Scott Mayers wrote: ↑Sun Dec 06, 2020 9:44 am
Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia wrote:
In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued that space and time are mere "forms of intuition" which structure all experience,
and therefore that while "things-in-themselves" exist and contribute to experience, they are nonetheless distinct from the objects of experience.
From this it follows that the objects of experience are mere "appearances", and that the nature of things as they are in themselves is consequently unknowable to us.[27][28] In an attempt to counter the skepticism he found in the writings of philosopher David Hume, he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787),[29] one of his most well-known works. In it, he developed his theory of experience to answer the question of whether synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, which would in turn make it possible to determine the limits of metaphysical inquiry. Kant drew a parallel to the Copernican revolution in his proposal that the objects of the senses must conform to our spatial and temporal forms of intuition, and that we can consequently have a priori cognition of the objects of the senses.
I underlined the above from a quick search of his Wiki that asserts he DOES believe in Platonic forms. The Platonic forms assert reality is a relative illusion but that the 'form' is itself literally all that IS real: the 'absolutes'. Another description of this is ANY form of "idealism". His is a doctrine of "transcendental idealism". The quote you quoted does not assert what you said. In fact, he appears to be again addressing how what one CONCLUDES of something based on their senses is not literally the reality of the object out there yet the sensation assures that an ideal form nevertheless exists. And so nothing technically can experimentally prove it beyond 'speculation'. The experience of seeing something is itself the "Speculative Structure" of what one observes and cannot BE the object. However, the experience
transcends [the experience points to SOME reality as existing beyond the observation but is something we cannot literally touch.
In the case of Kant's theories, generally it would not be effectively to rely on what is written without a reference to the totality of his work.
In the above quotes, 'forms of intuitions' are not the same as Platonic form.
I have already quoted from Kant where he critiqued Plato's 'forms' and 'universals' which exist independent of the human conditions.
For Kant, the intuitions are related of the sensible, the forms of intuition, i.e. space and time are not independent of the human conditions.
For Plato, the 'forms' are independent of the human conditions.
The above article has a serious error in stating,
"while "things-in-themselves" exist and contribute to experience, they are nonetheless distinct from the objects of experience."
The above is a wrong interpretation of Kant's view.
The above is based on the conventional sense, i.e. if we experience an object [phenomenon], then there must be a
realobject of experience [noumenon].
But Kant had stated, "don't be too impulsive is jumping to conclusion there is a real object of experience - the noumenon.
Since at the stage where Kant has to exhaust to explain experience and the sensible, he made the
assumption there is an object-that-is-experienced, but it is only an assumption not a real thing.
Here is what Kant state of the noumenon aka thing-in-itself,
- The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept, the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.
B311
Thus Kant made the assumption there is a real object of experience as a limiting concept and only of negative employment thus not admitting there is a real object of experience.
On the other hand, Plato hastily jumped to the conclusion there is a real object of experience, i.e. the form or universal object of experience.
After exhausting the explanation of the sensible, forms of intuition, space and time, Kant proceeded to investigate the assumed object-of-experience to find out whether there is any objective reality to it.
At the next phase of reality, Kant named the supposed object of experience [noumenon] as the thing-in-itself.
Upon thorough and exhaustive investigation, Kant conclude the ultimate object of experience, the noumenon aka the thing-in-itself is an illusion as he stated in the earlier quote I listed.
There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.
B397
This was happened to Plato who ascribed objective reality to the form or universal when upon detail reflection, there is no ultimate objective reality but there is only an illusion.
That is, the 'ideal form' of chair is proven to exist for merely experiencing one chair (observation) even though the particular chair you are observing is itself not able to be proven sound as a certain reality. So all that can be trusted is the 'form' that transcends and is transcended by the sensory phenomena.
"I see a chair" [observation] means certainly that "Some perception of that which you sit on exists absolutely as an IDEA"[interpretation of observation] but transcends the mere experience/observation in the form, "that which you sit on" [Ideal form(ula) as a DEFINITION of ANY chair universally.]
Plato used the "Cave analogy" (Republic), for instance, to demonstrate how you can have real proof that something absolutely real exists in principle beyond one's perspective, even though the perspective (shadows) are mere speculative inferences about the actual cause of the illusion, shadow, or observation. Since the analogy used the shadow as the perspective of something behind them, this shows how you may be realistically in error about presuming the shadows are the literal objects themselves but that something absolutely still exists more generally about both the reality and the image.
As with the above, the conventional view is this;
when one perceive and experience a "chair", it is conventionally logical there must be a 'real chair' that is experience.
Kant recognized the above point generally in the preface;
[..B xxvi]
But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these Objects as Things-in-Themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as Things-in-Themselves;*
otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be Appearance without anything that appears.
Thus Kant acknowledged within the conventional sense,
for the appearance of a chair it must be corresponded by a chair-that-appeared.
However one is limited to
think about it only and not jump to the conclusion there is a real objective chair out there independent of human participation.
Why people jumped to conclusion there is a real objective chair that is perceived is due to psychology [evolutionary] and not based upon reality.
To Kant, Plato's philosophy regarding the forms, universals as really real and his theories related to the 'cave' is not realistic.