moral conclusions. It's a fact that we want certain things more than others. It's a fact that morality differs from ethics because ethics requires collaboration (at minimum). It's a fact that some kinds of activity or belief are counter-productive. Etc. Morality isn't created whole cloth from desire, it's a weave of intent and capacity. It was not immoral for people to own slaves in the past if that was the best way to provide them a better life.

Okay - and that makes my point. If there were moral facts, the nature of the goal would be irrelevant. You're arguing that morality isn't objective.

It's still a fact that IF all cats are blue, AND you're a cat, THEN you're blue. The fact is in the logical validity of the formula. IF you plug in true information, THEN ethical facts pop out the other end.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

I agree it's rational to appeal to facts when we make moral assertions. But that doesn't mean those moral assertions are facts, or that facts can entail moral conclusions. And that's why morality isn't and can't be objective.

All conditional propositions are probabilistic, including propositions that contain 'should', 'have a duty to' and 'ought to'. Plus of course translations of 'should', 'ought to' , and 'have a duty to' into languages other than English.

A proposition of the form “if p then q” or “p implies q”, represented “p → q” is called a conditional proposition. For instance: “if John is from Chicago then John is from Illinois”. The proposition p is called hypothesis or antecedent, and the proposition q is the conclusion or consequent.

E.g." If you are a good boy and work hard at school then you can go to Disneyland".

E.g. " If little Tommy Thin put poor Pussy in the well then he is a naughty boy to try to drown poor PussyCat. "

E.g. " If you kill people then you are a wicked murderer , unless you are a fighting soldier on the battlefield".

E.g. "If you steal Jack's property then Jack will not be happy".

All of those examples of conditional propositions are exactly the same form as

"If you plant the potatoes in good time then you will have a decent crop"
Each of the examples implies effect from antecedent cause.

NB Not to plant in time with the season is a sin against your family who depend for their lives on your labour.

1 I think you're wrong about conditional premises. 'If A, then B' need not be porbabilistic. For example, 'If John is from Chicago, then John is from Illinois' doesn't express a probability. It's categorically true - given suitable definitions.

2 A moral assertion is never probabilistic, because it doesn't make a factual claim that's true or false or probably one or the other. What is the probability that, say, abortion is morally wrong, and how could it be calculated? The question is incoherent.